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The taboo against group contact. Hypothesis of Gypsy ontologization

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## Abstract

The idea of this article is that the symbolic relationships between human being and animal serve as a model for the relationships between majority and ethnic minority. We postulate that there are two representations that serve to organize these relationships between human beings and animals: a domestic and a wild one. If the domestic animal is an index of human culture, the wild animal is an index of nature that man considers himself to share with the animal. When the wild representation, contact with the animal will be taboo, as it constitutes a threat to the anthropological difference. We offer the hypothesis that ontologization of the minority -that is, the substitution of a human category by an animal category, and so its exclusion from the human species- is a way to the majority use when the taboo against the contact with the wild nature is necessary. Three experiments confirm the hypothesis that the Gypsy minority (as compared to the Gadge majority) is more ontologized when the context (a monkey or a clothed dog) is threatening the anthropological differentiation of the Gadge participants.

## INTRODUCTION

There is something paradoxical in the idea of a society where groups are not in contact and thus have no relations with one another. Society presumes the existence of relations, and that is undoubtedly why Bartlett (1923) devoted a fine book to social groups in contact, the changes it entails, and the resulting innovations. Conversely, G. Allport in his work *The Nature of Prejudice*, states that "human groups tend to stay apart. We need not ascribe this tendency to a gregarious instinct, to a 'consciousness of kind' or to prejudice. The fact is adequately explained by the principle of ease, least effort, congeniality and pride in one's own culture" (1954, p.18). One of the main consequences of this separation, this lack of contact, is the erection of social categories and the birth of prejudices.

To give our research a more concrete focus, we would like to point out, first of all, that in most known cultures we observe a dichotomy between nature and culture. We also observe that contact or lack of contact between groups is not a manifestation of the principle of least effort but of a taboo against contact with certain groups that is more prevalent than the taboo against incest (Moscovici, 1972). We see that the rejection of or taboo against exchanges and contacts between groups is carried out by means of symbols or rules that are sanctified by tradition. A set of these symbols and rules denies human status or human culture to the group with which contact is taboo. But we will also discover that this denial implies not so much a differentiation from the other than a deficit on his part, something that he does not have. It is claimed, for example, that a madman lacks reason, that a Black has no soul. In his analysis of the relationships between race and culture, Lévi-Strauss writes: "There is nothing, in truth, to prevent the coexistence of different cultures and the prevalence of relatively peaceful relations between them, although historical experience shows that they may each have different foundations. At times each culture asserts its being the sole real one and the only one deserving survival; it pays no attention to other cultures and denies them their authenticity. Most of the populations that we call primitive apply to themselves a term that means 'the true ones', 'the good ones', 'the excellent ones', or simply 'human beings', and they apply to the others designations that deny them their humanity, such as 'earth monkeys' or 'nits'" (Lévi-Strauss, 1952, p.21).

There are few explicit references in social psychology to these symbolic relationships (Doise, 1990) between human being and animal, as defining certain group relationships. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell (1987) for their part differentiate between relations on an individual level (subordinate level of categorization), relations on a group level (intermediate categorization) and relations on the basis of the integration of individuals within the human species (supra-ordinate level of categorization). They thus recognize the possibility of integrating individuals in the human species as supra-ordinate category. But even at this supra-ordinate level one can denote the opposition between the human species and other groups that suffering from a deficit of human qualities. By applying almost universal rules for maintaining a gap between civilized human being and savages, between human beings and animals (Moscovici, 1975; Vidal-Naquet, 1975), a group can seemingly identify itself with the human species and draw a line separating it from all the other groups designated as non-humans.

It is obvious that the research we will present is perforce strictly delimited. In summing up research on the representation of Gypsies that have for several centuries lived in the midst of French, Hungarian, Rumanian, Spanish, etc., majorities, two underlying dimensions stand out (Moscovici and Pérez, 1997; Moscovici and Pérez, 1999; Pérez, Moscovici and Chulvi, 2001). One of these dimensions highlights the nature-culture polarity, a polarity which is pronounced in any situation where the majority asserts its superiority over the minority. But when we delve deeper into these representations, we find that a second dimension exists: the human-animal polarity. Thus certain majorities draw a line between themselves and the Gypsies, whom they describe as does Lévi-Strauss, namely in their having a deficit of human qualities. We are thus forced to explain why certain majorities discriminate against Gypsies and symbolically prohibit contact with them. This leads us to hypothesize an ontologization that substitutes a shared representation into the feeling of a shared reality (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983): not only is the Gypsy minority attributed animal features, but the majority distinguishes itself from them as a human group as against a non-human, an animal group. We therefore propose differentiating these two phenomena. One process stresses differences within what is still the same category, while the other situates minority and majority in two logically distinct and incommensurable categories.

This hypothesis is important because it does more than show how the Gypsy minority is attributed non-human characteristics in order to discriminate against it or to assert a superiority over it, or even to forbid contact between a human and an animalized group. Its importance lies above all in the fact that ontologization can become the precondition for the annihilation as such of the de-humanized group. Several studies indicate how hostility is justified and the resulting propensity to exert violence against the minority (Pérez, Chulvi and Alonso, 2001). And it is a fact that in the countries where our investigations revealed a pronounced ontologization, for example in Moldavia, large numbers of Gypsies suffered deportation to concentration camps. We do not wish to establish a relationship between their situation and their tragic fate. We only want to emphasize that there is always an element of fear, of death, in the taboo against group contact, even when one only speaks of prejudices and stereotypes. Lévi-Strauss makes this link clear in concluding his analysis on the topic of races and cultures with: "to circumvent these dangers, today's and the even more threatening ones that lie just ahead, we must convince ourselves that their causes lie far deeper than ignorance and prejudice: our only hope is a change in the course of history, which is even harder to carry through than progress in the realm of ideas (op. cit., 48).

Our research aims to explore this ontologization hypothesis by on the basis of experiments we performed during several investigations. We fully realize their shortcomings and therefore consider it premature to aim for great rigor. As Festinger wrote (1980, p. 252): "How can one insist on empirical precision at the beginning of an idea that seems important and promising? If one does, the idea will be killed, it cannot at birth live up to such demands".

### The principle of the experiments

We assume that the meaning of ontologization depends on the social representations guiding the relationship between humans and animals in our culture. On the one hand, privileged relations of spatial proximity and temporal continuity with certain so-called domestic species have existed in the course of a common history within a shared social framework. "In our thinking, the ethologist Lestel writes, we tend to link species among each other. But we also speak of privileged relations that have persisted for over 10,000 years between human beings and dogs. More accurately: relations between human

beings and dogs are always between a specific human being and a specific dog" (Lestel, 2004, p. 21). In other words, the representation of a domestic animal always presupposes a privileged bond with the species and permanent cohabitation. On the other hand, the representation of wild animals presumes not so much the absence of a privileged relation, but an ephemeral relation, for it is not customary for human beings to cohabit with lions or bears. A true discontinuity is involved here. This representation of wild animals places animals and human beings in two incommensurable logical categories. The human category no longer refers to one particular species of the animal kingdom, even if it is a special one; rather, it is placed within a superior order by a given way of living, which the animal simply does not share. One substitutes a condition of the human species on the whole human species. To become more fully aware of such a category mistake (Ryle, 1947) we need only ask ourselves how one would represent a human being that was a deficient in one or the other conditions of human existence (for instance, language) or how one would represent an animal having such and such a typically human characteristics. The writings on monsters reveal the anxieties evoked by these kinds of 'mixed' creatures.

