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Social representations of history and the legitimization of social inequality: The form and function of historical negation

CHRIS G. SIBLEY^{1*}, JAMES H. LIU²,
JOHN DUCKITT¹ AND SAMMYH S. KHAN²

¹*Department of Psychology, University of
Auckland, New Zealand*

²*Department of Psychology, Victoria University of
Wellington, New Zealand*

Abstract

Three studies examined the form and function of ideologies that negate (versus recognise) the historical basis of claims for reparation for past injustices. Historical negation (a) predicted opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of social policy and (b) functioned as the mechanism through which majority group members high in a threat-driven security-cohesion motivation (indexed by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)) legitimated policy opposition in both undergraduate student (Study 1) and general population (Study 2) samples of the majority group (New Zealand Europeans/Pakeha). Study 3 experimentally manipulated historical negation in a general population sample using extracts adapted from political speeches, and demonstrated that historical negation increased opposition among liberal voters towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy. These results suggest that history serves an important symbolic function in mobilising support for public policies regarding intergroup relations because temporal continuity is central to claims of legitimacy, especially where resources are involved. Research in this area is important for any nation with a history of intergroup conflict, as it aids not only in understanding the form and function of historical narratives that legitimate social inequality, but also provides insight into the ways in which such discourses can be countered and re-formulated in order to promote social equality. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

There is considerable debate regarding issues of who gets what in contemporary New Zealand (NZ) society. Debates of this nature are not unique to NZ, however, and many nations are faced with similar challenges when determining just and fair procedures for achieving distributive and restorative justice. In NZ, such debate is anchored in a historical context of conflict between early European settlers and

*Correspondence to: Chris G. Sibley, Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand. E-mail: c.sibley@auckland.ac.nz

Maori (the indigenous people of NZ), historical injustices experienced by Maori during both colonial and post-colonial periods of NZ's history and more recent recognition of contemporary claims for reparation based upon the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 (Liu & Sibley, 2006; Liu, Sibley, & Huang, 2007; Sibley, Robertson, & Kirkwood, 2005). In such conditions, we argue that social representations of history provide an important symbolic resource for mobilising support for public policies regarding intergroup relations (Liu et al., 2007), because temporal continuity is central to claims of legitimacy for peoples and 'history is the story of the making of an ingroup' (Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999, p. 1023). Representations of history that emphasise or negate the relevance of historical injustices should, therefore, function as a proximal mechanism that affects public support in favour of increased allocations to minority groups that have experienced historical injustice. We examine this possibility in the context of ethnic group relations between Maori and Pakeha (New Zealanders of European ancestry) in NZ.¹

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF HISTORY AND THE DISCOURSE OF HISTORICAL NEGATION

Liu and Hilton (2005) argue that 'history provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going. It defines a trajectory which helps construct the essence of a group's identity, how it relates to other groups, and ascertains what its options are for facing present challenges' (p. 537). Following Malinowski (1926), Liu and Hilton (2005) posit that history provides foundational myths for nationhood, including an account of the nation's historical origins and mission; such a 'charter' defines rights and obligations for the group, and legitimises its social and political arrangements by appealing to cognitive narrative schemas (Wertsch, 2002) that communicate the relevance of cultural traditions in the face of new challenges. Liu and László (in press) further assert that historical accounts privilege some social categories above others by incorporating them into a story of national identity. How history is constructed can have enduring implications for anchoring social representations of what is considered fair in a society, whether specific historical events constitute *injustices*, and how resources are to be allocated in society, particularly in view of historical grievances.

The centrality of history in the psychology of nation-building has been thoroughly documented in NZ (see Liu, 2005). Whereas in the United States Whites are implicitly more associated with symbols of national identity than other 'racial' groups (Devos & Banaji, 2005), in NZ Maori and Pakeha were equally associated with symbols of NZ at the implicit level (Sibley & Liu, 2006). Sibley and Liu (2006) attributed this finding to culturally sanctioned bicultural discourses and representations established as a product of symbolic aspects of Maori-Pakeha intergroup relations, such as educational practices, artistic performances, representations of history, ceremonial occasions and cultural/sporting events; rather than resource-specific aspects such as the operation of the economy and the distribution of wealth and power. In addition, although the ideal of a bicultural partnership between Maori and Pakeha is firmly rooted at the symbolic level of implicit associations, and at the abstract level of explicit attitudes in support for biculturalism in principle, Pakeha are strongly opposed to policies distributing resources in favour of Maori on a categorical basis (Sibley & Liu, 2004). Qualitative research has shown that robust linguistic repertoires have emerged in NZ to marginalise Maori claims for economic compensation and other resource-specific issues as 'preferential treatment' (Kirkwood, Liu, &

¹There is continued debate in New Zealand regarding the most appropriate term describing New Zealanders of European descent. Although New Zealand European is the most popular term (Liu et al., 1999), Pakeha is the term that most strongly implies a relationship with Maori and hence seems most appropriate for this paper.

