

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p>Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p>SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	--	---

3RD INTERNATIONAL LAB MEETING – SUMMER SESSION 2005

**11TH EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SUMMER SCHOOL OF THE
European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication**

**Social Representations
in action and construction in Media and Society**



*“Applying the Facet Theory and Statistical Analysis
via HUDAP software to Research on
Social Representations:
Theoretical and Methodological
Computer Mediated Training Sessions”*

at the European PhD on Social Representations & Communication
Multimedia LAB & Research Center
in Rome

A PUBLIC VIEW ON EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

Dr. Antonia M. Ruiz Jiménez
Dr. Ankica Kosic
Paszkál Kiss

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	--	--

Introduction: national and European identities in comparison

This study aims at exploring the meanings of the sense of belonging to European and national identities and on source of exclusive versus multiple identities in nine European states: 6 old member-states (Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Greece and Austria) and 3 past accession and now new-member states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Different survey data available on these issues provide some indication of the level of identification or the pro- or anti-European orientation of people but fail to explore systematically people's views and understandings of their national and European identities. Through the use of survey research, we tried to identify the issues, symbols or values that are most frequently used by ordinary people to talk about their nation and Europe. In relation to this, the chapter is focused on exploring the relations between national and European attachments and the interrelatedness of representations about nation and Europe. More specifically, in the first place, we are interested in exploring the level of closeness to the nation and Europe, and the issue of inclusiveness/exclusiveness of these two categories. Is European identity in conflict with national and other lower-level (more parochial) identities? Do people consider European social categories (e.g. EU, Europe, Central and East Europe) as distant or something they belong to? In the second place, we are interested about the content or cognitive aspects of national and a possible European identity, and in identifying factors around which representations of the nation and Europe are organised.

Regarding our first consideration, an overview of the literature revealed that there is no consensus among authors on the issues about the level of closeness and inclusiveness vs. exclusiveness of the national and European identities. On one hand, several studies have found that individuals, or countries, with higher levels of national identity have lower levels of support for European integration (Deflem & Pampel, 1996; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Kaltenthaler & Anderson, 2001). Carey (2002) shows that national attachment combined with national pride have a significant negative effect on support for European integration. According to Smith (1992: 58-60; 1999: 229-230, 238), while people can easily hold more than one individual identity (such as being woman and coloured), collective identities (such as national identities) are "pervasive and persistent" and therefore more difficult to hold at the same time or to change from one to the other. On the other hand, several other studies have argued that high levels of national identity are consistent with support for European integration (Diez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Marks, 1999; Van Kersbergen, 2000). Identities to different territorial communities are, in this view, mutually inclusive, rather than mutually exclusive, and can form a kind of "concentric circles" with different levels of intensity (Haesly 2001; Kritzinger, 2001; Weiler 1999: 345; Kersbergen 1997: 11).¹ According to Van Kersbergen (2000), it is a question of multiple coexisting identities with local, regional and supranational communities, where the European identity just completes national and regional identities. Thus, it seems that in some contexts, national identity may exist alongside, or even reinforce, support for European integration. In others, national identity is mobilized around the contested claim that the European Union threatens national institutions, weakens the national community, and undermines national sovereignty.

We hypothesised that divergences between all above mentioned views, but also others not mentioned here, are at least partially caused by the use of different indicators by different authors to measure national and European identities. The most widely used is the Moreno's scale.² Presenting identities as

¹ Carey (2002: 392) have also pointed that individuals can hold mutually inclusive territorial identities. For Rise (2001) both individuals and social groups hold multiple identities.

² In some instances, support for European integration is also taken as an indicator of European identity.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	---	--

paired dichotomies, this scale tend to produce results in which identities appears as less inclusive than they really are. This kind of scale fail to capture the essence of the main theories explaining the formation of identities: the Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, 1985, 1987). Both stress the fact that identities are contextual. That is, one will appear as more relevant in a particular context, and less relevant in other contexts. In relation to this, we decided to use two separate scales to measure different kind of identities. We used a scale of closeness to fellow nationals and another scale of closeness to fellow Europeans. However, some of the divergences mentioned above might also be produced by some bias in the cases selected for study, since we know that national and European identities are more inclusive in some countries than in others. Therefore, we have include a wide range of countries in our analysis, and paid special attention to their histories in the nation-state formation that might play an important role in determining the extent to which European identities are merged with national ones.

Our second consideration regards the basic elements composing national and European identities. Here we can start from the analyses of definitions of the national identity or simple nation, most frequently used in the literature. It emerged that these emphasise its objective-cultural or subjective-voluntaristic nature, its functions, its political or affective component or a combination of different aspects. In the political realm, a nation is associated to a state, a given territory with delineated boundaries within which there may exist a national educational system and a single economy. Within the cultural sphere, the nation is related to myths of common ancestry, a name and a set of national symbols, a specific, national value constellation, a language and, in some cases, a religion. With regard to the affective sphere, the idea of national unity should be taken into account, the sense of belonging and solidarity, too. The experience of living together is also important because it fosters the development of a common, national will, a national character and also forges the idea of a common destiny. Furthermore, a nation can be defined in relation to its functions which may be to provide sovereignty and legitimacy, to promote solidarity, equality and cooperation between its members, to define their rights and duties and ensure their well-being, both material and social-psychological. From the literature it is not clear which constitutive elements are more relevant in the definition of the nation and which in the definition of Europe. Which of them are mutually inclusive or compatible and which are exclusive? What is the role such components as territory, language, culture, history, economy and policy, and other mentioned in theories on nations and nationalism, play in defining the sense of belonging to the nation and Europe? Is the representation of the nation different from that of Europe? If yes, what are these differences?

Authors such as Smith (1992, 1995, 1999) argue that the ethno-cultural elements, which are considered central for national identities, do not play a role in the configuration of European identities, implying that the latter will be non-existent or weaker as long as national identities remain strong and ethno-cultural based. According to these theories, European Union's member states do not share any common ethno-cultural element similar to those shared by citizens of nation-states: a common cultural heritage, a common language, common myths, common religion, etc. Weiler (1997) suggests also that national and ethno-cultural elements are the basis for the modern state, but that Europe is not based on these cultural-national criteria, and cannot be defined by them. Garcia (1993), on the other hand, have pointed that there exist an European cultural unity with all its diversity of expressions, and historic ties linking the nations of Europe, that may increase the awareness of European identity.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	---	--

A different view understands European identities as based on calculated individual self-interest. Within this view, some authors have explained support for European integration³ in instrumental terms as a kind of calculation between cost and benefits, either in economic or political terms (Kritzinger 2001; Gabel 1998; Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001; Olsen 1996; Sánchez Cuenca 2000; Held 2000: 269). The perception of potential gains or losses that could result from the membership of a social group may influence people's identification with it. This approach suggests that it is the functioning of the European and national institutions that determines whether the citizens of the member states will accept or not the basic elements of a supranational identity. According to Cinnerella (1997), the more people judge their country as not having enough decisional power, the more they identified with Europe. Held (2000: 269) emphasised another factor concerning the national security and defence policy. There has been a notable increase in emphasis upon collective defence and co-operative security and the "rising density of technological connections between states now challenges the very idea of national security and national arms procurement".⁴

Finally, a third approach suggests that the substance of EU membership is in a commitment to the shared values of the Union, to the duties and rights of a civic society, and a commitment to human features which transcend the differences of organic ethno-culturalism (Kersbergen, 1997; Mancini, 1998; Weiler, 1999; Weiler, Haltern & Mayer 1995).

