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**“REMEMBERING” WORLD WAR II AND WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT:
SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE SOCIAL REPRESENTATION OF
HISTORICAL WARFARE ACROSS 22 SOCIETIES**

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Abstract

3331 students from 22 nations answered a survey on the most important events in world history. At the national level, free recalling and a positive evaluation of World War II (WW2) were associated with World Values Survey willingness to fight for the country in a war and with being a nation victorious in the war. WW2 recall was associated with high casualties in this war. Willingness to fight, a more benign evaluation, and to a lower extent, recall of WW2 were associated with nation-level scores on Power Distance, Social Dominance Orientation and Hierarchical values, suggesting that values stressing obedience and competition between nations reinforce a disposition to officially sanctioned collective violence. Internal political violence was unrelated willingness to fight, excluding direct learning as an explanation of legitimization of violence. Recall of wars in general was also unrelated to willingness to fight, suggesting specific knowledge and emotions about a recent, representationally central war is more important than a general tendency to recall wars. Results replicate and extend Archer & Gartner's (1984) classic study showing the legitimization of violence by war to the domain of collective remembering.

REMEMBERING WORLD WAR II AND WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT: SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE SOCIAL REPRESENTATION OF HISTORICAL WARFARE ACROSS 22 SOCIETIES

What things do societies choose to remember? And how do these things influence their present characteristics, including willingness to wage war? The study of collective remembering has a long analytic tradition in sociology (see Halbwachs, 1950/1992; also Wertsch, 2002), but only recently has quantitative data been collected across cultures to afford new answers to these perennial questions. Liu et al. (2005) found that across twelve Eastern and Western societies, young people overwhelmingly chose to remember war and to a lesser extent politics as the most important events in world history, with World War II (WWII) being the most important event in all twelve samples. The overwhelming centrality of war in the popular remembrance of history has been replicated by Pennebaker, Rentfrow, Davis, Paez, Techio et al (2006), and gives rise to the main questions in the current research. At the national level, does the collective remembering of war impact on willingness to fight in current conflicts? And is it the remembrance of all wars in general or the specific remembering of WWII that relates to willingness to fight? Is the general remembrance of war associated with more abstract culture general features like the dimensions of cross-cultural variation (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1994)?

The most relevant evidence to date regarding these questions was reported in a classic study by Archer and Gardner (1984). Using archival cross cultural data at the national level, they found that combatant nations were more likely to experience increases homicide rates than control nations in the years immediately following WWII. Increases in homicides were more likely in victorious nations with high casualties, and these increases were unrelated to economic deprivation or social disorganization, and not attributable to returning male combatants. Archer and Gartner concluded that wars, especially victorious ones, tend to legitimate the use of violence in society, and this effect is not confined to combatants. In fact, for the US Army in WWII, Stouffer (1949) found that agreement with the standard positive meanings or rhetoric of war (e.g., the glory of war, heroism of battle, war enabling soldiers to realize their masculinity and actualize supreme values of comradeship) was highest among civilians at home, moderate among rear-area troops, and lowest among combat troops. Extending these findings to the domain of collective remembering, Pennebaker, Paez & Rime (1997) and Candau

(2004) claim that the most vivid collective remembrances have a life of two to three generations following the event (e.g., as they are related by relatives or personally experienced, especially in youth, see Schuman & Scott, 1989). Hence, we might expect a similar form of collective symbolic learning about the legitimacy of war to appear vicariously and cross-generational at cultural level for young people's current remembrances of WWII. If this is the case, then it will be the specific remembrance of WWII, not more general collective remembering of wars in general that is associated with willingness to fight in future or present wars.

Processes of Collective Remembering

Word of mouth is not the only or even the primary means by which societies organize their remembrances. Pennebaker et al (2006) describe the collective remembering of world history as "sociocentric". This sociocentrism has several important characteristics, as suggested by Liu & Hilton (2005), and elaborated here: it is (1) in-group favoring, both in terms of what is perceived as important and in terms of emphasizing positive meaning and/or moral lessons for the in-group, and concealing or forgetting one's own shameful deeds and remembering victimization by others, (2) conditioned by power relations, with greater and lesser degrees of Eurocentrism being more characteristic of representations of world history than ethnocentrism for Asian nations for example, (3) largely state controlled, with institutional practices (such as commemorations or mass media) consistent with the current political regime reinforcing collective remembering. However, this state control is (4) tempered by experience, with word of mouth and personal experience exerting powerful effects despite official exhortations, (5) mobilized by present day issues with the recent past, and distant events relevant to present day political issues perceived as important, and (6) anchored on values dominant in the national culture. Each of these factors is described in turn.