Weatherall, 2005; Nairn & McCreanor, 1990; Sibley, Liu, & Kirkwood, 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), despite the manifest disadvantages experienced by Maori according to many indicators of social value, including education, infant mortality, life expectancy, income and prison populations. These indicators all point to a continuing legacy of colonisation.

Ideologies of biculturalism and liberal democracy may thus form two competing historical narratives for NZ, which mobilise different historical events and present competing visions of national identity to chart paths for the future (Liu, 2005). Under a consensual ideology of liberal democracy, symbolic equality may be easier for the minority group to negotiate and for the dominant group to accept than policy aiming to equalise the distribution of wealth and power between groups (Sibley & Liu, 2006). In such conditions, we argue that discourses of historical negation (versus historical recognition) provide an axis of meaning that aids in the creation and mobilisation of public opinion to marginalise Maori perspectives on resource allocations, land claims, affirmative action programmes and a host of other material issues, while allowing majority group members to still endorse more symbolic aspects of intergroup relations unrelated to the allocation of status or material resources. Moreover, Liu et al. (2007) argue that such discourses are irreducible to more universal variables, and may act as proximal mediators of intergroup behaviour for more culture/content free universal variables.

Although Liu and Hilton (2005) and Liu and László (in press) posit a wide range of basic relationships between history and identity, empirically these influences may be unpackaged into smaller chunks. In the realm of political attitudes, we argue that historical representations provide a source of legitimising myths justifying the distribution of resources in society. Sidanius and Pratto (1999, p. 104) defined *legitimising myths* as 'values, attitudes, beliefs, causal attributions and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for social practices that either increase, maintain, or decrease levels of social inequality among social groups'. According to Sidanius and Pratto (1999), legitimising myths mediate the relationship between global motivational goals for group-based dominance and discriminatory outcomes. As such, legitimising myths may be thought of as the stepping stones between primary group-based motivational goals and discriminatory attitudes and outcomes. They help maintain stable hierarchical social structures through societally elaborated and consensually shared discourses and representations that prescribe governing rules for the allocation of resources within society, and more generally, the function, roles and appropriate social status of groups within that society (Pratto & Cathey, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, research examining how narratives of history may provide a general principle for constructing culture-specific ideologies or legitimising myths that justify the distribution of resources in society remains limited.

In NZ, the most perennial issues about the distribution of value between groups in society revolve around Maori and Pakeha, and the legacy of colonisation forms a critical discursive background around which politics on these issues is conducted. For example, Dr Don Brash, the leader of the opposition, drew upon discourses negating contemporary Pakeha responsibility and collective guilt for historical injustices in his Nationhood speech presented at Orewa in early 2004 prior to the national elections. Brash constructed Treaty settlements as a process whereby 'people who weren't around in the 19th century pay compensation to the part-descendants of those who were' and then proceeded to argue that 'there is a limit to how much any generation can apologise for the sins of its great grandparents'. This is in stark contrast to a statement made around the same time by Pita Sharples, co-leader of the Maori party, who emphasised his sense of continuity with previous generations of Maori when he stated that 'my mother used to talk and sing about the Treaty, and I know who signed it on our behalf—a chief in Hawke's Bay, where I come from. So you sort of feel that because they signed it, you signed it—you feel committed to it' (cited in *The Dominion Post*, June 5th, 2004). These quotes emphasise the polemical ways in which the issues surrounding history and responsibility may be framed in order to justify or oppose the legitimacy of Treaty settlement process and related issues in NZ.

MOTIVATIONAL GOALS UNDERLYING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN HISTORICAL NEGATION

To whom do discourses of historical negation most appeal? And under what sociostructural conditions are discourses of this type most likely to gain societal currency? Duckitt (2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) argued that individual differences in prejudice and the endorsement of related ideologies that maintain social inequality result from two motivational goals, indexed by social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996). The degree to which the individual adopts one or the other, or the linear combination of these two motivational goals depends in turn upon beliefs about the nature of the social world, which are in turn the result of socio-structural characteristics and stable individual differences in personality.

According to Duckitt (2001), high levels of SDO are an expression of the motivational goal for group-based dominance and superiority, whereas low levels reflect goals of egalitarianism and altruistic social concern. This motivational goal is thought to stem from perceptions of the social world as a competitive jungle, which is in turn thought to result from the combination of a personality disposition high in tough-mindedness and exposure to situations characterised by high levels of inequality and competition. High levels of RWA, in contrast, are an expression of the motivational goal for social cohesion and collective security, whereas low levels reflect goals of independence and autonomy. This motivational goal is thought to stem from perceptions of the social world as a dangerous place, which is in turn thought to result from the combination of a personality disposition high in social conformity and exposure to situations characterised by high levels of threat to ingroup norms and values.

