The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations

A social representations approach offers an empirical utility for addressing myriad social concerns such as social order, ecological sustainability, national identity, racism, religious communities, the public understanding of science, health and social marketing. The core aspects of social representations theory have been debated over many years and some still remain widely misunderstood. This handbook provides an overview of these core aspects and brings together theoretical strands and developments in the theory, some of which have become pillars in the social sciences in their own right. Academics and students in the social sciences working with concepts and methods such as social identity, discursive psychology, positioning theory, semiotics, attitudes, risk perception and social values will find this an invaluable resource.

Gordon Sammut is Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the University of Malta.

Eleni Andreouli is Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the Open University.

George Gaskell is Professor of Social Psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Jaan Valsiner is Niels Bohr Professor of Cultural Psychology in the Department of Communication and Psychology at Aalborg University, Denmark.
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Contributors

CLAUDIA ABREU LOPES, University of Cambridge
JEAN-CLAUDE ABRIC, University of Aix
ELENI ANDREOLI, The Open University
ANGELA ARRUDA, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS, University of Adelaide
ADRIAN BANGERTER, University of Neuchatel
MARTIN W. BAUER, London School of Economics and Political Science
GLYNIS BREAKWELL, University of Bath
SABINE CAILLAUD, Paris One Research Program
PAULA CASTRO, Lisbon University Institute, ISCTE-IUL
XENIA CHRYSSOCHOOU, Panteion University
FLORA CORNISH, London School of Economics and Political Science
CLEMENT DUE, University of Adelaide
VÉRONIQUE EICHER, University of Lausanne
UWE FLICK, Free University Berlin
JULIET FOSTER, University of Cambridge
GEORGE GASKELL, London School of Economics and Political Science
STEPHEN GIBSON, York St John University
ALEX GILLESPIE, London School of Economics and Political Science
SCOTT HANSON-EASEY, University of Adelaide
ROM HARRÉ, Georgetown University
CAROLINE HOWARTH, London School of Economics and Political Science
HELENE JOFFE, University College London
SANDRA JOVCHELOVITCH, London School of Economics and Political Science
NICOLE KRONBERGER, Johannes Kepler University, Linz
SAADI LAHLLOU, London School of Economics and Political Science
MARY ANNE LAURI, University of Malta
JAMES H. LIU, Victoria University of Wellington
FATHALI MOGHADDAM, Georgetown University
PASCAL MOLINER, University of Montpellier
JACQUELINE PRIEGO-HERNÁNDEZ, London School of Economics and Political Science
CHARIS PSALTIS, University of Cyprus
GORDON SAMMUT, University of Malta
MOHAMMAD SAR TAWI, Gulf University for Science and Technology
CHRIS G. SIBLEY, Victoria University of Wellington
CHRISTIAN STAERKLÉ, University of Lausanne
JAAN VALSINER, Aalborg University
GIUSEPPE VELTRI, University of Leicester
BRADY WAGONER, Aalborg University
WOLFGANG WAGNER, Johannes Kepler University, Linz
Preface

This handbook aims to take stock and to look forward at key theoretical, methodological and applied desiderata of the theory of social representations. It is designed to appeal to psychologists and social theorists, as well as scholars and students working in cognate disciplines including cultural studies, sociology, anthropology, political science, philosophy, communication studies and linguistics whose interests focus on the ordinary knowledge in the life-world.

In 1968 Gordon Allport wrote:

the modern social psychologist is haunted by the question: How can the individual be both a cause and a consequence of society. How can his nature depend indisputably upon the prior existence of cultural designs and upon his role in a pre-determined social structure, while at the same time he is clearly a unique person, both selecting and rejecting influences from his cultural surroundings, and in turn creating new cultural forms for the guidance of future generations? (Allport, 1968, p. 8)

Towards the end of ‘The historical background of modern social psychology’, Allport sets out the challenge for social psychology: the burning issues of war and peace, education, population control and effective democracy, are all in need of assistance. But he suggests that such assistance is unlikely to come from ‘small gem-like researches, however exquisite their perfection’. Will, he asks, the current preoccupation with methods and miniature models lead to theory and application? He goes on: ‘integrative theories are not easy to come by: like all behavioural science social psychology rests ultimately upon broad meta-theories concerning the nature of man and the nature of society’. Allport contrasts the ‘high level conceptualisations’ of the likes of Machiavelli, Bentham and Compte with the contemporary non-theoretical orientation of the empiricists. He hoped that the tide might turn (Allport, 1968, p. 69).

The turning of the tide is evidenced in this handbook, which brings together forty authors whose research is inspired by the theory of social representations. This theory traces its origins back to Durkheim’s notion of collective representations. Since its inception in Moscovici’s (1961/1976) writings, it has adopted a societal level of explanation to account for the fact that human behaviour, however assessed from the outside, is sensible within a cultural context that validates and legitimates such behaviour. The theory of social representations has thus served to advance the sociocultural agenda by highlighting how human behaviour is sensible within the
context of its production. Consequently, it has provided sociocultural theorists with a framework for studying and understanding sense-making processes in different sociocultural contexts.

The theory of social representations has come to stand as the foremost psychological theory for the study of common sense. Over the past fifty years it has stimulated much research that has addressed these concerns and charted its implications on varied psychological behaviour such as communication (Moscovici, 1961/1976), social cohesion (Duveen, 2008), social cognition (Augoustinos, Walker and Donaghue, 2005), identity (Moloney and Walker, 2007), dialogicality (Marková, 2003), discourse (Wagner and Hayes, 2005), and others. And while much sociocultural research draws inspiration from the theory of social representations, publications in the field remain dispersed in innumerable journals and volumes that have researched these concerns and advanced our understanding of psychological phenomena in their context of production.