1. In-group favoritism. Memorials, monuments and textbooks often gloss over the tragedies of collective violence, and the horrors of war are displaced by emphasis on heroes, glory, and justification of sacrifices. Death and destruction are re-evaluated within the sacred task of defending the nation. War made the nation-state, and the state made war (Tilly, 1975, p.42). In many countries wars of independence or other instances of collective violence are among the founding events of the national identity (Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004; Liu, Wilson, McClure & Higgins, 1999; Liu, Lawrence, Ward, &

Abraham, 2002). As Liu & Hilton (2005) state in their review, “A group’s representation of its history can explain how its world has come to be the way it is and justify its responses to current challenges” (p. 53). In the case of victorious nations, like USA and Russia, WW2 is represented as a Just War (Neal, 2005), or a “Great Patriotic War” (Wertsch, 2002). An analysis of official documents in 19th and 20th century Europe (Rosoux, 2001), mainly focused on Germany and France, found the following common features of representations of past wars: “Our” shameful past war episodes are concealed; our heroes, martyrs and epic battles are acknowledged and remembered; our internal conflicts and crimes are forgotten. Recalling past persecutions and martyrs imposes the duty of fidelity and justifies revenge against evil-doers. References to others as victims, civilians killed and suffering are concealed. In fact, aggression against enemies is a manner to repay injuries suffered by the nation or nation’s ancestors. War becomes a legitimate form of honoring the memory of ancestors and victims (Rosoux, 2001).

Even in the case of defeated nations, like Germany and Japan after WWII, people share and remember their own suffering, but, conceal, silence or ignore other people’s suffering (Buruma, 2002; Hein & Selden, 2000). Most soldiers remember war as a negative but normalized experience – more positive in the case of victorious armies, like the Red Army, and more negative in the case of defeated armies, like the German Army (Bourke, 2001; Hastings, 2004; Nordstrom, 1998; Lomsky-Feder, 2004). Hence, victory in war is an important precondition for glorifying war, and should lead to a willingness to fight in future wars at the collective level.

2. Conditioned by Power Relations. In-group favoritism organized by the state is constrained by the fact that states exist in relations to other states, and that history is contested between states and by supra-national institutions as well as by ethnic or other groups within states. Liu & Hilton (2005), for example, note how the problem of misconduct during WWII has been much more of an issue for Germany, located at the center of Europe and the object of countless Hollywood movies, than it has been for Japan, an island nation that surrendered to the USA rather than its Asian neighbors who accuse it of war crimes. Liu et al. (2005) also noted that Asian representations of world history were more Eurocentric than ethnocentric, with more European than Asian events nominated in most samples; Asian nations saw world history as emanating from the West, being largely ignorant of events taking place in neighboring areas. They interpreted this

as evidence of the representational power of the West, correlated with their disproportionate control of the world's wealth, power, and resources.

3. *Institutionally Mediated.* Japanese remember the end of WW2 more than Germans, because in Japan, "Surrender day" is also a day of ritual remembering of fallen soldiers by the nation, while no ritual related to surrender day exists in Germany (Schuman, Akiyama & Knaüper, 1998). Changes in formal education and political context also influence how people remember historical events. Older Russians emphasize the positive military role of Stalin on WW2 and state that the German aggression was unexpected. Younger Russians, educated under post-Soviet systems of education evaluate negatively Stalin and blamed his leadership for the early failures against the German Army (Emelyanova, 2002). In 1945, a poll found that 57% of French people believed the Red Army was the most important factor in defeating Germany in WW2. Sixty years later, after the Cold War, the USSR collapse and dozens of movies showing the role of the US and UK armies, only 20% agreed with this idea (Lacroix-Riz, 2005; Baumeister & Hastings, 1997). Finally the creation of a state appears to strongly influence collective remembering. For example Cabecinhas (2005) found that virtually every single event nominated by East Timorese as important in world history were relevant to the creation of the new Timorese state, including the invasions by Indonesia, the intervention by the United Nations based on human rights legislation, etc; similar effects have been found in India an ancient civilization where the collective remembering is focused on the post-Independence era. Of course, public, official, and elite memories should connect with popular memories to be effective. Collective memories are more likely to be formed and successfully maintained by rituals and institutions in the case of events that represent significant social and personal long-term changes, both unexpected and emotional laden (Pennebaker & Basanik, 1997).

