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A study of minorities as victims

SERGE MOSCOVICI¹ AND JUAN A. PÉREZ^{2*}

¹*Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales,
Paris, France*

²*University of Valencia, Spain*

Abstract

This article presents the idea that during the 1990s an important change took place in relation between minorities and majorities: the emergence of minorities as victims alongside the formerly predominant active, militant minorities. A hypothesis is raised that these two types of minorities differ in their agenda as well as in the nature of the influence they exert. Active minorities trigger an external conflict with majority and induce conversion (latent rather than overt influence); minorities as victims create an internal conflict, a sense of guilt, within the majority, while they exert an exclusively overt influence. We report two experiments confirming our hypothesis. We discuss the novelty of this phenomenon and its relevance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

An Unfinished Task

We are confident that the theory of innovation by the action of minorities has not exhausted its heuristic value for one major reason: as minorities keep changing, the field of exploration keeps broadening. To clarify this point, let us recall the two main explanations proposed by us to explain the attraction and the hold of minorities on majorities (Moscovici, 1976). The first was the behavior of the active minority, which provoked a conflict by refusing to adopt the norms and beliefs of the majority. It served as a model for change, either by severing its link with the group or by transgression against prohibitions. It thereby gave access to the unknown, the original, or to an alternative point of view, of which the dissident minorities at the end of last century are the best example.

But we also raised the hypothesis that *social culpability* might be a second explanation, applying to many types of deviants and minorities. These belong to groups subjected to various forms of economic, social, and racial discriminations that place them in a position of inferiority and exclude them from society's idea of normality. They are deprived—whether glaringly and directly or hypocritically—of

*Correspondence to: Juan A. Pérez, Facultad de Psicología; Av. Blasco Ibáñez, 21; E-46010-Valencia, Spain.
E-mail: juan.a.perez@uv.es

the rights guaranteed to all other individuals by the social system and by political or religious values. This discrepancy between principles and reality creates not only internal conflicts but also a sense of guilt. 'There is a self-contradiction in a Christian to be a slave owner, in a democrat to use devious means to prevent blacks from voting, or in an egalitarian to be surrounded by flagrant inequalities' (Moscovici, 1976, p. 85).

In his famous work on discrimination against blacks, *An American Dilemma*, Gunnar Myrdal (1944) described the general feeling of individual and collective guilt (cf., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004) and showed to what extent Americans lived in a conflicted situation. He made the following interesting observation: 'Whenever it is pointed out, preferably in a calm tone of voice, that prejudiced remarks are not in the American tradition, the bigot is more effectively defeated' (p. 314). Unquestionably, social guilt is not by itself sufficient to explain these behaviors or relations, but it is legitimate to assume that the contradictions between reality and the ideal lay the foundation for the conditions in which 'the disinherited, the oppressed, the vanquished may arouse strong emotions and sympathies when they are confronted with the powerful and the fortunate. The gods were on the side of the winners, but Cato was on the side of the vanquished' (Moscovici, 1976, p. 86). A society's official morality does not exempt its members of collective guilt.

It can be easily ascertained that most of the research in our field (De Dreu & De Vries, 2001; Moscovici & Mugny, 1987; Moscovici, Mucchi-Faina, & Maass, 1994; Mugny, 1982; Pérez & Mugny, 1990) examined the first explanation for the impact of minorities on majorities and the change induced in these majorities, namely, the role of conflict. This was the case not only because it is the most important explanation but also because these active minorities were the most numerous and the most relevant in our society. A shared vision, a whole world in the making seemed to be held by these minorities, which were shaping new social movements such as ecology and feminism. And it was feasible to study these minorities experimentally, albeit in a fragmentary and artificial way, because the participants tacitly shared this view of the world, continuing to think and to react in the laboratory just as they thought and reacted in every day life. It is a matter of course that the *Zeitgeist* determines research programs and at the same time makes them easier to implement. No matter how ephemeral or enduring this *Zeitgeist* is, the theory was incomplete as long as the second explanation for the impact or the influence of minorities was left out of account. At the same time, the sense of something that remains to be discovered, of an unresolved problem, is the best evidence of the theory's fruitfulness.

Minorities as Victims

Relations between minorities and majorities underwent a significant change in the 1990s (Barkan, 2000). Most of the groups that had been considered deviant, marginal, or anomic gained the status of victims entitled to social acceptance and to a specific remedy for all forms of discrimination or exclusion. One consequence of this shift is a change in nomenclature; persons formerly labeled 'handicapped' are now categorized as 'physically challenged', or, more correctly, 'differently abled'. Moreover, the status of victims confers a feeling of moral superiority and entitlements, among them, the right to compensation. According to Steele (1990, p. 14), 'it is a formula that binds the victim to its victimization by linking the power to his status of victim.' More specifically, 'it is primarily a victim power grounded in the entitlement derived from past injustice.'

As a consequence, society is viewed as an arena where the majority oppresses the minority and anyone who is vulnerable and without resources. On the other hand, collective racial, political, and cultural demands on the part of active minorities such as the Black Panthers in the United States are in some way changing in nature or are relying on new strategies. Nowadays equal rights, non-discrimination, the elimination of sexual or racial harassment and emancipatory measures are

demanding on the strength of victimhood. One way or the other, minorities presenting themselves as victims (Amato, 1990) have an opportunity 'not only of exculpating one's self from the blame, but also for projecting guilt into others' (Sykes, 1992, p.10). This guilt may originate in the past, as far back as the discovery of America by Columbus, to the birth of slavery, or to an even more distant past, as in the case of men's domination over women. It supposedly delineates the features by which one can recognize the majority's debt to the minority.

In short, there is a recognized activity and a recognizable category of persons who are assigned responsibility for the minority's victimization: Whites for the victimization of Blacks, males for the victimization of females. There are two aspects to this matter. The first aspect suggests that the state of victim is not rooted necessarily in an angry minority or one that is in some other way hostile. All that is required is for the minority to view its own situation or define itself in terms of an inadequacy, a lack, or a loss of power. But it may be true, as the English philosopher Williams points out, that 'victim's anger, on the other hand, draws the attention to the victim' (Williams, 1993, p. 222).

The second aspect suggests that it takes a victim to arouse a sense of guilt, and above all a social sense of guilt. The figure of the victim is highly internalized in this process. Without dwelling on this point, we must agree with Williams that if it is 'inherent of guilt opposed to shame' to draw 'our attention to the victims of what we have wrongly done, then the victims and their feeling should remain figured in the construction of guilt' (p. 222). This holds true as long as the feeling of guilt is not so highly refined that it completely transcends the original basis of anger and fear. This point is reached when 'guilt comes to be represented as the attitude of respect of an abstract law and then no longer has any connection with victims' (p. 222).

One might even wonder whether the minority's objective in assuming victimhood might not be to save the original starting point from oblivion. And even more to prevent the majority from identifying its guilt with transgression of an abstract law, rather than accepting a debt toward a concrete group that it has unjustly hurt. Or could it be that the difference or inequality between majority and minority has in some way become suspect, so that we must ask ourselves with the former and no longer with the latter: but who is really at fault? The shift that has taken place lies precisely in this reversal, the shift in who has the right to raise this question and who therefore has the right to give an answer to it. This reversal explains why newspapers are highlighting the controversy surrounding guilt; *Le Monde* (24-10-2004), for instance, refers to a 'society obsessed by its victims.' It is worth noting that a special government department for 'victims rights' was established in France in 2004. First the existence of victims came to be acknowledged, and now victims are beginning to seem ubiquitous, to the point where we can speak of a victim culture.