The theory of social representations takes a societal or sociocultural perspective. Sociocultural characteristics have featured in the psychology agenda since the beginnings of the discipline. Indeed, Wundt’s (1916) concern with ‘folk psychology’ balanced the remit of study for the discipline by including concerns with mental events that originate in community life alongside concerns with physiology and the biological basis of human behaviour. Wundt thus included within psychology’s remit concerns with language and cognate phenomena such as customs, religion, myth and magic (Farr, 1996). The quest for understanding human behaviour in its situational and cultural contingencies is, therefore, not new. However, in recent years the discipline has witnessed a concerted effort on the part of sociocultural psychologists who have sought to emphasize the fact that environmental, social and cultural conditions constitute an invariable condition for the very existence of psychological phenomena (Valsiner and Rosa, 2007; Valsiner, 2012).

In essence, human behaviour differs widely across behavioural conditions. The fact of individual differences in behavioural outcomes is well known and has received considerable scholarly attention. In response to a similar stimulus, an individual may respond in a certain way while another individual may respond in a totally different manner due to their personal inclinations. Human behaviour, however, differs even more widely than this. It differs due to social and cultural conditions that determine how a thing is perceived (Moscovici, 1984b), what construal of that thing is brought to bear in describing and understanding that behaviour (Ross and Nisbett, 1991), and what repertoire of behavioural outcomes is plausible and legitimate as a course of action for that individual in a given society (Wagner and Hayes, 2005). In this complex determination of behaviour, social and cultural conditions characterize psychological phenomena. Sociocultural psychology has drawn our attention to the fact that social and cultural conditions give rise to particular psychological phenomena that manifest within contexts which shape their emergence as well as ontogenetic progression. Understanding human behaviour in its manifold complexity, therefore, requires more than an appreciation of individual differences. It further requires sensitivity to those
extra-individual conditions that also determine behavioural outcomes. A consequence of this added focus is that assumptions of universality and standardization across cultural conditions are challenged. Sociocultural differences require a particular and specific focus on cultural elements that give rise to intercultural differences in the manifestation of psychological phenomena.

This handbook brings together various theoretical strands and developments that have emerged from the theory of social representations, some of which have become pillars in social psychology in their own right and have stimulated further inquiry in their turn. It also extends the social scientific agenda beyond that of the theory of social representations and into equally relevant concepts and domains of inquiry such as social identity, discursive psychology, positioning theory, semiotics and others.

The chapters provide an overview of the core aspects of the theory that have been debated over the years, some of which remain widely misunderstood, and provide an up-to-date account of developments such that further productive inquiry can be stimulated. Finally, the handbook will serve as an invaluable tool in the teaching of the theory of social representations. The theory has gained popularity over the years and routinely features in both undergraduate and postgraduate social psychology curricula in many countries. This handbook matches theoretical aspirations with real-world empirical concerns of interest to those of a sociocultural persuasion.

The handbook is divided into four parts. The first part, ‘Foundations’, deals with foundational issues and with the core concepts and debates within social representations theory. The second part, ‘Conceptual developments’, elaborates further notions and concepts that have become part of the social representations approach to sociocultural psychology. The third part, ‘New directions’, reviews some of the major social psychological theories that have furthered the theory of social representations and advanced the sociocultural agenda. The final part, ‘Applications’, presents empirical studies that have been undertaken in diverse fields and which demonstrate the breadth of application and the utility of a social representations approach.

GORDON SAMMUT, ELENI ANDREOLI, GEORGE GASKELL AND JAAN VALSINER
PART I

Foundations

The first part of this handbook addresses a number of foundational concerns that can be traced back to the origins of social representations theory in Moscovici’s (1961/1976) study *La Psychanalyse, son image et son public*. Since its inception, social representations theory has contended with a number of conceptual and empirical issues that have drawn the interest and criticism of scholars in equal measure. The lack of conceptual clarity has enabled both a theoretical and an empirical eclecticism to arise over the years, and arguably this has enabled the theory to thrive and to address myriad social and psychological issues in its later developments. Fifty years later, this handbook revisits these foundational concerns in order to take stock of the contributions that have shaped the theory’s development and to elucidate the characteristic contribution that social representations theory has made to social and cultural psychology in the understanding and explanation of social and psychological phenomena.

The five chapters of this opening part of the book disambiguate certain notions that have proven thorny over the years, such as the scope of action in social representations and the theory’s relevance in the study and explanation of human behaviour. They also address the merits and concerns of theorizing and conceptualizing ‘representations’ and the ‘social’. In doing so, they are intended to help the reader to understand what analytical and explanatory levels the theory is suited to address, and to identify the sort of phenomena that the theory has served to investigate. Finally, this part of the book aims to provide the reader with a blueprint for further developments and applications. It presents a wide-ranging discussion of empirical methods in order to provide social representations scholars and researchers with the required toolkit for an enquiry into social affairs and human conduct.
The issue of methods in social representations theory has proved contentious for some time, although we would argue that the focus of this discussion has shifted in recent years. During the 1980s and 1990s much criticism centred on the supposed lack of focus on methods in early considerations of social representations, and an alleged methodological polytheism (Jahoda, 1988): some critics suggested that an ‘anything goes’ attitude to methods would only serve to weaken the theory, and argued that researchers needed greater guidance as to how to ‘do’ social representations research. Many of these concerns have been discussed at some length elsewhere (see, for example, Flick and Foster, 2008): as a theory, and not a method, the social representations approach aims to examine the ways in which individuals within social groups make sense of the world around them, and how these understandings change, develop, interact and so on. The methods that can be used in order to examine these research questions will, as in any social science research, vary, and must be considered carefully on each occasion in order to ensure that the most appropriate methods are used. Indeed, it could even be argued that there are different ways of defining social representations within the developing theory, and different aspects of representations on which to focus, and so multiplicity in methods and analysis is not only inevitable, but preferable (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999). This chapter illustrates this point.