#### The world of the monkey: first experiment

In these experiments we chose monkeys as our prototype of wild animals. As we know since Darwin, human being shares its descent with monkeys, and our species thus has numerous similarities with them, but it also has one difference with them, which is usually defined by their lacking a characteristic -language, tools, etc.- the famous "missing link". From the similarity perspective, Lenain (1990) in a very beautiful book suggests "the primate difference" to point out the articulation of the human and the simian group within a same kind of beings. This difference emerges in the 18th century in the 10th edition of *Systema Naturae* (1758), in which Linnaeus first defines the groups of primates as a genus that is distinct from the human genus. What is interesting is the category leap Linnaeus did: the distinctive criterion is not morphological but mental. The pongids have a mental deficit, they lack the ability to reason that is characteristic of Homo sapiens (Centlivres, 1995).

Since that time, two opposing positions prevail among philosophers, naturalists, novelists, and culture in general. One position asserts the continuity between human

being and the animal kingdom. The second pays greater attention to the distinctions between species and tries to define the demarcation between monkeys and human beings. Each of the two positions try to clarify whether an essential difference can be upheld between what is human and what is non-human. It is understandable that anthropologist today are faced with an impossible choice and make, as Centlivres (1995, p.11) points out, "two seemingly contradictory assertions: they state on the one hand, that the supposedly solid demarcation lines between humanity and the great apes, that is, culture, language, tools, have been shown to be merely matters of degree, of quantitative differences, but on the other view humanity and animality as incommensurable, thus reasserting the singularity of the human condition".

This overview explains our choice of the picture of the monkey to study the ontologization hypothesis. By including the representation of a wild animal, the monkey evokes a supposedly solid demarcation line between the human and non-human, a mental deficit, and the impossibility of permanent relations or contact.

## METHOD

Participants. The participants consisted of 75 Gadge (i.e. non-Gypsies) volunteers, aged between 12 and 49 ( $M = 23.37$ ;  $SD = 8.77$ ). The majority (83%) were psychology and speech therapy students at the University of Valencia, and the experiment was carried out in their regular classroom . The rest of participants were volunteers from a public library. All participants were randomly assigned to the different experimental conditions. The study was carried out in 2000.

Material and procedure. The material used in the study consists of a small three-sheet notebook. Participants were asked to record their age, gender, and academic level on the first page. On each of the following two pages they were shown two photos that appear in Appendix 1. The first photo shows a monkey hanging by his arm from the branch of a tree and the second shows an adult male with a guitar and a dog sitting by his side. If we fill in the picture beyond the edge of the page, as we are all inclined to do, to round off what is not specified in the photo, we see that the monkey is in his own setting and the man with his dog living in theirs, a house. The suggested representation is a natural setting on the one hand, a cultural setting on the other. The participants' task is defined



by the instruction repeated on each photo: "Describe what you see on this photo". They were free to put things in their own words, without limitation in length or time.

Experimental design. Following a 2 x 2 factorial design, on the one hand the order of the pictures was alternated: in half the cases, the monkey's photo was shown before that of the guitar player with the dog, in the other half, the order was reversed. On the other hand, the appearance of the guitar player was manipulated so that in half the cases he belonged to the Gypsy minority, while in the other half he belonged to the Gadge (non-Gypsy, here Spanish) majority.

The ethnicity of the guitar player (Gypsy minority or Gadge majority) is implicit and is suggested by the looks that often differentiate the two ethnic groups. The same person - a 38-year-old man- appears in both photos. All we did was to vary his attire, relying, so to speak, on the language of clothing. For inducing the majority, Gadge condition, the guitar player wore a cap and a plaid shirt. And, to induce the minority, Gypsy condition, the guitar player wore no cap and had a black shirt. His face was slightly modified on the photo by lengthening the sideburns. It should be added that the word Gypsy or Gadge was never mentioned during the experiment.

If we wish to induce the animalization of the human being (wild representation), it is likely to result from the presentation of the picture of the monkey in the forest. And we hypothesize that by presenting this image before that of the guitar player and the dog, we induce a greater need for "anthropological" differentiation between the animal and the human realm. The taboo with respect to the contact of the majority with the animal realm should be intensified in this condition. This is only a means to an end, the end being to show the ontologization of the Gypsies. The domestic representation, without the monkey, on the other hand, should move the majority closer to the dog, since in this representation is the animal, the dog, who becomes a reflection of culture.

Dependent variables. Each word set down to describe the photos was codified by three judges according to two criteria. The first codification criterion was meant to establish whether the word refers to a trait that is specific to the human species, that is, whether it has an anthropological association, or whether it refers to a trait characteristic of animals, and hence has a zoomorphic association. The second codification criterion

refers to the positive, negative, or neutral connotation of the trait in question. After the completion of this task, we grouped the characteristics of the words that were set down into categories. The complete list is presented below:

Negative anthropological terms. We found altogether 19 negative traits in this category: divorced, is not working, poor, poor economy, vagabond, plays badly, down-and-out peasant, amateur, non-professional, down-and-out, awful, boring, not quiet, embittered, mean, irritated, tired, dissatisfied, anxious.

Neutral anthropological terms. We found 9 such terms: woodcutter, farmer, Andalusian, Spanish, North American, chauffeur, football fan, head of family, sideburns.

Positive anthropological terms. There are 48 such terms: cheerful, listening, thoughtful, rhythmical, pleasant, curious, artist, friend, coordinates mind and hand, folkloric, free, faithful, compliant, resembles someone, observing, obedient, pensive, passion, clever, creative, talent, communication, company, good relations, intelligent, radiant, sentiment, calm, tender, pleasing, humble, self-assured, extroverted, appealing, confident, happy, content, quiet, attentive, guitar player, musician, flamenco singer, he likes to sing, skilful flamenco clap, flamenco, plays in a rock group, is skilled with the guitar, composer, flamenco dancer.

Negative animalizations: There are seven such terms: famished, idle, fierce, dangerous, barker, thirsty, abandoned.

Neutral animalizations: There are twelve of these: fur, instinct, mixture, hunt, seated, dark-skinned, white, breathing, summer, nature, sun, countryside.

Positive animalizations: There are eight: nourished, fast, muscular, strong, big, beautiful, agile, tall.

Gypsy: We counted separately how often this word appears, given that it is an explicit check of the experimental manipulation about the person's ethnic membership.