4. *Tempered by Experience.* People have more accessible "fresh events" that are anchored on direct experience and communicative memory or face-to-face interaction. Britons were more likely to remember WW2 than were Americans by a margin of 16%, probably because the British experienced the war much more directly and personally (Schuman & Scott, 1989; Scott & Zac, 1993). Recalling an event like the Spanish Civil War was associated with social sharing and direct experience (Paez et al, 2000). Remembering an event is also higher among people living the events in their formative

years (10-25) or adolescence or young adulthood. Older Americans most frequently mentioned in a 1989 survey the Great Depression and WW2, while younger mention more JFK assassination and the Vietnam War, events that had occurred during participants early adulthood (Deschamps, Paez & Pennebaker, 2002; Schuman & Scott, 1989; Schuman, Belli, Bischooping, 1997; Neal, 2005). Finally, different authors suggest that three generations is the maximum that people retain vividly historical events. Studies confirmed that when asked about important political events lived by relatives (Pennebaker, Paez, & Rime, 1997), or asked about genealogical knowledge and relatives' episodic information, most subjects have information for about two-three generations (Candau, 2005). Assman (1992 quoted in Lazlo, 2005) proposes that collective memories stem for about a century or three generations, and then memories change to ritualized abstract and semantic knowledge or "cultural memories". These factors suggest experiential and word of mouth constraints to the glorification of war. Hence, measures of the extent to which a people suffered casualties during a war within the last three generations (e.g., WWII) should negatively predict willingness to fight in future conflicts, even as they predict a greater remembrance of the war.

5. Mobilized by Present Day Issues. Not all wars are remembered at the same level: WW2 and Vietnam War are largely recalled in polls as important events, while for Americans the Korean War is largely forgotten, even though casualties were similar in Vietnam and Korea (Griffin, 2005; Neal, 2005). Vietnam and WW2 were associated with high impact on institutions and subsequent social changes, whereas Korea was a less socially relevant war for Americans (but not Koreans). People remember more events that are relevant for their social identity and current political issues. For instance, 54% of African-Americans recalled as an important historical national event Civil Rights movements and 4% WW2, versus 10% and 23% of Whites respectively (Griffin, 2005). Each ethnic group "over-recalls" by a ratio of five the event most relevant for their in-group. In 1985 30% of USA citizens mentioned WWII as an important historical event; this dropped to 20% in 2000, but following the September 11 bombing, the percentage rose to 28%, in a "resurrection" of WWII as historical event in the context of international terrorist violence (Schuman & Rodgers, 2004). Liu and Hilton (2005) claim that a U shape of collective remembering is characteristic of national histories, with foundational events in the nation's history (e.g., independence, treaties, etc.) and recent events

remembered most often, and popular discourse connecting the lessons of the past to the challenges of the future and vice versa.

6. *Anchored in dominant cultural values.* Finally, social representations of war are related to general norms and meaning structures prevalent in a societal context. With respect to cultural values, High Power Distance values (PDI) are related positively to civil war and internal political violence, because asymmetrical and authoritarian systems and low consensus increase the chance of intense internal conflicts (Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, confirming that hierarchical cultural values are positively related to collective violence, self-enhancement or hierarchical values like Power and Achievement, called by Schwartz Hierarchy at a cultural level, and PDI, correlate negatively with the main dimension of a socio-structural index of a “culture of peace” (De Rivera, 2004; Basabe & Valencia, 2006). PDI is associated at the cultural level to Schwartz’s Conservatism and negatively to Autonomy. This implies that PDI is associated with Security and Conformity values and inversely related to Self-direction and Stimulation. Such a “PDI cultural syndrome” promotes differences in power and hierarchical systems of role, emphasizing obedience and respect for authorities, while Hierarchy (HIE) emphasize the legitimacy of using power to attain goals, including in-group or national goals (Schwartz, 1994). PDI and HIE are also related negatively to Inglehart’s Post-materialism, due to its emphasis on equality and tolerance (Basabe & Ros, 2005).

