1961-1976: Notes in the Margin to a Meta-theoretical Analysis of the Two Editions of *La Psychanalyse, son Image et son Public*.

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Although 1961 is unanimously indicated in the literature as the year of birth of the theory of social representations, in coincidence with publication *La Psychanalyse, son image et son public*, Moscovici had begun his research around one decade before that date, and he had also published preliminary results well before 1961\(^1\), *La Psychanalyse, son image et son public*, in its 1961 edition, is without doubt the *opera prima* as well as the *opus magnum* in which Moscovici systematically set forth his theory of social representations developed from his empirical research on the phenomenon – never so topical and controversial as at that time – of the diffusion of psychoanalysis in France.

Moscovici’s choice of psychoanalysis (as both a theory and a therapeutic practice) – an object of knowledge/experience much discussed in France during the 1950s – was prompted by his intent to study the transformations, the similarities and/or differences between expert knowledge and everyday knowledge, between science and common sense, between “*reified universes*” and “*consensual universes*” with their specific modes of operation (processes) and functions in the broader symbolic system of social relations and ideological positions.

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mediated by communication systems. By surveying the field through detailed analysis of the social representations of psychoanalysis in the French press – marked by the strong ideological antagonisms of that time between the Catholic and Communist world views, between American and Soviet culture – Moscovici showed how the various forms of diffusion, propagation, and propaganda are structured in communication systems, giving rise to representations of diverse types.

The heuristic value of the theory of social representations set out in the two editions of Moscovici’s “monumental” and “documental” book transcended the specific object of study (psychoanalysis) on which his first exemplary inquiry centred, and extended it to the most varied objects of social knowledge through a tight-knit conceptual framework. This theory has subsequently become an epistemology used to investigate (and somehow to rehabilitate) the common sense that governs the anthropology of knowledge and practices in everyday life amid dynamic interrelations among subjects, objects, and systems for the construction and transmission of knowledge itself. And it has been employed to determine how “a science of reality becomes a science in reality, almost a physical dimension of reality itself”. Moscovici identifies the study of social representations as the specific “mission” of social psychology compared with the other social sciences, albeit in close collaboration with them.

The original 1961 and 1976 editions of *La Psychanalyse, son image et son public* respectively mark the birth and revision of the social representations theory developed by Serge Moscovici, whom Leon Festinger subsequently described in 1981 as “the most important and creative thinker in contemporary social psychology”. Moscovici was excessively modest in terming the two editions as respectively a “thesis” and a “book” if his thesis supervisor, Daniel Lagache – with the pride of any supervisor who has inducted an outstanding doctoral student into the art of research – declared in the preface to the first edition:

“Tackling the problems of the sociology of knowledge by discussing very recent events and what is sometimes a hotly contested debate is a new and brave undertaking. Moscovici tackles them with an understanding of the problems, with a sureness of touch and a writerly elegance that make him one of the ‘young masters’ of Francophone social psychology” (Lagache, 1961, p. VII-XI).

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2 See the letter sent by Leon Festinger on 2 June 1981 to Serge Moscovici congratulating him on the doctorate *honoris causa* awarded to him by the University of Geneva. The letter has been published in the book edited by Buschini and Kalampalikis (2001).

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
The insistence with which Moscovici has described only the second, profoundly revised, edition of his *opera prima* as a “book” induced me to conduct a meta-theoretical analysis of the two editions, my purpose being systematically to identify continuities and innovations in Moscovici’s reformulation of his theory.

Indeed the meta-theoretical analysis of the complete body of literature on Social Representations was launched by de Rosa, during the 2nd International Conference on Social Representations held in Rio de Janeiro in 1994 (de Rosa, 1994a) It was inspired by the goal to provide an organic, comprehensive understanding of the overall development of this theory over time and across continents (de Rosa, 1994a, 1994b, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006a, 2008, 2012a; de Rosa & d’Ambrosio, 2003, 2008). Some of the main objectives of this project are to:

- map the theory and its application over time and around the world;
- bring some clarity to the Social Representations galaxy, by analytically reconstructing the complexity of its various theoretical and methodological approaches. In particular by reflecting on the pertinence–coherence between the scientific paradigmatic definition of the problems addressed in the literature inspired by the S.R. theory and methodological operationalizations;
- identify the possible paradigmatic re-definitions operating explicitly or implicitly through recourse to methodological designs modelled on other theoretical constructs (for example prototype, script, schemata, or even more generically social cognition) and therefore inappropriate in a study inspired by the Social Representations theory.

Since the comparison of the two successive editions of a work by the same author was a highly specific case of meta-theoretical research, besides applying *the grid*³ (de Rosa 1994a) to the 18 chapters of the 1961 edition and the 16 chapters of the 1976 edition (to which can be

³ The grid – which has been again revised in February 2012 in order to take into account some recent developments of constructs and paradigmatic approaches - is still organized in five main areas:
- *Theoretical reference to Social Representations constructs* monitors whether a publication refers to Social Representations Theory in a very generic way or addresses specific paradigmatic elements of the theory (i.e. the genesis, processes, functions, structure, transmission, and transformation of Social Representations) or whether the contribution refers to the theory itself as an object of critical analysis (meta-theory);
- *Theoretical reference to other constructs and theories* identifies whether the publication refers to other constructs, concepts and theories related to Social Representation as well as the focus of the reference: integration, differentiation, comparison, replacement;
- *Thematic analysis* categorizes the contents of empirical contributions by identifying the general thematic areas (i.e. health, environment, etc.) and the specific object of each study (i.e. AIDS, pollution, etc.), as well the specific typology (closed, open, polemic) of the Social Representations;
- *Methodological profile* of each study (its research design, its location, its nature, instruments for data collection, channels used as source of information, techniques for data analysis) and *Characteristics of the selected population* (size of sample, variables considered, unit of analysis);
- *Paradigmatic coherence* between the theoretical assumptions and the methodological research design.

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
added the appendix to Chapter V *Quinze ans après*, which, however, because of its uncertain status between a section and a chapter has not been numbered as a free-standing chapter), I integrated the meta-theoretical analysis with systematic comparison between:

a) *the tables of contents in the two books*, in order to verify whether Moscovici’s reformulation of the manner in which he presented his research and its underlying theoretical concepts, or those which developed from it, led in the second edition to an expository restructuring such to alter organization of the contents;

b) *the bibliographies in the two editions*, in order to identify the authors who had significantly entered Moscovici’s intellectual universe in the fifteen years between the first and the second editions.