Non- classified. Altogether there are nine characteristics that could not be classified: he likes animals, complicity, I don't like him, clean, does not inspire confidence, alert, peace, noble, ugly. These words were not classified because it was unclear to the judges whether it was specifically anthropological or animal.

Index of human-animal superimposition: The score of anthropological characteristics on the one hand and the animalization score on the other were standardized and an index was created showing the degree to which person and animal were superimposed. This superimposition index consists of the sum of the number of anthropological characteristics attributed to the dog and the number of animalizing characteristics attributed to the person. With this human-animal superimposition, we were targeting the concept of ontologization, the representation of the person by the dog and the converse. This was done on the one hand for positive characteristics and on the other for negative or neutral characteristics. Neutral characteristics were merged with negative characteristics after some preliminary analyses.

Thus, everything happens as if the index expressed the description of the guitarist with the dog's features as well as the description of the dog with the guitarist's features. Yet the important theoretical function of this index is to focus the analysis precisely on the substitution of the category of the human for the category of the animal. Or, in other words, it is possible to interpret the animal with the help of the semantic field of man, and man with the help of the semantic field of the animal. This is why we consider this index as an appropriate measure, not of the evaluations but of the representation in which the concepts of man and animal can be substituted for one another in order to describe the former or the latter.

## RESULTS

Variable checking. It can be noticed that the implicit induction about the Gypsy or Gadjé figure was successful. Six of the seventy-five participants who wrote the word Gypsy were in the condition in which the given photo was supposed to represent a Gypsy (Fisher's exact test,  $p < .03$ ). If in addition to the word 'gypsy' we take into account four other words which in Spanish slang are almost synonymous with it, referring to musician Gypsies, namely "flamenco", "bailaor" (flamenco dancer), "cantaor"

(flamenco singer), "manitas" (skilful flamenco clap), it can be seen that, in the condition supposedly referring to a Gypsy, 42.11% of the participants have given one of those terms, in contrast with the 2.7% who did so in the condition "Gadje" ( $\chi^2(1) = 16.60, p < .0001$ ). The manipulation of the guitar player's implicit ethnic membership thus proved effective.

Table 1: Average number of characteristics in each category for each experimental condition.

		with monkey		without monkey	
	Total	Gypsy	Gadje	Gypsy	Gadje
n	75	18	16	20	21
for the person: positive anthropologization	2.76	3.28	2.81	2.90	2.14
for the person: negative anthropologization	.79	.50	.50	.30	1.71
for the dog: positive anthropologization	2.24	2.50	2.94	1.30	2.38
for the dog: negative anthropologization	.40	.44	.25	.45	.43
for the person: positive animalization	.03	.11	.00	.00	.00
for the person: negative animalization	.20	.33	.13	.00	.33
for the dog: positive animalization	.29	.28	.06	.30	.48
for the dog: negative animalization	.64	.61	.19	1.15	.52

We first applied an analysis of variance to the number of words in each of these categories based on the three within-subjects factors by which they are organized: 2 (attributed to the person vs. attributed to the dog) x 2 (anthropological vs. animalization) x 2 (positive vs. negative-neutral). On the strength of this analysis we can state (see Table 1) on the one hand that in all the conditions the participants evoke a much greater number of anthropologized than of animalized characteristics ( $F(1, 74) = 174.43, p < .0001$ ), and many more positive than negative characteristics ( $F(1, 74) = 58.70, p < .0001$ ). It must be emphasized, furthermore, that the participants associated as many characteristics with the persons as with the dog ( $F < 1$ ). Overall, the tendency to anthropomorphize is stronger than the tendency to animalize. It is thus perfectly logical to expect a stronger tendency to attribute anthropologization to persons, whether Gypsies or Gadjes, and animalizations to the dog (interaction:  $F(1, 74) = 23.93, p < .0001$ ). This seems to express a normative discrepancy by which a higher or more positive value is attributed to the anthropologized element than to the animalized element.

These results were further developed by a set of univariate variance analyses following the two between-subject factors used in manipulation: 2 (implied ethnic membership of the person: Gypsy vs. Gadge) x 2 (monkey's picture: present vs. absent) for each type of characteristics (see Table 1).

Anthropologized characteristics. It appears that the positive anthropological characteristics associated with persons are a little more likely to be attributed to the Gypsy than to the Gadge, but this difference is not significant ( $p = .146$ ). Conversely, negative anthropological characteristics are more likely to be attributed to Gadge ( $M = 1.19$ ) than to the Gypsy ( $M = .39$ , ( $F(1, 71) = 9.37$ ,  $p < .003$ ). There thus seems to be an asymmetry that is favorable to the minority, as has been noted in numerous other studies (for instance, Dovidio and Gaertner -1986- for Blacks in the U.S.; Pérez and Mugny - 1993- for Gypsies).

As to the domesticated animal, that is, the dog, more positive anthropological characteristics are attributed to the Gadge's dog ( $M = 2.62$ ) than to the Gypsy's dog ( $M = 1.87$ ,  $F(1, 74) = 4.64$ ,  $p < .04$ ). However, there is no difference between the negative anthropological characteristics associated with either one's dog ( $p > .43$ ). If one keeps in mind that anthropologizing means humanizing, one must conclude that the Gadge's dog is more favorably humanized than the Gypsy's dog.

We now come back to the fact that in certain conditions the associations were made without the participants' seeing the picture of the monkey and in other conditions they were made after seeing this picture. While in the absence of the monkey the negative characteristics tend to be attributed more to the Gadge ( $M = 1.71$ ) than to the Gypsy ( $M = .30$ ), when the participants have seen the picture of the monkey, on the contrary, the difference between the Gadge ( $M = .50$ ) and the Gypsy disappears ( $M = .50$ ; interaction:  $F(1, 71) = 7.75$ ,  $p < .007$ ), as though the latter receives more and the former fewer negative characteristics. This may be interpreted as a manifestation of ontologization, which has a greater impact on the minority, probably because it is linked to the animal realm, while the majority is not.

The question might therefore well arise whether the comparison between the wild and the domestic animal accentuates the gap between the two. More experiments would be

needed to answer this question. But even this experiment highlights a contrast effect to the extent that the number of positive anthropologizations for the dog increases significantly in the conditions where the participants have seen the monkey's picture ( $M = 2.71$ ) compared to the conditions where the monkey is absent ( $M = 1.85$ ,  $F(1, 74) = 5.78$ ,  $p < .02$ ), especially in the case of the Gypsy's dog, which facilitates the superimposition of the Gypsy and his dog in those conditions where the monkey is present.