Duckitt's (2001) dual process model (presented in the left half of Figure 2) provides insight into the processes underlying individual differences in prejudice, and proposes that certain social conditions are likely to influence levels of SDO and RWA, which then predict intergroup attitudes. However, although the dual process model outlines the antecedents that *motivate* expressions of opposition towards redistributive social policy, it does not elaborate upon the potential role of societal discourses and ideologies that may be used to *justify* such opposition.

In the NZ context, we suggest that historical negation should be endorsed by individuals high in RWA and SDO because it provides these individuals with an ideological mechanism through which to plausibly justify expressions of opposition towards bicultural policy aimed at redistributing wealth and social status in favour of a disadvantaged minority. Discourses of historical negation should thus function as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimising myth that promotes systemic inequality by engendering opposition towards the resource-specific and to a lesser extent, symbolic aspects of bicultural policy. To the extent that the history of injustices experienced by Maori can be construed as irrelevant and due compensation as having been paid, claims for reparation on the basis of such historical grievances can be construed as irrelevant, unnecessary and unfair (Nairn & McCreanor, 1990; Sibley et al., 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). It is in this manner that discourses of historical negation provide an axis of meaning that facilitates the creation and mobilisation of public opposition towards resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy. Because legitimising myths deal primarily with the distribution of material value in society, symbolic aspects of bicultural policy will be less influenced by such discourses.

OVERVIEW AND GUIDING HYPOTHESES

We present three studies that examine the effects of historical negation versus historical recognition on attitudes towards bicultural policy using both cross-sectional and experimental designs conducted

using electoral roll (Studies 1 and 3) and undergraduate student (Study 2) samples. Our first two studies use structural equation modelling (SEM) to assess the effects of historical negation on attitudes towards bicultural policy by directly measuring individual differences in historical negation using a scale developed from content analysis of political speeches and previous qualitative and discursive research on race relations in NZ. Study 2 extends and replicates these findings using an undergraduate sample to test an integrative model that also includes the personality (social conformity, tough mindedness) and social worldviews (dangerous worldview, competitive worldview) that Duckitt (2001) theorised underlie RWA and SDO, and hence individual differences in Pakeha historical negation and opposition to bicultural policy. Study 3 elaborates upon the aforementioned cross-sectional designs using an experiment in which we present vignettes adapted from the same content used to develop the historical negation scale described in Studies 1 and 2. In one condition, we present a vignette that emphasises the negation of historical injustices for contemporary society and social policy; whereas the other condition presents an alternative vignette based on similar content that recognises and emphasises the contemporary relevance of historical injustices.

Finally, we also sought to rule out the alternative possibility that individual differences in historical negation may simply reflect a general disinterest, or lack of knowledge about, NZ or world history. If historical negation is employed as an *ideological mechanism* that functions to legitimate social inequality, then individual differences in historical negation should be unrelated or only weakly correlated with objective measures of knowledge of NZ and world history. Alternately, if high levels of historical negation simply reflect a lack of knowledge and general disinterest in history that is not ideological in function, then historical negation should be strongly negatively correlated with objective measures of historical knowledge. In this latter case, the hypothesised associations between SDO, RWA historical negation and opposition towards social policy (outlined below) might be a product of shared variance due to limited knowledge of history. We control for this alternative (historical knowledge-based) explanation in Studies 1 and 2. Our predictions are outlined in the following three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 (Studies 1 and 2)

Individual differences in historical negation will predict majority group members' opposition to both the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy, however, given that historical negation is anchored primarily in issues of equality and resource-allocation, it should be more strongly associated with opposition towards the resource-specific, as opposed to the symbolic, aspects of bicultural policy. Furthermore, these associations will remain significant when controlling for objective levels of historical knowledge (thus supporting the discriminant validity of the scale as a measure of historical ideology, rather than historical interest or knowledge).

Hypothesis 2 (Studies 1 and 2)

Historical negation will be predicted by individual differences in threat-driven security-cohesion motivation (indexed by RWA) and the competition-driven motivation for intergroup dominance and superiority (indexed by SDO). In addition, historical negation will function as a legitimising myth that mediates (or partially mediates) the relationship between these group-based motivational goals and opposition to the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural social policy for majority group members.

Hypothesis 3 (Study 3)

Finally, participants who are exposed to a vignette that negates historical injustices and past inequalities between Maori and Pakeha will express *increased* opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy (relative to a control condition), whereas participants who are exposed to an alternatively worded vignette that emphasises the relevance of historical injustices and past inequalities between Maori and Pakeha will express *decreased* opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy (relative to a control condition). Furthermore, given that the vignette we use to manipulate historical negation is based on actual political speeches to which participants have likely been previously exposed and which formed one of the central platforms for the previous 2005 election campaign (Sibley et al., 2005), we expect that such effects will be moderated by political party support (this prediction is discussed in detail when outlining Study 3).