For reasons of space, this article will present only some of the findings of the meta-theoretical analysis, referring the reader to other works (de Rosa, 2011a, 2011b, 2012b) for detailed descriptions of the analyses mentioned at points a) and b) above.

Comparison between the tables of contents of the two books shows that, in both editions, the work is divided into two parts:

- The first part reports the results of a survey conducted on six groups representative of the population (for a total of 2265 interviewees) with the purpose of determining how psychoanalysis had penetrated into French society and with what effects. The intent is not solely to describe opinions on the diffusion of psychoanalysis; it is also to analyse those opinions in light of the specific positions of the individual and the group in the psychosocial context, and to conduct detailed (and ideologically audacious at that time) examination of the ideological mapping that characterized French society in the years after the Second World War.


Demonstrating the fact that, in rewriting his *opera prima*, Moscovici was more conceptually interested in modelling the theory of social representations than in furnishing an updated description of the phenomenon studied (an empirical occasion to elaborate on his theory), the research work set out in the two editions is substantially the same. In fact, Moscovici does not present a follow-up on his study of fifteen years previously, and in explicit response to demands by Marxist commentators that he should update the chapter on the anti-psychoanalytic propaganda of the Communist Party, he merely added a
section/chapter\(^4\) entitled ‘Fifteen years later’, in which he declared his unwillingness to write a new book based on follow-up research and new analyses, not seeing any valid reason to do so, and asserting the continuing currency of the systems of communication identified. In this section/chapter, Moscovici briefly refers – and not without overt scepticism concerning the genuineness of the *rapprochement* between the communist vision of the world, society, science and ideology, on the one hand, and psychoanalysis on the other – to certain circumstances which had reduced hostility and even led to some sort of armistice between communists and psychoanalysts (such as their pacific coexistence during the 1960s at international level and in Gaullist France, followed by denunciation of the horrors and crimes of the Stalinist period, the splitting of psychoanalysis into a science and an ideology) and events (such as Althusser’s legitimisation of psychoanalysis, and particularly the compatibility between Marxism and the Lacanian structuralist school at the Communist Party Conference of Argenteuil). He put forward conclusions based on an analysis of the content of 84 articles published in *L’Humanité, France Nouvelle* and *La Nouvelle Critique* which suggested that the communicative forms of communist propaganda against psychoanalysis, predominant in the 1950s, had given way in the 1960s to forms of propagation similar to those applied ten years earlier to communication guided by the values of the Catholic Church.

As expressly stated in the introduction to the second edition, the differences with respect to the first edition consist in Moscovici’s declared intent to modify his manner of expounding facts and ideas, and to eliminate a large amount of technical and theoretical details understandable only by a small and expert audience. It is for this reason that Moscovici called the second edition a ‘rewriting’ which marked his personal and intellectual evolution.

It appears that the reason for the theoretical modelling and a certain shift of focus, in the second edition, from the object and its contents (psychoanalysis) to the theory of social representations and the communication systems which transmit them in relation to the symbolic positioning of social actors\(^5\) stemmed from Moscovici’s desire more to re-orient the ‘mission’ of social psychology systemically than to attenuate the ‘*scandal*’ provoked by the first edition.

\(^4\) It is interesting to note that the reflections added to the 1976 edition in the section entitled ‘Fifteen years later’ have an uncertain status between being a new section of Chapter V (to which, however, a sequential numbering is not given) and a chapter itself (to which, once again, a distinct chapter number is not given, although it has the indentation that indicates new chapters in the table of contents and the beginning of a new page in the body of the book).

\(^5\) See among many others: Duveen (2008b).

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
Systematic analysis of the comparative Table 1 published in de Rosa (2011a) – which contains all the titles in French of the chapters, sections, and subsections of the first edition of La Psychanalyse, son image et son public, juxtaposed with those of the second edition – immediately shows the effects of the ‘rewriting’ of the work, which in 1976 comprises an entirely new section/chapter, even though the restructuring of the chapters reduces them by two, among those formally numbered, and the book is 144 pages shorter owing to the substantial cuts made to the text of the first edition.

Comparison between the titles of the chapters, sections and subsections in the two editions (1961 and 1976) of La psychanalyse, son image et son public shows a greater systematicity of content and a different conceptual framework behind the second edition. Testifying to this is a notable increase in the use of titles, which, besides giving rhythm to the reading, demonstrates the profound restructuring of the text, which steers the reader in its interpretation. Titles and subtitles (certainly more appealing and metaphorical in the second edition) are used to give guidance in reading a voluminous work, which in its second edition more than the first, assumes the form of a systematic exposition (and re-elaboration) of the theory of social representations.

To be noted in particular is that in the first part of the text, centred on interpretation of the results obtained by the questionnaire, the interviews and the free associations, the order of topics is practically reversed:

- the 1961 edition opens with eight chapters devoted to the scientific and naive image of psychoanalysis, the psychoanalyst, patients, and therapeutic practices. Only in the ninth chapter does it turn to more systematic treatment of the theory of social representations and the concepts associated with it, but it does so always in light of the discourse on psychoanalysis set out in the first chapters;
- the 1976 edition begins with four chapters centred on the theory of social representations and then resumes treatment of its various concepts simultaneously with the results of the interviews on the images of psychoanalysis, analysts, patients and analytical practices. In a certain sense, there is as an inversion of figure/ground between the object of study (the image of psychoanalysis in French society of the

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9 See the bibliographic references for the details about the various translations into English, Italian and Portuguese. For the translation into English, to prevent confusion in the reader, it should be pointed out that on p. VII of the Contents, and also on page 256 in the text, the term Propagation has been erroneously translated as Propaganda, although these terms refer to two very distinct notions.

7 In fact – especially in the first edition of 1961 – some sections present in the body of the text are not given in the table of contents.

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
time) and the theory that, on the basis of this object, was conceived to furnish a refined reading of the relations between scientific knowledge and common sense, how they are manifest in everyday exchanges, and their diffusion and re-elicitation by the media and social actors according to their ideologies and values.

But the work of rewriting the second edition was not a purely stylistic–narrative matter. As Moscovici himself informs us in the introduction to the second edition, he eliminated “technical and theoretical information that were of interest to only a small circle of specialists, or that have become common currency. This also corresponds, of course, to a shift in my personal and intellectual views on academic initiation rites and science.” (Moscovici 1961/1976, English translation of the 1976 edn in 2008, p. XXII).