Redressing Past Wrongs

We have highlighted the following two points: (i) we are now seeing the emergence of minorities as victims alongside the active militant minorities that used to predominate and (ii) the minorities as victims are basically stressing external factors, claiming external causes for their handicaps, insisting on respect for their rights (Waldron, 1990), which had previously been neglected or thwarted by the majority. They mainly differ from the older militant minorities in their insistence on compensation for what has happened to them. As observed, their expression of anger, resentment and indignation awakens social guilt among the majority. We learn from religion and history that the majority can assuage this indignation or this resentment only by redressing old wrongs. It is conceivable that the majority fears punishment or that it punishes itself to atone for its mistakes. While in the past recognizing guilt, pleading for the forgiveness of past injustices knowingly inflicted on ethnic, racial, and religious minorities would have seemed strange, all this has now become almost the norm.

The Catholic church has taken the lead among institutions that have admitted their social and historical culpability. John Paul II uttered his first '*mea culpa*' in 1982 for the excesses of the Inquisition against 'truth', and he has since then on a hundred occasions apologized for a specific list of wrongs attributable to the Catholic church. In 1984, he asked forgiveness for the actions of the missionaries during the colonization period. In 1987, he admitted that Christians were involved in the extermination of Indians. In the same year he apologized to African populations for the brutality they suffered during the last centuries. In 1995, he spoke out against military undertakings and even against the Crusades as errors. He asked forgiveness of all Catholics for the persecution of non-Catholics throughout history. Similar apologies were extended by the pope with respect to slavery, racism, the Church's collaboration with dictatorships, the attitude of Christians during Nazism, for the Holocaust—and this list is far from complete. His admission of social and institutional guilt and his plea for forgiveness are evidently a new practice in the long history of the Catholic church. It is not an isolated behavior, however, since recently Queen Elizabeth II apologized to the New Zealand Maoris for their mistreatment under the British Empire. And the US Congress has repeatedly followed suit, for instance with respect to Hawaiians and the abuses that occurred during the occupations of their country.

At the same time that minorities have been asked for their forgiveness, countries or minority populations for redressing injustices have been demanding redress for their suffering. At the time of the United Nations' summit meeting against Racism held in Durban in 2000, several African and Caribbean countries demanded that the former colonial powers confess their fault with respect to slave trade and address it by paying them compensations. It may be surmised that these are strategies intended to preserve social and political peace. But the important aspect from our point of view is that there has been an admission of social culpability and that such strategies have never in the past been used on such a scale (Barkan, 2000). They are a reflection of the fact that human rights have become embedded in society and that our social representations of minorities (Doise, 2002) and our relations with them have undergone realignment.

Victimized and Active Minority

For all these reasons we have therefore designed a project to study victimized minorities. A first step is to examine the differences between the stratagems and methods of exerting influence of these new minorities, about which we know next to nothing, and those of active minorities, about which we know a great deal (Levine & Russo, 1987). We need not dwell here on the reasons why an active minority creates a conflict (Simmel, 1987) between its representations or attitudes and those of the majority—a conflict that will be resolved by conversion, the effect of a latent rather than an overt influence on the majority (Maass & Clark, 1984; Moscovici, 1980; Pérez & Mugny, 1990). This effect has been confirmed by numerous experiments (for a meta-analysis, see Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). But if we wish to understand how minorities as victims in our time exert an influence or an action on the majority and why this action or influence differs from that of an active minority, we must explore the following two hypotheses:

- i) The minority laying claim to the status of victim is recognized, and the majority can or even must accept its demands or share its opinions. In that case, it is not a matter of conciliatoriness, in the old sense, but of making a concession that may express an agreement.
- ii) It can be assumed that the message of the minority as victim will more often trigger a conflict within the majority than with the majority. It will be the conflict expressed by the sense of guilt, that is, between its beliefs, its ideas and its principles on the one hand and its actions or prejudices and its behavior toward the minority on the other. This guilt arises either because these actions and

prejudices are publicly prohibited or condemned or because one imagines that they are. One possible consequence of this conflict is that the majority has a more negative representation of itself than does the minority. Indeed, several experiments show that, in an influence condition, a white source attracts more negative descriptions than a black source, of course on the part of the white majority (Pérez & Mugny, 1993). In short, it is reasonable to assume that the minority as victim allows the majority—which has done so much harm—to overcome its internal conflict, to make a fresh start, but that it does not create an external conflict by which it might change at a latent level the majority's way of judging or prejudging the minority. This hypothesis explains in part the practice of reparations that we listed earlier, pleas for forgiveness or offers to redress wrongs, which are supposed to purify memory. The International Theological Commission (document on internet) clearly stated that purifying memory is not an archaeological working but a process of internal change that makes it easier to face the future freely and creatively. To summarize our hypothesis: the effect of a minority as victim is to bring about manifest influence in the majority's judgments or evaluations. It is expected that an active minority is to produce a latent influence.

EXPERIMENT 1

Method

Participants

Ninety-six students (82 women, 14 men; mean age = 21.38, $SD = 3.92$) from the departments for Social Work and Labor Relations at the University of Valencia participated in the experiment. Two participants failed to complete the questionnaire and were excluded from analyses.

Procedure

The students were asked to fill out a questionnaire in one of the courses they were taking at the university. Their first task was to read a short summary of a report about the history of Gypsy persecution in Europe. As will be seen later, the initial experimental manipulation involved the presumed source of this report. The participants were then asked to set down whatever ideas came to mind after reading the report and to answer a set of questions.

Design

The experiment has a 2×2 design: active versus victimized minority and symbolic guilt versus symbolic conflict. At the outset, the participants read a one-page report about the history of Gypsy persecution. The first independent variable consisted in manipulating the source of this text: active minority versus victimized minority. In half the cases, for the *victimized minority* condition, participants were told that they were reading an 'Abstract of a report about the Gypsy population by Gypsy Representative,' while in the active minority condition they were informed that it was an 'Abstract of a report about the Gypsy population by the Gypsy Political Party.'

The abstract in question consisted of a rather unpolished, one-page summary on the true history of the persecution of the Gypsies in Europe. After recalling the dates at which the Gypsies reached the different European countries, the summary divided the fate of the Gypsies into three phases: a favorable reception (objects of curiosity, treatment as pilgrims, respect for their family and judicial system, etc); a

phase in which they were evicted from each country: several European countries and the respective dates, names of the kings, and a range of punishments inflicted in the (numerous) cases of Gypsy 'disobedience;' and a final phase of intensified Gypsy persecution: enforced slavery in Rumania prior to 1860, defenseless slaughter while roaming in Germany, Austria, Switzerland; Charles VI's edict to hunt down all men and cut off an ear on all women and children; enforced name change, enforced residence in specific places; enforced attire differing from that of other people; prohibition against speaking their own language, and finally, a reference to the 250,000 Gypsies exterminated by the Nazis.

At the beginning of the abstract, there appeared a photograph of a man of around 40 on landing of a building reminiscent of the headquarters of an institution. In the *victimized minority* condition, the man was seated on the steps; in the *active minority* condition, the same man was in an upright position. The idea was to reinforce the impression that the seated man was more passive and the standing man more active. In the *victimized minority* condition, the caption of the photograph read that the man was '*Representative Raimundo Heredia waiting there for a meeting at the Ministry with the government representative for Gypsy Affairs*'. In the *active minority* condition the caption of the photograph read that the man was '*Leader Raimundo Heredia entering the room for the assembly of the Gypsy Political Party*'. This was meant to imply that, in the face of the horrendous persecution of the Gypsies in the past, the minority as victim remains passive and merely seeks to obtain a compensation from the State; the other minority takes an active, combative stance and envisages changing society so that in the future it will no longer have to suffer this kind of persecution.