STUDY 1

Study 1 tested a structural equation model examining the hypothesised structure of associations between group-based motivational goals (RWA, SDO), historical negation and opposition towards the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy using a sample of majority group members (Pakeha) randomly sampled from the NZ electoral roll.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 115 self-identified NZ Europeans/Pakeha (55 males, 60 females) who ranged from 21 to 91 years of age ($M = 54.63$, $SD = 17.13$) and had an average yearly income of NZ\$ 50 010 ($SD = 42\ 360$). Participants were randomly selected from the electoral roll. A total of 500 surveys were posted, which generated a total of 129 valid responses (14 participants identified with an ethnic group other than NZ European/Pakeha and were therefore excluded from all analyses). A further 38 surveys were returned unopened due to invalid addresses, yielding a response rate of 28%.

Materials

SDO and RWA were both assessed by using six balanced items, which were randomly selected from the scales developed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999) and Altemeyer (1996).

Historical negation was measured by using the eight items shown in Table 1. These eight items were developed from a variety of sources, primarily recent NZ political speeches (e.g. Brash, 2004), qualitative responses and summaries of responses described in earlier work on 'race talk' in NZ (e.g. Kirkwood et al., 2005; Nairn & McCreanor, 1990; Sibley & Liu, 2004; Sibley et al., 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and research on perceptions of history and the collective guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Items were revised to give a balanced number of protrait and contrait statements, as the discourses from which items were adapted tended to be protrait in nature. The majority of items were adapted from a political speech (titled Nationhood) made by Dr Don Brash in

Table 1. Study 1: Item content and factor loadings for the historical negation scale

The historical negation scale	Loading
Grievances for past injustices should be recognised and due compensation offered to the descendants of those who suffered from such injustices (<i>r</i>)	.86
New Zealand law needs to recognise that certain ethnic minorities have been treated unfairly in the past. People belonging to those groups should be entitled to certain benefits and compensation (<i>r</i>)	.84
I believe that I should take part in the efforts to help repair the damage to others caused by earlier generations of people from my ethnic group (<i>r</i>)	.83
We as a nation have a responsibility that see that due settlement is offered to Maori in compensation for past injustices (<i>r</i>)	.82
We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors	.81
We should all move on as one nation and forget about past differences and conflicts between ethnic groups	.79
It is true that many things happened to Maori people in the past that should not have happened, but it is unfair to hold current generations of Pakeha/NZ Europeans accountable for things that happened so long ago	.78
People who were not around in previous centuries should not feel accountable for the actions of their ancestors	.69

(*r*), item is reverse scored.

2004, who was the leader of the opposition at that time. Item 3 of the historical negation scale was taken from Doosje et al.'s (1998) measure of collective guilt.

Exploratory factor analysis indicated that the items assessing historical negation loaded on a single dimension that accounted for 64.57% of the variance (see Table 1). Interpretation of the scree plot supported this unidimensional solution, as the eigenvalues displayed a steeply decreasing trend that leveled out after the first value (eigenvalues: 5.17, .96, .51, .36, .27). This scale was designed to assess the degree to which people endorse discourses that negate the relevance and legitimacy of historical injustices and construe such injustices as irrelevant in present day NZ society, versus the degree to which people construe the history of intergroup relations as highly relevant and of lasting importance for understanding contemporary relations between Maori and Pakeha in NZ.

Opposition towards the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy were assessed using items referring to actual or recently proposed social policy, as developed by Liu and Sibley (2006). Exploratory factor analysis using oblique rotation indicated that the items assessing resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy loaded on two distinct factors, as shown in Table 2. This two-factor solution was supported by analysis of the eigenvalues, which displayed a steeply decreasing trend that levelled out after the second value (eigenvalues: 4.82, 1.82, .78, .69, .66). These two factors explained 60.42% of the item variance. Parallel analysis conducted using the procedure developed O'Connor (2000) validated this interpretation, and indicated that only the first two eigenvalues were greater than those generated by chance from random data using the same number of items and participants (generated eigenvalues: 1.53, 1.37, 1.25, 1.15, 1.06). Participants rated their level of support for each policy on a scale ranging from -4 (strongly oppose) to 4 (strongly support). These ratings were scored so that a higher score indicated increased opposition to pro-bicultural social policy. All other items were rated on a scale ranging from -4 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

Finally, in order to test the discriminant validity of the historical negation scale, participants also completed a 12-item multiple choice questionnaire assessing knowledge of historical events related to the Treaty of Waitangi and World War II (WWII). This scale is presented in Appendix A. Scores for