A systematic way to measure the conceptual reorganization of the second edition with respect to the first consists in comparing their bibliographical references, identifying the authors who appear in both editions (and therefore constitute some sort of common ground between them), the authors included only in the bibliography of the first edition (and who have therefore been deliberately removed from the second edition), and the authors who appear only in the second edition.

Rapid inspection of the Table 2 published in de Rosa (2011a), which lists these authors – according to the above three categories – and the dates of the publications cited, immediately evinces that the authors cited in the bibliographies of both editions are a minority with respect to those specific to the former or the latter. This highlights that Moscovici did not compile the bibliography of the second edition by integrating the bibliographical items of his first work with new ones. There are then authors who – although influential on his thought, as testified by references made to them by Moscovici in other publications, lectures, or also in personal conversations – are not systematically cited in the bibliography of the *opera prima*: an example is the book on the history of science by Robert Lenoble (1943) *Essai sur la notion d’expérience*, discovered in the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* and which, as Moscovici himself declares (2003), first attracted his attention to the concept of collective representation, and then to other readings.

It is too simple to argue that these are works published after 1961 and therefore ones which Moscovici would not have been able to consult when writing the first edition of *La psychanalyse*. This is the case of Berger and Luckmann (1966), Birnbach (1965), Burnstein (1967), Canguilhem (1966), David (1966, 1967), De Saussure (1967), De Soto, London, and
Handel (1965), Foucault (1963), Garfinkel (1967), Giese (1967), Hymes (1968), Maslow (1963), Pontalis (1965), Roqueplo (1974), Rose (1962), Zajonc and Burnstein (1965). But it is not this simple temporal criterion alone that explains the inclusion of new items (nor their selection rather than other sources available at that time), considering that the second edition’s bibliography also contains an abundance of publications well anterior to 1961: for example, Abelson and Rosenberg (1958), Adorno et al. (1950), Asch (1940, 1946, 1958), Bruner (1957), Evans Pritchard (1934), Jaspers (1954), Koelher (1937), Koyré (1939, 1950), McGuire (1960a, 1960b), Mead (1934), Sherif (1933), Tarde (1901), Weber (1949), Worf (1953), Zajonc (1960) – to mention some of the best-known authors in social psychology, sociology, linguistics, philosophy – evidencing the expansion of Moscovici’s intellectual horizons and the change in his sources fifteen years after his \textit{opera prima}.

The cuts that reduce the second edition by 144 pages partly concern the sociology of knowledge: ‘The discussion of the sociology of knowledge disappears: having said all that was necessary, Moscovici does not hark back on his reflection.’ (Jodellet 2008, p. 419).

It is also interesting to note that removed from the bibliography of the second edition are references to Moscovici’s own publications prior to 1960, their place being taken by some of his publications subsequent to 1961 (Moscovici 1962, 1963; Moscovici & Zavalloni 1969) largely concerned with attitudes and the effects of the group as their polarizer, communicative processes and the properties of language, but also the \textit{human history of nature} (Moscovici 1968, 1972).

This analysis of the sources – as regards both authors that were somehow important referents for Moscovici (because of intellectual affinity but also because they represented conceptions from which he differed) and other works and theories produced by Moscovici in the meantime – would require much closer philological and conceptual examination than is possible here. Merely to be pointed out is that, in 1976, Moscovici published not only the second edition \textit{de La Psychanalyse}, but also a book in English, \textit{Social Influence and Social Change} (thus anticipating by three years the 1979 French edition of \textit{Psychologie des minorités actives}). Hence, the conceptual universe of this fertile and innovative author had already extended to produce another theory, which would bring him fame well beyond Europe. Although Moscovici was inclined to keep the strands of empirical research inspired by his various theories distinct – also by involving his assistants separately – it is evident that

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\footnote{Given the limit of space for this article, for details on the bibliographic references cited here and in the next paragraph see de Rosa (2011a) or Moscovici’s original editions (1961/1976).}

his mind could not but be a conceptual space for synthesis of these various inspirations and
the hybridization of ideas, and that his writings could not but be influenced by these
developments of thought and research in the meantime matured in other directions. Dispelling
any doubts about the close interconnection between the theory of social representations and
the theory of innovation and active minorities is Moscovici’s reply in the well-known
interview given to Markova: ‘If we do not have the same representation then the behavioral
style has no effect’ (Moscovici 2000, p. 266).

If we shift our attention from comparison between the tables of contents and the
bibliographies – as indicative respectively of the core concepts and intellectual influences by
authors that characterize the two editions – to some of the more significant empirical results
obtained by the meta-theoretical analysis applied to Moscovici’s *opera prima* in its 1961 and
1976 versions, we find a number of differences. These pertain to Moscovici’s differing focus
on certain paradigmatic aspects of his theory, such as the genesis, functions, processes,
transmission, and transformation of social representations, or references to other constructs
and theories.

As regards the purely theoretical nature of the treatment – as compared with the
presentation of empirical findings – the editions do not exhibit substantial differences, given
that the purely theoretical chapters account in both editions for over one-quarter of the entire
work, and the chapters in which the theoretical treatment is supported by results anchored in
empirical data represent, to a largely similar extent, 79% of the 1961 edition and 77% of the
1976 one.

With respect to the various specific paradigmatic components of the theory of social
representations (functions, processes, genesis, transmission, transformation), the meta-
theoretical analysis of the two editions reveals a predominance of references in both editions
to the ‘functions’ of social representations: such references amount to 31% in the first edition
and 30% in the second. However, more analytical consideration of specific functions (which,
though groupable into the two broad classes of cognitive functions of *reality ordering* and
functions of *intra- and inter-group communication*, can in their turn be diversified into further
ones) shows some similarities and differences between the two editions.

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9 This meta-theoretical analysis has been the subject of a degree thesis assigned by me as supervisor to Sara Di Michele, who
– after spending a year of study and documentation at the E.H.E.S.S. of Paris as an Erasmus student – discussed her thesis
entitled “La psychanalyse, son image et son public: Analisi meta-teorica della prima e seconda edizione” at the summer
session of the 2002-2003 academic year.

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
The function most frequently described in both editions is that of *guiding behaviour in social interactions and intra- and inter-group relations*, so that a social representation, in so far as it constitutes a set of interrelated symbols, thoughts, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, images, ideas, collective memories, practices, etc. – and, as such, is a system of interpretation of reality – becomes the symbolic mediator of interactions among the members of a group on the basis of their shared codes, and among individuals belonging to different groups, ordering their perceptions and guiding/prescribing/justifying their behaviours and social practices. However, this function appears with a frequency of 48% in the first edition, but of 26% in the second (assuming 100% as representing the total frequencies of all the functions mentioned).