Similarly, more work has now discussed the issue of approaching methods in social representations theory in more depth, providing the researcher with more guidance (see, for example, Bauer and Gaskell, 1999; Breakwell and Canter, 1993; Wagner and Hayes, 2005). However, concerns now focus more on problematic aspects of the use of particular kinds of methods, rather than on a lack of relevant discussion. For example, social representations studies continue to take both qualitative and quantitative approaches: should this be an issue of concern, or something to be encouraged? Another issue concerns the role of the researcher in social representations studies. Later in this chapter we hope to address these issues, among others, in more depth.

**Levels of analysis: relating theory to method**

Many studies now routinely consider the way that representations develop and circulate at different levels: Duveen and Lloyd (1990) argued that
representations need to be considered at the three interrelated levels of ontogeny, sociogenesis and microgenesis, and consideration of the implications of this methodologically is important. Ontogenetic processes refer to the way that representations become active for the individual, as he or she ‘grows’ into existing representations within society. This is a common consideration in social developmental studies, and a strong focus in this area has been on representations of gender (e.g. Duveen, 2001a; Duveen and Psaltis, 2008). Longitudinal studies might have particular relevance in the study of the development of representations in relation to particular identities: indeed, given the importance of development and change in the process of representation, there is wider scope for longitudinal studies in general (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999). Few studies take a longitudinal approach, although there are some notable exceptions (e.g. Brondi et al., 2012). Sociogenetic processes refer to the ways in which representations circulate and are active at the broader level of society, and how they develop, change and interact with one another. A common way of attempting to access representations at this level is to engage in documentary analysis of some kind, perhaps including official policy documents, or the media. This approach is also often combined with an attempt to consider the more microgenetic processes within social representations, that is, the way in which representations are evoked and discussed at the interactional level, between individuals within a social group: interviews are often employed here, although there is also scope for other methods, including ethnography and experiments. These levels of analysis also relate to wider discussion of the aims of social psychological research, such as those discussed by Doise (1986a) (see Chapter 3 in this volume for more consideration of this issue).

In this chapter we seek to examine some of the important questions that relate to methods and analysis in social representations research. We hope to do this through a close consideration of different methods that have been used and the various issues pertaining to social representations that relate to these. The first section will focus on qualitative analysis; although some of us (Flick and Foster, 2008) have argued elsewhere that this is particularly suited to social representations work, we then want to broaden this debate to include quantitative analysis and consider the advantages of this as well. Finally, we will discuss mixed methods research, and the importance of triangulation.

It should be noted that we would like to avoid the common assumption that particular methods can be designated ‘qualitative’ or ‘quantitative’ all too easily. We would, instead, prefer to argue that an approach, and a form of analysis, can be either qualitative or quantitative or mixed method. It is not the case that the interview, for example, is a qualitative method: the questions may, of course, be more or less structured, and the analysis may be more qualitative or quantitative, depending on the research questions. While we will include examples of particular methods in the different sections that follow, this important point should be borne in mind.
Qualitative analysis

Although there were some qualitative aspects to Moscovici’s (1961/1976) first study using social representations theory, Herzlich’s (1973) work on representations of health and illness is usually seen as the first purely qualitative study using social representations theory. In it, she analyzes individual semi-structured interviews to examine the representations held by individuals in both urban and rural areas of France. In this early study we see many aspects that will recur in social representations studies that employ qualitative analysis in the future: individuals are asked what they think, the researcher analyzes their responses, compares them for similarities and differences, and suggests the presence of different themes, or representations, of health and of illness. In this section, on qualitative analysis, we will firstly consider methods that rely on asking participants for responses, before moving on to consider other possible methods that might examine social representations from a qualitative perspective. We will also consider the all-important process of analyzing the data qualitatively.

Asking people what they think

At the heart of social representations theory is the idea that common sense has a value and a purpose, and that it is all too often denigrated in comparison with scientific understanding (Moscovici, 1984). In many ways, then, it is not surprising that one of the main methods that has been used qualitatively in social representations studies is the interview: if we value lay understandings about a topic, then it makes sense to ask an individual, or a group, what they think about that topic. This runs counter to some approaches within psychology, in which the research participant is seen as being less capable than the omniscient expert researcher (Spears, 1997). A wide variety of interviews have been employed in social representations studies, including individual interviews, as in Herzlich (1973), discussed above. Narrative interviews have also been very successfully employed: as Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2000) point out, there is a close relationship theoretically between the concepts of the narrative and of social representations, so this is not surprising. Some studies (e.g. Foster, 2007) draw on aspects of the narrative interview to examine social representations as participants tell their own stories: this is particularly useful where there is any sense of change or development, as in cases of illness or the development of identity. However, this might not always be the most appropriate interview format for studying other representations, and indeed the traditional structure of the ‘narrative interview’ (Flick, 2014) might prove too stringent for social representations studies: the suggestion, for example, that the researcher should not ask ‘why’ questions in the main body of the interview could be seen as limiting if we want to engage seriously with how representations influence our action, and

1 Herzlich (1973) found three different representations of health (‘health-in-a-vacuum’, health as equilibrium and reserve of health) and three different representations of illness (illness as destructive, illness as liberator, illness as an occupation).
interaction, and provide us with a template for understanding and approaching the world. In a similar vein, but avoiding some of these disadvantages, is the episodic interview (Flick, 2007, 2014), which has been used extensively by Flick (e.g. Flick and Röhnsch, 2007 or Flick et al., 2012). Here the idea is to combine narratives of situations (episodes) with questions (e.g. about subjective concepts, causes and consequences of a phenomenon) in one interview. For example, most people remember their first day at school or a situation in which they decided whether to leave school or to continue attending. Such situations can be recounted in short narratives. At the same time these people will have a concept of what a good teacher is or what defines success and failure in school. While those concepts may be built on or influenced by the above situations, concepts can only be presented in answers to questions and not in narratives. The episodic interview combines both approaches in moving back and forth between stimulating situation narratives and question/answer sequences.