In its conclusion, the summary of the history of Gypsy persecution was formulated so as to stress the contrast between the two types of minorities. In one case, it ended with a petition pointing to Gypsy suffering, in the other with a slogan calling for social change. In the *victimized minority* condition, the report ended with these words: '*We ask ourselves: should not we Gypsies seek compensation from the State, given that this society has inflicted such grave sufferings on us in the past and continues to make us suffer?*' In the *active minority* condition, it ended with: '*we ask ourselves: should we Gypsies not mobilize and fight actively until we achieve a radical change in this society, which has persecuted us so grievously and continues to persecute us?*'

Let us recall our hypothesis. While minorities as victims exert a manifest influence through the majority's internal guilt feelings, active minorities exert their influence through their external conflict with the majority. It should be pointed out that experimental studies involving guilt feelings must take a specific emotional aspect into account, to wit, that people are less inclined to share with others their feelings of guilt or shame than feelings of a different sort: they are likely to conceal their underlying thought process or to hide their feelings (Lewis, 2000). The tendency to internalize these emotions to the utmost and to keep them secret exacerbates the conflicts participants experience whenever they keep others at a distance. 'On the whole, Rimé states, emotions kept secret are thus clearly linked with characteristic manifestations of shame and guilt. While social sharing is favorable to self-revelation, shame and guilt, on the contrary, encourages a tendency toward self-concealment' (Rimé, 2005, p. 309).

The second independent variable was meant to reveal social guilt indirectly, circumventing any attempt at concealment. It consisted solely in varying the affective and symbolic context by displaying the minority's petition or slogan either on a *black* or on a *red* background. Our idea was that in Europe and especially in the south of the continent, black is often associated with grief, evil, sadness, or mourning. Red, on the contrary, is most commonly associated with life, revolution, struggle, and with openly expressed violence (Bousoño, 1952; Gauthier, 1982; Servier, 1994). We believe that, in keeping with these widely held views, the sense of guilt aroused by the request to compensate for the Gypsies' past suffering is symbolized by the black background, while the red background is symbolic of the confrontation the minority triggers when it expresses its goal, i.e., changing the prejudice of the majority. Thus we expected a reinforcement or a Gestalt effect when the text was shown on a black background in the first condition, or on a red background in the second condition.

Even when stated summarily, the ideas underlying this manipulation offer an explanation for the two diametrically opposite effects we anticipated. If, on the one hand, black tends to symbolize the guilt of the majority and red a confrontation with the minority and if, on the other hand, guilt is the cause of the victimized minority's manifest influence and confrontation or conflict is the basis of the active minority's latent influence, our theoretical predictions become clear. We expect that the minority as victim will have greater manifest influence when its message is presented on a black background reinforcing guilt feelings, while the active minority will strengthen its influence when its message is presented on a red background that accentuates the conflict with the majority. We expect that this context, which seems to represent a purely external aspect, actually has a noticeable effect on influence, in that it reinforces either the majority's internal conflict or its conflict with the minority.

Dependent Variables

Evoked ideas Similar to the thought-listing technique (Brock, 1967; Cacioppo, Harkins, & Petty, 1981), the first dependent variable, which was also intended to focus the participants' attention on the experimental manipulations, consisted of asking the participants the following question: 'What feelings does this request arouse in you? What ideas occurred to you when you read it? Write down all the words that come spontaneously to your mind' (In the active minority condition, request is replaced by slogan). To answer this question, the participants received a table with three columns, each with five lines. Participants were not limited either in the number of words they could write down or in the time available for this task.

The participants were then asked to reply to a set of items grouped along two scales. *Manifest attitude scale* The following items were used to establish the scale (1 = I completely agree; 21 = I completely disagree): (a) *One must grant special rights to the Gypsies to erase the memory of this horrible past;* (b) *the Gypsies must be given 2% of the leadership positions in public institutions;* (c) *There should be a ministry devoted solely to the Gypsy question.* Cronbach alpha is 0.50. The scale was inverted so that a high rating implied a more favorable attitude about Gypsy.

Latent attitude scale This scale is practically taken from prior research (Pérez & Mugny, 1993) and consists of the following four items (1 = I completely agree; 21 = I completely disagree): (a) *Gypsies are less concerned about their children's education than the Gadjé (i.e., Spaniards, 'payos' in Spanish);* (b) *Gypsies are less determined to excel than the Gadjé;* (c) *Gypsies are less involved in politics than the Gadjé;* (d) *Gypsies care less about technological progress in our society than the Gadjé.* Cronbach's alpha is 0.75. A high score indicates a strong opposition to these statements, and thus implies that the participant has more favorable latent attitudes toward the Gypsies.

As can be seen from this scale, Gypsies are compared to Spaniards (*payos*) with respect to values that are practically truisms for the majority: the value of education, development of political life, technological progress, and hygiene. The more the participant affirms that the Gypsies are unconcerned about these values, the more removed they seem in his eyes from the culture of the majority. These are latent items, since most people simply consider them to be factual statements.

Results

Semantic Context

The participants suggested 446 ideas related to the history of the persecution for the four different conditions. The reported number of ideas per participant ranges from 1 to 15, with an average of 4.74

($SD = 3.00$) reported ideas per participant. The 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) analysis of variance shows no significant effect ($p > 0.35$), that is, the same number of reported ideas occurs for each of the four experimental conditions (see Table 2).

Grouping of the 446 reported ideas into nine categories was done by three judges on the basis of their semantic content (see Table 1 for all the complete list of textual terms). The 'Others' category includes whatever ideas did not fit into the previous categories or on whose meaning the judges were unable to agree, 10.3% of the total.

The judges thus first arranged the ideas in line with each of the conclusions of the message. In Category I (Table 1) were summed up the relatively few terms (3.2%) referring to the victimized minority's explicit demand for *compensation*. As was to be expected, the 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) ANOVA reveals a main effect, namely, that

Table 1. Experiment 1. Complete list of textual terms, grouped by category. The number in parenthesis shows the number of participants who wrote down the same term

Category	%	Textual terms
I. Compensation	3.2	Compensation (6); Reasonable (2); Logical; Consideration; Recognition; Solutions; Empathy; Unfair.
II. Change	4	Change (10); Mobilization (3); Action (2); Agitation; Radical; Transformation.
III. Suffering, Injustice	17.7	Injustice (12); Inequality (7); Suffering (6); Pain (5); Mistreatment (4); Repression (4); Pity (4); Sadness (2); Humiliation (2); Forgetfulness (2); Past (2); Persecution (2); Powerlessness (3); Incomprehension (2); Feeling (2); Shame (2); Too late; Fury; Absurdness; Abuses; Distress; Punishment; Understanding; Cruelty; Guilt; Excessive; Indignation; Unnecessary; Remoteness; Memory; Death; No manners.
IV. Justice, Quality	17.7	Justice (29); Equality (25); Rights (19); Democracy (2); Laws (2); Norms; Civic duty.
V. Discrimination	15.6	Discrimination (19); Racism (12); Marginalization (7); Intolerance (6); Prejudices (4); Xenophobia (3); Exclusion (3); Poverty (2); Race (2); Rejection (2); Isolation; Stereotypes; Labeling; Expulsion; Fascism; No to disrespect; Nazi government; Negation; No special rights.
VI. Struggle	13.9	Struggle (18); Courage (5); Conflict (4); Rebellious spirit (4); Claims (2); Minority (3); Union (3); Strength (2); Resistance (2); Demonstration (2); Defense; Non-conformity; Confrontation; Revolution; Strikes; Violence; No radical change; Autonomy; Independence; Constancy; Improvement; Participation; Politics; Recognition; Willpower; Wanting their own; Minority culture.
VII. Resentment	5.9	Resentment (10); Revenge (4); Hatred (5); Aggression; Frustration; Anger; Discomfort; Lie; Reaction.
VIII. Integration	3.8	Adaptation (3); Integration (3); Assimilation (2); Cultural respect (3); Tolerance (2); Multiculturalism; Diversity; Acceptance.
IX. Values	7.8	Freedom (6); Solidarity (5); Dignity (4); Well-being (2); Ideals (2); Sensitivity (2); Social harmony; Peace-loving; Dialogue; Education; Effort; True to values; Peace; Protection; Good sense; Human being; Society; Solitude; Employment.
X. 'Others'	10.3	Abandonment; Adapting; Profiteers; Toil; Majority culture; Culture; Impertinent; Culture ignorance; Different; Troublesome; Money; Deceptive; Exaggeration; Extraneous; Illusion; Self-important; Incongruity; Intention; Individualism; Self-interest; Machismo; Manipulation; Sufferers; Mentality; Non-fulfillment; Nomads; Opportunity (2); Pride; People; Reject past; Gypsy respect; Second time; Submissiveness; Shameless; Utopia (3); Own life; Customs (2).