Also references to *social identity functions* decrease – albeit to a lesser extent – in the second edition, diminishing from 14% in the 1961 edition to 12% in that of 1976. Social representations, as symbolic constellations, which closely regulate relations among groups, create and stabilize the social identity based on cohesion among individuals and members of a group sharing a particular system of representations.

By contrast, the second edition makes more frequent reference to the function of *orientation and control of social reality*, together with the *familiarization function*. Both these functions are connected with the regulation of socio-cognitive processes. In particular, the *cognitive function of orientation and control of social reality* (a function that can determine, by helping or hampering, and therefore by organizing and filtering, the diffusion of a science in society) is described with a frequency of 4% in the 1961 book, and with a greater frequency of fully 23% in that of 1976. Of interest is the treatment in the second edition, with a frequency equal to 6%, of a further function: *familiarization* of the strange, which is performed in concomitance with the anchoring process, so that a social representation is transformed for insertion into an already-existing interrelated symbolic system of social thoughts, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, images, ideas, collective memories, practices, etc.

The predominant attention paid to the multiple functional aspects of social representations evidences the indissoluble “reality/representation” linkage that Moscovici’s theory establishes among constructs (attitude, opinions, behaviour, identity, social knowledge, inter-group relationships, communication, etc.) traditionally studied in fragmentary manner and used atomistically. (See for example among other quotations: Moscovici, 1976, Engl. edn. 2008, p. 32-33)

As presented elsewhere (de Rosa, 2012, in press), ‘*Functions*’ have been found also as the most frequent paradigmatic reference among other specific elements of the theory (F = 1113)
by the meta-theoretical analysis on 2065 bibliographical sources on Social Representation, including chapters in books (N = 956), articles (N = 936), papers presented at conferences (N = 65), PhD thesis chapters (N = 57), university reports or manuscripts (N = 46) and web documents (N = 5), published from 1952 to 2009 by authors coming from different disciplinary, institutional and cultural backgrounds. The highest frequency of the paradigmatic reference to “Functions” still appears in the most recent meta-theoretical analysis of the 2195 papers literature retrieved from the on-line specialised Meta-theoretical Bibliographic Inventory, on January 18th, 2012 from http://www.europhd.eu, as illustrated in the fig. 1 below,

![Bar chart showing reference to specific paradigmatic elements](image)

**Figure 1:** Reference to specific paradigmatic elements

The centrality of the socio-cognitive and communicative functions both in Moscovici’s *opera prima* in its 1961 and 1976 versions and in the successive literature is also evident in the definition of the Social Representation, referring to the *socially marked functions* as essential component “The social marking of contents or processes of representations refers to conditions and contexts in which those representations reveal themselves in communication and through which they circulate and to the functions those representations serve in interactions with the world and with others” (Jodelet, 1989, p. 340)

In terms of the importance of the paradigmatic constructs, the meta-theoretical analysis conducted on the two editions shows that, immediately after functions, it is reference to the

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10 The results of the meta-theoretical analysis of a specific corpus of sources based on 1629 abstracts presented at the eight editions of the Biannual International Conferences on Social Representations have been published elsewhere (de Rosa & d’Ambrosio, 2008).

11 About the role of the context and the interconnections between social representations and intervention, see among others: Jodelet (2012), Jovchelovich, (2006).

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
‘genesis’ of social representations that records the highest frequency in both editions (25% in the 1961 edition and 22% in the 1976 one). The slight decrease found in the 1976 edition for references to the genesis of representations is off-set by a slight increase in references to the ‘processes’ and the ‘transmission’ of representations.

In regard to genesis, predominant in both editions is the socio-genetic dimension (that of the socio-cultural and historical processes generated by representations). This records the highest percentages (26% in the 1961 edition and 36% in that of 1976). The emphasis on the socio-genetic dimension is well summarized by the following statement: “…world view, ideology, utopia, all stress the fact that these theoretical elaborations are the results of a collective interaction, the expression of a social organisation” (Moscovici, 1961, p. 306, my translation). This is followed (with percentages of 21% for the first edition and 12% for the second) by references to the micro-genetic dimension (that of the genesis of representations in the social and inter-group interactions by means of which individuals negotiate their social identities and seek to establish shared definitions in regard to reality). Finally, the onto-genetic dimension (that of the formation of the social representations acquired as part of the development of an individual’s knowledge and cognitive abilities) is measured by the meta-theoretical analysis as a category specific to the first edition, where it records 16% of references.

This greater importance in the second edition of the socio- and micro-genetic dimension – to the detriment of the onto-genetic dimension – should be read in parallel with the “accentuating the importance of language and communication in the production, functioning and efficacy of social representations.” (Jodelet, 2008, p. 419).

It should be pointed out that this distinction among the genetic processes of social representations – which was the basis for the categorical criterion in my grid used to analyse the paradigmatic element relative to ‘genesis’ – has been drawn from Duveen and Lloyd (1990), and is therefore subsequent to both the first and second editions of Moscovici’s work. The distinction should therefore not be regarded as attributable to Moscovici – even less should it be considered a rigid classification. It only indicates the prevailing focus of the theory, given that the three genetic dimensions are intimately bound up with each other in Moscovici’s conceptualization.

Connected with interest in the socio- and micro-genesis of social representations is interest in their ‘transmission’. This assumes such importance in the theory that it forms one of its constitutive elements. It, too, has therefore been subjected to my meta-theoretical analysis. In
particular, the various *transmission systems* identified by Moscovici form a heuristic element central to the sensitive issue of the relationships between representation and social influence. It is therefore interesting to determine empirically whether there are significant differences between the 1961 first edition and that of 1976 (which was also the year in which Moscovici published his book on *Social Influence and Social Change*). However, this is not what the empirical analysis found, given that – at least from the point of view of the recursiveness of the categories used in the two texts – it recorded very similar frequencies in both editions. Rather than disappointing, however, this finding induces us to value Moscovici’s *opera prima* even more, and to regard as excessively severe his judgment that it was merely a doctoral “thesis”, rather than a “book”, given that it already contained, amongst other theoretical insights, a systematic account of the relationships between representation and social influence.

This conceptualization of the dynamics of social influence, which in the *opera prima* Moscovici addresses from the perspective of the relations among the various communicative genres, driven by the ideological positions of different newspapers, and their readers with their reference social groups, formed the core of his subsequent theory (Moscovici, 1976/1979) on the relationships between minorities (and their patterns of behaviour) and the majority (see also Duveen, 2008a, p. XIV-XV and 2008b, p. 373).