Hierarchical (power and achievement), conformity and security values at individual level correlate with Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) in different countries (Altmeyer, 1998; Cohr, Moschner, Maes & Kielman, 2005; Mendoza et al, 2005). The association between hierarchical values and SDO suggest that individuals and nations sharing hierarchical values should stress asymmetrical and competitive international relations, including the use of collective violence. In USA, Spain, Lebanon and Germany, high SDO participants supported military involvement in war and were less fearful of inter-group violence (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Pratto, Lemieux, Glasford & Henry, 2003; Cohrs et al, 2005; Moya & Morales, 2005). Similarly at the collective level, Power Distance and Hierarchy values were related to disposition to fight in war for the nation (Basabe & Valencia, 2006). Emphasis on obedience to official leadership, in competition between nations and a more benign evaluation of violence, all relate to PDI, HIE and SDO, and should reinforce the remembering of and positive attitudes towards Wars.

We explore the extent to which this is true for the remembrance of WWII versus general recall for wars in general. One might expect that recall of a specific event such as WWII to be related to such specific cultural feature such as willingness to fight in a war, but less to abstract and generalized dimensions of cultural variation compared to more abstract recall of war in general. To the extent that it is the specific remembrance of WWII that is related to willingness to fight and possibly the dimensions of cross-cultural variation, then this would suggest that it is specific knowledge and emotions about a recent (i.e., within 3 generations) event that is important in validating present conflicts and structuring society; on the other hand, if it is remembrance of wars in general, then this would suggest that chronic remembrance of war may form a more general or abstract feature of culture similar to the other dimensions of cross-cultural variation (e.g. a warlike culture?).

Summary and Hypotheses

To summarize, we examine the role of in-group favoritism and power relations (and indirectly, institutional mediated recall) on the free recall of a recent and core representation of warfare (i.e. WW2) and also Wars in general. We then relate the collective remembering of WW2 to the actual experience/involvement in WW2, and relate these to dimensions of cultural variation. We expect that victorious nations with direct experience (i.e. directly and highly involved), and those with a hierarchical cultural syndrome should report higher recall of WW2 memories and high disposition to fight in a new war. This study will contrast associations between historical experience, cultural values and attitudes, recall of WW2, recall of war in general, and willingness to fight in a war, using large student samples from the Americas (USA, Argentina, Brazil), Europe (Germany, France, Hungary, UK, Portugal, Russia, Spain), Asia (Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, China and Singapore), South Asia (India) and Australasia (Australia and New Zealand – see table 1 for samples features).

Table 1 about here

METHOD

Historical experiences. Being Victorious in WW2: Nations belonging to Nazi-Fascist Axis were Germany, Hungary and Japan. Allied and occupied nations included former Asian American and British colonies, France, Poland, and Russia. Spain sent troops to fight in the Russian front but was formally neutral, as was Portugal. Brazil sent troops to fight with the Allies, and Argentina was neutral until the very end. Victorious nations were considered all allied nations directly involved in war. Defeated nations receive a score of 1, Neutral or passive allies 2, and active allies 3 (see Table 2). Casualties and involvement in WW2: WW2 Death toll was estimated death by 1000 habitants using Wikipedia. For instance Poland and Russia lost 15-20% of their populations (source: www.Wikipedia). Internal Political Violence in the 20th century: Instances of civil war or number of political riots and armed attacks against and by the government in 136 countries between 1948 and 1977 were used as an index of internal political violence (for a detailed report, see Van der Vliert, 1998).

Cultural factors. Hofstede (2001) reports Power Distance scores for 53 nations and regions. These ratings are based on questionnaires answered by IBM employees throughout the world in the 1970's. In spite of the fact that the survey was performed more than 30 years ago, Hofstede's scores show high convergent validity with current surveys of values and with current cross-cultural studies (Hofstede, 2001). For example, Hofstede's PDI scores correlated .37 and -.50 with Schwartz's Conservatism and Intellectual Autonomy and -.60 with Inglehart's Post-materialism (Basabe & Ros, 2005). We also included Schwartz's value scores (Schwartz, 1994) on Conservatism, Autonomy (Affective Autonomy+Intellectual Autonomy) and Hierarchy, from 14 countries (Schwartz, 1994). Finally, Inglehart's Materialism and Post materialism scores were used (World Values Survey-WVS, Inglehart et al, 2004). The post materialism concept results from a factor analysis with one pole representing post materialist values (high subjective well-being, not giving importance to hard work, encouraging tolerance, and trusting people), and an opposite pole representing materialist values, with items such as "rejection of different groups," "respect for one's parents," "liking for work," and "women need to have children to fulfill themselves" (Basabe & Ros, 2005). Table 1 shows the scores for each country (mean scores by country) for the values of Hofstede, Schwartz and Inglehart (for Conservatism and Autonomy scores see Schwartz, 1994, pp.112-113; for Materialism scores, Inglehart et al, 2004).