In all countries, the configuration of European identities will merge different ethno-cultural, instrumental and civic elements. However, we go further asking if these configurations are similar across countries and what causes the differences that can be observed. Another relevant question is if those differences have an impact in the extent to which both kind of identities are inclusive in each country. Finally, we ask ourselves about the implications for the future development of European identities. Is it feasible to develop an European identity based exclusively on instrumental considerations? Is it advisable? What about the presence of ethno-cultural elements in the notion of being European? Are those aspect necessary? Are they necessarily negative? How plausible is the emergence of a civic European identity in comparison?

Our public opinion research: data, variables and methodology

Data



The study is based on a public opinion survey (N=10,023) in nine European countries in co-operation with Eurobarometer.⁵ Six old member-states of EU (Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Greece and Austria) and three new member-states of EU (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) were included.

³ It is obvious that European integration is a concept different from European identity but they are nevertheless so strongly correlated that we may assume that the studies about support for European integrations tell us something about European identities also.

⁴ However, these models are deductively sophisticated but cognitively naïve. They assume that citizens are well-informed about the economic and political consequences of European integration (McLaren 2002). Cognitive and social psychologists have shown that human capacity for calculation is far more limited than utilitarian models presume (Chong 2000; Kinder 1998; Simon 1985).

⁵ In the member states these scales were included within the Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 questionnaire.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p align="center">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p align="center">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p align="center">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p align="center">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	---	---

These latter were accession countries still at the time of the interviews.⁶ Samples were representative to the population aged 15 years and over, resident in each country. It was conducted between 27 April 2002 and 10 June 2002 (see details in Appendix: Table 1).

As a further precision of the samples given by Eurobarometer, we excluded those respondents that were non-nationals of the given country. The analyses therefore refer only to nationals living in the countries under examination. We weighted the sample to meet criteria for representativeness at minimum for *gender*, *age*, and *region*. The weights summed cases up to 1,000 respondents from each country, contributing to the same extent to the aggregate analysis.

Variables


We asked three questions: one about the level of closeness to different social groups and categories, a second about the sense of national belonging, and a third about the sense of European belonging. In the first question we asked levels of closeness to some ‘parochial in-groups’ (to those living in the same city, region, and nation), to European social categories (to EU citizens, to fellow Europeans and to people living in Central and Eastern Europe), and to nine “out-groups”. Six out of the nine were common to all countries (Arabs, Turks, Russians, United States citizens, Gypsies and Jews), the other three represented the most numerous groups of immigrants in each nation (Italy: Moroccans, Albanians and Filipinos; Greece: Albanians, Kurds, and ; Great Britain: people from the white dominions, people from the Commonwealth, immigrants from non-Commonwealth countries; Austria and Germany: Italians, Poles, people from the former Yugoslavia; Spain: Latin Americans, people from the Maghreb, immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). The question was formulated as follows ‘*I am going to read out to you a list of groups of people from different places. I would like you to indicate to what extent you feel close to the following groups.*’ Participants responded to this question on a 4-point scale (1 = *not at all close*; 2 = *not very close*; 3 = *quite close*; 4 = *very close*).

This question followed the logic of traditional Bogardus scales of social distance, with some modifications. Apart from introducing an explicit measure of social distance (answers expressing differing degrees of closeness) we merged closeness judgements to established ingroups and outgroups. Our measure thus allowed us to see whether European social categories will be considered similar to outgroups or to ingroups. Closeness we took as an indicator to assess the affective (attitudinal) aspect of identity as defined above (‘feeling of belonging together as a group’). It has some advantages over other indicators used to appraise European (or national) identification such as citizenship, support for European integration (or nationalism) and pride in being European (or belonging to the nation). Citizenship could be understood as more related to rights and duties, while support for integration could be understood as more related to economic (or political) costs and benefits. Closeness is more neutral in this sense. Pride, on the other hand, can be defined as a specific positive affection that results from feelings of identity.

The second question contained 14 items as relevant components for a cognitive, representational aspect of belonging to the nation. It was formulated as follows, “*Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to a nation. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? ‘I feel [NATIONALITY] because I share with fellow [NATIONALITY]...’* The items included in the scale were: ‘*common culture*’, ‘*customs and traditions*’; ‘*common language*’; ‘*common ancestry*’; ‘*common history and a common destiny*’; ‘*common political and legal system*’; ‘*common rights and duties*’; ‘*common system of social security/welfare*’; ‘*common borders*’; ‘*national army*’; ‘*national economy*’;

⁶ Adding these latter three countries Eurobarometer 57.2 with a special questionnaire administered at the same time was exceptional. Even if basic socio-demographics and our three specific questions on national and European identifications were asked only and we lacked other Eurobarometer questions.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	--	--

'feeling of national pride'; 'national independence and sovereignty'; 'national character'; and 'national symbols (flag, national anthem)'. Each provided component of the national identification was judged on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = 'strongly agree'; 2 = 'tend to agree'; 3 = 'tend to disagree'; 4 = 'strongly disagree').

The third scale contains 14 items similar to items selected in the previous scale, but this time, concerning the features that are relevant for the definition of a sense of belonging to Europe. The following instruction was given: *'Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to Europe. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? I feel European because I share with my fellow Europeans ...'*. Elements provided were: *'common civilisation'; 'membership in a European society with many languages and cultures'; 'common ancestry; common history and a common destiny'; 'the European union institutions and an emerging common political and legal system'; 'common rights and duties'; 'common system of social protection within the European Union'; 'right to free movement and residence in any part of the European Union'; 'an emerging European union defence system'; 'common borders'; 'feeling of pride for being European'; 'sovereignty of the European Union'; 'common European Union currency' - (in UK and new member states — 'a future common European union currency');* and *'European union symbols (flag, anthem, etc.)*. Each provided component of the national identification was judged on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = 'strongly agree'; 2 = 'tend to agree'; 3 = 'tend to disagree'; 4 = 'strongly disagree').

The questionnaire was administered in a personal interview by INRA⁷ as part of Eurobarometer 5.2 (in member states of EU) or of another omnibus survey (in new member states of EU). If respondent answered that s/he "does not feel national" the interviewer did not proceed with the second question. The same applied to the third question if someone did not feel European. Generally, this possibility wasn't explicitly offered as a previous filter but was ticked only if respondents spontaneously said so, except in the case of Great Britain and the Czech Republic, where it was asked explicitly. In the case of Great Britain, there were about 62% of respondents who expressed that they do not feel European, but responded to other items. We were concerning if this would create problems for the comparative analysis, since we substituted missing values with mean values. We tested previously if this caused a distortion of data. We run same analyses with and without imputation for the British sample and did not find significant differences in results. Therefore, we decided to proceed with analyses after substituting missing values with mean values also for British sample.



Optimal Scaling Analysis

In order to explore the meaning of national and European identifications on an aggregate level we ran Optimal Scaling Analysis⁸ on the latter two questions described above. For Optimal Scaling analysis we have imputed missing data. Although we had limited percentage of missing values for single questions, in this multidimensional analysis we would have lost about 50 percent of respondents overall. Attribution

⁷ Public opinion research agency dedicated to the design and analysis of multinational projects in the field of marketing and opinion research <http://www.inra.com/>.

⁸ Optimal scaling is similar to factor analysis in that it compute dimensions (factors) taking into account the empirical relations among the items included in the analysis. Those dimensions define a common space on which the relation among the items are graphically displayed. Similar items are plotted in the common space in a way that they appear closer to each other than dissimilar items.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: right;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: right;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	--

therefore was recommendable. We have rounded attributed values to conform to our previous socio-demographic categories.

Optimal scaling was done on an aggregate level merging all respondents from all national samples. We plotted countries on figures. In the figures presented below the position of countries also appear, their relation to the items which define the common space and their comparative position regarding other countries. The variable 'country' was used as supplementary, that is, it has not been used to compute the dimensions that define the common space in the optimal scaling analysis. In the figures, items are represented as vectors, by arrows, while countries are represented by points.