The fact remains that, on re-reading Moscovici’s *opera prima*, even after having read and re-read his subsequent works, one is impressed by intuitions which anticipate lines of thought woven together in theories that are only apparently distinct.

Empirical analysis of the two editions of Moscovici’s book shows that references to the *transmission* of social representations, and to the communication systems that regulate them, appear – with respect to the other paradigmatic constructs evidenced by the meta-theoretical analysis grid – with a frequency of 21% in the first edition and 24% in the second – in which, moreover, every generic reference to this construct (that is, references that do not specify a particular transmission system) disappears. More specifically, the *transmission systems* termed, according to their characteristics and modes of discourse production/organization, *diffusion, propagation* and *propaganda* configure a generative dynamic of social representations – not banally as a contagion effect by the media or some other source of influence, but rather as a “re-elaborative” and “re-constructive” dynamic performed by subjects according to the social contexts in which and through which new knowledge objects are socialized. This attention paid to the transmission systems, innovative with respect to the
traditional unilinear conception of the “power of the media”, is strictly isomorphous with the nature itself of the concept of social representation, which for Moscovici is never a photograph replicating reality (Moscovici, 1976, Engl. edn. 2008, p. XXX).

Much the same attention is paid to the transmission system termed ‘diffusion’ in the two editions, given that the percentages are very similar (19% in the 1961 edition vs. 17% in that of 1976). This system differs from both propagation and propaganda in that it is characterized by a concrete, attractive, and rapid style which “it attempts to get as close as possible to what is assumed to be the taste and vocabulary of the reader” given that “In diffusion, the problem of the adaptation of sender to receiver, and the former’s dependence on the latter, is fundamental. (Moscovici, 1976, Engl. edn., 2008, p. 216). This style typifying the relations between the source of communication and the transmitter (which tends to become the expression of the receiver, turning the media into megaphones for the opinions of their readers/audiences – a sort of vox populi) confers relatively neutral influence on diffusion. The audience does not consist of a highly structured and oriented group, and the source of information is not overtly capable or desirous of orienting its readers; rather, it is a means to transmit common knowledge that must be shared.

The representations transmission system which Moscovici terms ‘propagation’ – and whose operation he demonstrated mainly in the Catholic press – (10% in the 1961 edition, rising to 20% in that of 1976) is characterized by a certain ‘pressure to uniformity’ (although this is not the manifest and authoritarian uniformity exacted by propaganda). In fact, the purpose of the ‘propagation’ system is to incorporate socially important objects of representation into a frame of already-existing conceptions, favouring assimilation and adaptation in order to prevent tensions and to create convergence (guiding behaviours without evident coercion) on a doctrine acceptable to the reference group. The latter is assumed to be unitary and definite, although smaller than the atomistic and indistinct target of the diffusion, and its attachment to and respect for authority is promoted through an educational function. A ‘propagation’ system is less concerned to foster opinions on specific problems (this being typical, according to Moscovici, of the diffusion system) than to develop “attitudes that can influence both representations and behaviours” (Moscovici, 1976, English ed., 2008, p. 282) so that the transmitter’s degree of implication is apparent, in the sense of dependence on principles and a shared values system, rather than on the readers.

The ‘propaganda’ system is more markedly ideological. It seeks to impose uniformity on the representations and behaviours of the recipients of the communication (in this case to be
enlisted as followers and activists by persuasive strategies). Moscovici showed how the propaganda system works by analysing the ways in which the French communist press of the time represented psychoanalysis. He devoted equal attention to propaganda in both editions (in fact, the percentage frequencies recorded by the meta-theoretical analysis were exactly 26% in both cases). In this system of representations transmission, the meaning of a behaviour is not renewed; instead, it is created and reinforced with manipulative devices. Iterative and rhetorically armed communicative strategies induce strongly dichotomous and polarized ‘sterotypes’ evocative of emotional reactions to conflicts among visions of the world and schemas predicated on the binary logic of true/false, authentic/alienated Contrary to traditional sociological analyses of propaganda and the doctrines of its omnipotence, in Moscovici’s investigation on various levels of analysis (situational, cognitive, linguistic, and psychological), propaganda instead becomes “mode of expression used by a group in a situation of conflict, and as the instrumental or action-oriented elaboration of that group’s representation of the object of the conflict” “process that shapes and instrumentalizes representation.” (Moscovici, 1976, Engl. ed.. 2008, p. 314, 338)

One should carefully read and re-read Moscovici’s book in its entirety and possibly in both editions. This will counter the schematizing simplifications of Moscovici’s thought that too often reduce his conception of the communicative systems of diffusion, propagation and propaganda to separate univocal and binary channels in the production of opinions, attitudes and stereotypes.

One wonders whether, fifty years later, Moscovici’s explanation of the correspondences between communication systems and modes of behaviour construction still holds, notwithstanding the changes that have taken place in the great ideological systems and their fruition by social and institutional subjects, but also in the polyphony of the apparatuses of communication systems in the current and prospective scenario of the cross-media. Thanks to new technologies, the latter have transformed the transmitter-message-receiver relationship, both in the sense of the oneness-multiplicity of the subjects involved (with the demise of the one/many communicative model), and in that of how messages are structured and the reference population segmented. I shall deal more thoroughly with these prospects of development in research on social representations and communication in other publications (de Rosa, 2011a, 2011c, 2012c in press). Here suffice it to emphasise that Moscovici’s constant endeavour since the first edition of La Psychanalyse has been to go beyond the traditional approaches that merely ascertained the existence of ties between the content of
what is being communicated and the responses of a particular recipient of the message, replacing “the recording of global effects with the analysis of specific interactions and processes, once they have been clearly identified” (Moscovici, 1976, English ed., 2008, p. 359). But it is respect for the fineness and phenomenological dynamism with which the categories have been defined by Moscovici that enjoins that they must not be hypostatized, thereby sterilizing the heuristic capacity of his theory with a simplifying orthodoxy which rigidifies intuitions into mummified notions. How is it possible to imagine that people can, for instance, develop only opinions or only attitudes or only stereotypes according to the newspapers that they read? Or that newspapers can induce only opinions or only attitudes or only stereotypes according to the ideological orientation that modulates the relationship with their readers? This consideration does not solely concern the multiple and competing exposures of people to the complex contemporary polyphonic and cross-media world. Moscovici repeatedly warns, while describing his research on the social representations of psychoanalysis, that the same newspaper – depending on the topic treated and its greater or lesser sensitivity for the reference values system or ideology – may adopt the communicative mode of diffusion for one topic and that of propagation or propaganda for another; or that the same newspaper – according to the evolution of a particular ideological world-view and its relationships with the history of ideas and development of the intellectual climate – may convert a propaganda communicative system into a propagation one (see the section “From propaganda to propagation”: Moscovici, 1976, Engl. edn., 2008, p. 354).