Table 2. Experiment 1. Average of ideas by condition, and percentage of participants -based on the total for each condition- having given at least one characteristic of the dimension in question

	Total	Active minority		Victimized minority	
		Red	Black	Red	Black
I. Compensation	0.15	0.00 (0 %)	0.09 (8.7 %)	0.17 (12.5%)	0.33 (25.0 %)
II. Change	0.19	0.43 (39.1 %)	0.30 (30.4 %)	0.00 (0 %)	0.04 (4.2 %)
III. Injustice and suffering	0.84	0.57 (30.4 %)	0.57 (43.5 %)	1.08 (70.8 %)	1.13 (62.5 %)
IV. Justice, equality, rights	0.84	0.96 (52.2 %)	0.70 (52.2 %)	0.54 (41.7 %)	1.17 (66.7 %)
V. Discrimination	0.74	0.30 (17.4 %)	1.09 (56.5 %)	1.17 (54.2 %)	0.42 (25.0 %)
VI. Struggle, conflict	0.66	1.22 (73.9 %)	1.13 (56.5 %)	0.13 (8.3 %)	0.21 (12.5 %)
VII. Resentment	0.28	0.48 (30.4 %)	0.30 (17.4 %)	0.29 (20.8 %)	0.04 (4.2 %)
IX. Human fulfillment values	0.37	0.35 (21.7 %)	0.30 (17.4 %)	0.29 (25.0 %)	0.54 (29.2 %)
III. Integration	0.18	0.26 (26.1 %)	0.26 (13.0 %)	0.17 (12.5 %)	0.04 (4.2 %)
X. 'Others'	0.49	0.43 (30.4 %)	0.35 (26.1 %)	0.67 (41.7 %)	0.50 (29.2 %)
Total	4.74	5	5.09	4.50	4.42

the victimized minority ($M=0.25$, $SD=0.25$) induces more ideas related to compensation than the active minority ($M=0.04$, $SD=0.21$), $F(1, 90) = 5.47$, $p < 0.03$.

Similarly, Category II (Table 1) subsumes the ideas explicitly referring to 'mobilization and change', which is advocated by the active minority in the slogan that concludes its message. Although the percentage is also quite modest (4%), the 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) ANOVA does indicate a main impact according to which the active minority ($M=0.37$, $SD=0.53$) elicits these ideas significantly more frequently than the victimized minority ($M=0.02$, $SD=0.14$), $F(1, 90) = 19.07$, $p < 0.0001$. There is thus some backing for the relevance of these manipulations. We must now examine more closely the semantic fields associated with each of the manipulations, that is, the judgments and ratings triggered by the messages of the two minorities who lay claim to the same history.

Let us first examine Category III in Table 1, with 17.7% of the associated ideas, namely, those referring to 'injustice' and 'suffering' which invoke the pain, inequality, repression, experienced by the Gypsy minority in the course of its history. According to the 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) ANOVA, there is a single main impact, namely, that the victimized minority ($M=1.10$, $SD=1.04$) elicits more associations under the 'injustice and suffering' heading than the active minority ($M=0.57$, $SD=0.83$), $F(1, 90) = 7.51$, $p < 0.007$ (see Table 2).

The values of 'justice, equality, and rights' (see Table 1, category IV) encompass an equally large number of associations (17.7%). A consensus can be observed on these values. In fact, the ANOVA 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) shows an interaction between both experimental variables on the category 'justice, equality, rights', $F(1, 90) = 4.87$, $p < 0.03$. Even though the contrast of the means don't reach significance, means go in the right direction. More specifically, this democratic view of the relations between majority and minority is expressed more frequently by participants who received the message attributed to an active minority in the symbolic conflict condition (red background) and by those who received the message of the victimized minority in the symbolic guilt condition (black background). We will come back to this effect.

Another heavily represented category (15.6%) combines the ideas of discrimination, racism, intolerance, prejudices (see Table 1, V, Discrimination). These ideas, which refer to the reasons

responsible for the oppression and discrimination suffered by the Gypsies, are elicited in response to the interaction between both manipulated variables, $F(1, 90) = 12.68, p < 0.001$: in the active minority condition in the context of the symbolic guilt condition (black background) and in the victimized minority condition for the symbolic conflict condition (red background), SNK $p < 0.05$ (see Table 2). What these results show is that in the semantic realm there are gestalt effects. It is quite possible that when the active minority refers to discrimination in the context of culpability, this sounds like an accusation. Conversely, when the victimized minority addresses discrimination in the context of symbolically violent relations with the majority, this produces an analogous effect.

We turn finally to a category that encompasses 13.9% of ideas, those related to struggle, conflict, and courage (see Table 1, category VI). This category clearly reflects the adversarial relation between an active minority and the repressive and racist majority described in the historical account. Here the ANOVA 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) reveals a single main effect. These ideas of struggle, conflict, are more frequently elicited when the participants are confronted with an active minority ($M = 1.17, SD = 1.16$) than with a victimized minority ($M = 0.17, SD = 0.52$), $F(1, 90) = 29.34, p < 0.0001$.

Three-fourth of the participants' associated ideas fall in the six categories or values that we have just examined. As a whole, they describe a semantic field shaped by the messages of the victimized minority and the active minority, a field that, as we had expected, has at one pole 'compensation' and 'justice, equality, and rights', and at the other pole 'struggle, conflict, courage'. It may not be quite apparent how the structure of this field relates to the cultural change outlined at the beginning of this article. Yet, it is difficult to imagine that the field would have been structured in this manner, had the participants belonging to the majority simply enunciated these ideas in a matter-of-fact way and without some degree of personal involvement (Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990), and this fact makes us conscious of the change. It is certainly the kind of phenomenon that calls for a more thorough investigation. In any case, the remaining one-quarter of the associations deal with 'grudges, hatred, vengeance' (5.9%) perceived in Gypsy history, with 'integration, adaptation' (3.8%) and with values of 'freedom, dignity, solidarity' (7.8%), whose distribution is not dependent on the experimental conditions.

Manifest and Latent Influence

The scores of manifest ($M = 15.11, SD = 4.16$) and latent ($M = 10.63, SD = 4.31, r = 0.17, ns$) attitudes were standardized and analyzed by an ANOVA 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) \times 2 (manifest attitude vs. latent attitude) with repeated measures on this last factor. Results show an interaction between the type of minority and the manifest versus latent attitude, $F(1, 90) = 7.253, p < 0.008$, and a marginal interaction between all the three variables, $F(1, 90) = 2.882, p < 0.093$.