It has also been argued (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996) that the socially shared aspects of social representations make group interviews particularly useful. The individual interview might be less sensitive to capturing interactional aspects of representations which are socially shared and maintained, as well as contested and challenged. However, what constitutes a group is important. Bauer and Gaskell (1999) employed focus groups as part of their study of representations of biotechnology: they make the distinction between strong groups, who share a common goal, project and identity, and weaker groups, who might share aspects of a representation through some (but not all) aspects of a shared project. They use the example of mothers of young children, who share the project of raising healthy children, and so might share representations of genetically modified foods as a result of this. Careful consideration of segmentation in this way is an important part of methods in social representations: much of social science research divides participants by age, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, and so on, yet there is no a priori reason to assume that all white female middle-class thirty-somethings will share a representation of a particular object (Foster, 2011). The social representations researcher needs to consider common projects and identities much more subtly so as to avoid imposing a structure on to a representation that might stem from existing assumptions (see also Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish, 2012).

However, it is also possible to find ways of bringing a lack of consensus to the fore in focus group interviews, either through deliberately including participants who hold diverse views (and therefore do not share a common project or identity) or through the researcher playing ‘Devil’s advocate’ by introducing aspects of representations that go against those being evoked and discussed by the group. This strategy was used to good effect in Arthi’s (2012) work on representations of mental illness amongst the Tamil community in Singapore: most participants did not volunteer information regarding spirit possession unless it was introduced by the researcher as a controversial topic, but resulting discussion was often highly informative, and revealed more belief in paranormal explanations for experiences/behaviour labelled as mental illness.
Using the moderator/interviewer in this way can also bring to the fore taken-for-granted aspects of consensual representations, in other words the things that a group may not mention, as they are accepted as matters of fact, or ontological reality (Marková, 1996). This touches on the wider issue of the role of the researcher in social representations studies, by no means limited to qualitative analysis in social representations research: later in the chapter the importance of understanding the process of the choice and interpretation of quantitative analysis, and the researcher’s role within this, will also be stressed. However, it has frequently been assumed that qualitative analysis requires closer attention to reflexivity, given the researcher’s particular role in the elicitation and subsequent analysis of data. This is perhaps debatable, but it is certainly the case that designing a project, developing an interview guide and then analyzing the resulting data involves the researcher’s own perspectives to a significant degree (Hodgetts et al., 2010). The researcher must be able to recognize how he/she is embedded in a network of representations, and to bear these in mind while approaching those of others. Presenting oneself to participants as a ‘learner’ keen to understand their perspectives and ideas can work well in some cases (again, see Foster’s (2007) study of mental health service clients’ understandings of mental health problems) but this may not always be appropriate. In some cases, researchers may be considered to be ‘insiders’, or positioned in a particular way by participants, which may affect their responses: Rose (2003) found in a review of studies looking at attitudes towards electro-convulsive therapy that much greater satisfaction was reported if clinicians asked the questions, while research conducted by service user organizations or independent researchers engendered much more ambivalence and dissatisfaction. This could be even more relevant in interview situations when the participant is face to face with the interviewer and aspects of his/her identity are particularly salient.

Another significant issue is whether the researcher can (or should) have any role in changing the situation which is being researched. This is complicated, since social representations theory explicitly moves away from the idea of one ‘correct’ version of understanding, and the notion that any other understandings are therefore faulty and in need of correction. Bauer and Gaskell (1999) suggest that the researcher’s role should be, for the most part, disinterested. However, it is also clear that there is a potential for social representations researchers to engage more critically with representations, working with communities to challenge stigma (Campbell and Jovchelovitch, 2000; Howarth, Foster and Dorrer, 2004).

**Moving beyond what people say**

Qualitative analysis of interviews of different kinds can clearly be useful in social representations studies. However, there may be limitations to this from a representational point of view. In many places, different theorists discuss the ways in which representations are not merely present in people’s heads, nor only manifest in what they say (e.g. Moscovici, 1984). Instead, representations are present in actions and interactions within daily life, and are also evident in the ways in which we organize
our lives, our institutions, our rituals and so on (ibid.). If we rely purely on self-report and discussion in the form of interview data, are we easily able to access this representational level? There are two possible responses to this problem: firstly, we can address the way we approach interview data, and secondly, we can move beyond interviews. In the case of the former, we must remember that interviews should not only be used as a way of accessing what people say, but also of accessing how they think, what they fail to say, what they cannot say, and so on. Analysis, which will be discussed later in this section, must move beyond the ‘facts’ of what is being said and we must employ our skills as researchers to enable this (Condor, 1997), or we risk what Bauer, Gaskell and Allum (2000) have referred to as ‘empiricism by proxy’.

There has been interesting discussion of representations that are not always conscious (Joffe, 1999, 2003), questioning whether all aspects of a representation are accessible to research participants. A paradigmatic (and much quoted) example of this comes from Jodelet’s (1989/1991) study of representations of madness in a French community in which psychiatric patients live as ‘lodgers’ with local families: here, although the family participants overtly rejected the idea that mental illness was contagious in any way, they organized their lives around rituals of separation to avoid contact between bodily fluids. As in Joffe’s (1999) work, the need to construct some aspects of representation as ‘Other’ in order to protect the Self (and therefore not see oneself as being vulnerable to mental illness, HIV, etc.) was paramount. However, it is also possible that participants may be fully conscious of aspects of their representations of a particular issue, but not prepared to mention these overtly, however creative the researcher is in his/her attempts to elicit them. This could be the case if we consider representations which might be stigmatizing of particular issues or groups: social desirability bias or a fear of seeming discriminatory might mean that some participants refrain from saying what they privately believe and might even publicly demonstrate in other settings.