Animal characteristics. None of the positive characteristics relating to the animal are ascribed to the person on the photo ( $M = .03$ ), but some negative characteristics are ascribed to him ( $M = .20$ ,  $t(74) = 3.16$ ,  $p < .002$ ). There is also an interaction between the two manipulated factors ( $F(1, 74) = 6.70$ ,  $p < .02$ ); in the absence of the monkey's picture, these negative characteristics are more often ascribed to the Gadge ( $M = .33$ ) than to the Gypsy ( $M = .00$ ), but in the presence of the monkey's picture the opposite occurs, the Gypsy received more negative characteristics ( $M = .33$ ) than the Gadge ( $M = .13$ ). The result is that the participants who have not seen the picture of the monkey impute to an adult of their own group characteristics that match in his animal's features, as when an animal tamer's ferocity is evoked. But when they first see the picture of the monkey, the human-animal polarity is activated, and it is the Gypsy to whom the negative characteristics associated with animal are more often imputed.

The negative characteristics, furthermore, are more likely to be ascribed to the Gypsy's dog ( $M = .89$ ) than to the Gadge's dog ( $M = .38$ ,  $F(1, 74) = 4.84$ ,  $p < .04$ ). Tendency, fewer negative characteristics are imputed to the dog in the condition where the participants have seen the picture of the monkey ( $M = .41$ ) than in the conditions where the picture was shown only afterwards ( $M = .83$ ,  $F(1, 74) = 3.25$ ,  $p < .076$ ). The Gadge's dog and the dog in the presence of the monkey thus seem more domesticated.

All these results taken together converge on an overall view. We observed earlier that after having seen the image of the monkey, the participants tended to express a more domestic representation of the dog, i.e. they assigned it a higher number of positive anthropological traits. As a sharp contrast, the image of the "savage" monkey to some extent carries out a "domestic" dog representation, i.e., a more positive humanizing dog and a less negatively animalized dog. Reassuringly, this propensity could be explained


by itself. It is a new reaction to the link between the man and the animal. Participants who had not seen the picture of the monkey evoked less positive images for the Gypsy's dog than for the Gadge's dog. Those who had seen the monkey's image evoked next more animalized and more negative associations with the Gypsy's dog. In short, there is an inner link between these two tendencies that have prevailed everywhere and over many years: the tendency to anthropologize and the tendency to animalize majorities and minorities.

### Superimposition of the person and the dog

The complexity of the explored phenomena compels us to recall from time to time the procedure we have followed, and particularly the index expressive of the superimposition link. Firstly the anthropological and animal feature scores were standardized. Secondly we calculated the sum of the two scores, i.e. the anthropological characteristics attributed to the dog, and the number of zoomorphic characteristics attributed to the guitarist. Thirdly we made an analysis of variance for this score with the following three factors: 2 ethnic membership of the person (Gypsy vs. Gadge) x 2 picture of the monkey (present vs. absent) x 2 evaluation of the characteristics (positive vs. negative-neutral) with repeated measures on this last factor.

Only one interaction between the two manipulated independent variables emerges ( $F(1, 71) = 7.00, p < .01$ ; see Figure 1). In the experimental conditions where the participants have not yet seen the monkey's picture before setting down the words, the Gadge and the dog are more frequently mutually superimposed ( $M = +.15$ ) than the Gypsy and his dog ( $M = -.51, p < .05$ ); it would seem that the domestic link, the domesticated character of the animal is more salient for the Gadge than for the Gypsy. But in the conditions where the participants have already seen the monkey's picture, the Gypsy is more frequently superimposed on the dog ( $M = +.44, p < .05$ ) than the Gadge ( $M = -.07$ ). This interaction is independent of the evaluation ( $F < 1$ ) and thus the effect is the same, whether the characteristics are positive or negative. In the absence of further research on this subject, all we can do is to speculate that the ontologization of the Gypsy is stimulated by the symbolic presence of the monkey, which symbolizes both the wild animal and the wild man alone and in their own environment.

Figure 1: Degree of person-dog superimposition for the positive and negative-neutral characteristics, according to experimental conditions. A positive sign indicates a greater rate of superimposition.



## DISCUSSION

These findings are certainly encouraging in our attempt to show ontologization at work in relation to a minority group. When something wild is represented, i.e., when the participants have seen the monkey's picture first, the minority is more frequently superimposed on the animal. When the representation is domestic, i.e. the monkey's picture missing, the majority is the one that is superimposed on the animal. The old man-animal relation remains predominant as a part of the culture's fabric which favors the Gadge more than the Gypsy. On the other hand, the finding which shows an animal association between the Gadge and the dog actually enhances the domestic setting of the animal in man's environment. It does not correspond to ontologization, that is, to an inverse superimposition.

As we pointed out in the introduction, under the wild representation, the animal substrate emerges in man and man loses his singularity; his anthropological difference is subsumed in his differentiation from wildness. In this light, the minority, in our case the Gypsy minority, is ontologized, interposed between animal creatures and the own group.

In other words, we can suppose that the picture of the monkey, that is, of a wild animal, induces the participants to envisage more clearly a domestic order in the case of the Gadge, in whose case a clear distance is kept between human beings and domestic



animals. The opposite occurs with respect to the Gypsy, this picture tends to induce the subjects to reproduce, symbolically of course, what they believe is a more natural or wilder state of things. And therefore, according to our hypothesis, the ethnic minority is more likely to be represented as an intermediary between human being and animal, between the domestic and the natural or wild order. It might thus evoke a wild human creature bridging the ontological gap between animals and human beings. The fact is that this mixture of resemblances and differences can arouse anxiety and may occasionally provoke extreme reactions (Katz, 1981). It serves both as the source of an ambivalence that leads to an overestimation of the minority -the concept of the Noble Savage- or to its devaluation -as the Ignoble Savage. In both cases, the ambiguities of resemblance and difference prevent real, normal bonds from being formed between majority and minority.

## **Study II: Another version of the men-monkey experiment**

Before extending the discussion, we decided to gain a deeper insight into our hypothesis by seeking to substantiate these results with a different procedure. It was perhaps desirable for this experiment to rely on familiar prejudices and commonsensical representations; and even on a language that express them in the usual communication modes of our society. That is why our first version of the experiment took as its starting point the subjects' spontaneous associations with the pictures presented to them in the light of their own interpretation of the picture. Only in this second version, which we will present now, did we proceed to standardize the material by asking the subjects to choose responses in line with pre-establish categories.

In deed, in the first study the subjects set down their impressions and associated freely without limitation as to length or available time, and the result was a long list of various traits or characteristics. In this second study the procedure is modified by asking the subject to say, for each of the 114 characteristics obtained in the previous study, to what degree they apply to the person, the dog, to both, or to neither.

## **METHOD**

Participants. Participants in this study consisted of 90 psychology students at the University of Valencia, 67.8% of whom were women. The age range was from 18 to 53 ( $M = 23.52$ ,  $SD = 5.88$ ). All participants were randomly assigned to the different experimental conditions.

Material and procedure. The material consisted of a small notebook. On the first sheet, the subjects were asked to record their age, gender, and academic level. On the subsequent pages, the same two photos as in Study 1 were presented. As will be seen, the difference is that now the participant is not asked to give associations about the person and the dog but is presented with each of the 114 characteristics that emerged from Study 1. He is then asked to say about each of these characteristics whether "it applies to the person, the dog, both, or neither". On each of six sheets about twenty of these characteristics are listed, and on each of these six pages the photo of the guitar player and the dog is always reproduced at the top of the page.