In the light of these results, our hypothesis about the difference between an active and a victimized minority seems plausible. As expected, the former exerts a greater latent influence and the latter a greater manifest influence. In further univariate analysis, the ANOVA 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) on manifest attitudes, the extent to which compensation due to Gypsies for past discriminations is conceded or accepted, shows an interaction between the two variables, $F(1, 90) = 5.50, p < 0.021$ (see Table 3). In the context of symbolic guilt expressed by the black background, as expected, the victimized minority elicits a much more favorable response to Gypsy claims for compensation ($M = 0.41, SD = 1.03$) than it does in the context of symbolic conflict expressed by a red background ($M = -0.36, SD = 0.86$), $p < 0.007$, and than an active minority in the same guilt context ($M = -0.11, SD = 0.95$), $p < 0.04$, one-tailed. Our hypothesis

Table 3. Experiment 1. Mean scores of manifest and latent attitudes (higher values indicate pro-Gypsy attitudes), number of participants and standard deviation appear in parentheses

	Manifest attitude		Latent attitude	
	Guilt (black color)	Conflict (red color)	Guilt (black color)	Conflict (red color)
Active minority	-0.11 (23; 0.95)	0.06 (23; 1.05)	0.40 (23; 0.98)	0.25 (23; 0.80)
Minority as victim	0.41 (24; 1.03)	-0.36 (24; 0.86)	-0.20 (24; 1.03)	-0.43 (24; 0.99)

is also confirmed by the fact that the active minority's favorable or unfavorable manifest attitude as to the Gypsies' demand for compensation is unaffected ($p > 0.57$) by the context of guilt ($M = -0.11$, $SD = 0.95$) or conflict ($M = 0.06$, $SD = 1.05$).

In the univariate analysis, the ANOVA 2 (victimized minority vs. active minority) \times 2 (symbolic guilt vs. symbolic conflict) on latent attitudes shows us that the active minority elicits more favorable attitudes toward the Gypsies ($M = 0.33$, $SD = 0.89$) than the victimized minority ($M = -0.31$, $SD = 1.01$), $F(1, 90) = 10.56$, $p < 0.002$ (see Table 3). The active minorities' hidden impact on latent attitudes is thus in fact confirmed. And so is the difference with the attitude elicited by the victimized minorities, in that the latter do not have such an impact. Contrary to our expectations, this difference is independent of the symbolic context of guilt or conflict within which the participants were presented with the message.

To summarize these results, it appears that the minority viewed as a victim can exert more overt influence on the majority than the active minority. It makes sense to say that the majority frees itself of its internal contradictions by giving in to the standpoint and propositions of the minority. However another question then arises: do minorities have a hidden impact? No phenomenon has been as bitterly contested (Moscovici & Mugny, 1987) and at the same time as well established as this hidden impact (Maass & Clark, 1984). One might say that the conversion of the majority is itself a centerpiece of our theory. That is why the results on a scale of latent attitudes toward Gypsies are of the most crucial among the results obtained in our experiment. They give us the opportunity both to confirm the generality of the conversion phenomenon and the difference between victimized and active minorities.

Mediation Tests for Manifest Attitudes

In an exploratory analysis on whether evoked thoughts acted as mediators of manifest attitudes, only those relating either to 'justice, equality, rights' or to 'discrimination' showed any significant probability of having such an effect. We used Baron and Kenny's (1986) regression analysis procedure for testing mediation to examine whether the observed interaction between the two manipulated variables (active vs. victimized minority \times symbolic context of guilt vs. conflict) on manifest attitudes could be explained by either of these two evoked thoughts.

In a regression equation, with manifest attitudes as dependent variables, the following predictor variables were included: Type of minority (dummy coded as 0 for minority as victim and 1 for the active minority), symbolic context of guilt or conflict (dummy coded as 0 for black color and 1 for red color), the interaction between those two manipulated variables and the number of evoked thoughts related to 'justice, equality, rights' (standardized). Result of this analysis, $\text{adj. } R^2 = 0.20$, $F(4, 89) = 5.45$, $p < 0.001$, shows that the reported thoughts of 'justice, equality, rights' significantly predicted manifest attitudes, $\beta = 0.40$, $t(92) = 4.22$, $p < 0.001$ (see Figure 1), whereas the interaction between the two manipulated variables (type of minority and symbolic context of guilt or conflict) was




Figure 1. Experiment 1. Test of thoughts related to ‘justice, equality, rights’ as mediator of manifest attitudes. Note: Significance of standardized beta coefficients: (a) $p < 0.03$; (b) $p < 0.001$; (c) $p < 0.021$; (d) $p = 0.129$; (e) $p < 0.001$. Coefficient c in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the type of minority \times guilt/conflict context on manifest attitudes prior to controlling for thoughts of ‘justice, equality, rights’. Coefficient b in parentheses indicates the direct effect of thoughts of ‘justice, equality, rights’ on manifest attitudes prior to controlling for the type of minority \times guilt/conflict context

no longer a significant predictor, $\beta = -0.25$, $t(92) = -1.53$, $p = 0.129$. A similar test indicates that thoughts related to ‘discrimination’ are not a significant mediator of manifest attitudes. The conclusion is that evoked thoughts of ‘justice, equality, rights’ serve as mediator for the observed effect on manifest attitudes of the interaction between the type of minority and the symbolic context interaction.

Mediation Tests for Latent Attitudes

Let us recall that latent attitudes were a simple function of the type of minority, $\beta = -0.32$, $t(92) = -3.27$, $p < 0.002$. The following categories of reported thoughts were also primarily related to the type of minority: ‘change’, $\beta = -0.42$, $t(92) = -4.38$, $p < 0.001$; ‘struggle, conflict’, $\beta = -0.50$, $t(92) = -5.47$, $p < 0.001$; ‘injustice, suffering’, $\beta = 0.28$, $t(92) = 2.77$, $p < 0.007$; ‘compensation’, $\beta = 0.24$, $t(92) = 2.33$, $p < 0.03$. Of these four categories only ‘struggle, conflict’ was significantly related to latent attitudes, $\beta = 0.21$, $t(92) = 2.02$, $p < 0.046$.

We then tested whether thoughts related to ‘struggle, conflict’ could play a role in latent influence, depending on the type of minority. In the regression equation with latent attitudes as the dependent variables, the type of minority (dummy coded as 0 for victimized minority and 1 for active minority) and the reported thoughts concerning ‘struggle, conflict’ (standardized) were introduced as independent variables. Results, $\text{adj. } R^2 = 0.09$, $F(2, 91) = 5.44$, $p < 0.006$, showing the effect of the type of minority prior to controlling for ‘struggle, conflict’, $\beta = -0.32$, $t(92) = -3.27$, $p < 0.002$ (see Figure 2), or after controlling for conflict, $\beta = -0.29$, $t(91) = -2.56$, $p < 0.012$, remain significant in




Figure 2. Experiment 1. Test of thoughts related to 'struggle, conflict' as mediator of latent attitudes. Note: Significance of standardized beta coefficients: (a) $p < 0.001$; (b) $p < 0.046$; (c) $p < 0.002$; (d) $p < 0.012$; (e) $p > 0.50$. Coefficient c in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the type of minority on latent attitudes prior to controlling for thoughts of 'struggle, conflict'. Coefficient b in parentheses indicates the direct effect of thoughts of 'struggle, conflict' on latent attitudes prior to controlling for the type of minority

both cases. However, the significant direct effect of conflict on latent attitudes observed prior to controlling for the effect of the type of minority, $\beta = 0.21$, $t(92) = 2.02$, $p < 0.046$, ceases to be a significant predictor of latent attitudes after controlling for the effect of the type of minority, $\beta = 0.06$, $t < 1$. We interpret these results to mean that the participants' thoughts to a militant style and to the stimulation of social conflict characteristic of an active minority is connected with its positive influence on latent attitudes. At the same time, these results do not allow us to conclude that active minority's impact on latent attitudes is explained entirely by this explicit responsiveness to the minority's conflictual style.