Table 2 about here

Social Domination orientation scale (SDO). SDO is a widely used 16 item scale attitudinal measure of a generalized motivation for dominance by the in-group as opposed to inter-group equality. SDO scale has been validated in a number of countries, and two major cross cultural studies were used to provide nation level means (see Sidanius, Levin, Liu & Pratto, 2000; Pratto, Liu, Levin, Sidanius, Shih, Bachrach & Hogarty, 2000). Additionally, national means based on scores from students or convenience samples were also available for some of the samples reported here (see Table 2 and for national scores see Sidanius & Pratto, 2001, Guimond et al, 2003 and Mendoza et al, 2005).

Percentage remembering WW2 as an important historical event. Responses to a questionnaire in English, Spanish, German, Portuguese and French were collected from 1996-2005. All participants were volunteers from Psychology courses in universities in the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, and USA), Europe (France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain and the UK), Asia (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan) and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand - see Table 1 for the 22 nations studied). The sample consisted of 3073 subjects (60 % female) with a mean age of 21.78 years (SD= 4.25). Participants were asked open ended questions: "Imagine that you were given a seminar in world history. What 7 events would you teach as the most important in world history? How positively or negatively do you regard each event" (on a 7 point scale ranging from very negative to very positive). Hungarian evaluations were not available. These studies are described fully in Liu et al (2005) and Liu et al (2006).

Percentage remembering wars in general as important historical events. Using the same questionnaire, general indices of the remembering of wars in general were computed in different ways: (1) the total percentage of wars among the top 10 events for each nation, both including and not including the atomic bombings and (2) the percentage of war reported overall among all historical events (including minor events not in the top 10) nominated.

Willingness to fight in a war for country. The World Values Study Group collected data in 54 nations, using large random samples (ranging from 1000 in Argentina to 2500 in Russia). Fieldwork was carried out in 1999-2002. One item asked

“Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if were to come that, would you be willing to fight for your country? Yes =1, No=2. Yes Percentage was used (see Inglehart et al, 2004, page E012 for national scores).

RESULTS

Using the country scores on historical experience, SDO, Inglehart, Schwartz and Hofstede's scores, a series of non parametric Spearman Rho correlations at the collective level were performed in order to compare relationships between sociocultural factors, WW2 recall and evaluation scores (see Table 3). Recall of war in general (or of WW1 for instance), was mostly uncorrelated with any of the other factors and hence is not reported in detail here. The interest value of this null result will be revisited in the discussion.

Table 3 about here

High death toll and Being a victorious nation correlated with greater WWII recall. High Inglehart's Materialism, SDO, low Inglehart's Post-Materialism and low Schwartz Autonomy also correlated with WW2 recall.

Being a victorious nation, Hofstede's PDI , Schwartz's Conservatism and Hierarchy correlated positively with WW2 evaluation – hierarchical cultures evaluated less negatively WW2. SDO, Inglehart's Post-materialism scores show a marginal significant correlation with WW2 evaluation. Materialist cultures and oriented toward social domination nations evaluated less negatively WW2. Finally, high domestic political violence was slightly associated to a less negative evaluation of WW2.

Being a victorious nation, death toll, WW2 recall and positive evaluation of this war correlated with willingness to fight. Internal political violence was unrelated to willingness to fight. Willingness to fight correlated with Power distance, Schwartz's Conservatism, low Autonomy and Hierarchy, Inglehart's materialism, low post-materialism, and SDO.

Some doubts remain about the generality of results obtained given the limited sample of nations for which remembrance of war were available. Hence, we performed an additional analysis with all countries available in World Values Survey, and the Hofstede and Schwartz data. This replicated our correlations using the more limited sample of nations (see Inglehart et al, 2004, Hofstede, 2001 and Schwartz, 1994 for details on values and beliefs, and Wikipedia for the historical experience in WW2). Being a victorious nation correlated with willingness to fight ($r(54) = .34, p < .01$) but not with death toll, ($r(30) = .16, p > .10$). Internal political violence was unrelated to willingness to fight, ($r(39) = .02, p > .10$). Willingness to fight correlated with Power distance ($r(42) = .37, p < .01$), Inglehart's materialism ($r(52) = .29, p < .05$), and post-materialism ($r(54) = -.51, p < .05$).

Data were available for 18 nations with Schwartz's values and 16 nations for SDO and the new analysis improve only marginally statistical power and show similar patterns. For instance SDO correlated $r(16) = .48, p < .03$ with willingness to fight.