Closeness to different groups – attitudes to nation and Europe



Social distance measures are most often used to assess prejudice towards outgroups. Bogardus's first formulation of this classic attitude scale was established to measure attitudes of the majority towards minority groups. Since these early times of attitude measurement attitudes to disadvantages groups such as ethnic minorities (e.g. Gypsies, Jews) and marginal social groups or categories (e.g. drug addicts, alcoholics) were also measured in this way. If majority (ingroup) appeared at all in these studies it was generally used as a control group to which the rejection or dispreference of the minorities could be contrasted. But distinction between ingroup and outgroups is not always that straightforward, thus closeness judgements may draw a whole spectrum for groups with differing levels of social distance from respondents.

National categories can be taken as natural ingroups. Thus it is worthwhile examining, how more inclusive (e.g. European) and more specific (e.g. regional) categories are regarded. They can be assimilated to the national ingroup by expressing them to be very close to the self, or they can be contrasted from the self (and the national ingroup) by judging them to be as distant as outgroups. In a peculiar set of social groups and categories we asked our respondents about supposedly ingroup and outgroups in our first question. Results show (Table 1) that respondents regard their *nation* very positively together with other parochial social groups (inhabitants of their *village/town* and of their *region*). A more detailed analysis might consider the differences between these ingroups, but even in our relatively rough 4-grade-measure it was visible that only these national ingroups were regarded positively on average in every country (see also Appendix: Table 2). Whereas all outgroups were regarded as being more or less distant by our respondents. In this spectrum of positively regarded (close) and negatively regarded (not close) groups, European groups were generally treated almost as positively as parochial ingroups. In Table 1 it is visible that European social categories (*EU, Europe*) came right after (sub)national categories if rank ordered by their average positivity or closeness. It was only one national sample, that of Great Britain and only one special outgroup, *US citizens* that could catch up with European inclusive categories in this rank ordering. Generally, respondents preferred European Union to the category of Europe, and countries not yet members of EU were not exception to this. Although we would not go very far in interpreting this small difference, it may suggest that the social category of EU is easier to grasp than the general continental category of Europe.

[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]

European categories are not only taken as very similar to national ingroups, but they were also compatible with them. Figure 1 shows that sizeable proportions of each national sample saw both national ingroup and European inclusive ingroups (EU or Europe) as rather close to them. These respondents had inclusive national identity as they associated European social categories to the national

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p>Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p>SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	--


ingroups. There were respondents on the other side, who expressed a greater difference between attitudes to the nation and attitudes to Europe, thus showed an exclusive national identification not as open to Europe. The green and blue bars in Figure 1 sum up to the proportion that saw the national ingroup quite close or very close within each national sample. Proportions of those with inclusive and exclusive national identification varied greatly by country in our sample. Public opinion of these nations was more or less divided on this issue. It was only in three countries (Italy, Hungary, Spain) where inclusive national identifications became above 50%. And even in these countries many people regarded rather positively to the nation while expressing distance to European categories. In most of the countries (Czech Republic, Austria, Germany) a comparable portions of the respondents had inclusive an exclusive national identification. While in a third cluster of nations (Poland and Greece) an absolute majority of the people expressed a greater distance to European social categories, while those with an inclusive national identification are also sizable. It was only in one national sample (Great Britain) where only a quarter of the population had inclusive national identification.

[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]

In comparison to other countries considered, Great Britain had a peculiar position from two aspects. Here inclusive national and European identification was significantly lower than in any other cases. On the other hand, here was the highest portion of cases (31%) not classifiable to either identification patterns. This latter point could be explained by the general result that many of the British respondents did not indicate their being close to their national ingroup either. British respondents appeared to have low level of closeness regarding any groups or social categories in comparison to other countries. The relatively weak identification with any of groups considered is congruent with the findings by McCrone and Surrige (1998:4), and could be related to the ideology of individualism in that country, being higher than in any other considered in this study (Hofstede, 1980; 1991). The small proportion of those with inclusive national identification may stem from a specific British perspective on Europe and European social categories. They would perceive them more as out-groups than any other nations in our sample. A geographical reason for this perspective is Great Britain being islands divided from the rest of the continent by the Channel (cf. Europe being ‘overseas’). The relative distance from the European groups is further amplified by the fact that historically ‘Britishness’ was constructed in confrontation with France, and thus with continental Europe in a broader sense. Even if after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, continental Europe ceased to pose a real physical threat to Britain (except during a brief period during the Second World War). Presently, it seems that the institutional structure of the EU⁹ is perceived to threaten and undermine Britain’s sovereignty (Ichijo 2002: 13; Marcussen *et al.* 1999). Besides, the EEC also challenged the idea of UK being a ‘third force’ between the USA and the Soviet Union after WWII (Ichijo 2002: 17). In comparison to other national samples, the Brits felt relatively closer, to out-groups, e.g., people from the ex-British colonies (Dominions and Commonwealth) and US citizens, in particular. While in other countries the most accepted non-national groups tend to be European groups, in Britain citizens feel closer to people from the dominions and the US citizens, which have long standing historical ties with Britain (Uzelac & Ichijo 2003: 4). Thus the greater perceived distance from European social

⁹ With this label we refer generally to the European Union and its historical antecedent the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC).

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	---	--

categories might have been a reflection that the British public opinion has rival international frames (e.g. that of the Commonwealth, or Trans-Atlantic relations) to the European frame in providing an immediate context for the nation.

Greece is among those countries with a public opinion dominated by exclusive national identification, although here inclusive national/European identification exceeds a third of the national sample. Probably the somewhat greater distance from European social is related to the historical suspicion or ambiguity developed toward the West. Events such as the Crusades, the imperialist tendencies of the Church of Rome, the Venetian occupations, and more recently, the intervention in Greek affairs by western powers after the birth of the Greek nation state in the late 1820, created a general mistrust and cultural distance between Byzantium and the West, that has continued until nowadays (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos 2002: 4-5, 13). On the other hand, there are obvious signs of a sense of trust in the EU, which may be explained in the context of more recent Greek history. After the end of the dictatorship (1974) joining the EEC meant economic association but it had also, and overall, political implications, concerning the issue of internal security, and the restoration and protection of democracy against a future *coup d'état* (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos 2002: 23). An ambivalent view of Europe is also combined with a high degrees of national attachment in the Polish public. Here inclusive national/European identification is even higher than in Greece, but also accompanied with a relatively high number of exclusive national identification. Historical reasons for a certain mistrust in the West that Europe symbolizes for the Poles also appear. **The West is held responsible for the division of the country in ancient times and a domination of its land after WWII by the Soviet 'Empire' (Romaniszyn & Nowak 2002).**



Germany (East and West), Austria, and the Czech Republic tend to form a cluster in the middle of figure 1 concerning the proportion of inclusive and exclusive national identification. The West German sample felt relatively close if asked about the "EU citizens" (that is, West Europeans), a little bit more distant if asked about "fellow Europeans" (a broader term), and relatively distant when the term of "Central and Eastern Europeans" was explicitly stated.¹⁰ This phenomenon is twofold. On the one hand, the division of Germany and Europe after World War II, during the period of the Cold War, has contributed to create a sense of distance with Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, it also reflects the historical relation with Poles (that are included within the group of Europeans, at large, and Central and Eastern Europeans in particular), usually perceived as a significant Other (Spohn *et al.* 2002: 15). In comparison, East Germans, who were kept on the other side of the Berlin wall were, and considered themselves, as part of Central Europe. Finally, in the case of Austria, closeness to Central and Eastern Europe could be explained by the history of the Habsburg Empire, constituted together with Hungary (Spohn *et al.* 2002). The Czech Republic appears close to Germany and Austria. As those countries, it also shows a relatively high proportion of those with inclusive national identification and an almost equal proportion of those who express greater distance from European social categories. Geographical proximity and cultural similarity may have resulted in these similar patterns within the public opinion of these Central European countries on the Western and Eastern side of the Elb (and the iron curtain).