Table 2. Study 1: Item content and factor loadings for attitudes towards the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Attitudes towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy		
Performance of the Haka at international sports events	.81	
The use of Maori cultural icons to promote New Zealand tourism	.80	
Maori greeting ceremonies (Powhiri) at formal events	.72	
Teaching Maori language in all New Zealand primary schools	.68	
Singing the national anthem in Maori and English	.59	
Waitangi Day as a national celebration of biculturalism	.55	
Attitudes towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy		
Maori ownership of the seabed and foreshore (<i>r</i>)		.90
Crown ownership of the seabed and foreshore		.72
Rates exemptions on Maori land		.64
Treaty claims for rights to the radio spectrum		.58
Requiring all Treaty claims to be lodged by the end of 2006 (<i>r</i>)		.48

Loadings < .30 are not shown. (*r*), item is reverse scored.

both Treaty- and WWII-related knowledge ranged from 0 (no correct responses) to 6 (all correct responses). Descriptive statistics for all scales are presented in Table 3.

Results

As shown in Table 3, historical negation was positively correlated with RWA ($r = .43$), but not significantly related to SDO ($r = .07$). Historical negation was extremely strongly positively associated with opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy ($r = .73$) and also strongly

Table 3. Study 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations between SDO, RWA, historical negation, opposition to the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy and historical knowledge

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Gender										
2. Age	.13									
3. Income	.18	-.27*								
4. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)	-.01	.27*	-.05							
5. Social dominance orientation (SDO)	.31*	-.19*	.23*	-.13						
6. Historical negation	.09	.15	-.18	.43*	.07					
7. Opposition to resource-specific policy	.15	.11	-.09	.45*	.02	.73*				
8. Opposition to symbolic policy	.33*	.43*	-.13	.38*	.22*	.61*	.62*			
9. Knowledge of Treaty-related history	.07	-.19*	.10	-.21*	.00	-.16	-.16	-.17		
10. Knowledge of WWII-related history	.29*	.06	.01	-.26*	.05	-.16	-.17	.03	.33*	
<i>M</i>	—	54.63	50.01	-.20	-2.43	1.82	2.49	-.44	4.35	4.76
<i>SD</i>	—	17.13	42.36	1.93	1.19	2.05	1.62	2.01	1.34	1.31
Skewness	—	.14	1.79	.00	.64	-.67	-.96	.52	-.79	-1.11
Kurtosis	—	-.70	3.23	-.68	-.07	-.62	-.15	-.58	.33	.70
α	—	—	—	.73	.52	.92	.85	.86	—	—

Note: $n = 115$ self-identified NZ Europeans/Pakeha. Scores for knowledge of Treaty-related and WWII-related history ranged from 0 (low level of knowledge) to 6 (high level of knowledge). Scores for all other variables ranged from -4 to +4. * $p < .05$.

positively correlated with opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($r = .61$), although this latter correlation was significantly weaker ($z = 2.14$, $p < .05$). These associations were unchanged when individual differences in objective levels of Treaty- and WWII-related historical knowledge were controlled using partial correlations. RWA was moderately correlated with opposition towards the resource-specific ($r = .45$) and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($r = .38$), whereas SDO was only weakly related to opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($r = .22$) and unrelated to opposition to its resource-specific aspects ($r = .02$). Finally, SDO and RWA were not significantly correlated in this sample ($r = -.15$).

The hypothesised structure of causal associations between these constructs was explored using SEM. In order to construct latent variables, the items contained in each scale were parcelled to form three manifest indicators. The items contained in each parcel were randomly selected, but where possible contained a balanced number of protrait and contrait items. In all SEM analyses, the three manifest indicators created for a given scale were allowed to relate solely to the latent variable assessing that particular construct. As illustrated in Figure 1, the hypothesised model performed well and yielded fit indices that fell within the ranges recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999; sRMR $< .08$, RMSEA $< .06$, NNFI, CFI and population GFI $> .95$).

As shown in Figure 1, individual differences in historical negation were predicted by RWA ($\beta = .53$, $z = 5.08$), but were not significantly related to SDO ($\beta = .13$, $z = 1.18$). Historical negation, in turn, was strongly predictive of opposition towards both the resource-specific ($\beta = .84$, $z = 9.14$) and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($\beta = .71$, $z = 7.52$). As hypothesised, the association between RWA and opposition towards the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy were fully mediated by historical negation (β for indirect effect = $.44$, $z = 4.65$; β for indirect effect = $.38$, $z = 4.40$, respectively). SDO, in contrast, was directly associated with opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($\beta = .26$, $z = 2.70$), and this association was not mediated by historical negation (β for indirect effect = $.09$, $z = 1.19$).

Importantly, the hypothesised model, which tested the inferred causal effect of historical negation on attitudes towards bicultural policy, provided a significantly better fit to the data than an alternative model in which attitudes towards the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of biculturalism were modelled as exerting a causal effect on perceived historical negation ($\chi^2_{d,ff}(1, n = 115) = 12.24$, $p < .01$).