Besides the paradigmatic elements of the theory outlined thus far – mainly to show possible differences of focus between the first and second editions – particular mention should be made of the processes by which a social representation is elaborated. These processes are objectification and anchoring. Compared with the other paradigmatic elements discussed above (functions, genesis, transmission systems), the results of the meta-analysis show that references to processes amount to 13% in the first edition and 18% in the second, thus revealing that closer attention is paid to them in the former. On more specific assessment of the importance assumed by the two processes, the frequency of objectification increases from 21% to 25%, that of anchoring decreases from 21% to 18%, while the simultaneous treatment of objectification and anchoring is relatively invariant between the two editions (15% in the first, 14% in the second).

In the first edition (1961), it is not until Chapter Ten (“Dynamics of social representations”), and particularly pages 311-36, that there is a section devoted to
“Description of the two Major Processes” which concur in the “formation” of social representations. Here Moscovici specifies that the term should be understood neither genetically nor chronologically, but rather as denoting the outcome of a series of analyses on the concatenation of phenomena. In the second edition (1976), chapter III, entitled “Ideas That Become Common-sense Objects”, is entirely devoted to objectification. This is the reification of abstract thought into objects through the following procedure: (a) the selection and de-contextualization of information, which is similar to the conventionalization described by Bartlett; (b) schematization, whereby concepts are transformed into images (schemas or figurative nuclei) able to reify imaginative and visual thought, as opposed to abstract scientific thought; (c) naturalization, or the concretization of abstract notions to render them tangible – a sort of “animism in reverse”. (Moscovici, 1976, English ed., 2008, p. 69)

Language with its multiform versatility (between scientific language and common-sense language) once again has an essential role in the transformation of scientific ideas into common-sense objects.

But it is not enough to transform an idea into a visible element of concrete reality – in a word, to ‘objectify’ a scientific theory. For an idea to become domesticated and made familiar, it must be positioned in the sphere of common sense populated by the objects of everyday life through being “classified” and “named”. Language thus becomes a sort of semantic hinge between the two processes of objectification and anchoring. It acts as an instrument of mind-culture-society which transforms mental images into social categories of language: indeed, there is a passage in which Moscovici attributes the verb “classify” to the process of objectification rather than to that of anchoring. (Moscovici, 1976, Engl. edn., 2008, p. 56)

Thus, in the second edition, Chapter Four – entitled “Homo Psychanaliticus” – gives salience to ‘classifying’ and ‘naming’, two practices of thought which follow the naturalization of the core of the social representation and enable individuals to orient themselves in relation to others and the environment; whilst the first section of Chapter Six,

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13 In this regard, Denise Jodelet (2008, p. 426) points out – following Mary Douglas (1986) – that also Bartlett was influenced by Wiener, the inventor of cybernetics, who worked at Cambridge with Bertrand Russell “The correspondence between the two phenomena is evident by their relation to processes of communication and confirmed by a variety of studies on cognition.”


Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
entitled “The Psychoanalysis of Everyday Life”\(^{15}\) describes the second key process: that of anchoring.

Whilst objectification explains how the emblematic elements of a scientific theory, or of any socially significant item of knowledge, are transformed into common-sense objects, anchoring shows how new common-sense objects, opportunely classified and named, are inserted into the mapping of already-existing knowledge and contribute to the constitution and expression of social relationships, thereby orienting the behaviours of individuals and groups.

Anchoring inserts new items of knowledge into the social world in a hierarchy of reference values and along a scale of preferences within existing social relationships, favouring the social recognisability of such knowledge through the shifting of salient characteristics, and establishing practices by which representations constitute and orient social relationships. In this way, anchoring confers functional value on social representations, which, as grids for the interpretation of reality, become systems which mediate between the individual and his/her environment by furnishing repertoires and typologies that serve for the classification of events and behaviours.

Although some texts popularizing the theory of social representations (for example, Galli, 2006; Jesuino 2009; Wagner & Hayes, 2005) tend to reverse the order of presentation of the two fundamental processes, it should be stressed that Moscovici – in both the first and second editions of his work founding the theory of social representations – described first the process of objectification and then that of anchoring (expressly calling it the second process\(^{16}\)). This choice, whose significance warrants carefully consideration, should not be regarded as a purely narrative-descriptive expedient. Rather, it reflects a specific operational phenomenology of such processes, although – as already pointed out – the before/after relation should not be taken to be a strictly temporal constraint, given that in some cases such processes operate in synergy, if not simultaneously. (Moscovici, 1976, Engl. edn. 2008, p. 104)

As Jean-Marie Seca has aptly stressed (2001):

“Objectification and anchoring proceed in parallel and in context” (Seca, 2001, p. 66)

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\(^{16}\) For the sake of philological honesty, however, it should be said that in the essay “The Phenomenon of Social Representations”, published in 1984 in R. Farr and S. Moscovici and republished in 2000 in the collection of essays entitled Social Representations, Moscovici reversed the order of description of these processes, first presenting anchoring and then objectification.

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
Once again it is language – and especially thematic language – which mediates and resolves the conflicts that arise in society over new knowledge. (Moscovici, 1976, English ed., 2008, p. 151)

Language is conceived by Moscovici, not as a neutral vehicle of information, nor as pure individual cognitive expression, but as an intrinsically cultural element, in which the inseparable mind-culture-society linkage and the interweaving among cognitive-symbolic-cultural processes dispels the traditional dichotomies between individual and society, rational and irrational, scientific and non-scientific thought. It is this conception that leads Moscovici in search of a correspondence between social situation and cognitive system extraneous to any deterministic logic from the social to the cognitive (much in vogue during the 1960s) or from the cognitive to the social (much in vogue today, owing to the development, and in some respects the hegemony, of first cognitivism and then neurosciences).  

Before concluding this rapid review of some of the results obtained from systematic comparison of the two editions of Moscovici’s book, I shall present two graphics showing the importance assumed in the 1961 and 1976 versions by the constructs and concepts of social psychology. Those with low frequencies have been eliminated because they would have made the graphics illegible (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).