Finally, partial correlations were computed between Hofstede's PDI, experience in WW2 and willingness to fight. Power Distance, partial $r(36) = .40, p < .01$, and to a lower extent, historical experience or being a victorious nation, partial $r(36) = .22, p < .09$, were associated to willingness to fight, when the other factor (historical experience and PDI respectively) was controlled for – because of the lower degrees of freedom Schwartz's and SDO's scores were not used, nor was it appropriate to use multiple regression.

DISCUSSION

At the national level, percentage free recalling WW2 as an important event for world history was associated with being a victorious nation; on the other hand belonging to the Axis powers was related to a relatively lower mention of WW2. Level of involvement (i.e. higher death toll or casualties) was also associated to higher recall. These findings underline the in-group favoring aspects of collective remembering, particularly in the case of high status (i.e. victorious) nations, but this is an in-group favoritism that is tempered by bloody experience. Nations with high casualties, like Poland or Russia, probably produce more instances of institutional remembering, and also higher levels of

communication between generations, but NOT a higher evaluation of WW2. These processes are reinforced among victorious nations that can afford to remember positive moral lessons, heroes and WW2 as a just cause. In fact, death toll was unrelated to evaluation, but being a victorious nation was associated with a more positive or at least less negative evaluation of WW2. The evaluative mean for winner nations was 2.64 compared to losers (Axis powers $M=1.6$) and not involved nations ($M=1.50$). Moreover, differences in meaning related to victory appears within nation: Russian participants mention WWII with two different labels, World War Two (56%) and Great Patriotic War (44%). Only 6% mention both. The mean evaluation for the first label was 2.09 and for the second 4.0. This younger Russians, educated under post-Soviet systems of education, use predominantly a neutral label and evaluate negatively WW2 – probably because of Stalin negative leadership, failures against the German Army and high casualties. A minority uses the label that emphasizes the triumph over foreign invaders and the just defeat of Nazism; in this case the evaluation was more positive. As Wertsch (2002) argues, this label is a condensation of the important positive narrative template “triumph-over-alien-forces” - particularly in Russia. Two different “voices” or narratives attributes meaning to WW2, the positive being a minority in the current Russian context. To a lower extent China participants show a similar pattern: 17% mention Sino-Japanese war (1931-1945) as a distinctive event versus 81% mentioning WW2. Evaluation of this independence war that ends with the defeat of Japanese was more positive ($M=4.2$) that the evaluation of WW2 ($M=2.0$).

Recalling WW2 and a positive evaluation of this war were also related to a positive disposition to fight for the country, perhaps because the same factor that reinforces WW2 memories and evaluations reinforces willingness to fight: being a victorious nation. An idealized and positive image of WW2, as a just cause or a necessary war, related to courage, heroism, epic battles like Stalingrad, Guadalcanal, or the Battle of Britain, and stressing soldiers' virtues and the inhumanity of the Nazi-Fascist-Axis enemy, is relatively hegemonic in victorious nations. This positive image is likely to be more credible to people that were not directly involved, like grandchildren of the generation of soldiers. Even if loser nations conceal more negative aspects of their WW2 action (e.g., denial of crimes of war by the Imperial and German Army, see Buruma, 2002), their representations of the war do not (or are not able to) reinforce a positive view of war and national warriors. Because defeated nations remember war

defensively, emphasizing in-group suffering, they may teach new generations about the negative effects of collective violence (Conrad, 2003, Evans, 2003). The younger generations learn that wars are “social catastrophes”.

This effect may not be restricted to winners and losers in war, but to the collective remembering of warfare as a catastrophe. In fact, a similar social representation of the Spanish Civil War was constructed in the last phase of Franco’s fascist dictatorship (Igartua & Paez, 1997). Some authors posit that this representation of the Spanish Civil war as a catastrophe teaches new generations the necessity of consensus and of avoiding social conflict, and helped ease a relatively peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy (Aguilar, 2001) after Franco’s death. The lowest means in WW2 evaluation were German, Portugal and Spain, all European nations with a fascist past. Even though Portugal and Spain were not directly involved in the war, we speculate that the collective remembering of the war was tilted towards the direction of interpreting it as a catastrophe in these nations.

Of course, such speculation awaits more definitive empirical proof, as civil war exerts an additional effect of collective remembering. Civil Wars or internal political violence after the war was slightly positively related to WW2 evaluation, and was unrelated to recall of WW2 as an important event or to willingness to fight in a new war. This suggests that recent violence made less negative the Great War and rules out direct experience of collective violence as a factor affording a positive disposition towards war. While civil wars may be just as violent as wars between states, they are rarely glorified by the victors to the same degree, and hence, the representational processes involved in collective remembering are underlined as compared to the pure experience of collective violence.