Italy, Hungary and Spain form another, even more Euro-enthusiastic cluster with a small majority of those with inclusive national/European identification. Albeit the dominance inclusive identity patterns a sizable part of the public expresses greater distance to European social categories here too.¹¹ Italy and

¹⁰ Some analysis and results are available through the EURONAT project web page. <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Projects.shtml>

¹¹ Besides, Poland, Italy, Spain and Hungary show the stronger tendency to identify with all groups than other countries considered which in itself enhances the chances for showing inclusive national/Euroepan identification patterns.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p>Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p>SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	--



Spain has less pronounced exclusive national identification and certainly less intense overall national attachment than Hungary. Italy's relatively weaker attachment to national in-groups, suits well to Italian history as it has been characterised by internal conflicts that might impede the consolidation of a strong national identity (Brierley & Giacometti, 1996: 172-6). Italy was unified only in 1861 under King Victor Emmanuel II, but huge cultural and social differences between the industrialised north and the poverty-stricken south, and between different regions, have persisted until nowadays. As suggested by Galli della Loggia (1996), Italy has very few historical and national symbols to develop a strong national identity. The relative higher closeness to European groups could be explained by the importance given to integration into the EU, perceived as a remedy for national ills and a source of national pride (Triandafyllidou 2002; Kosic 2003: 6; Sánchez-Cuenca 2002; Diamanti 1999; Cinnerella 1997). In Spain Europe also represented a chance to jump on the train of Western modernity, prosperity, and progress and was seen as a guarantee to consolidate democratic values after the Francoist dictatorship. The EU has largely retained its association with values of freedom, modernity, and democracy until the present day (Jaúregui 2002: 2). In a second place, the concept of Spanish nationalism, and especially its ethnic and symbolic components, has been rejected by the political elite in Spain (Ruiz Jiménez 2002; Álvarez Junco 2000: 197). Hungarian respondents expressed the closest affiliation both national in-groups and to European social categories. Apart from a general tendency for social affiliation, it could reflect the highly positive evaluations of both the nation and Europe through out the history of Hungarian national identity formation (Hunyady & Kiss 2002). National movements have fought for national freedom together with 'Europeanisation' (modernisation) of society since the early 19th century. European, and more larger, international context and power-balance have always had a profound effect on Hungarian nation building. The history of Hungary influences the perception of differences between national in-groups and Others (internal or external out-groups).¹² Some of the out-groups (e.g., Russians and Turks) are seen as relatively distant because of their . Secondly, there has been no immigration to Hungary from other continents and from non-European countries (except a lately established Chinese community), which also motivates the expression of greater social distance to the chosen out-groups.

As a general conclusion from the analysis above we can say that attachment to European social categories is not in conflict with national identification. Our findings confirmed that the European identification is weaker than its national counterpart, as citizens from all member states feel much closer to their national in-groups (nation, region or village) than they feel to any other groups (including European social categories). Figure 1 showed that, in fact, the percentage of citizens with dual identities, national and European at the same time, is fairly large in all the member states considered, but the attachment to national identities is stronger than attachment to a European identity. The percentage of people who feel only European is rather small. People do not stop feeling national as they start feeling European, they rather incorporate these different (levels of) identities. This finding suits best to the idea of concentric circles in identification with different levels of intensity in attachment. But it may also be the case that both types of identities are compatible and that the attachment to each one derives from different sources. We test this hypothesis in the following sections (4 and 5).

The history within the process of nation building is relevant to understand national identities in each country, but also for understanding the emergence of a European identity. Italian national dividedness, Spanish experiences with fascist dictatorship and Hungary's historical experience with dominating empires seemed to form different but equally strong reasons to welcome a European identification as a counterbalance of difficult situations in national development. On the other hand, the lively history of a

¹² Although more detailed national analysis shows that minorities (Gypsies, Jews) are seen to be closer than external Others.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: right;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: right;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	--

glorious imperial past is reconstructed and projected on an English national identity which hinders, at the same time, the emergence of a strong European identity. Even if the effects of historic process are not straightforward, since countries with similar past experiences use them in different ways and with different effects on their citizen's national and European identities.

Dimensions in attachment to the nation

Several theories of nation formation and nationalism formulate the necessary components of national identity. Some emphasize the role of ethnic factors, others stress the role of political institutions or a sense of belonging and pride. We collected keywords for many of these dimensions possibly important for developing a national identity. They altogether supposedly formed a cognitive or representational aspect of national identity. When we asked them from national samples of ordinary people we were interested in how the public represent the importance of different (cognitive) components in or reasons for national identification.

First, we must emphasize the existence of a strong common pattern among all countries. The individual analysis of each case provided a picture (Table 2) in which ethnic-cultural factors are central for the definition of national identity in each of the countries analysed. Thus, common language, common culture, common ancestry and common history and destiny are among the five items mentioned as the most important for national attachment in all countries.

[TABLE 2]

However, we mostly interested in the differences between countries that lay in attributing other reasons for national identification. Therefore, we ran an optimal scaling analysis in order to produce a comparative picture of the relative importance that citizens gave to each component of national identity in different countries. Figure 2 shows a two dimensional graphic representation as a result of a multidimensional analysis. This analysis took all individual variance into account to map covariations in answers on an aggregate, pan national level (merging all national samples). The smaller the angle between vectors (red lines) the more similar the components are in the representation of national identity. Countries were used as passive variables therefore national differences did not influence the results themselves but were introduced into the graph later to show main tendencies in national samples as compared to each other. The first dimension¹³ runs from left to right and distinguishes overall the pattern of attributing less (on the left hand side) or more importance (on the right hand side) of all elements for national identification. We called this dimension *global feelings of nationalism*. It distinguished between Greece and Poland, on the one hand (highest general agreement) and West Germany, on the other (weakest general agreement).



[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]

The second dimension,¹⁴ in the vertical axis, is more differentiating, substantial and easier to interpret than the first one. It includes the elements of national identification along the axis, distributing those measuring ethnic-cultural aspects together on the top. In the bottom we find a set of civic-instrumental

¹³ This first dimension is reliable with a Cronbach alpha of .946. It explains 8.24 of the variance.

¹⁴ This second dimension is less reliable with a Cronbach alpha of .211. It explains 1.24 of the variance.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	---	--

elements, while symbolic and affective elements are placed toward the middle of the dimension. We called this second dimension as *type of national identity*. The pattern of ethnic-cultural elements consists of common language, culture, history/destiny together with common ancestry. The symbolic affective pattern consists of common symbols, character, pride, and also borders and sovereignty. The instrumental political-economic pattern consists of common politics, rights and duties, army, economy, welfare system in a more scattered way. In terms of national differences, this dimension distinguishes between Hungary and the Czech Republic on the one end (stress ethnic-cultural background) and Spain, on the other (underlines political, economic aspects).