It is for these reasons that finding other ways of collecting data which can be qualitatively analyzed is important. Ethnographic work has been particularly fruitful in social representations studies: again, returning to Jodelet’s (1989/1991) study, an ethnographic approach that combined informal discussions and observations of the community with detailed analysis of documentary material, and semi-structured interviews, provided a very rich set of data from which to examine the ways in which the foster families, professionals and lodgers interacted in different places (homes, public spaces and so on) and the way that the entire community was organized. This allows for a close consideration of the ways that representations are enacted and communicated and developed both in non-verbal communication and also in institutional practice. Other social representations studies have also taken an ethnographic approach: in Foster’s (2007) study, using this approach not only allowed access to some of these less linguistic and more non-conscious aspects of representations of mental ill-health, but also allowed for a greater understanding of settings which are often hidden from the general public (here, three
mental health services). Participant observation can also allow for greater rapport building with participants, and can allow the researcher to generate hypotheses and theories about what they observe, which can then be discussed with participants and altered as necessary. In cases where participants may have problems expressing themselves verbally, or problems concentrating for longer periods (for example, because of age, illness or medication), this method has further advantages.

Documentary analysis can form an important part of ethnography, but is also a useful stand-alone method in social representations study. The analysis of media representations has been particularly common for some time, with studies not only focussing on the text of articles, but also on pictures and on moving images in television and in film (Rose, 2000).

However, to return to the point made at the very start of this chapter, the most important aspect relating to the use of any of these methods is the way in which the resulting data are analyzed. Interviews, observations and documents can all be analyzed quantitatively if that is best suited to the research questions, and ways of approaching this will be discussed below. However, the qualitative analysis of such data also needs discussion. In recent years a number of high-profile papers have been published that seek to clarify the process of qualitative analysis, especially thematic analysis (e.g. Attride-Stirling, 2001; Braun and Clarke, 2006); a wide variety of textbooks now also detail the process of coding and analysis in more depth (e.g. Flick, 2014; Sullivan, Gibson and Riley, 2012). These works have been enormously important in providing researchers with a stage-by-stage guide to how to approach analysis, something which had perhaps been previously portrayed as a rather mystical and opaque process. Elsewhere we have commented on the utility of thematic analysis in social representations research (Flick and Foster, 2008): a close consideration of the themes in any data (and the relationship between them) is an important step in considering the representations of any issue. However, Provencher (2011b) has warned against fetishism when it comes to thematic analysis in social representations studies: she argues that we should not be lulled into assuming that following a number of different stages of coding will automatically lead to understanding the social representations of a particular concept. She points out the importance of sociological imagination in moving beyond the basic themes that might be considered in any data if we are truly to consider social representations. In this way, we need to be able to make links, consider absence as well as presence (Gervais, Morant and Penn, 1999), suggest why such patterns might be in evidence, and develop hypotheses about social understanding in action and interaction. It is also the case that thematic analysis might not be sufficient, or relevant, in all cases. As we discuss above, focus groups are particularly useful for considering the communicative practices involved in the development and maintenance of social representations, and a form of analysis that can take this interaction into consideration, such as analysis from a more dialogical perspective, may be more appropriate (see Marková et al., 2007, and Caillaud and Kalampalikis, 2013, for comprehensive discussion of this). Barbour (2014) and Halkier (2010) suggest
integrating a conversation analysis approach to analyzing how things are said in a focus group and in particular to analyze how the interaction evolves, how turn-taking is organized in the group and what this reveals about group dynamics. Developing this approach allows Lunt and Livingstone’s (1996) idea – that focus groups can reveal how social representations are constructed and changed in interactions – to be put into practical terms.

Of course, advocating use of one’s sociological imagination should not be equated with an ‘anything goes’ attitude, since the researcher must remain grounded in the data and aware of the different ways in which the quality of the analysis (and overall research) can be maintained. We return to this in the final part of this chapter, but before that, let us move on to consider quantitative analysis of data and its relationship with social representations research.

**Quantitative methods**

We will use the notion ‘quantitative methods’ for analytical tools based on statistical inferences. They can be used to analyze both quantitative and qualitative data. These tools are inviting: they provide a procedure and give the analysis a ‘scientific aspect’. However the efficiency of statistical software – where using one command gives results – should not blind us and we should avoid using these procedures as a ‘black box’.

We must keep in mind some of the assumptions of the social representations approach when choosing an appropriate tool. First, society thinks (Moscovici, 2001) and thinking always implies dialogicality (Billig et al., 1988; Marková, 2000). In this sense, social representations are not fully consensual: debate is necessary, tensions exist and consensus only makes sense as ‘functional consensus’ (Wagner, 1994b). This is a consensus based upon a common language and a common argumentative level of immediate social interaction (Voelklein and Howarth, 2005). Therefore, it may not make sense to calculate means and compare them when using a social representations approach, and the standard deviation may be more useful.

However, we do not want to reject all social representations studies that employ means calculations. For example, sometimes people prefer a consensus (even a feeble one) to dissent (Moscovici, 1994), making the mean informative. Obviously this statistical description alone does not provide an interpretation as to *why* a feeble consensus exists and the researcher still has to give meaning to the result he/she observes (but this is another problem).

The start of every quantitative analysis is a data table: however, methods differ as to how this table is regarded and approached. Reflexivity implies knowing what the software does (and does not do). ‘Knowing how it works’ enables the researcher to choose the procedure appropriate both to the data and to the theoretical approach. Our aim here is not to give an exhaustive overview of ‘relevant’ quantitative methods but to outline, using some examples, how the same methods can be used
differently according to the approach. However, the examples will demonstrate that the relevance of the methods lies in their ability to throw light on tensions structuring the social representations of an object.