The two figures below illustrate both the importance of certain constructs in comparison to others in each edition and the differences between the two editions in the frequencies of the constructs to which Moscovici refers. Consideration of the figures highlights the following:

- The predominant reference in the 1961 edition is to the construct opinion as a means of expression and exchange among the members of a group in regard to socially significant issues. This predominance is due to the popularity that the construct had enjoyed in the social sciences, and particularly in social psychology, in previous decades (“Every opinion or social representation is marked by socialized expressions”: Moscovici, 1961, p. 9, my translation).
- The image is the second most frequently used construct in the 1961 edition, and it is closely connected in Moscovici’s theory with the construct opinion, as already evident in the 1952 article cited at the outset. That image is an important construct – although not necessarily declined in its iconic and figurative aspect (a key element in the

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17 For a critical discussion about the role of the language in the Social Representation theory and in the radical Discursive Psychology, see de Rosa (2006b).

Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
objectification process) but as a mental image as well\(^{18}\) – is also evinced by the fact that it appears in the title of Moscovici’s first work, *La Psychanalyse, son image et son public*, and that it remains unchanged in the second, profoundly revised, edition of 1976. In fact, although fifteen years had passed since the formulation of the theory of social representations, which from the end of the 1960s onwards spread among researchers, especially in France (producing a first wave of studies on topics ranging among health, education, childhood, justice, etc., as well as the first experimental studies on the structural properties of representations and on the effects exerted by inter-group relations on the formation of representations, or on the role of social representations in social relations and practices), Moscovici did not replace the more common term of ‘image’ with that of ‘social representation’. In this regard, Jean Claude Abric has repeatedly said, referring to the time when Moscovici’s theory began to circulate among his colleagues, “we still said image!”

- The third construct prominent in Figure 2 is that of *communication*, whose importance is due to acknowledgement that it not only transmits a message or information but also forms, deforms and re-elaborates social representations, establishing symbolic relationships between individuals and groups within society.

> “The modes of transformation, during exchanges or *communications*, are multiple, and they depend as much on the social organization as they do on the means of communication (newspapers, radio, conversations). Communication does not consist solely in the act of transmitting a message. It deforms, differentiates, translates at the same time as groups create, deform, or translate the social objects or images of other groups. Social symbols and models are born from, and evolve during, exchanges. (...) We observe in the communication process the genesis of social images and models, their interferences with the existing rules and values before they become a particular language, the speech of society”. (Moscovici, 1961, p. 9, my translation).

- These three constructs (*opinion, image, communication*) are followed by a second, broader group (*language, judgement, behaviour, social processes, stereotype, value*) which record greater frequencies than other constructs – *belief systems, common sense, self, perception, identity, ideology* – which in their turn are more frequently cited in the 1961 edition than other popular constructs, most notably *attitude*, together with *beliefs*,

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\(^{18}\) On the relationships among social representation, image, and imagery see de Rosa 1987a, 1987b; de Rosa & Farr, 2001; Arruda & De Alba, 2007.
cognitive schemas and processes, categorization, cultural knowledge, development, individual representations, practices, prejudice, symbol, judgment.

Figure 2. Constructs and concepts of social psychology identified in the 1961 edition of La Psychanalyse.

- In the 1976 edition, one notes the marked prevalence of the construct language, immediately followed by communication, which confirms various considerations made hitherto concerning the thematic-conceptual re-focus of this second, profoundly revised, edition – and which is also visible in the reformulation of the titles and the sections (see the comparative Table 1, including the tables of contents of the two editions: 1961/1976, published in de Rosa, 2011a, 2011b). Also confirmed is the high frequency of the construct behaviour (which is not yet replaced by the construct practices, although it already appears in the first edition), while the constructs opinion and image, though still important, are considerably less frequent than in the 1961 edition, as are those of stereotype and social processes. Interesting among the principal differences is the greater recursiveness of the construct attitude, followed by values, common sense, ideology (which have nearly equal frequency rates in the two editions). Besides the constructs that appear less frequently, from the first edition (belief systems, cognitive schemas and processes, cultural knowledge, development, identity, perception, practices, self, symbol) there also appear in the figure relative to the second

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19 The closer attention paid to the construct of attitude is coherent with the comments made on the systematic comparison of bibliographical references, with more ample regard to publications on social psychology in the second edition than in the first (see de Rosa 2011a, 2011b, 2012 a).
edition constructs such as archetypes, myth\textsuperscript{20}, norms, propaganda. These constructs that did not appear in the figure relative to the most significant constructs in the first edition due to a threshold effect of the frequencies shown (although many of these terms were already cited and also the subjects of specific chapters, for instance Chapters Sixteen and Seventeen on propaganda).

![Figure 3. Constructs and concepts of social psychology measured in the 1976 edition of La Psychanalyse.](image)

It is also interesting to compare the importance of these constructs and concepts as emerges from the meta-theoretical analysis conducted on the two editions of Moscovici’s book with the findings of meta-theoretical analysis on a large multilingual corpus of literature produced by the international scientific community centred on the theory of social representations (for a total of 2065 bibliographical references among book chapters, articles and, to a marginal extent, also conference papers and doctoral theses). In fact, these analyses (de Rosa, A.S. 2012a) – as well as a previous meta-analysis conducted on 1629 abstracts presented at the first eight International Conferences on the Social Representations, from the first held in Ravello in 1992 to the eighth held in Rome in 2006: de Rosa & Ambrosio, 2008) – found that the construct recording the highest frequency was ‘attitude’,\textsuperscript{21} with the manifest intention among the authors of integration in regard to that of social representation (in 91% of

\textsuperscript{20} On the connection between the notions of myth, science and social representations, see de Rosa, 2009/2010, Jodelet and Parades, eds. 2010.


Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
cases), while only in 4.3% of cases it was *differentiation*, or in 2.8% simple *comparison*, or in 0.2% *substitution*.

The widespread tendency to interrelate the concept of social representation with other constructs of psychology testifies to the unifying value of the theory, as claimed by Moscovici. Though emphasising the distinctive elements and the epistemic principles that constitute pre-requisites for the social representation construct, to the point of transforming it into theory— he has repeatedly argued that this is not a new label for an old concept, nor a new instrument to augment the methodological apparatus, but rather a new conception of the discipline and its structures. The most recent results of the meta-analysis conducted on the corpus of 2065 bibliographical references selected on the basis of various criteria of paradigmatic specificity in regard to the theory of social representations show that the fifteen most frequently cited constructs (with N greater than 400) recall the main approaches of social psychology: a) classic transversal constructs to various paradigmatic traditions (*attitude, opinion, image, behaviour*); b) the socio-cognitive perspective (*cognitive schemas and processes*); c) and the socio-cultural and interactionist ones (*cultural knowledge, beliefs, social processes, values, practices, identity, communication, language, action, common sense*) (de Rosa, 2012a, 2012d in press).