Regarding the dimension of global feelings of nationalism, we can see in Figure 2 that the respondents in West Germany showed relative lower agreement with overall elements of national identification. This location could be connected with the consequences of the “German Catastrophe” and nationalism in the first part of the last century (Spohn *et al.* 2002: 1; Meinecke 1946). The collapse of Nazi Germany was accompanied by a weakening German national identity, and a destruction of the belief in the destiny and superiority of the German nation. On the other hand, we can see that East Germany exhibited stronger global feelings of national identity. In relation to that, we can suppose that in East Germany the feeling of moral guilt never developed in the same way as in the West. East German communist regime did not see itself responsible for the Nazi past, but rather as its main victim, and relegated the Holocaust to a side aspect of the history (Spohn *et al.* 2002; Bettina Westle 1999; Kittsteiner 1994). The same explanation, of the re-elaboration of the Nazi past within national identity, could be used in case of Austria, resulting an even more positive view of the nation. In Austria the impetus to come to terms with the past has been weaker than in Germany, and the public discussion have evolved to a mainstream consensus regarding the enforced imposition of the Nazi *Anschluss*. It denied the active role of Austrian authorities in Nazi crimes and emphasized instead the victimization of Austrians under Nazi rule (Spohn 2002).

Concerning the second dimension the type of national identity, West Germans appear relatively closer to the cluster of civic element of identification (for more details about each components see Appendix: Table 3). We may suppose that, as a reaction to nationalism promoted by Nazism, the concept of a German nation has become politically transformed in West Germany from a ethno-cultural nation into a civic-territorial nation. East Germans in comparison to West Germans give relatively more importance to ethno-cultural elements. As mentioned previously, it was less problematic for them to include some elements of the German political and cultural history into their national identity (Spohn *et al.* 2002: 11-12)

In their definition of national identity, Austrians give relatively higher importance to symbolic-affective elements and, especially, to the existence of common borders. The relative higher importance of symbols (and borders) in Austria may be interpreted within the need to constitute a separate national identity against Germany. The same explanations applies to their location relatively closer to civic elements than to ethno-cultural elements, since the separation of Austria from the Great-German heritage included also a separation from the moral components of the German *Kultur* (Spohn *et al.* 2002: 8, 13-16).

Furthermore, concerning the first dimension of global feelings of nationalism, Italy showed a relatively weaker agreement than other countries with items considered as defining the national identity. Its location here could be explained by the same factors emphasized previously regarding its (lack of) closeness to national in-groups and relatively higher closeness to European groups (Triandafyllidou 2002: 10, 37; Brierley and Giacometti 1996: 172-176). Regarding the type of national identity, in Italy more importance is given to symbolic-affective and civic-instrumental elements in defining national identity than in other countries. We have already mentioned that the Italian history, characterized by

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p>Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p>SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	--

internal contradictions, might have impeded the consolidation of a strong national identity based on ethno-cultural elements. Our findings support the hypothesis of Diamanti (1997; 1999), Nevola (1999) and Rusconi (1994) who have argued that Italian national identity is predominantly based on a civic territorial conceptions. In fact, civic elements further gained relevance as the basis for national identification after the fascist regime collapse and more recently, after the public corruption scandals of the 1990s (Kosic, 2003: 19; Triandafyllidou 2002: 7). As we have already mentioned in several occasions, this does not mean that ethno-cultural elements are irrelevant; it means only that, in comparison to other countries, the civic components of national identity are relatively stronger in Italy, even when taking into account the relatively low level of national identity.



Concerning the dimension measuring global feelings of nationalism, close to Italy is Great Britain. The relative weaker agreement of British people with the importance of all items for national identification may be accounted by some of the factors mentioned previously in relation to the closeness to national groups, but it may also reflect the actual crisis that British national identity is facing, as reported in the recent literature (Marr 2000; Nairn 2000). Regarding the dimension measuring the type of national identity, Great Britain appears relatively closer in comparison to other countries to civic elements of national identification. This finding is not surprising, since historically British national identity did not grow out from a pre-existing entity, but was constructed through institutions such as the Parliament and monarchy (Ichijo 2002: 10; MacCrone 1997).

The Czech Republic has an almost neutral position regarding global feelings of nationalism. Concerning the second dimension measuring the type of national identity, Figure 2 revealed the relatively higher importance of ethno-cultural elements and the lower importance of civic-instrumental elements for the definition of Czech identity. Historic context plays again an important role in explaining this configuration of national identity. The autonomy of Czech territory was based on ancient privilege of the states, and reckoned in favour of ethnic Czechs who had majority at that time (Kubis *et al.* 2002: 11). The importance of the civic elements in the national identification was further undervalued during the Communist regime, which alienated the state deeply to the citizens. This attitude toward the state survived the collapse of Soviet Bloc, although it is slowly fading away. After 1989, the *civic principle* has become one of the leitmotifs in the attempt to re-build the Czech national identity. However the co-existence of ethnic and civic principles has so far favored the ethnic one (Cerny & Vorisek 2003: 16-17; Kubis *et al.* 2002: 14; Mozny 1999).

Spain holds a neutral position regarding global feelings of nationalism. Instead, concerning the second dimension measuring the type of national identity, it seems that, in comparison to other countries, Spain gives less importance to symbolic-affective elements in defining national identity. This feature stem from its recent authoritarian past. In Spain, national symbols are strongly associated with the authoritarian past which is strongly rejected. The position of Spain in Figure 2 also shows the relative higher importance of the civic-instrumental dimension in comparison to other countries. These elements are preferred over ethno-cultural ones and often stressed by national elites in their representation of the nation (Ruiz Jiménez 2002: 20-21). Looking at the individual country analysis (tables 7 and 8) we can see that commons customs and traditions as well as common language are the elements most important for feeling Spanish.

Hungary has a representation of the national identity characterised by strong ethno-cultural, and also symbolic elements (Kiss 2003). This result can be associated to the historical tensions between the state and the nation in the construction of Hungarian national identity. Hungary was the part of a multi-national state, the Habsburg Empire, until the end of 19th century. In that period, Hungarian national identity was very much based on cultural and symbolic factors. In coping with a national trauma of

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p>Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p>SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	--

loosing during the WWI a third of Hungarian historic territory and the relation to the great percentage of ethnic Hungarians left outside the national territory, national identity became a debated issue in the first half of the 20th century. Between the two world wars, ethno-culturally-historically driven national identity served as an ideology for political elites pulling Hungary back to pre-modern social and political order. During the communist period these ethno-cultural-historical elements were forcefully suppressed. Contemporaneous national identity is still polemic in nature. Hungarian elites express the primacy of individual choice and citizenship of being Hungarian within the state, but emphasizes cultural definitions of over two millions of Hungarians living as minorities in neighbouring countries (Hunyady 1998; Hunyady & Kiss 2002; Kiss 2003).

Regarding global feelings of nationalism, in comparison to other countries, Poland shows, similar to Greece, although to a lesser extent, a tendency to strongly agree with all items of national identification. Concerning the second dimension representing the type of national identity, we can see from Figure 2, that in Poland civic elements are relatively more important for the definition of the national identity than in other countries. The relative higher importance given to civic elements can be explained, in part, by historic context in which national identity was developed in this country through struggles with state-enemies. We can hypothesise that the long term (about 120 years) repartition of Polish territory between Russia, Germany and Austria, then the German and Soviet occupation during World War II, and the communist regime imposed by Soviets for half of the XX century (Gorniak 2003: 12; Romaniszyn and Nowak 2002: 18), suffocated the expression of ethno-cultural elements in the national identification. On the other hand, the more recent socio-economic developments and modernization of Poland have emphasized the importance of civic-instrumental factors.



Finally, regarding the dimension measuring global feelings of nationalism, Greece appears being the country with the strongest agreement with all elements of national identification in comparison with other countries. Instead, concerning the type of national identity, Greece emphasizes more symbolic-affective elements in the national identification than other countries. There are historical, national political and geopolitical reasons to explain the prominence of these elements in the consolidating of the national identity. More specifically, in Table 2 (see also Appendix: Table 3) we can see that national borders are considered as an important component of the national identification. We should note here that borders have kept shifting in the modern Greece from its establishment in the 1830s to 1948, and they became an issue fuelling nationalist feelings each time when a particular territories or national borders are in dispute or contested. Probably, ethno-cultural elements which are of the higher importance in individual country analysis loose importance in a comparative context due to the stronger emphasis on symbolic-affective elements. Civic-instrumental elements, on the other hand, appear as not very important in the definition of Greek national identity (Sereti & Kokosalakis 2003: 18-21; Kokosalakis & Psimmenos 2002: 8).