**Factor analysis and different ways to use it**

Factor analysis is a set of techniques for determining how variables are linked together and/or are linked to individuals and/or to variables describing these individuals and/or to the context of data production. Factor analysis does not take into account means and variance, but outlines similarities and differences. Despite some differences, all the techniques follow a common general procedure. From a data table (with lines and ranges), two scatter plots are constructed: one represents the lines, while the other represents the ranges. These two scatter plots are projected on to a succession of orthogonal axes so that the largest proportion of the overall variance is explained. Each factor explains a proportion of variance: the first one explains the largest; the second will explain the next largest one that is not explained by the first factor; and so on. Some variables load most highly on each factor. So the factors differentiate the variables that are opposed to one another. Factor analysis allows us to make some assumptions about the tensions organizing social thinking.

Beyond these generalities, the different techniques (Principal Component Analysis, Correspondence Factor Analysis, Multiple Factor Analysis, etc.) differ through the table used as the point of departure. For example, principal component analysis uses a table which crosses individuals with quantitative variables (e.g. their age or their weight or their attitudes measured by a Likert scale). Correspondence factor analysis, in contrast, uses a table where qualitative variables are crossed (a contingency table, indicating frequencies). Therefore in this method, we lose the individuals but we have the link between different variables. Finally, multiple factor analysis, the most complex procedure, uses tables which cross qualitative and quantitative variables and individuals. Factor analysis offers some important opportunities: for example, factorial scores can be used as a new variable to compare individuals or groups. Moreover some additional variables can be projected in a second stage on the factor plane.

**Organizing principles of individual differences**

Doise, Clémence and Lorenzi-Cioldi (1993) propose a specific approach to social representations and highlight which method fits each step of the research procedure. Probably the most famous study is that on human rights (Doise, Spini and Clémence, 1999): here, the authors make the assumption that objectification is defined as common views about a given social issue. Moreover, differences in individual positioning are organized and the variations between individuals are anchored in cultural symbolic realities, social psychological experiences and beliefs. Campbell, Muncer
and Coyle (1992) used a similar procedure without referring to the notion of ‘organizing principles’. They examine social representations of aggression and suggest that women subscribe to an expressive model of aggression (focused on intrapsychic determinants of aggression and loss of self-control) whereas men subscribe to an instrumental model of aggression (aggression as an attempt to gain control over a situation). To test this hypothesis, a questionnaire with bipolar items was administered to men and women. Each item could be answered using an instrumental or an expressive model of aggression. Factor analysis was conducted on the answers to these items. The first factor refers to the dichotomy instrumental/expressive; the second factor is defined by items differentiating private and public aggression. Finally, the third factor appears to be a guilt factor. The analysis therefore reveals some principles organizing social representations of aggression, which can be interpreted as tensions structuring the discourse on aggression. Having conducted and interpreted the factor analysis, the authors search for any link with gender (note that gender is not introduced in the factor analysis) and validate their hypothesis. However, at this stage, gender differences are not explained; they are only observed.

Outlining the role of context

Factor analysis can be used to follow an aim other than looking for organizing principles of individual differences. Some experimental studies using the central core approach analyze their data using factor analysis (Flament, Guimelli and Abric, 2006; Lo Monaco and Guimelli, 2011). Their aim is not to highlight the central nucleus but to show that the same social representation inspires different discourses in various contexts. In this way, the hypothesis that these answers are organized through a one-dimensional structure is tested. Using principal component analysis, it means that a horseshoe phenomenon (or Guttman effect) exists. This phenomenon, which is not at all systematic, is observed when the two axes explain more than 90 per cent of the variance. The first axis often opposed extremes conditions (also called a size effect) and the second axes opposed the extreme cases and the intermediate cases. Graphically, the scatter plot has a parabolic form (like a horseshoe).

To illustrate this effect, we will use the results presented by Lo Monaco and Guimelli (2011). This experimental study concerns social representations of wine in the French context. Despite its cultural aspect, a social debate around wine (healthy and socially positive versus dangerous) exists. The interviewer first asked the respondent if he consumes wine, before identifying himself as a consumer or a non-consumer. So, four experimental conditions of data collections are used: a non-consumer asking a consumer, a non-consumer asking a non-consumer, and so on. Then, subjects were asked to rate ten propositions concerning various aspects

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2 This is relevant for the central nucleus approach, which postulates that the central core of the social representation is stable.
foundations of wine. A principal component analysis was conducted (on a table linking the context of data production and items)\(^3\) and shows a horseshoe phenomenon.

One of the factors opposes non-consumer and consumer and shows that their answers are more extreme when the interviewer shares the same identity. Also some aspects of social representations are ‘masked’ or ‘un-masked’ depending on the context. For example, non-consumers rated wine as more dangerous when the interviewer presented himself as a non-consumer too. If the interviewer presented himself as a consumer, these aspects were ‘masked’. This echoes the earlier discussion on the role of the interviewer. Therefore, we are tempted to say that here factor analysis is used to access organizing principles of contextual positions.

Hierarchical analysis and the Alceste method

The social representations approach also often employs hierarchical cluster analysis. Comparing this procedure to factor analysis, we suggest – even if this is a simplification – that cluster analysis only looks at the data table in one way, comparing the lines or comparing the ranges. As with factor analysis, different methods can be employed. Hierarchical cluster analysis can be ascendant: the first stage is to measure the proximity or the similarity between the variables (usually the squared Euclidean distance). Then, the variables are grouped together to form a cluster: the two variables having the shortest distance are grouped together, and then the next variable having the shortest distance with this cluster is associated. An ascendant hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted for example by Doise, Spini and Clémence (1999) in their study of representations of human rights to group together articles for which similar responses’ patterns were observed.