Figure 1. Study 1: Structural equation model testing the structure of associations between SDO, RWA, historical negation and opposition to the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy with standardised path coefficients. Fit indices for the model were as follows: $\chi^2(84, n = 115) = 120.70$, NNFI = $.97$, CFI = $.98$, population GFI = $.96$, sRMR = $.08$, RMSEA = $.06$. (Note: For simplicity, manifest indicators and paths from latent to manifest indicators are not shown, $^{*}p < .05$)

Discussion

The structural equation model tested in Study 1 fit the data extremely well, and was consistent with the hypothesised causal pattern of associations in which Pakeha high in threat-driven security cohesion-motivation (indexed by RWA) were more likely to endorse discourses of historical negation. Individuals who were high in historical negation were, in turn, among those most likely to express opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy relevant to the redistribution of resources to Maori, and the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy relating to the incorporation of Maori values and culture into mainstream NZ culture and national identity. As hypothesised, historical negation mediated the association between RWA and opposition towards both aspects of social policy, suggesting that historical negation may act as a mechanism through which people high in RWA legitimate expressions of opposition to pro-bicultural social policy. SDO, in contrast, exerted a direct effect on opposition towards the symbolic, but not the resource-specific, aspects of bicultural policy that was unmediated by historical negation. This suggests that a discourse of historical negation is employed to justify opposition to pro-bicultural social policy, and hence maintain social inequality, primarily on the basis of perceived societal threat (rather than perceived societal competition). People who oppose pro-bicultural social policy because of a competitive-driven motivation for intergroup dominance and superiority (indexed by high SDO) may employ other forms of legitimising myth that do not draw upon social representations of history, such as the protestant work ethic and discourses that position equality as meritocracy (Sibley & Wilson, in press).

STUDY 2

Study 2 sought to provide a more detailed model of the constructs theorised to underlie individual differences in Pakeha historical negation. Towards this goal, our second study tested a structural equation model of the inferred causal associations between the personality (social conformity, tough-mindedness), social worldview (dangerous worldview, competitive worldview) and motivational goals (threat-driven security cohesion indexed by RWA, competitive-driven dominance and superiority indexed by SDO) identified in Duckitt's (2001) dual process model that we theorise underlie individual differences in the degree to which Pakeha adopt discourses that negate historical injustices, and express opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of pro-bicultural social policy.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 194 undergraduate students who participated for partial course credit and who self-identified as solely NZ European/Pakeha. Participants (63 males, 130 females, 1 unidentified) ranged from 17 to 44 years of age ($M = 19.20$, $SD = 3.07$).

Materials

Personality dimensions of social conformity and tough-mindedness were each assessed using eight balanced items randomly selected from Duckitt et al. (2002). These items were administered with

Table 4. Study 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations between personality traits (social conformity, tough-mindedness), social worldviews (dangerous world, competitive world), SDO, RWA, historical negation, opposition to the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy and historical knowledge

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Social conformity											
2. Tough-mindedness	-.34*										
3. Belief in a dangerous world	-.21*	.11									
4. Belief in a competitive world	-.06	.41*	.36*								
5. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)	.31*	-.04	.40*	.16*							
6. Social dominance orientation (SDO)	-.03	.36*	.26*	.57*	.23*						
7. Historical negation	.02	-.03	.23*	.12	.26*	.18*					
8. Opposition to resource-specific policy	.07	.11	.19*	.17*	.25*	.21*	.68*				
9. Opposition to symbolic policy	-.10	.15*	.24*	.27*	.10	.27*	.29*	.35*			
10. Knowledge of Treaty-related history	.05	.15*	-.21*	-.03	-.17*	-.09	-.18*	-.04	-.01		
11. Knowledge of WWII-related history	-.03	.21*	-.10	.01	-.19*	-.12	-.10	.10	.04	.25*	
<i>M</i>	4.61	2.42	-.31	-1.18	-1.01	-1.87	1.41	1.19	-2.19	3.50	3.51
<i>SD</i>	.79	.74	1.26	1.07	1.22	1.35	1.58	1.30	1.21	1.22	1.40
Skewness	-.46	1.04	.19	.87	.16	.64	-.42	.17	-1.37	-.28	-.13
Kurtosis	.48	2.56	.40	2.00	-.26	.61	-.06	-.24	3.85	-.55	-.66
α	.78	.79	.70	.73	.74	.63	.91	.75	.76	—	—

Note: $n = 194$ self-identified NZ Europeans/Pakeha for all correlations. Scores for social conformity and tough-mindedness ranged from 1 to 7. Scores for knowledge of Treaty-related and WWII-related history ranged from 0 (low level of knowledge) to 6 (high level of knowledge). Scores for all other variables ranged from -4 to $+4$. * $p < .05$.

instructions to: 'Please rate the extent to which you feel each of the following descriptive adjectives is characteristic or uncharacteristic of YOUR PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOUR'. Adjectives were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all characteristic of my personality and behaviour) to 7 (very characteristic of my personality and behaviour). Belief that the social world is a dangerous and threatening place and belief that the social world is a competitive place were each assessed using six balanced items randomly selected from Duckitt et al. (2002), which were rated on a scale ranging from -4 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).