From Figure 2 we can see that ethno-cultural elements in the definition of the national identities are relatively more important in some countries, while civic or instrumental elements are more central in other countries. We argue that the history has a relevant role in attempt to explain the reasons for some elements being more important than others in different countries. The level of importance of ethno-cultural elements is generally related to historical factors, such as the “abuse” or “misuse” of ethno-cultural nationalism by authoritarian or fascist regimes in the past (e.g., in Germany and Spain), the political need to differentiate the own country from a quite similar ethnic-cultural group (e.g., in Austria), the process of nation-building (e.g., in United Kingdom), and so on. We shall see in the following section what are the consequences of all these patterns and differences to European identification.

Dimensions in attachment to Europe

As happened with national attachment, there are also common trends in European attachment among all

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p align="center">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p align="center">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p align="center">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p align="center">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	---

countries. As Table 3 shows, civic-instrumental elements, and in particular the existence of a *common currency* and the *right of free movement and residence* in EU countries, are among the most important components of a European identity in older member states. While in new member-states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), a common European civilization and the diversity of languages and cultures take precedence.¹⁵ Although they are not absent in older member states (in total language is mentioned by nine out of ten countries, and a common European civilization by seven of them). Otherwise the correlation patterns are very similar to that of the components of national identity.

[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]

In exploring the differences among countries in the configuration of their attachment to Europe, Figure 3 represents a common space defined with two dimensions. The first one, on the horizontal axis, distinguishes between overall patterns of weak (on the left hand side) versus strong agreement with the importance of different items (on the right hand side). We called this dimension *global feelings of Europeanism*. This dimension is dominant in defining the space and statistically more significant than the second.¹⁶ Although complicated to read, it is not completely trivial. It differentiates Germany, Great Britain and Greece (giving less importance to all elements of European identification) from new member states and Italy attributing high importance to all elements of European identification.

[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]

The second dimension,¹⁷ on the vertical axis, measures the *type of European identity*, distinguishing broadly between identities based on ethno-cultural elements or on civic-instrumental elements. Along this dimension are located mainly new members of EU, as more prompted to agree with the importance of ethno-cultural elements for European identification, and these are clearly distinguished from Greece giving lower importance to these elements.

Greece is the most remarkable case in this graphical display, being at the extreme of both dimensions in figure 3. When compared with other countries, regarding global feelings of Europeanism, Greece appears to have the weakest agreement on all items that may characterize the European identity (for more details about each component see Appendix: Table 4). In comparison with Figure 2, on which Greece showed relatively high agreement with all elements forming national identity, we may suppose that in Greece the European identity is less differentiated than national identity. Regarding the dimension measuring the type of European identity, Greece gives low importance to ethno-cultural and symbolic-affective factors in defining European identity. As mentioned above, this kind of elements were central to Greeks in defining their national identity, what means that they use different types of elements in defining national and European identities.



West and East Germany, together with Great Britain tend to form a cluster of countries toward the left hand side of the dimension measuring global feeling of Europeanism, revealing thus to have low

¹⁵ Or rather “took precedence” at the moment when the interviews were carried out, in the Spring of 2003, before these countries became the new members of the EU. We do not know if this finding is changed as a result of the enlargement.

¹⁶ This first dimension is reliable with a Cronbach alpha of .931. It explains 7.37 of the variance.

¹⁷ This second dimension is less reliable with a Cronbach alpha of .400. It explains 1.53 of the variance.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

	<p>European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p>MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p>Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p>SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	--

agreement with all items defining European identity. These countries also appear together regarding the second dimension measuring the type of European identity, giving a little bit more importance to ethno-cultural than to civic-instrumental elements. Through a more detailed analysis of the answers (Appendix: Table 4) we can see that Great Britain gives the relatively high importance to the perceived *common origin* of Europeans and, simultaneously, the relative low importance to instrumental elements in defining a European identity. The rejection of a *common EU currency* in the UK is a well known issue. In the same vein, *free movement* of people is not particularly appreciated by British respondents, who may consider it as an aggression on their national border (Uzela & Ichijo 2003: 19).

Spain and Italy show more positive attitudes toward all items of European identification than other countries considered so far. These two countries also share their position on the second dimension, giving relatively higher importance to civic-instrumental elements in defining European identity in comparison to other countries. It has already been pointed out that due to recent severe social, economic and political crisis Italians delegation of power to European institutions as a positive development (Cinnerella 1997). The 'EU act both as a resource for national identity, providing for the civic dimension that Italian State is lacking, as a new level of governance accessible to regions, independently from the nation state' (Kosic 2003: 6). We also mentioned that for Spaniards the notion of 'becoming European' has strong positive economic connotations. 'In the Spanish context of collective memory, essentially represented the opportunity to leave behind what was popularly know as *el atras*' (the backwardness) of the nation's for good' (Jaúregui 2002: 2). The EU is associated with the values of freedom, modernity and democracy very much appreciated in Spain, specially after the franquist regime.

New member-states, together with Austria, tend to form a cluster in the right hand side regarding global feelings of Europeanism and the upper part of the dimension measuring the kind of European identity. All this suggests that, in comparison to other nations, these countries give relatively higher importance to ethno-cultural elements in their definition of a European identity.¹⁸ Poland appears further down, reflecting the fact that in this country it is more important the civic-instrumental underpinning of a European identity. As reported in the literature, both Euro-enthusiasts as well as Euro-rationalists in Poland saw integration in instrumental terms (Romaniszyn & Nowak 2002: 23). On the other hand, Hungary gives more emphasis, in comparative terms, to an ethno-cultural definition of European identity. Further analysis for that country shows that Hungarians consider a common civilisation as a most important element in defining European identity. It is also represented as a multicultural 'society' and the EU is seen as an economic entity. These findings taken together express that Hungarians give importance to common culture but accept differences in Europe and appreciate the economic integration within the European Union.

There are several conclusions worth mentioning from these analyses. First of all, it seems that in most of countries, national and European identities are based on different sources of attachment. This fact may facilitate, as we pointed earlier, their compatibility. At the same time it could explain their different order. National identity, based on ethnic-cultural elements, is stronger and could be represented as a kind of inner circle, while a European identity, based on instrumental elements, is weaker and would be an outer circle. However the European identity is not exclusively instrumental. Ethnic-cultural factors (a common

¹⁸ An alternative explanation could suggest that instruments used failed in our attempt to distinguish between European identity and attachment to the EU. That is, while older member states have stated their European identity thinking of themselves as citizens of the EU and, therefore, giving relatively higher importance to civic-instrumental elements, accession countries, since they had not been in the period of data collection the part of the EU and had not have experience with the EU institutions, gave relatively high importance to ethno-cultural elements in their definition of European identity. This hypothesis is rejected, because together with the new member states, on the upper part of the dimension measuring the type of European identity, we can find also Austria, Great Britain and Germany.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	--	--

civilization as well as diversity of languages and cultures) are also mentioned in several countries among the five more important elements of attachment. In particular, new member states, lacking institutional experience with European institutions, base their European identity on ethno-cultural elements. Constructing a European identity in such ethno-cultural terms has been used also as a justification for their entry within the EU. This contradicts the hypothesis that there is no cultural basis for building up a European identity. Our results showed that European identity could be also based on ethno-cultural elements, as national identity is. Civic elements, on the other hand, are not mentioned among the five more important items in all countries. It seems that in South European countries instrumental elements are relatively more important than in other countries. Italy and Spain are the best examples of how the EU could become “the remedy” for national problems, either past or present.