Another procedure is descending hierarchical cluster analysis. Here, at the beginning all the variables are in the same class and they are then divided into different classes: the variable with the highest distance is retrieved, then the second one and so on. In fact, these two methods differ in the way the variables are considered at the beginning: a whole that has to be divided in classes or, alternatively, elements which should be grouped together into clusters. But both methods finally reveal a dendogram.

The Alceste method

The Alceste method is based on a descendant hierarchical cluster analysis and is often used in social representations research (Klein and Licata, 2003; Lahlou, 2001; Kalampalikis, 2003). Alceste is a method of statistical lexical analysis which seeks ‘to investigate statistical similarities and dissimilarities of words in order to identify repetitive language patterns’ (Kronberger and Wagner, 2003). First, the text is decomposed into groups of words or phrases called elementary contextual units

\(^3\) Note that the PCA is not conducted on the table linking individuals and items but experimental conditions and items. This is coherent with the experimental approach: answers are considered as dependent from the conditions, not from the individuals.
(ECUs) and the software reduces the words to their root (plurals, conjugations, etc.). Next, a contingency table indicates the presence versus absence of each reduced form in each ECU. Then a descendant hierarchical cluster analysis is performed on the table. The result is a hierarchy of classes, of ‘lexical universes’ present in the corpus. The link with illustrative variables is calculated afterwards (for example: who is speaking? when was a discourse held? etc.). When interpreting the classes of words obtained, we must remember that they stem from the same text but were divided because of differences between them. These differences lead the interpretation.

In fact, the Alceste method is not, initially, interested in the meaning of words. The method looks only for the organization of the discourse and therefore enables the researcher to study pragmatic aspects of social representations (Moscovici and Kalampalikis, 2005). Combined with a more semantic analysis, this method enhances the interpretation of the data.

Caillaud, Kalampalikis and Flick (2012) used the Alceste method in this way in a study of social representations of the Bali climate conference in French and German media. The different classes were interpreted as ‘references spaces and anchoring categories’. We will take as an example only the German results.

The corpus was divided into four classes as shown in Figure 5.1. The titles are proposed by the researchers themselves to designate the classes. The most representative words of each class are in brackets.

Classes 1 and 2 refer to political discourses about the conference itself. In class 1, the discourse is concrete and local (the aim of the conference) whereas in class 2 the discourse refers to a more global aim (to reduce greenhouse gas production).

**Figure 5.1 Alceste analysis of Bali climate conference.**
Class 3 and 4 both refer to climate change and its consequences for humanity. Again, the opposition between concrete and general perspectives structures the discourse (all humanity versus poor countries).

In this sense, in Germany, the conference is anchored in political and human categories linking both global and local dimensions.

Also, this procedure searches for tensions organizing the discourse about an object by paying attention to the co-text (which words are often associated together). The Alceste method also enables the researcher to take into account the context of discourse (Moscovici, 1994). Klein and Licata (2003) analyzed the speeches from Patrice Lumumba during the decolonization of Congo using the Alceste method. They consider some illustrative variables (e.g. political and historical context, audience). The results were interpreted with reference to the historical context and the authors show how the speeches of Patrice Lumumba contribute to the social change.

Despite a growing interest in Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) in social psychology, only a few studies using social representations try to use this method. SEM can be used in two ways: to test the relationships between different variables; or to test the relationships between observed variables (what we measure) and latent variables (what we want to measure). Friestad, Rise and Roysamb (1999) use SEM to show that social representations about smoking mediate the effect of smoker status on attitudes towards smoking restrictions. Alternatively, Carugati, Selleri and Scappini (1994) propose using SEM to underline the way social representations are structured (how different concepts are linked together in common sense and forms theories). Once more, the same methodological tool is used in quite different ways. However, we can question why SEM is not used as widely by social representations studies as it is more generally in social psychology to try to ‘make sense of absence’. Perhaps the implicit idea of SEM to test ‘causal relationships’ does not fit well with the epistemological assumptions of social representations: for example, does the smoker status cause the social representations, or do social representations of smoking cause smoking behaviours and lead to smoker status? Social representations theory turns to a dialogical relationship between identity and social representations (Marková, 2007) which go beyond causality. Nevertheless, we can hypothesize that some relevant use of SEM will be developed in future research. This seems plausible especially as SEM offers numerous possibilities and only tests causality if inputs variables refer to an experimental design.

The quantitative methods we have presented here share the same perspective. They propose some answers to the following research questions: What tensions structure the data? What is opposed? What is similar? What goes together? How does the context structure the data? There is no doubt that these questions are relevant within social representations theory. However, the different examples we have presented also outline the importance of interpretation of the results and also of the data (as relevant indicators for the social representations in the focus of the concrete study). Moreover, we show how the same method can be used to follow
different aims. Ultimately, these are only tools we have to use with reflexivity to enhance our understanding of social phenomena.

### Triangulation and mixed methods in the study of social representations

As mentioned at several points in this chapter, studying social representations often needs more than one methodological approach due to the complexity of the phenomenon. Two major methodological concepts (and discussions) are relevant in such multi-method approaches.

**Triangulation**

Triangulation was introduced to social research by Denzin (1978). It refers to combining several approaches in the study of a phenomenon or of several aspects of it (e.g. knowledge and practices as parts of a social representation of an issue). The original idea of cross-validating results by a triangulation of methods was initially criticized (see Flick 1992 as an overview) and soon replaced by the aim of seeing the phenomenon from different angles and thus elucidating its diversity or complexity. Denzin mentioned triangulation on four levels: of different researchers, of various sorts of data, of different theories and methodological triangulation – the combination of two (or more) independent methods (between methods triangulation), which can also consist of two qualitative methods. The alternative is within methods triangulation when several approaches are combined in one method (see the episodic interview discussed above as an example for this). Triangulation refers to combining several perspectives in a systematic way (Flick, 1992) and thus goes beyond confirming results. Often triangulation produces complementary results, highlighting different aspects of a phenomenon and differences between what people say and what they do, for example. In studying social representations, triangulation can be fruitful in various ways.