Discussion

In this first experiment, we started out from the observation that during the 1990s an important change took place in relations between minorities and majorities. This change could be ascribed to the emergence of a new type of minority, minorities as victims, along with the formerly predominant type, that of active, militant minorities. Unless we are willing to let it go at that—which would be a bit cavalier—we must seek some explanation why two such different minorities exert an influence on the majority. Our theory assumed that (a) active minorities triggering an external conflict with the majority in order to convert it induce latent rather than overt influence; (b) minorities as victims arouse an internal conflict in the majority by awakening its guilt feelings. Or, to put it differently, active minorities create a conflict to bring about change; minorities as victims exacerbate an existing conflict to restore equilibrium or to achieve a consensus with the majority.

The results of this experiment appear to confirm our hypothesis about the difference between an active and a victimized minority. As expected, the former exerts a greater latent influence and the latter a greater manifest influence. For reasons that we explained at the outset, we expected that conflict was the determining variable in the influence exerted by the active minority, while social guilt was the determining variable for the influence exerted by the victimized minority. By presenting the message of the active minority against a red background, we wished to emphasize its confrontational context; by presenting the message of the victimized minority against a black background, we hoped to highlight the context of social guilt. These results indicated the significance of this relationship between symbolic affective context and the effects of the message.

However, the hypothesis is confirmed only with respect to the victimized minority, which exerts a greater manifest influence in the context of guilt (black color) than when a confrontational context (red color) is emphasized. In the case of the active minority, on the other hand, the opposite effect was not observed. Its latent influence is the same in both affective and symbolic contexts, that is, whether the message is displayed on a black or on a red background. We must conclude that this experimental manipulation allows us to verify some effects, but that its explanatory power is limited.

On the reported ideas or values set down by the participants after reading the historical account of the Gypsies' oppression in Europe it seems that the victimized minority focused the participants' mind on the repression and suffering unjustly inflicted on the minority by the majority, on righting this injustice, and to a lesser extent, on the compensation requested for the earlier exactions. All this is part and parcel of a more general tendency to respect human rights and to ask forgiveness for the wrongs that have been inflicted. But to the extent that the active minority expressed a need or desire to change the relations between the Spanish minority and the Spanish majority, it triggered a more traditional but still vivid layer of associations about struggle and the courage needed to attain a goal. This is the most robust effect seen in this experiment. This suggests the differentiated representation of the two minorities and their relation to the majority. An ethical relationship is elicited by the minority as victim, whereas the active minority arouses an antagonistic relationship and thus a conflict. We can raise the hypothesis that an adversarial relationship must be perceived in order for a latent change and conversion of the majority, while an ethical relationship is adequate to obtain compensation, without necessarily bringing the majority around to the point of view of the minority. Obviously, this is the key point of our theory of the two minorities.

On the whole, there is also a gestalt effect which corresponds to the historical fact that the dominant semantic field of ideas and values of the recent past has quite frankly been one in which political views and revolution coexist with more current values that express an ethical view and the right of all men to liberty and equality. It is quite possible that certain groups foresee the futility or the likely failure of violent action in our time and have joined forces with movements that aim to improve living conditions or better the relations between majorities and minorities. It would require an analysis of these movements to reveal a syncretism or a synthesis, which results from the coexistence of these different ethical and political visions.

These two relationship modalities between majority and minority (namely, ethical and/or political) lead to two types of influence that can be differentiated qualitatively. Mediation tests demonstrated that reported thoughts of 'justice, equality, rights', which are indicators of an ethical relationship, are in fact mediators acting on manifest influence but not on latent influence. Conversely, only the perception of the adversarial relationship between the minority (and especially an active minority) and the majority in terms of 'struggle and conflict' had a bearing on latent attitudes. Nevertheless, the share of variance in latent influence explained by this variable with respect to the perception of the adversarial relationship is insufficient to put the entire effect of the active or victimized minority under this heading.

In a nutshell two important points for the theory are not still sufficiently clarified. The first concerns the failure of the black and red backgrounds to have the full impact that we had expected. The second

concerns our failure to include a way to measure the participants' guilt feelings. No category relating to social guilt feelings emerged in the participants' spontaneously evoked thoughts, in contrast to what we tended to find with respect to conflict.

EXPERIMENT 2

In our view, the hypothesis that a minority's opting for an ethical relationship with the majority tends to lead to a manifest rather than a latent influence and a minority's opting for a political relationship of struggle for social change tends to produce a latent rather than a manifest influence deserved further confirmation.

The new experiment therefore set out to measure social guilt feelings elicited by the victimized minority as compared to those elicited by the active minority. It also attempted to examine the effects of each of these two minorities in what might be called simpler contexts, without the cumulative impact or interference of symbolic induction of guilt feelings or antagonistic feelings, which in the previous experiment were presumably elicited by the manipulation of the black or red background color.

With these two clarifications in mind, we introduced the following two variations in the new experiment. We eliminated the manipulation involving the background color on which the central argument of each type of minority was presented. We then added a measure for social guilt feelings, which we borrowed from recent research by Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt (2005). Again, the experiment's first prediction was that in comparing the influence of a victimized minority with that of an active minority, the former will elicit more manifest influence and the second more latent influence. The second prediction was that social guilt feelings mediated the influence of the victimized minority, while conflict mediated that of the active minority.

Method

Participants

Fifty-one students (42 women, 9 men, M age = 20.90, SD = 4.50) from the department of Psychology at the University of Valencia participated in the experiment.

Procedure and Design

We used exactly the same procedure as in the previous experiment. The students were asked to fill out a questionnaire in one of the courses they were taking at the university. As in Experiment 1, their first task was to read the summary of a report on the history of Gypsy persecution in Europe. The only independent variable consisted in manipulating the source of this text: active minority versus victimized minority. The manipulation of this variable was exactly identical to the one in Experiment 1, except for the fact that the photo accompanying the summary was now identical in both conditions—that of a man seated on the steps. The second innovation introduced in this experiment was that, to reinforce the contrast between the two minorities, the participants were told, after reading the report, that in a workshop on the Gypsy people a small group of young Gypsy university students held a discussion on this report. They were then given an extract of opinions voiced during this discussion. In the condition *victimized minority*, the list of opinions was: 'Incredible, all this injustice suffered by the Gypsy people; I suppose that someone will feel guilty; a historically absurd punishment; it produces enormous sadness in me to read this history; now I understand perfectly the pain of my people; how

Gypsies could have borne so much suffering! I know of no other minority that has been so oppressed in this country; historical humiliation; I almost feel other people's shame'. In the *active minority* condition, the following list of opinions was submitted to the participants: 'It is necessary to fight until we change the society that keeps us isolated; we Gypsies must rebel against the discrimination we have suffered; we have to voice our claims vigorously; united, Gypsies will never be subjugated; we must continue to resist oppression as did our relatives in the past; we Gypsies must defend our culture; we have to organize as a political party; Gadge society will not listen to us unless we speak out loudly; a Gypsy who remains silent is not a true Gypsy; we must fight until we are accepted as we are.'

Dependent Variables

Evoked ideas As in Experiment 1, the first dependent variable consisted of asking the participants the following question: 'What feelings does this request arouse in you? What ideas occurred to you when you read it?' 'Write down all the words that come spontaneously to your mind' (in the active minority condition, *request* is replaced by *slogan*).

The participants were then asked to reply to a set of items grouped along three scales designed to measure guilt, manifest and latent racism. Participants were asked to respond to each item on a 1 (I strongly agree) to 9 (I strongly disagree) scale.