Conclusion: national and European identification is compatible but different


In most of countries, the attachment to the nation and the attachment to Europe is based on different sources. This facilitates the inclusion of an European identification within citizens’ national identities, while, at the same explains the different strength of both kind of attachment. National identity, based on ethnic-cultural elements, is stronger and could be represented as a kind of inner circle, while a European identity, based on instrumental elements, is weaker and would be an outer circle.

In fact, our first findings in this article have pointed that in all the countries analysed (except for the case of Great Britain), Europe comes right after parochial ingroups (village, region, nation), being closer to those ingroups than to other groups. That is to say, Europeans are not perceived as an outgroup. In other words, attachment to European social categories is not in conflict with national identification. However, our findings also confirmed that the European identification is weaker than its national counterpart, as citizens from all member states feel much closer to their national in-groups (nation, region or village) than they feel to any other groups (including European social categories). On the one hand, the percentage of citizens with dual identities, national and European at the same time, is fairly large in all the member states considered (although with great differences between national samples). But on the other hand, attachment to national identities is stronger than attachment to a European identity. The percentage of people who feel only European is rather small. This means that people do not stop feeling national and start feeling European, they rather incorporate these different (levels of) identities.

This finding suits to the idea of concentric circles of identification with different levels of intensity in attachment. But we suggested also that it might be the case that both types of identities are compatible because the attachment to each one derives from different sources. Regarding the test of this hypothesis, we have shown that national and European identities are to some extent different. On the one hand, we find that national identities are still stronger and primarily “cultural”, based on common shared language, religion, culture, etc. European identities, on the other hand, have a quite important “instrumental” dimension. What make these two identities different is that, in most countries the “instrumental” dimension of the European identification is more important than the “cultural” one (although cultural elements are not absent), and much more important than in the configuration of national identities.

The fact that European identities are based mainly on “instrumental” considerations has further important implications. It may favour the possibility of the EU being able to create European identities by intensifying the perceived (economic or political) benefits of membership. However, this will have only very limited effects. Only those citizens who benefit by European policies will develop this kind of “instrumental” attachment to an European identification. Besides, it should be noted that in countries which stand out for their strong sense of national pride, such as Greece or Great Britain, European identification might actually weaken as the perception that the EU is working effectively intensifies. The perception that the EU performs better than the nation state could be perceived as a threat to citizens’

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">European Ph.D. Social Representations and Communication</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	---	--

national pride (in order for national pride to remain high citizens must believe that their own country functions better than the EU).

However the importance of instrumental consideration for an European identification, a “cultural” dimension is not absent from the notion of European identity. Cultural elements are mentioned among the five most important items in almost all the countries analysed (language is mentioned by nine out of ten countries, and a common European civilization by seven of them). It should be remembered that authors such some authors hypothesised that it would be extremely difficult for a European identity to emerge, given a) the strength of national “cultural” identities and b) the simultaneous lack of European “cultural” elements shared by all Europeans. However, not only has a European identity emerged in all countries, as measured by the percentage of dual identity holders, but in most of them this European identity does also include “cultural” elements (among the five most relevant), in a similar vein to national identities. So there is also much more common “cultural” ground among the European countries on which to built up a European identity than this theory would suggest. This is important because this “cultural” side of the European identification could substitute for “instrumental” considerations in the feeling of European identification of those citizens who do not benefit from the European integration. Of course, there exist a dark side, as some scholar points. There is the possibility that an European identity based in “cultural” elements may develop into a “racist” and exclusive identity against non-EU citizens or non-Europeans.

Therefore, a “civic” kind of European identification would much more desirable, not having the limitations of “instrumental” identification or the undesirable side effects of “cultural” identification. However, the pessimist reading of analysis suggests that, for the time being, we are unlikely to see the emergence of a European identity based primarily on civic considerations. According to our data, only in three out of nine countries did rights and duties figure among the five most important items for citizens’ European identifications. Civic elements play a minor role the configuration of contemporary European identities. Nevertheless the cases of Italy and Spain tend to back the idea that in countries in which civic elements are important both for national and European identifications the compatibility of these two kind of identities is easier and higher.

Our data does allow also for an optimistic interpretation. Before, we understood the right to freedom of movement and residence in any part of the EU as an kind of instrumental consideration for feeling European. However, the fact is that most citizens have lived, and will continue to live, in their own country, never moving to a neighbour member state. So, one may interpret that it is not the instrumental use of this right (most citizens have not, and will not, used it), but the consideration of having this (civic) right, and having it in common with other Europeans, what is important. In this sense, increasing the feeling of shared common European civic rights would influence the European identification of citizens. It also means that the new European Constitution, entitling people to new civic rights may help the fuelling of European identifications. However this will only happen as far as citizens are made quite aware that this rights *are new, are European-level, and are common to all European citizens*.

But the development of this “European civic society” encounters a number of difficulties. Pérez Díaz (1998) find, at least, three key hindrances: the priority that citizens give to national internal questions and their expectation that those internal problems will be solved by national governments; the self-interested nationalist behaviours that contradict the rhetoric ideal of a common European interest; and the difficulties to go beyond historic narratives focused in the nation-state. With a completely different methodology, Kritzinger (2003) reach the same conclusion: the national sphere is still predominant in citizens worries. Therefore, it depends on national government, politicians and mass media to spread the idea of this “European civic society”. However, as we pointed in the introduction member states are resistant to this idea, arguing that that the emergence of an European identity may

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings
New series of events 2005-2008

 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p style="text-align: center;">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
--	--	--

weak their citizens' national loyalties. This brings us up to the beginning of these conclusions, stressing again that we find no sign that the emergence of an European identity weakens national identities in any sense.

Still, what our investigation also confirms, in line with Pérez Díaz (1998) and Kritzinger (2003) is that national historic narratives are quite relevant for understanding the emergence of a European identity. Italian national dividedness, Spanish experiences with fascist dictatorship and Hungary's historical experience with dominating empires seemed to form different but equally strong reasons to welcome a European identification as a counterbalance of difficult situations in national development. On the other hand, the lively history of a glorious imperial past is reconstructed and projected on an English national identity which hinders, at the same time, the emergence of a strong European identity. Even if the effects of historic process are not straightforward, since countries with similar past experiences use them in different ways and with different effects on their citizens' national and European identities. These findings stress again the idea that the emergence of European identifications is an endogenous process, more dependent on national dynamics than EU policies or performance.

Bibliographical references (uncompleted)

Kritzinger, S. 2003. "The influence of the nation-state on individual support for the European Union", *European Union Política*, 4 (2): 219-241.

Pérez Díaz, V. 1998. "Putting citizens first. The task facing Europe, her public sphere and the character of her public authority", *ASP Research Paper* 22(b)/1998.

Tajfel, H., & Turner J.C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In: S. Worchel & W.G. Austin (Eds.). The social psychology of intergroup relations (S. 33-47). Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publ.

Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the self concept: A social cognitive theory of group behaviour. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), *Advances in group processes* (Vol. 2, pp. 77-122). Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Turner, J. C. (1987). A self-categorization theory. In J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher, & M. S. Wetherell, *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory* (pp. 42-67). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Appendix

[TABLES 1-5 HERE]

**FINAL EURONAT-EUROBAROMETRE QUESTIONNAIRE – 8 April 2002
(version completed with specific options)**

Q.1 I am going to read out to you a list of groups of people from different places. I would like you to indicate to what extent you feel close to the following groups.