If social representations of a phenomenon include the views of various groups, then we may need to use several methods for studying it. To examine a phenomenon like the utilization of professional healthcare by homeless adolescents, for example, we can first interview the adolescents using the episodic or narrative interview. To understand the processes and barriers influencing whether the adolescents use services or are reached by these institutions more fully, it may be necessary to integrate service providers’ views on the phenomenon. For this purpose, expert interviews (about the target group, needs, barriers, cooperation of services, etc.) should be a second methodological approach. If the processes being examined (health problems and use of services) also call for the study of practices and discourses in the target group (homeless adolescents and their peers in open spaces), then an ethnographic approach using participant observation may be necessary. Thus the methodological triangulation in this example (see Flick, 2011a; Flick and Röhnsch, 2007)
addresses three levels of the phenomenon (adolescents’ knowledge, their practices, and expert knowledge) with three methods. A theoretical triangulation complements methodological triangulation, in this example, when the perspective of social representations is complemented by the theoretical approach of ‘social problems work’ (Holstein and Miller, 1993) focussing on the practices of identification and classification of social problems in the interaction (or lack of it) between clients and service providers (see Flick, 2011a). Thus, triangulation – in this example of multiple qualitative methods – can open a more comprehensive empirical approach to studying the social representation of a complex phenomenon. The triangulation of several theoretical perspectives can provide a more comprehensive theoretical ground for combining these methods. Of course the methodological triangulation can also include qualitative and quantitative methods.

**Mixed methods**

In recent decades a discussion about using mixed methods has developed and attracted much attention (see e.g. Creswell and Piano Clark, 2010 and the *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*). This discussion has a strong focus on combining quantitative and qualitative methods and thus fits into this chapter in that it brings together both the approaches we discussed separately earlier. However, this approach has a number of limitations (see Flick, 2011a). First, its focus is on (only) combining qualitative and quantitative methods and not, for example, on combining several qualitative methods. Secondly, we see a concentration on methods and lack of concern for their theoretical backgrounds and potential differences. Thirdly the use of the concept of ‘paradigms’ for describing qualitative and quantitative research neglects differences in the ways qualitative research is done in different contexts (say narrative research and ethnography). As we argue elsewhere in more detail (see Flick *et al*., 2012), a mixed methods approach of combining quantitative and qualitative research can be integrated in a more complex approach of triangulation to a complex phenomenon. In a study of the social representations of sleeping problems of nursing home residents and their treatment, we applied a systematic approach by focussing on an in-depth case study. Two sources of quantitative data (assessment of residents’ status and medication prescribed by physicians) and several contextualized qualitative approaches – one that focusses on physicians’ interpretive patterns concerning their prescription practices, and another that looks at nursing staff and nursing home residents’ attitudes toward sleep medication – were triangulated. Here, the quantitative approaches demonstrate first the relevance of the problem (sleeping problems in their frequency, distribution and link to other medical problems) and how often medications are prescribed for treating them. The qualitative approaches showed the representations of the problem held by staff and residents. The combination of approaches revealed that physicians’ statements in interviews, for example, made us expect a much higher prescription rate than became evident in analyzing the actual prescription rates. Thus the triangulation
showed differences between the levels of knowledge and practices as two levels of
the social representation of this phenomenon.

This example shows, as do several others, that triangulation is a substantial
addition to the methodologies for studying social representations. In particular,
using the concept to address several levels of social representations – such as
knowledge and practices or states and processes – allows us to draw a fuller
picture of an issue and its representations. By linking several approaches, which
also means linking several types of data, and in assuming that these approaches are
indicators for the social representations under study, a specific form of interpretation
is possible – of the data and of the findings produced by the combination of
methods.

**Concluding remarks**

This chapter has shown that a range of qualitative and quantitative methods
are available for empirical studies of social representations, and that they can be
used as stand-alone methods or in combination. All of these methods have to be
considered for their appropriateness to the issue being studied. None has been
designed exclusively for studying social representations. For all, then, a number of
decisions have to be taken by the researchers: How far can data collected with each
method be seen as an indicator of the representations that shall be studied? How far
can differences between certain subgroups in the study be seen as an indicator of a
social representation? Data as well as statistical or other forms of results cannot per
se be equated with a social representation. This link is a theoretical inference and
thus an interpretation which the researchers have to draw. Which method should
be used and whether methods should be combined (and which methods) should
be decided with respect to the phenomenon under study. Whose representations
and which levels of the social representation of a phenomenon will be studied are
the relevant points of reference for methodological decisions, rather than a general
preference for qualitative or quantitative research or for combining both. In the
end all methods and their theoretical backgrounds are tools for making empirical
research fruitful for understanding social representations.

Inevitably, this chapter has not been a comprehensive discussion of all possible
methods, but as the selection of methods presented shows, the toolkit for empirically
studying social representations is substantial. This should allow researchers to find
the ‘right’ method for the issue they want to study within the framework of social
representations. However, the more methods are available and prove successful
in the study of social representations, the more researchers face the need to take
the decision regarding a method that is appropriate both for the issue and for the
approach of social representations. This brings the general question of the indication
of methods back into focus: how should researchers decide which methods to use
(see Flick, 2014, for qualitative research, Flick, 2011a, ch. 6, for quantitative
and qualitative research, and Flick, 2007, for triangulation studies)? This is even
more relevant in a field like social representations, which is not tied to any specific methodological approach, but within which basically all methods in psychology and the social sciences have been used in one way or another, as Breakwell and Canter (1993) have already stated. In this sense, our chapter has provided an orientation to the variety of methodological approaches to social representations research by discussing prominent examples.
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