After these detailed observations based on systematic meta-theoretical analysis, I shall conclude this section comparing the two versions of Moscovici’s book by setting out the salient points identified for each edition by Denise Jodelet (2008) in her excellent essay entitled “The Beautiful Invention”.

In regard to the 1961 edition, Jodelet identifies three elements of innovation qualifying a social psychology as authentically ‘social’:

1. the focus on *common sense*, as a specific form of knowledge socially produced in interpersonal exchanges and not the product of mere cognitive structures (a subject somewhat extraneous to the social psychology at the time of *La Psychanalyse*, with some exceptions for symbolic interactionism and the psychology of Heider or Lewin);

2. the role of social representations in the *constitution of reality*, far anticipating the constructionist models usually identified with the subsequent books by Berger and Luckmann (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality* and Gergen (1982) *Toward a Transformation in Social Knowledge*, and entirely superseding the sociological models of


Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
theories of knowledge through innovative attention to the correspondence between the organization of social relations and social representations, between cognitive processes and social interactions, between the workings of natural and logical thought, and among the cultural, symbolic and imaginary forms of social thought;

3. the holistic framework, which superseded the classic society/individual dichotomy or the linear determinism dominant in the 1960s (social structure – psychological structure) and the binary (structure-superstructure) logic through a composite and interdependent conceptualization of the reciprocal influences among society, culture and the individual (Jodelet, Sugiman, Permanadeli, 2012, in press). This framework anticipates complexity theories with the connected requisites of inter-disciplinarity and hybridization between the physical and social sciences (Jodelet, 2009).

In regard to the 1976 edition, the three main aspects reported by Denise Jodelet as resulting from reorganization of the text in the second edition are the following:

1. the disappearance of discussion on the sociology of knowledge, with closer reference made to the psychological-social literature and the principal thinkers in sociology and linguistics. “As a consequence, the relation between social factors and social representations is no longer treated in terms of determination but in terms of an isomorphism between social regulations and the structure of social representations.” (Jodelet, 2008, p. 419)

2. emphasis on the importance of language and communication in the production, functioning, and effectiveness of social representations, thus highlighting “jointly the constitutive role of interpersonal, intergroup and of media communications and discourses” (Jodelet, 2008, p. 419), with the following two consequences:

   a. more thorough analysis of the properties and functions of social representations, including their influence on communicative actions and practices, assuming representations to be ‘meanings’ – rather than information or knowledge – and therefore expressing a group dimension and at the same time ways to name and classify social reality, thereby domesticating its extraneous and unfamiliar dimension;

   b. criticism of the linear subject-object models characterizing the mechanistic reductionism of classical psychology (not only behaviourism, but also the radical versions of cognitivist behaviourism, which replaced observable behaviour with the cognitive behaviour of information processing). As an alternative, Moscovici proposes the triangular “Subject-Other-Object” model, which synthesises the intrinsically social
nature of knowledge, not because it concerns social objects (a limitation characteristic of the literature generally included in the macro-category of social cognition\(^{23}\)), but because it is socially generated by the dynamics of social interactions with the Other (individual, group, institution) and because it performs social functions for and in communication.

3. The conceptualization of other forms of thought (ideological, scientific, magical) besides common sense and beliefs, until the conceptualization of a new transhistorical form that has led Moscovici to elaborate, together with Vignaux, the concept of Themata (Moscovici & Vignaux, 1994/2000).

Apart from rewriting and conceptual reorganization, the features which are theoretical aspects common to the two editions of La Psychanalyse, as well as being heuristic principles which give marked capacity for influence to the theory of social representations, are – again according to the analysis by Denise Jodelet (2008, p. 418) – the following:

1. the joint analysis of knowledge processes and products at both individual and social level. (Jodelet, 2008, p. 418);

2. the dynamic relation between social representations and public issues in the ‘social marketplace’ as an arena for the symbolic positioning of groups with similar or conflicting interests and visions of the world (de Rosa, 2012b), thus conferring intrinsic social relevance on the choice of objects of study.

These two elements form a linkage between two works published in 1961 and 1976. Both of them centre on the following key aspects identified by Jodelet (2008, p. 418):

a) the description of the content of social representations in terms of different dimensions (information, attitude, and the field of representations) and its modes of elaboration (information dispersion, inference pressure, focalisation);

b) analysis of the processes of formation of representation (objectification, anchoring);

c) detecting the logical properties of natural thinking (formalism, informal repetition, analogy and cognitive polyphasia);

d) exploration of the functions of representations (the orientation of behaviour and communication).

\(^{23}\) For comparison among the epistemic principles that orient the theory of social representations and the various lines of inquiry which come under polysemous heading of ‘social cognition’, see de Rosa, 1992.
Martin Bauer and George Gaskell (2008, p. 351) identify four further salient features of the theory of social representations, in their conviction that it will continue to be a research programme for the development of social psychology:

a) its framing of diversified common sense as creative resistance;

b) its analysis of communication processes;

c) its concern with science in society;

d) its methodological implication.

I could continue with illustration of views or interpretations concerning a work which has been much discussed, cited or, unfortunately, distorted. However, owing to the limits within which I must confine this comparison between the two editions of La Psychanalyse, I shall stop here. I thus conclude this article by recommending that Moscovici’s theory (which is more than a theory: Kalampalikis & Haas, 2008; Palmonari & Emiliani, Eds. 2009) be first approached from its source: that is, by reading the opera prima without being intimidated, so that subsequent interpretations of the work by others are taken for what they are without detriment to the quality of Moscovici’s “beautiful invention”.

References


24 For an updated and prospective analysis of the Social Representations Theory see: the Introduction to the Italian Edition of “La Psychoanalyse, Son Image et Son Public” (de Rosa, 2011a) and the Introduction to the forthcoming book “Social Representations in the Social Arena” (de Rosa, 2012b) the sections: - “1961-2011 and beyond: 50 years of history from an idea to “more than a theory” - for a discussion of the supra-disciplinary research field on social representations unified by a meta-theoretical perspective and a strong societal focus and for more details about the meta-theoretical analysis of the Social Representations literature (de Rosa, 2012a).


Papers on Social Representations, 20, 36.1-36.34 (2011) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]


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