Guilt Scale We adapted four items from Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt's (2005) Collective Guilt Scale. This set contained the following four items: (a) *I feel guilty about Gadjes' harmful actions toward Gypsies*; (b) *I feel guilty about the negative things other Gadjes have done to Gypsies*; (c) *I feel regret for some of the things Gadjes have done to Gypsies and (d) I might well feel guilty about bad things done to Gypsies by the Gadjes*. The scale was inverted, so that a high rating indicated a greater sense of guilt with respect to the Gypsies' fate on the part of the participants. Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.69.

Manifest attitude scale It should be noted that this scale was not highly reliable in Experiment 1. We attempted to improve it by adding the following five items to the same three items used in Experiment 1: *I feel that I should compensate the Gypsies for the harm they have suffered*; *it is incumbent on the Gypsies to respect the Gadjes' norms of conviviality* (inverted); *the Spanish Gadjes should do something to make up for what they did to the Gypsies in the past*; *I feel that I should make an effort to improve the Gypsies' lot*; *the Gypsies should receive special benefits from the state, in view of the persecution they suffered in the past*. Now Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.78. When necessary, items were inverted, so that a high rating implied a more favorable attitude about Gypsy compensation. The score ($M = 5.89$, $SD = 1.12$) was standardized.

Latent attitude scale This scale was the same as in Experiment 1. Cronbach's alpha for this scale in this experiment was 0.80. The score ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 1.60$) was also standardized.

Results

We followed exactly the same criteria as in Experiment 1 for codifying the thoughts. In the Category I (Table 1) were summed up the relatively few terms (9.25%) referring to the victimized minority's explicit demand for *compensation*. As was to be expected, the victimized minority versus active minority ANOVA reveals that the victimized minority ($M = 0.60$, $SD = 0.71$) induces more ideas related to compensation than the active minority ($M = 0.04$, $SD = 0.20$), $F(1, 49) = 15.19$, $p < 0.001$ (see Table 4). Similarly, Category II (Table 1) subsumes the ideas explicitly referring to 'mobilization

Table 4. Experiment 2. Average of ideas by condition, and percentage of participants—based on the total for each condition—having given at least one characteristic of the dimension in question

	Total	Active minority	Minority as victim
I. Compensation	0.31	0.04 (3.8%)	0.60 (48.0%)
II. Change	0.20	0.35 (26.9%)	0.04 (4.0%)
III. Injustice and suffering	0.57	0.15 (15.4%)	1.0 (56.0%)
IV. Justice, equality, rights	0.27	0.23 (23.1%)	0.32 (32.0%)
V. Discrimination	0.16	0.15 (15.4%)	0.16 (16.0%)
VI. Struggle, conflict	0.67	1.23 (73.1%)	0.08 (8.0%)
VII. Resentment	0.14	0.12 (11.5%)	0.16 (12.0%)
VIII. Integration	0.43	0.54 (46.2%)	0.32 (28.0%)
IX. Human fulfillment values	0.10	0.12 (11.5%)	0.08 (8.0%)
X. 'Others'	0.51	0.46 (30.8%)	0.56 (40.0%)
Total	3.35	3.38	3.32

and change', which is advocated by the active minority in the slogan that concludes its message. Although the percentage is also quite modest (5.97%), the victimized minority versus active minority ANOVA does indicate that the active minority ($M = 0.35$, $SD = 0.63$) elicits these ideas significantly more frequently than the victimized minority ($M = 0.04$, $SD = 0.20$), $F(1, 49) = 5.398$, $p < 0.024$. There is thus some backing for the relevance of these manipulations.

Category III in Table 1, with 17.01% of the associated ideas, namely, those referring to 'injustice' and 'suffering' which invoke the pain, inequality, repression, experienced by the Gypsy minority in the course of its history. According to the victimized minority versus active minority ANOVA, the victimized minority ($M = 1.00$, $SD = 1.11$) elicits more associations under the 'injustice and suffering' heading than the active minority ($M = 0.15$, $SD = 0.37$), $F(1, 49) = 13.393$, $p < 0.001$ (see Table 4). The category related to struggle, conflict, and courage (see Table 1, category VI), that encompasses 20% of ideas, are more frequently elicited when the participants are confronted with an active minority ($M = 1.23$, $SD = 1.03$) than with a victimized minority ($M = 0.08$, $SD = 0.28$), $F(1, 49) = 29.064$, $p < 0.001$. The remaining categories of evoked thoughts did not depend on the experimental conditions.

Social Guilt, and Manifest and Latent Influence

As predicted, the minority as victim induce a greater social guilt ($M = 5.75$, $SD = 1.15$) than the active minority ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.66$), $F(1, 49) = 6.46$, $p < 0.014$. The score on manifest attitudes and the score on latent attitudes were standardized ($r = 0.31$, $p < 0.03$). The ANOVA 2 (type of minority: victim vs. active) \times 2 attitudes (manifest vs. latent) with repeated measures on the last factor, indicates an interaction between these two factors, $F(1, 49) = 12.94$, $p < 0.001$. Univariate analyses show that the victimized minority elicits more favorable manifest attitudes toward the Gypsies ($M = 0.31$, $SD = 0.93$) than the active minority ($M = -0.30$, $SD = 0.99$), $p < 0.03$. Conversely, the active minority arouses more favorable latent attitudes toward the Gypsies ($M = 0.28$, $SD = 1.18$) than the victimized minority ($M = -0.29$, $SD = 0.69$), $p < 0.041$. All these results confirm the hypothesis that the victimized minority induces more favorable manifest attitudes toward the Gypsies but that the active minority elicits more favorable latent attitudes toward them.

Mediation Test

We performed the mediation test on manifest and latent attitudes, in which we have just shown that more favorable attitudes were induced by the victimized minority on the manifest level and by the

active minority on the latent level. It is indeed our hypothesis that guilt feelings are the mediator whereby the victimized minority influences manifest but not latent attitudes and conflict is the mediator for latent but not for manifest attitudes.

To examine whether the effect of the type of minority on manifest attitudes could be explained by social guilt, we used Baron & Kenny's (1986) regression analysis for testing mediation. It was found a significant effect of type of minority on the manifest attitudes ($\beta = -0.31$; $t(49) = -2.24$, $p < 0.03$) and on social guilt, $\beta = -0.34$, $t(49) = -2.54$, $p < 0.014$ (see Figure 3). To test whether this guilt feeling actually mediates manifest influence, type of minority (dummy coded as 0 for minority as victim and 1 for active minority) and social guilt (standardized) were included in a regression equation with manifest attitudes as the dependent variable, adj. $R^2 = 0.43$, $F(2, 48) = 18.50$, $p < 0.001$. The coefficient associated with social guilt significantly predicted manifest attitudes, $\beta = 0.62$, $t(49) = 5.39$, $p < 0.001$, whereas the type of minority was no longer a significant predictor, $\beta = -0.09$, $t(49) = -0.80$, $p < 0.42$ (see Figure 3). It is thus legitimate to conclude that social guilt feelings mediate the more favorable manifest attitudes obtained by the victimized minority.

We used a similar procedure to determine whether the effect of the type of minority on latent attitudes could also be explained by social guilt. We found, however, that social guilt feelings are not related to latent attitudes either before, $\beta = 0.07$, $t < 1$, or after introducing the variable type of minority into the regression equation, $\beta = 0.19$, $t(48) = 1.29$, $p > 0.20$. Thus social guilt feelings do not mediate the influence of the type of minority on latent attitudes.

We tested the hypothesis that conflict is the mediator of latent but not of manifest attitudes in the same manner. We found that for all the categories of thoughts whose induction was contingent on the type of minority involved ('compensation,' 'change,' injustice and suffering), only those thoughts




Figure 3. Experiment 2. Test of social guilt as mediator of the effect of the type of minority (Victimized vs. Active) on manifest attitudes.