Experimental design. The second study involves the same factor design as the first study, a 2 x 2 factorial design: 2 photo order (first the monkey and then the guitar player with the dog vs. first the guitar player with the dog and then the monkey) x 2 manipulation of the implicit ethnic membership of the guitar player (Gypsy vs. Gadjé).

Dependent variables. The same categories as in the first study (anthropological vs. animal; positive vs. negative-neutral) were formed with exactly the same characteristics in each category. To make the results comparable with the first study, the analyses took into account only the number of characteristics in each category that was attributed either to the person or to the dog.

## RESULTS

Manipulation checks. It should be remembered that in half the cases the photo supposedly represented a Gypsy and in the other half it supposedly represented a Gadjé. In the condition that is supposed to trigger the choice of Gypsy, this percentage rises to 71.7% as against 29.5% in the condition that is supposed to trigger the Gadjé ( $\chi^2(1) = 16.02$ ,  $p < .00006$ ). The manipulation of the guitar player's implicit ethnic membership thus proved effective.

As to the analyses of the content of the characteristics, all the previously noted effects are confirmed. Here again, the anthropologization of the person is more frequent ( $M = 20.67$ ) than the anthropologization of the dog ( $9.56$ ,  $t(89) = 9.08$ ,  $p < .0001$ , see Table 2). Here too, the animalization of the dog is greater ( $M = 7.21$ ) than the animalization of the person ( $M = 2.70$ ,  $t(89) = 12.39$ ,  $p < .0001$ ), both for the positive and for the negative characteristics. The positive anthropological identifications refer primarily to the person ( $p < .01$ ) and the negative animalizations to the dog ( $p < .01$ ). These results confirm by and large those obtained in the first study.

Then, as in Study 1, we performed an analysis of variance 2 (ethnic membership of the person -Gypsy vs. Gadjé) x 2 (monkey picture -present vs. absent) for each of the dimensions.

Table 2: Average number of characteristics in each category for each experimental condition.

	total	with monkey		without monkey	
		Gypsy	Gadjé	Gypsy	Gadjé
n	90	23	22	23	22
for the person: positive anthropologization	19.06	20.26	19.14	21.00	15.68
for the person: negative anthropologization	10.66	11.04	10.59	11.61	9.32
for the dog: positive anthropologization	7.68	9.39	5.82	6.09	9.41
for the dog: negative anthropologization	2.01	2.09	1.91	2.26	1.77
for the person: positive animalization	1.32	1.57	1.36	1.09	1.27
for the person: negative animalization	1.48	1.65	1.41	1.26	1.59
for the dog: positive animalization	1.74	2.17	1.41	1.35	2.05
for the dog: negative animalization	6.24	7.43	5.64	5.96	5.91

Anthropological characteristics. The positive anthropological characteristics trigger an effect depending on the person's ethnic membership ( $F(1, 86) = 6.85$ ,  $p < .01$ ): more positive characteristics are attributed to the Gypsy ( $M = 20.63$ ) than to the Gadjé ( $M = 17.41$ ). As may be remembered, this effect was only a tendency in Study 1. There is also a tendency interaction between the two manipulated factors ( $F(1, 86) = 2.90$ ,  $p < .092$ ), which shows that without the monkey these positive characteristics are less often attributed to the Gadjé ( $M = 15.68$ ) than to the Gypsy ( $M = 21.00$ ), but when the monkey was presented the attribution of positive characteristics is equal for the Gadjé

( $M = 19.14$ ) and the Gypsy ( $M = 20.26$ ). In short, one can see that while in Study 1 people avoid saying negative things about the ethnic minority and the interposition of the monkey significantly counteracted this effect, in this second study the effect is not on the negative but on the positive anthropological characteristics. There is a convergence in that, although there are more positive things said about the Gypsy than the Gadge, the presence of the monkey again tends to counteract this "favoritism" of the out-group.

The ascription of anthropological characteristics to the dog does not give rise to any effect when they are negative ( $p > .45$ ; same as in Study 1). For the positive characteristics, interaction between the two variables can be noticed ( $F(1, 86) = 8.89, p < .004$ ): in the absence of the monkey, the Gadge's dog receives a greater number of positive characteristics ( $M = 9.41$ ) than the Gypsy's dog ( $M = 6.09$ ), but when the monkey is shown first, then the Gadge's dog receives fewer positive characteristics ( $M = 5.82$ ) than the Gypsy's dog ( $M = 9.39$ ). Some subtle differences notwithstanding (with respect to the case where the Gadge's dog is seen before the monkey), this result largely converges with the result obtained in Study 1.

Animal characteristics. Even if, in comparison with Study 1, a somewhat larger number of positive characteristics normally associated with animals are ascribed to the person ( $M = 1.32$ ), the number of these responses remains extremely low, and, as in Study 1, there are no significant differences either between conditions ( $p > .21$ ). As to the negative animal characteristics applied to the person, a tendency toward the same interaction between the two manipulated factors ( $F(1, 86) = 3.59, p < .062$ ) as in Study 1 recurs. Even though it is now less significant, the tendency is identical: in the monkey's absence, these characteristics tend to be transferred more to the Gadge ( $M = 1.59$ ) than to the Gypsy ( $M = 1.26$ ), while, in the monkey's presence, they are transferred more frequently to the Gypsy ( $M = 1.65$ ) than to the Gadge ( $M = 1.41$ ).


As was true in Study 1, more negative ( $M = 6.24$ ) than positive characteristics ( $M = 1.74, t(86) = 14.76, p < .001$ ) are ascribed to the dog. There is no difference between conditions on the negative characteristics ( $p > .18$ ). For the positive characteristics, there is an interaction between the two factors ( $F(1, 86) = 6.06, p < .02$ ): without the monkey they are more likely to be ascribed to the Gadge's dog ( $M = 2.05$ ) than to the

Gypsy's dog ( $M = 1.35$ ), but with the monkey they are ascribed less frequently to the Gadge's dog ( $M = 1.41$ ) than to Gypsy's dog ( $M = 2.17$ ). The direction of the effect is the same as in Study 1, except that now it applies to the positive characteristics, while in Study 1 it applied to the negative characteristics.

### Superimposition between the person and the dog

As in Study 1, the anthropological and animal trait scores were standardized and a superimposition index devised. This index consists of the sum of the anthropologizing characteristics for the dog and the animalizing characteristics for the person. These superimposition judgments were then tested by an analysis of variance 2 ethnic membership of the person (Gypsy vs. Gadge) x 2 monkey's picture (present vs. absent) x 2 evaluation of the characteristics (positive vs. neutral-negative) with repeated measures for this last factor.

Figure 2: Degree of person-dog superimposition for the positive and negative-neutral characteristics, according to experimental conditions. A positive sign indicates a greater rate of superimposition.