READ OUT	Very much	Quite a lot	Very little	Not at all	DK
1. The inhabitants of the city or village where you live/where you have lived most of your life					
2. The inhabitants of the region where you live (i.e. BRITAIN: Scotland, Wales, etc., SPAIN: “Comunidad Autonoma”)					
3. Fellow (NATIONALITY, i.e. Austrians, British, Czechs, Germans, Greeks, Hungarians, Italians, Poles, Spaniards)					
4. EU citizens					
5. Fellow Europeans (including EU citizens and people living in countries that are part of the European continent but do not make part of the EU)					
6. Central-Eastern Europeans					
7. Arabs					
8. Turks					
9. Russians					
10. US citizens					
11. Gypsies					
12. Jews					
13. Moroccans (ITALY), Albanians (GREECE), German minority (POLAND), people from the white dominions (BRITAIN), Turks (GERMANY & AUSTRIA), Chinese (HUNGARY), Slovaks (CZECH REPUBLIC)					
14. Albanians (ITALY), Kurds (GREECE), Ukrainian minority (POLAND), people from the Commonwealth (BRITAIN), Poles (GERMANY & AUSTRIA), Romanians (HUNGARY), Ukrainians (CZECH REPUBLIC)					
15. Filipinos (ITALY), Filipinos (GREECE), Roma minority (POLAND), people from non-Commonwealth countries (BRITAIN), people from former Yugoslavia (GERMANY & AUSTRIA), Austrians (HUNGARY), Poles (CZECH REPUBLIC)					

Q.2 Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to a nation. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (SHOW CARD WITH SCALE)

“I feel (NATIONALITY) because I share with fellow (NATIONALITY)...

READ OUT	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK
If you do not feel (NATIONALITY), please tick here and ignore the other items					
1. A common culture, customs and traditions					
2. A common language					
3. Common ancestry					
4. A common history and a common destiny					
5. A common political and legal system					
6. Common rights and duties					
7. A common system of social protection					
8. A national economy					
9. A national defense system					
10. Our homeland					
11. A feeling of national pride					
12. National independence and sovereignty					
13. Our national character					
14. Our national symbols (e.g. the flag, the national anthem)					

Q.3 Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to Europe. To what extent you agree with the following statements? (SHOW CARD WITH SCALE)

“I feel European because I share with fellow Europeans

READ OUT	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK
If you do not feel European, please tick here and ignore the other items					
1. A common civilisation					
2. Membership in a European society with many languages and cultures					
3. Common ancestry					
4. A common history and a common destiny					
5. (SPLIT BALLOT A –EU member states) The EU institutions and an emerging common political and legal system (SPLIT BALLOT B – Accession countries) The EU institutions and an emerging common political and legal system after accession					
6. Common rights and duties					
7. (SPLIT BALLOT A –EU member states) A common system of social protection within the EU (SPLIT BALLOT B – Accession countries) A future common system of social protection within the EU					
8. (SPLIT BALLOT A –EU member states) The right to free movement and residence in any part of the EU territory (SPLIT BALLOT B – Accession countries) The future right to free movement and residence in any part of the EU territory					
9. An emerging EU defense system					
10. A common European homeland					
11. A feeling of pride for being European					
12. (SPLIT BALLOT A –EU member states) Sovereignty within the EU territory (SPLIT BALLOT B – Accession countries) Sovereignty within the enlarged EU territory					
13. (SPLIT BALLOT A –EU member states – WITHOUT UK) A common EU currency (SPLIT BALLOT B – Accession countries AND UK) A future common EU currency					
14. A set of EU symbols (e.g. flag, anthem)					

**European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab
Meetings**

New series of events 2005-2008



 <p>MARIE CURIE ACTIONS</p>	<p align="center">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p align="center">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p align="center">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p align="center">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	---

Table 1. Five groups mentioned as the closest, by country*¹

	<i>AUSTRIA</i>	<i>CZECH REPUBLIC</i>	<i>GERMANY EAST</i>	<i>GERMANY WEST</i>	<i>GREAT BRITAIN</i>	<i>GREECE</i>	<i>HUNGARY</i>	<i>ITALY</i>	<i>POLAND</i>	<i>SPAIN</i>
1 st	Village	Village	Village	Village	Village	Nation	Nation	Village	Nation	Village
2 nd	Nation	Nation	Region	Nation	Nation	Village	Village	Nation	Village	Nation
3 rd	Region	Region	Nation	Region	Region	Region	Region	Region	Region	Region
4 th	EU	EU	EU	EU	USA	EU	EU	EU	EU	EU
5 th	Europe	Europe	Europe	Europe	EU	Europe	Europe	Europe	Europe	Europe

*Taking into account both the median closeness and the percentage of people who feel close to the group.

Table 2. Five items mentioned as the most important for national attachment, by country*

	<i>AUSTRIA</i>	<i>CZECH REPUBLIC</i>	<i>GERMANY EAST</i>	<i>GERMANY WEST</i>	<i>GREAT BRITAIN</i>	<i>GREECE</i>	<i>HUNGARY</i>	<i>ITALY</i>	<i>POLAND</i>	<i>SPAIN</i>
1 st	Language	Language	Language	Language	Language	Symbols	Language	Language	Symbols	Language
2 nd	Culture	Culture	Culture	Culture	Borders	Language	Culture	Culture	Language	Culture
3 rd	Borders	Symbols	Ancestry	Rights/D.	Sovereign.	Ancestry	Hist/Dest	Ancestry	Hist/Dest	Borders
4 th	Rights/D.	Ancestry	Hist/Dest	Hist/Dest	Pride	Hist/Dest	Ancestry	Rights/D.	Ancestry	Rights/D.
5 th	Welfare	Hist/Dest	Rights/D.	Politics	Symbols	Pride	Symbols	Symbols	Culture	Character

*Taking into account both the median importance of the item and the percentage of people who think that it is important.

Table 3. Five items mentioned as the most important for European attachment, by country*

	<i>AUSTRIA</i>	<i>CZECH REPUBLIC</i>	<i>GERMANY EAST</i>	<i>GERMANY WEST</i>	<i>GREAT BRITAIN</i>	<i>GREECE</i>	<i>HUNGARY</i>	<i>ITALY</i>	<i>POLAND</i>	<i>SPAIN</i>
1 st	Mov/Res	Civiliz.	Mov/Res	Mov/Res	Mov/Res	Econ.	Civiliz.	Econ.	Civiliz.	Econ.
2 nd	Civiliz.	Lang/Cult	Econ.	Econ.	Lang/Cult	Mov/Res	Lang/Cult	Mov/Res	Lang/Cult	Mov/Res
3 rd	Econ.	Army	Borders	Civiliz.	Civiliz.	Borders	Econ.	Army	Mov/Res	Lang/Cult
4 th	Lang/Cult	Borders	Civiliz.	Lang/Cult	Rights/D.	Army	Hist/Dest	Rights/D.	Pride	Rights/D.
5 th	Welfare	Hist/Dest	Rights/D.	Borders	Welfare	Lang/Cult	Borders	Lang/Cult	Politics	Borders

*Taking into account both the median importance of the item and the percentage of people who think that it is important.

European Ph.D. on Social Representations and Communication International Lab Meetings

New series of events 2005-2008

	<p align="center">European Commission Research Directorate General Human Resources and Mobility</p> <p align="center">MARIE CURIE CONFERENCES & TRAINING COURSES (MSCF-CT-2004-013264)</p>	 <p align="center">Social Representations in action and construction in Media and Society</p> <p align="center">SoReCoMedia & Society</p>
---	---	---

Figure 1. Proportions of individuals with Inclusive National (and European) and with Exclusive National identification, by country