SDO, RWA, historical negation, opposition towards the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of pro-bicultural policy and Treaty- and WWII-related historical knowledge were measured using the scales described in Study 1. Descriptive statistics for all scales are presented in Table 4. Consistent with Study 1, exploratory factor analysis indicated that the items assessing resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy loaded cleanly on two distinct factors (eigenvalues: 3.25, 2.27, .87, .83, .77). This factor structure was again validated using parallel analysis. Items assessing the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy all loaded on the first factor, whereas items assessing resource-specific items all loaded on the second factor.

Results

Consistent with the general population sample assessed in Study 1, and as shown in Table 4, historical negation was positively correlated with RWA ($r = .26$), but also significantly although relatively weakly positively correlated with SDO ($r = .18$). Historical negation was strongly positively associated with opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy ($r = .68$). Historical negation was also positively correlated with opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($r = .29$),




Figure 2. Study 2: Structural equation model testing the structure of associations between personality (social conformity, tough-mindedness), social worldviews (dangerous and competitive worldview), SDO, RWA, historical negation and opposition to the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy with standardised path coefficients. Fit indices for the model were as follows: χ^2 (310, $n = 194$) = 445.30, NNFI = .95, CFI = .96, population GFI = .95, sRMR = .07, RMSEA = .05. (Note: For simplicity, manifest indicators and paths from latent to manifest indicators are not shown, * $p < .05$)

and as hypothesised this correlation was significantly weaker than the association between historical negation and opposition to resource-specific policy ($z = 6.07$, $p < .05$). These associations remained comparable when individual differences in objective levels of Treaty- and WWII-related historical knowledge were controlled for using partial correlations.

We tested an SEM model using latent variables, which followed the same parcelling procedures outlined in Study 1. As indicated in Figure 2, the hypothesised model performed well, and yielded acceptable fit indices. Tough-mindedness was directly related to competitive world beliefs ($\beta = .52$, $z = 5.57$), which were in turn directly related to SDO ($\beta = .73$, $z = 7.06$). Thus, the effects of tough-mindedness on SDO were indirect, and entirely accounted for by intermediary beliefs that the social world is a competitive place (β for indirect effect = .40, $z = 5.14$). Consistent with predictions, competitive world beliefs also predicted dangerous world beliefs ($\beta = .40$, $z = 4.12$). As expected, social conformity was negatively related to tough mindedness ($\beta = -.35$, $z = -4.09$), and also directly and strongly positively predictive of RWA ($\beta = .57$, $z = 6.21$). Dangerous worldview was also strongly positively associated with RWA ($\beta = .56$, $z = 5.42$). Unexpectedly, social conformity was weakly negatively, rather than positively, associated with dangerous worldview in this sample ($\beta = -.21$, $z = -2.48$).

Social conformity was indirectly related to opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy (β for indirect effect = .07, $z = 2.03$), but not the symbolic aspects (β for indirect effect = .00, $z = .00$). Tough-mindedness, in contrast, was indirectly related to both the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy (β for indirect effect = .07, $z = 2.49$; β for indirect effect = .15, $z = 3.34$, respectively). Dangerous and competitive worldviews were also indirectly associated with opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy (β for indirect effect = .15, $z = 2.84$; β for indirect effect = .14, $z = 2.65$, respectively), and the symbolic aspects (β for indirect effect = .08, $z = 2.38$; β for indirect effect = .29, $z = 3.77$, respectively). These effects were fully mediated by RWA and SDO.

Consistent with Study 1 individual differences in historical negation were predicted by RWA ($\beta = .27$, $z = 2.98$), but were not significantly related to SDO ($\beta = .12$, $z = 1.43$). Historical negation, in turn, was strongly predictive of opposition towards the resource-specific ($\beta = .77$, $z = 9.39$) aspects of bicultural policy, and also significantly, although more weakly, predictive of opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($\beta = .29$, $z = 3.37$). As hypothesised, the association between

RWA and opposition towards both the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy were fully mediated by historical negation (β for indirect effect = .22, $z = 3.12$; β for indirect effect = .12, $z = 2.65$, respectively). SDO, in contrast, was directly associated with opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($\beta = .31$, $z = 3.38$), and this association was not mediated by historical negation (β for indirect effect = .04, $z = 1.53$).

The hypothesised model provided a significantly better fit to the data than an alternative model in which attitudes towards the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of biculturalism were modelled as exerting a causal effect on perceived historical negation ($\chi^2_{d,ff}(1, n = 194) = 6.30$, $p < .05$). We also tested an alternative model in which historical negation and attitudes towards bicultural policy were modelled as causal antecedents that mediated the relationship between social worldviews and SDO and RWA. This alternative model provided a significantly poorer fit than the hypothesised model, $\chi^2_{d,ff}(1) = 249.52$, $p < .001$.