Note: Significance of standardized beta coefficients: (a) $p < 0.014$; (b) $p < 0.001$; (c) $p < 0.03$; (d) $p = 0.42$; (e) $p < 0.001$. Coefficient c in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the type of minority on manifest attitudes prior to controlling for guilt. Coefficient b in parentheses indicates the direct effect of social guilt on manifest attitudes prior to controlling for type of minority




Figure 4. Experiment 2. Test of conflict as mediator of the effect of the type of minority (Victimized vs. Active) on latent attitudes.

Note: Significance of standardized beta coefficients: (a) $p < 0.001$; (b) $p > 0.047$; (c) $p < 0.041$; (d) $p > 0.28$; (e) $p > 0.34$. Coefficient c in parentheses indicates the direct effect of the type of minority on latent attitudes prior to controlling for conflict. Coefficient b in parentheses indicates the direct effect of conflict on latent attitudes prior to controlling for type of minority

relating to a militant and conflictual style ('struggle, conflict') on the part of the minority were significantly related to latent attitudes, $\beta = 0.28$, $t(49) = 2.03$, $p < 0.047$, but had no bearing on manifest attitudes, $p > 0.50$. To test whether conflict is the mediator for latent attitudes, minority type (dummy coded as 0 for minority as victim and 1 for active minority) and the reported thoughts concerning 'struggle, conflict' (standardized) were included in a regression equation with latent attitudes as the dependent variable. Results, $\text{adj. } R^2 = 0.06$, $F(2, 48) = 2.65$, $p < 0.081$, show that while the effect of the type of minority was significant prior to control for struggle, conflict, $\beta = 0.29$, $t(49) = 2.10$, $p < 0.041$ (see Figure 4), it was no longer a significant predictor of latent attitudes, $\beta = 0.19$, $t(48) = 1.08$, $p > 0.28$. At the same time, while 'struggle, conflict' had a significant direct effect on latent attitudes prior to control for the effect of the type of minority, $\beta = 0.28$, $t(49) = 2.03$, $p < 0.047$, it no longer was a significant predictor of latent attitudes after controlling for the effect of the type of minority, $\beta = 0.17$, $t < 1$.

These results with respect to 'struggle, conflict' as a mediating factor for latent influence is similar to the results in Experiment 1. The second experiment confirms that the participants' responsiveness to the militant and confrontational social style characteristic of active minorities is related to its positive influence on latent attitudes. But at the same time, it cannot be asserted that the effect of the active minority on latent attitudes can be explained by a perception of its confrontational style.

Discussion

Experiment 2 brings convergent validity to our hypotheses by confirming the difference found in Experiment 1 on latent score and by showing a significant difference on the manifest score, which was

in the right direction but non-significant in Experiment 1. The victimized minority achieves more manifest influence, while the active minority obtains more latent influence. When social guilt feelings are explicitly measured, results show that the victimized minority arouses more guilt feelings than the active minority. The mediation test clearly indicated that this social guilt feeling is in fact the mediator for the greater manifest influence produced by the victimized minority.

While this second experiment confirms that the greater latent influence of the active minority can be ascribed directly to perceived conflict and not to social guilt feelings, it replicates the result of the first experiment by showing that the difference between the two minorities cannot be explained solely by this perceived conflict.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The object of these studies was to confirm a fundamental hypothesis of the theory of innovation by minorities and to expand its field by taking into account the evolution of our cultural ethics (Moscovici, 2004). The results obtained point out that our conjectures were reasonably well verified. Let us recall that the first hypothesis referred primarily to this incipient phenomenon of granting minorities a quasi-legal status as victims. This may be the result of circumstances -their living in an environment of repression and discrimination- but it is mainly the result of a welcome change in democratic ethics, the spread of human rights (Barkan, 2000). These are all circumstances that create an outlook of equality and liberation towards groups suffering from repression and discrimination. And indeed, this changed outlook may well lead to an admission of social culpability, which is historically rooted. More specifically, this social culpability on the part of the majority rests on the contradiction or conflict between its principles or values and its actual behavior, the distance that separated it from minorities, the lack of knowledge about the condition under which they live or the violence to which they are exposed. Thus, as recognized victims, minorities can arouse the majorities' social guilt and intensify their internal conflicts in, so to speak, a legitimate way. We were able to confirm this hypothesis by the extent to which the participants respond more favorably to the victimized minority's demand for the compensation of past wrongs. And especially in the context of guilt symbols, mediated by social guilt. Conversely, the active minority does not receive a similar concession from the majority.

The second hypothesis is admittedly more classic (Moscovici, 1980) in this field of research. It presumes that the degree of conversion or latent change in the majority depends on the intensity of the conflict aroused by the minority. For this very reason, active minorities exert a greater latent influence on the opinions of the majority, as we have found. Victimized minorities, on the other hand, rather than latent influence exert more overt influence with respect to their demand for compensation without succeeding in the conversion of the majority. Let us add a final observation on the difference between minorities as acting individuals and minorities as victims. Whatever theory is used to account for their specific features, it is surely puzzling that these two minorities in fact represent the same minority, in our case the Gypsies. Some well-defined features that we have observed allow us to spell out more accurately the outlook of the majority. When the majority is faced with a minority of acting individuals, that is, an active minority, the majority's views are questioned by an external 'other' and whom it resists in an external conflict that forces it in the end to alter its way of thinking or feeling. Conversely, when it is faced with a minority performing as victim, the majority focuses on its own alter ego, feels an internal conflict, which it must alleviate. As a result, there is room for it to change, but this change is entirely within the majority framework.

What can then be said about the compensations or reparations conceded to minorities seen as victims? Basically that they contribute to a change on the part of the majority or within the majority,

without necessarily implying that on a deeper level a new attitude or outlook has been established toward these minorities.

We would finally like to raise two more practical questions, in the light of the results that we have obtained. The first is to determine whether minorities are pursuing the status of victim at the very time when collective action is stymied by difficulties and mobilization of the ‘masses’ to transform the state of affairs, the relations between minorities and majorities, society, and all the rest, is no longer an option. In other words, to the extent that the old political strategy of attaining transformations in the system as a whole has come to a dead end, a new, we might say, ethic-legal path is now being pursued to change people’s psychic and social representation, in order to improve human interactions and to readjust the system accordingly. In other words, being unable to modify the police, we are now attempting to modify policemen. We are neither denying the depth of these changes nor underestimating their social consequences. However, if they are genuine, we must envision victimized minorities and their strategy for action and for exerting influence in a new light.

The second question bears on the results obtained in these studies, which certainly agree with the existing theory. If we limit ourselves to the fact that the minority exerted an overt influence and obtained favorable compensatory concessions to its demands from the majority, as others achieved a pardon or reparations, then we must say that the minority has reached its goal and that its problem has in some way been resolved. But to the extent that it fails to exert a latent influence and fails to change opinions and representations regarding the minority—specifically the Gypsies—that is, to the extent that it fails to convert the majority, a danger, a threat still exists.

To take a familiar analogy, it would be as though women were to find that they had been granted equal wages and social standing, with men, without the latter’s having altered their image of and their prejudices about women. Or, to take another example, as if the Jews had been emancipated, granted the same political and civil rights as all other citizens, without the simultaneous disappearance of the old attitudes toward them, anti-Semitism. We certainly know that we are dealing here with psychic and social forces that tend to endure and to resurface when circumstances are propitious. For most minorities that have suffered from discriminations and oppression, the unleashing of these forces is a threat that hangs over them in perpetuity. This second question may transcend the field of social psychology and may lie outside the field of research. Or perhaps it does not, for, once we dispose of a reliable theory, all that is needed is some mental acuity, curiosity, and empathy to discover an approach for studying these difficult, uncertain phenomena. They are surely of crucial importance for understanding what is happening under our very eyes and for seeing more lucidly in this age of minorities.

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