The only significant effect that again emerges is an interaction between the ethnic membership of the person and prior exposure or lack of exposure to the monkey's picture  $F(1, 86) = 4.82, p < .031$ ). The direction of this interaction (see Figure 2) is the same as in Study 1: without prior presentation of the monkey, the Gadge is more often superimposed on the dog ( $M = +.15$ ) than the Gypsy ( $M = -.22$ ), but with the prior presentation of the monkey, the Gypsy is more frequently superimposed on the dog ( $M$

= +.40) than the Gadge ( $M = -.34$ ). Again this interaction is independent of the positive or negative connotation of the characteristics ( $p > .17$ ).

## DISCUSSION

There is a nearly complete convergence of the results in the two studies, a reassuring finding about the postulated process at work. We postulated that human being's relation with animal was guided by the representation of animals as either domesticated or wild. We meant to induce a representation of the guitar player and the dog on the picture as being domestic, while we expected that the prior introduction of the monkey's picture would induce a wild representation, a representation of beings related to nature and beings related to culture. Both representations can lead to a superimposition of human being and animal, but with an inversion of who is the object and who is the subject, of who is assimilated to whom.

In the domestic representation, animals are assimilated to human beings; human being serves as the subject and the animal as the object; the animal becomes an extension of man, in fact a demonstration of man's cultural "strength". Animal domestication is viewed as a product and a reflection of his know-how. According to the general principle that each group sees itself as the best representative of culture in general (Pérez, Moscovici and Chulvi, 2001), it makes sense that the Gadge's dog is more domesticated (or is attributed fewer negative and more positive traits, or more positive anthropological traits) than the Gypsy's dog. From our point of view this shows that the subjects interpret domestic order, training culture, as being better developed in their own group, that of the Gadge, than in the Gypsies'. The man-animal superimposition under this domestic representation does not presuppose ontologization of the man (anchoring human beings in animality), but rather the annihilation of animal identity, since the animal is turned into a mere product of the trainer's culture and hence removed from its own nature or identity. It seems rather the ontologization of the dog.

When the monkey is present, the wild representation predominates in the relationships between human beings and animals. In this case man is brought closer to animals. The monkey challenges the existence of an anthropological difference by making man as much part of the same natural order as animals: man become an object, one more

instance of the animal kingdom. The presence of nature acts as a threat against culture, its progress is then seen as the denial of nature. Culture is perceived not as having domesticated nature but as a way of keeping nature at a distance.

We postulate that in the face of this anthropological threat ontologization intervenes to interdict contact or mixture with the animal realm. We do see a superimposition of man and animal, but this time it does not apply to the Gadge and the dog, but to the Gypsy and the dog. Our hypothesis is that, in contrast to the previous superimposition, this superimposition constitutes an ontologization of the Gypsy, that is, a representation where the minority becomes more closely coupled to the animal realm.

### **Study III. Naked dogs and clothed dogs.**

The crucial point is that the relationship between men and animals, between "us" and "them" has been fundamental even before domestication began. Consequently a small number of species symbolize a privileged bond with culture, excluding most of the others. With the benefit of hindsight, we have tried to show that ontologization arises where the continuity between humanity and animality is questioned, for very different reasons. Substantially the question bears on the definition of what the human species is and what feature distinguishes it from non-human species. For certain reasons, which hardly need to be spelt out, at the heart of the conquest of America lies the question which was debated for nearly two centuries in churches and universities: whether the Indians were or were not human beings possessing souls. Later, the English sociologist Baumann remarked: "Theodore Roosevelt represented the extermination of American Indians as a selfless service to the cause of civilization. The settlers and pioneers have at bottom had justice on their side: this great continent could not have been kept as nothing but a game preserve for squalid savages" (Baumann, 2004, p.38). The representation of uncultivated and non-human wasted land ontologized the aboriginal minority and shaped the psychology of the majority, with all its consequences.

In the two preceding studies we have seen how the anthropological continuity is put in question more by a "wild" animal species than by a "domestic" animal species. This is as one would expect. It is no less interesting to go farther and ask oneself what would happen if, on the contrary, one goes to the extreme point where, by dint of

domesticating, assimilating animal to man, and humanizing it, as people attempt to do today, the anthropological difference between man and animal seems to fade, or be blotted out. One can surmise, pushing the previous argument farther, that anthropologization will be all the greater where the threat surrounding the difference is greater. In other words, one expects that the Gypsy minority will be more ontologized than the Gadge majority.

But let us return to our quest. In this new experiment we have attempted to push the domestication of animals, that is, the humanization of the dog, to its symbolic limit, that is, to the blurring of this difference between humanity and animality. According to Desmond Morris (1990), keeping an animal as part of the household is a deeply entrenched characteristic of the human species. He cites the case of American Indians where women nurse animals that are taken into the village at a very tender age. We are all too familiar with humanized pampered house animals, dressed up and tended like human beings. We may view them as simulacra, toys or puppets artificially removed from the animal realm. Serpell even brands this phenomenon as "a meaningless modern extravagance: a secondary product of Western decadence or bourgeois sentimentality" (Serpell, 1986, p.66).

If this description is apt, then this domesticated animal, whose humanization has been carried to its limit, no longer constitutes something intermediate, a distinctive link between the human and the animal kingdom. The confusion to which this leads should threaten the anthropological difference and thus modify the results that we obtained in the preceding experiments, thereby confirming *a contrario*, so to speak, the ontologization hypothesis.

We approached this question in a fairly direct way by putting clothes on the dog next to the musician on the photo presented to the subjects. It is reasonable to assume that the "clothed dog" symbolizes culture in contrast to nakedness (as the monkey is), which is more likely to represent nature. The experimental conditions create two situations: on the one hand, in the absence of the monkey, the clothed dog is "puzzled" to the musician, who is also dressed, and, on the other hand, the naked monkey compared to the dog and the musician, both of them clothed, activates the contrast between nudity and clothing and thus highlight the sharp nature-culture distinction. The threat of



anthropological difference should impinge more strongly in the first (clothed man vs. clothed animal-dog) than in the second condition (clothed man vs. naked animal-monkey). In keeping with this line of reasoning, the Gypsy minority will be more ontologized where the threat to anthropological difference is greatest, thereby contributing to the preservation of the majority's cultural singularity.

## METHOD

Participants. The participants in this study consisted of 71 Gadge volunteers. Women constituted 71.8% of the participants. Ages ranged from 13 to 47 ( $M = 22.22$ ,  $SD = 7.14$ ). The sample is almost identical to study 1: 87.1% of them were students of the University of Valencia (psychology and speech therapy), and the experiment was carried out in their regular classroom. The rest of participants volunteers from a public library. All participants were randomly assigned to the different experimental conditions.

Material, procedure, and design. The material, procedure, and design of this study are identical with Study 1, in that free association is used. The only difference is that now the dog appears wearing clothes (see Appendix 1 and photos 4 and 5).

The same dependent variables and the same analyses as in the two preceding studies are used here.