Similarly, remembrance of wars in general was unrelated to willingness to fight, suggesting along the lines of Assman (1992, quoted in Laszlo, 2003) that there is something qualitatively different about living memories, transmitted from parents and grandparents to children and grandchildren by word of mouth that influences current political decisions. A general remembrance of wars was also uncorrelated to any of the dimensions of cultural variation we investigated, suggesting that collective remembering about war is event focused rather than a culture general predisposition to

glorify conflict. This result accords with Liu et al.'s (2005) assertion that WW2 serves as part of the core representation of world history, anchoring new events.

Given its position as a core representation, it is perhaps not surprising that remembering WW2, WW2 evaluation and willingness to fight in a war was negatively related to post-materialistic/individualist values and in a lower extent positively to collectivist/materialistic values. Post-materialist values emphasize expressive individualism and self-actualization. The shift from an industrial and materialistic to a post-materialist society (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) appears to be associated with a shift from a social representation of war focused on heroes, martyrs and a positive connotation of collective violence, towards a social representations of war focused on suffering, victims, the murder of civilians and the meaninglessness of war (Lomsky-Feder, 2004; Rosoux, 2001). Post-materialist values probably erode "heroic war narratives" and do not provoke a positive attitude towards collective violence.

On the other hand, positive evaluation of WW2 and willingness to fight were associated to Power Distance, low Autonomy, Conservatism, Hierarchical values - and Social Dominance Orientation was related to willingness to fight and WW2 recall. Under conditions of scarcity, societies focused on survival and hierarchical values tend to emphasize competition, particularly a competitive view on inter-group relations, as seen in the association of hierarchical values with SDO at both the individual and collective level. This hierarchical cultural syndrome reinforces a positive attitude towards collective violence and national wars both at collective and individual level (Cohrs et al, 2005, Sidanius and Pratto, 2001). *Our results suggest that participation in a victorious war and hierarchical cultural values are the most important factors reinforcing positive societal attitudes towards war and willingness to fight in future wars.*

Our study is limited by the scope of nations available and student samples of data for collective remembering and SDO. However, usually correlations between national samples and students samples in beliefs and opinions are high (Diener, Diener & Diener, 1995; see also Liu et al., 2005, Taiwanese data for the similarities between adult and student representations). Comparison between countries using matched samples of young adults with higher education probably under-estimates cross-cultural differences (Inglehart et al, 2004) because they compare participants with similar social background

and exposure to a similar “globalized culture”. Obtaining results using such restrictive samples increases confidence in the subjective culture associated with the differences, because other more salient cultural differences like economic development are controlled for. Moreover, using only large WVS samples and the maximum of available information replicated several of our main findings. It is important that results using different scores of cultural values and attitudes showed a convergent pattern. The current data also use free recall rather than more closed ended judgments of history; while free recall may be affected by event salience, Schuman and Rodgers (2004) report high correlations between free recall and judgments using rating scales.

Conclusion

Archer & Gartner (1984) concluded that wars tend to legitimate the use of violence in society. Our conclusion is that collective vicarious symbolic learning or legitimization of war occurs across a span of 3 generations at the cultural level: highly involved and victorious nations reported higher recall of WW2 memories and higher disposition to fight in a new war for the motherland. Hierarchical values and attitudinal orientation towards the social dominance of the in-group over others groups and nations also supported a “culture of war”, but not the collective remembering of wars in general. This suggests that it is event specific and focused symbolic learning, passed by word of mouth and mass media, replayed through institutional forms of commemoration and state building that contribute to a culture of war, not a general abstract dimension of hawkish remembrance.