## RESULTS

Manipulation checks. It should be remembered that in half the cases the photo supposedly represented a Gypsy and in the other half it supposedly represented a Gadge. If in addition to the participants who wrote the word 'gypsy', we take into account four other words which in Spanish slang are almost synonymous with it, referring to musician Gypsies, namely "flamenco", "bailaor" (flamenco dancer), "cantaor" (flamenco singer), "manitas" (skilful flamenco clap), it can be noted that, in the condition supposedly referring to a Gypsy, 53.13% of the participants gave one of those terms, in contrast with the 12.82% who did so in the "Gadge" ( $\chi^2(1) = 13.35$ ,  $p <$

.0001). The manipulation of the guitar player's implicit ethnic membership thus proved effective.

As to the analyses of the content of the characteristics, an analysis of variance is performed with the three within-subject factors categorizing the content of the characteristics: 2 (ascribed to the person vs. to the dog) x 2 (anthropologization vs. animalization) x 2 (positive vs. negative-neutral).

Table 3: Average number of characteristics in each category for each experimental condition.

		with monkey		without monkey	
	total	Gypsy	Gadje	Gypsy	Gadje
n	71	17	20	15	19
for the person: positive anthropologization	2.58	3.59	2.35	3.07	1.53
for the person: negative anthropologization	.83	.47	1.10	.60	1.05
for the dog: positive anthropologization	1.70	1.59	1.90	1.67	1.63
for the dog: negative anthropologization	.24	.24	.20	.40	.16
for the person: positive animalization	.04	.00	.10	.07	.00
for the person: negative animalization	.25	.00	.55	.33	.11
for the dog: positive animalization	.13	.00	.25	.13	.11
for the dog: negative animalization	.49	.47	.90	.33	.21

One can see that the participants convey more anthropological characteristics than animal characteristics ( $F(1, 70) = 156.91, p < .0001$ ), that positive characteristics are attributed more frequently than negative characteristics ( $F(1, 70) = 72.36, p < .0001$ ). The interactions in this study are the same as in the first study. It is clear that anthropological characteristics are more often ascribed to the person and animal ones to the animal ( $F(1, 70) = 39.18, p < .0001$ ). And anthropological characteristics are more commonly positive, while animal characteristics are more commonly negative or neutral ( $F(1, 70) = 89.87, p < .0001$ ). The experimental modification, that is, putting clothes on the dog, does not disturb the comparability of the two experiments.

The following analyses consist of a set of analysis of variance according to the two manipulated factors: 2 (ethnic membership of the person: Gypsy vs. Gadje) x 2 (picture of the monkey: present vs. absent) on each of the categories of characteristics.

Anthropological characteristics. Positive anthropological characteristics are much more frequently associated with the Gypsy ( $M = 3.34$ ) than with the Gadge ( $M = 1.95$ , ( $F(1, 67) = 14.58$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Also in the condition where the monkey's picture is presented prior to the picture of the guitar player and his dog, more of these associations with the Gypsy or the Gadge ( $M = 2.92$ ) are produced than in the conditions where this picture is not produced ( $M = 2.21$ , ( $F(1, 67) = 3.64$ ,  $p < .061$ ).

Negative anthropological characteristics are elicited more frequently when the person on the photo is a Gadge ( $M = 1.08$ ) than when it is a Gypsy ( $M = .53$ , ( $F(1, 67) = 6.41$ ,  $p < .014$ ). However, in this third study there is no reversal of the associations with the Gypsy or the Gadge, whether or not the monkey is presented, in contrast to the first study.

But results seem to change with respect to the characteristics attributed to the clothed dog. There is no difference between the experimental conditions, either as far as the positive or the negative characteristics are concerned ( $F < 1$  in both cases). The failure of this effect to manifest itself is probably due to the fact that the dog wearing clothes somehow neutralizes the contrasts. That explains the lack of differences between the positive anthropologizations observed in the first two studies and the influence of the monkey's picture on the anthropologization of the Gypsy's dog in the first study.

Animal characteristics. It is certainly true that very few positive animal characteristics are attributed to the guitar player ( $M = .04$ ). However, there tends to be an interaction between the experimental conditions ( $F(1, 67) = 2.99$ ,  $p < .089$ ): the participants associate more positive animal characteristics with the Gypsy in the condition where they have not seen the monkey's picture ( $M = .07$ ) and with the Gadge in the condition where they have seen this picture ( $M = .10$ ). This is a tendency of which there was not the least trace in the previous studies.

Another tendency to interaction appears with respect to the negative animal characteristics ( $F(1, 67) = 3.17$ ,  $p < .079$ ). Those characteristics are also ascribed more frequently to the Gypsy in the condition where the participants do not see the monkey's picture prior to their response ( $M = .33$ ) than where they do see it ( $M = .00$ ), while more


negative animal characteristics are ascribed to the Gadge when they do see the monkey's picture ( $M = .55$ ) than when they do not ( $M = .11$ ). The opposite result was obtained in the first and second studies.

Negative characteristics tend to be more often attributed to the dog when the participants see the monkey's picture prior to their response ( $M = .70$ ) than when they have not seen it ( $M = .26$ , ( $F(1, 67) = 3.58$ ,  $p < .063$ ). And again the opposite result was obtained in the first study (where the dog was not clothed). These results tend to indicate that an attempt is made to identify the Gypsy with the overly humanized animal and to dissociate the Gadge from it, by placing him higher on the evolutionary ladder. But these tendencies are not sufficiently significant to give strong support to such an interpretation.

#### Superimposition between the person and the clothed dog.

As in two previous studies, the anthropological and animal trait scores were standardized and a superimposition index devised. This index consists of the sum of the anthropologizing characteristics for the dog and the animalizing characteristics for the person. We then carried out an analysis of variance of the superimposition index: 2 (ethnic membership of the person: Gypsy vs. Gadge) x 2 (monkey's picture: present vs. absent) x 2 (evaluation of the characteristics: positive vs. negative-neutral) with repeated measures for this latter factor.

Figure 3: Degree of person-dog superimposition for the positive and negative-neutral characteristics, according to experimental conditions. A positive sign indicates a greater rate of superimposition.



There is an interaction between the person's ethnic membership and the presence or absence of the monkey's picture prior to the response ( $F(1, 67) = 4.79, p < .032$ ) and this occurs independently of the positive or negative evaluation of the anthropological or animal characteristics ( $F < 1$ ). Figure 3 shows that in the conditions in which the participants respond without having seen the monkey's picture, they are more likely to superimpose the Gypsy and the clothed dog ( $M = +.28$ ) than the Gadge and his clothed dog ( $M = -.30$ ). Conversely, when the participants respond after having seen the monkey's picture, they are less likely to superimpose the Gypsy on the clothed dog ( $M = -.28$ ) than the Gadge on his dog ( $M = +.32$ ). This interaction completely reverses the ones we obtained in the first and second study.

## DISCUSSION

The third study is similar to the first, since in both cases only one visible factor is altered: the dog's clothes. If we then compare the types of associations expressed in these two studies, there is above all one revealing effect: the clothed dog elicits fewer anthropological characteristics than the naked dog, and this applies both to the positive characteristics ( $M = 2.24$  vs.  $1.70, p < .05$ ) and negative ones ( $M = .40$  vs.  $.24, p < .05$ ). This effect is reinforced by the tendency to attribute more positive animal characteristics to the naked than to the clothed dog ( $M = .29$  vs.  $.13, p < .07$ ). For the characteristics associated with the person, no difference between the two studies emerges.

The clothed dog seemed to evoke not so much another species, but rather a non-species, a purely human artifact and not a domesticated biological creature. The facts as such tend to indicate that the exaggerated similarity between human being and animal produce an undesirable identification and trigger confusion between them. As a consequence, the tendency is to reestablish differences, to return to an anthropological hierarchy, especially when the person involved belongs to the majority, in this case the Gadge. This reinforces the ontologization hypothesis: when the animal is turned into an in-between creature by putting clothes on it, the Gypsy seems to move closer to it. In the limiting case one might say that the Gypsy symbolically serves as a bridge between the Gadge and the clothed dog. When one thinks more deeply about this relation and the result obtained, one is left with the impression of a hierarchy of social skills, in which

the Gadge occupies a higher place than the Gypsy and is further removed from the animal than the Gypsy. A fuller examination of this hypothesis and its implications calls for additional research.

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

We would like to stress, first at all, that these numerous results confirm the ontologization hypothesis overall. However, to determine its bearings, we must, of course, spell it out more narrowly. In the first place, one result emerges from all three studies, namely, that the Gypsy is evaluated more favorably than the Gadge. This may be attributable to the spirit of our times (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995): there is a tendency to view minorities or victims more positively than majorities or dominant groups. But the Gypsy musician may also be perceived more prototypical of this art and thus more highly esteemed in this role than the Gadge musician. And yet it is significant, from our point of view, that this general effect does not in the least interfere with the superimposition that is made of the Gypsy and the animal.

Essentially elemental, in human or infra-human character perceived in the out-group has been established in a number of studies (Bar-Tal, 1989; Demoulin, Rodríguez, Rodríguez, Vaes, Paladino, Gaunt, Cortés and Leyens, 2004). They have shown that individuals tend to ascribe to the out-group more primary emotions, common to men and animals (e.g., surprise, fear, anger), and ascribe to the in-group more secondary emotions and such as those that are exclusively human (e.g., love, contempt, resentment). If the distinction between primary and secondary emotions holds, then these studies show us that the categorisation of out-groups constitutes at the same time a stigmatisation (Moscovici, 2002). This is no doubt a salient aspect, if not the most important, in the phenomenon of contact avoidance between majority and minority, two social groups who have cohabitated for five centuries. An avoidance, "whether consciously presented, is no less the universal characteristic of human relations where similarity, harmony, friendship and love are absent" (Crawley, 1927, p. 108).

This is why our work has been dedicated to the representations of the minority group, including their symbolic occupation "guitarist" and features which imply either the wild animal or the domestic animal. Thus the animal does not appear as a mere adjective, a

discriminating feature of the out-group, but as an ontological metaphor for a real minority. For that matter, our animalization index consists of just as many items in which the person is substituted for the animal as the other way around. Comfortingly therefore, our studies exemplify that only when the minority is faced with a wild representation is it more infra-animal, if one can say so. Whereas when faced with a domestic representation the majority is more often perceived with animal features.

We have shown in the three studies that the Gypsy minority can be superimposed on an animal species, by taking into account the number of characteristics befitting an animal and the number of characteristics befitting a person and attributed to an animal. This superimposition is approximately of the same order of magnitude for the Gypsy majority. Hence animals do not automatically function as a predicate for the Gypsy. It would be much more troubling and in fact much more ominous, if such a thing were possible under normal conditions in our culture, in time of peace, as it happened in time of war. From the very start, we doubted this automatic association between animals and humans. We did so by calling to mind, with respect to monkeys, that people were looking both for an intermediary link between them and us and, at the same time for a missing link, an essential distinction. In short, we think that we are like monkeys, but that monkeys are not like us. That allows us to represent men like monkeys that have succeeded, from the Darwinian perspective, and to represent monkeys like humans who are deficient in something, failed humans. It is in the light of this representation that the Gypsy may be assimilated to a wild man in the continuum that goes from the human species to an animal species. And this assumes a mixture of similarities and differences between human and animals attributes. As psychologists have known for a long time, it is this mixture that causes confusion and anxiety, against which people set up defenses. The ambiguous answer to the question "Are they or are they not like us?" arouses sharper and more persistent reactions than if the choice were a simple alternative of men or animals.

Theories have something in common with searchlights and spotlights. That is, they light up only certain parts of the stage, while the other parts remain dark and invisible. In contrast, if the same light fell on every part of the stage, no distinction would be made between them. The studies on deshumanization, which we owe to our colleagues consider broad social categories as defining the relations between in- and out-groups.

Our "work in progress" is focused on a specific problem in Europe, concerning specific groups in the light of a theory of social representations about the relationships between minorities and majorities. This is why the "infra-animal" concept leaves in the dark some of the aspects of reality that we are trying to understand and make sense of.

The question remains, however. Let us raise it clearly for those who study discrimination and the taboo against contact at the privileged level of a general theory. We cannot dispute their principle that there exists a bias in favor of one's own group and of maintaining a certain distance with respect to other groups. This finding corresponds to a lived experience and has a strangely simple air. And yet, if we look at things more closely, we find that there are always groups, minorities, that use so to speak sanctified, viewed more positively than they were in the past or by their own group, as were the proletariat in the last century and women or homosexual in our times. And Gypsies, like other minorities, benefit from this change in the "spirit of the times", as our research indicates. Yet we wonder all the same whether prejudices or the taboo against contact are receding as much as would be expected, in this heyday of human rights. We raise this question to the extent that studies about Gypsies in several European countries show us that the ontologization phenomenon persists. It would seem that there remained a need to regulate contacts between the nomad minority and the sedentary majority and to maintain the distinction between the former and the latter. And animal species are a symbol of this distinction since, for ages, they have been represented after the fashion of a minority group, of an "alien", thereby justifying the destruction of certain animal species for the benefit of human being (Benson, 1980; Driscoll, 1992).

What we are saying is this: this process (of ontologization) which is usually concealed or neglected deprives minorities of that part of humanity that is their due and limits their field of existence. We do not simply make the case for lucidity, for a better insight into the dense reality of discrimination. What we are proposing is that this reality is somewhat different from what we have been led to believe.

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## APPENDIX I.

Photo 1: Naked monkey



Photo 2: "Gypsy" guitar player



Photo 3: "Gadge" guitar player




Photo 4: "Gypsy" guitar player and clothed dog



Photo 5: "Gadje" guitar player and clothed dog