Table 1.- Sample features

Country	<i>Year</i>	Number of subjects	Percentage of women	Average age	Language
Argentina	2005	100	50	18.5	Spanish
Australia		98	75		English
Brasil	2005	367	80.4	23.9	Portuguese
China	2006	115	54	19.9	Chinese
France		102	51		French
Germany		81	51		German
Great Britain		39	87		English
Hong Kong		123	50		Chinese
India	2006	100	55	21.5	English
Indonesia	2006	104	52	21.2	Indonesian
Japan		91	42		Japanese
Malaysia		180	81		
New Zealand	1996	112	68		English
Philippines		302	70		Philipino
Poland	2006	102	70	20.4	Polish
Portugal	2005-06	100			Portuguese
Russia	2005	60	80	18.4	Russian
Singapore		201	70		English
Spain	2004/2005	142	68	26.4	Spanish
Taiwan		646	53	26.4	Chinese
Ukraine	2006	84	74	21.4	Russian
USA	2002	82	41		English

Table 2. - Historical experience, percentage recalling WW2, evaluation, and dimensions of cross-cultural variation

Country	WW 2 EXP	Death Toll	WW 2 Rec	Eval*	PDI	HIE R	SDO	Post mat
Argentina	N	0.0	48	1.79	49		2.39	25
Australia	W	5.7	68	1.73	36	2.36	2.47	35
Brazil	N	0.0..	40	2.03	69	2.64	2.21	12
China	W	40.7	81	2.37	80	3.70	3.04	03
France	W	13.4	64	2.12	68	2.16	2.2	18
Germany	L	108.2	68	1.54	35	2.27	1.66	17
Hungary	L	63	88		46	2.42		02
Hong Kong	W	18.9	81	2.0	68		3.27	
India	W	3.80	80	2.97	77		3.11	02
Indonesia	W	56.7	79	2.80	78		3.14	03
Japan	L	36.1	52	1.66	54		3.61	09
Malaysia	W	4.5	60	3.95	104	2.43		
New Zealand	W	7.6	73	2.15	22	2.38	2.25	20
Poland	W	160.9	93	1.30	64	2.53		08
Philippines	W	7.3	68	3.33	94			06
Portugal	N	0.00	72	1.6	63	2.08	2.46	10
Russia	W	137	92	2.95	105		3.73	02
Singapore	W	18.9	94	3.96	74	2.75		07
Spain	N	0.0	50	1.4	57	2.03	2.49	17
Taiwan	W	18.9	69	3.1	58	2.85	2.69	05
United Kingdom	W	7.7	77	2.82	35		2.62	20
USA	W	3.2	86	2.87	40	2.39	2.49	25

Note. WW2 Exper=Experience Second World War, W= Real Winner (fighting and victorious nation) =3, Neutral or Allied non fighting=2, Defeated Nation or axis defeated country=1. WW2 Rec = percentage mentioning WW2 as an important event. Eval= evaluation of WW2, 1=Negative, 7=Positive. PDI=Hofstede's Power distance (Hofstede, 2001), HIE= Schwartz's Hierarchy (Schwartz, 1994), SDO= Social Dominance Orientation scores (USA, Russia, Taiwan, New Zealand, HK-China and Australia, scores, Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; France, Guimond et al, 2003; Germany, Cohrs et al, 2005; Argentina, Brazil, Portugal and Spain, Mendoza et al, 2005; India (N=98), Japan (N=80) and UK (N=39), data collected in Liu et al, 2006

study) and Post= Percentage population with Post-materialist values (Inglehart et al, 2004). A High number denotes a high score on the termed variable. * For Russia and China evaluation is the weighted mean of different labeled events related to WW2: of course WW2, plus Great Patriotic War and Sino-Japanese War respectively.

Table 3 .- Non parametrics Correlations (Rho) between Historical experience (Victorious WW2, Death Toll, Domestic Political Violence), Cultural Variables (Power Distance, Hierarchy, SDO) and WW2 and willingness to fight in a war across Nations

Measures	Reca	Evaluat.	Willin
	ll WW 2	WW2	g to Fight
Victorious WW2 $\underline{n}=20-22$.31+	.62**	.64**
Death toll in WW2 $\underline{n}=19-22$.61* *	.09	.36+
Domestic Political Violence 1947-77 $\underline{n}= 19-22$	-.22	.33+	.13
Hofstede Power Distance $\underline{n}=19-22$.13	.47**	.55**
Schwartz Conservatism $\underline{n}=14-16$.29	.55**	.79**
Schwartz Autonomy $\underline{n}=14-16$	-.39+	-.30	-.78**
Inglehart Materialism $\underline{n}=19-20$.37*	.32+	.59**
Inglehart Post-Materialism $\underline{n}=19-20$	-.49*	-.37+	-.58**
Schwartz Hierarchy $\underline{n}=14-16$.24	.42+	.54*
Social Dominance Orientation $\underline{n}= 15-17,$.57*	.39+	.49*
Recall WW2 $\underline{n}=19-21$.30+	.64**
Evaluation WW2 $\underline{n}=18$.53*

+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

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