Discussion

Consistent with analyses of the general population sample reported in Study 1, the model tested in Study 2 supported a causal pattern of associations in which RWA predicted historical negation, which had a strong direct effect on opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy, and a significant although somewhat weaker effect on opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy. Once again, SDO exerted a direct effect on opposition towards the symbolic, but not the resource-specific, aspects of bicultural policy that was unmediated by historical negation.

STUDY 3

Study 3 tested the causal association between historical negation and opposition to bicultural policy by experimentally manipulating historical negation using extracts adapted from content contained in previous NZ political speeches. We reasoned that if discourses that negate the relevance of historical injustices between Maori and Pakeha function as a legitimating myth that provides an axis of meaning for the creation and mobilisation of public opinion regarding resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy, then we should observe *increased* levels of opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy when participants are presented with an extract that negates history, and *decreased* levels of opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy when participants are presented with an alternative extract that emphasises the relevance of history (relative to a control condition).

Furthermore, given that the material used to manipulate historical negation was based on actual political speeches to which participants have likely been previously exposed and which formed one of the central platforms for the previous 2005 election campaign (Sibley et al., 2005), we expected that such effects would be moderated by political party support (i.e. whether participants voted for a conservative party that tended to negate historical relevance in campaign speeches, or a liberal party that tended to emphasise historical relevance). In this context, attitudes towards history should be anchored to relevant social representations and thus activate schemas associated with pre-existing political views rather than producing solely independent effects (Liu et al., 2007). Specifically, we expected that conservative voters' attitudes would be heavily anchored in culturally mainstream representations of biculturalism and history (operationalised here at the individual level as historical negation), and thus be more resistant to change than those of liberal voters (Liu & Sibley, 2006).

Discourses that emphasise maintenance of a *status quo* favouring the dominant group are far more prevalent in NZ mass media than alternatives that emphasise affirmative action and historical redress to redistribute value in favour of the minority (see Kirkwood et al., 2005; Liu & Sibley, 2006; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Hence, in the language of social dominance theory, we expected a form of 'behavioural asymmetry', where conservative voters would express high levels of opposition to resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy regardless of condition (being effectively immune to more liberal arguments rarely encountered in mainstream media and everyday talk), whereas we predicted that liberal voters would be more open to an argument that emphasised the relevance of history for determining a just and fair basis for resource allocations and resource-related social policy. Finally, we also predicted similar, although weaker, effects for opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy given that attitudes towards this aspect of policy were more weakly correlated with historical negation in Studies 1 and 2.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 113 self-identified NZ European/Pakeha (60 males, 53 females; $M_{\text{age}} = 53.37$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 16.78$), who responded to a postal questionnaire mailed to 650 randomly selected New Zealanders who were listed on the electoral roll. A total 155 valid responses were received, yielding a response rate of 24% (29 participants identified with an ethnic group other than NZ European/Pakeha and were therefore excluded from all analyses, a further 16 participants were excluded due to missing data).

Materials

Participants first read a cover letter, which invited them to participate in a survey on the perception of NZ culture. The cover letter stated that participants would be asked to read and respond to a passage containing extracts and summaries of material adapted from various speeches and opinions about NZ culture and history. The cover letter also stated that the passage had been developed for research purposes and did not necessarily reflect the opinion of any person or organisation.

Participants were then presented with one of three alternative passages. One passage emphasised the relevance of historical injustices for contemporary society and social policy; whereas the other condition presented an alternative version based on the same content that negated the contemporary relevance of historical injustices. These passages were drawn primarily from a political speech (titled *Nationhood*) made by Dr Don Brash in 2004, who was the leader of the National Party at the time, and are included in Appendix B. Finally, a control condition was also included, in which participants read an extract of a comparable length that discussed the pros and cons of the current voting system used in NZ. This extract was deemed to be an appropriate control as it referred to politically relevant issues in NZ society, but did not refer to intergroup relations between Maori and Pakeha.²

Participants then completed a measure of demographics, and indicated which party they had voted for in the 2005 election. Participants who voted for the National Party (the main centre-right political party in NZ) or the NZ First Party (a small conservative party) were classified as conservative voters. Participants who voted for the Labour Party (the main centre-left political party) or the Green Party (a

²This passage is available from Chris G. Sibley upon request.

smaller liberal-progressive party) were classified as liberal voters (see Sibley & Wilson, in press). Between them, these four parties obtained 91% of the total votes in the 2005 election and comprised the four largest parties in NZ politics. Participants then completed the measures assessing opposition towards the resource-specific ($\alpha = .89$, $M = 2.16$, $SD = 1.93$) and symbolic aspects ($\alpha = .80$, $M = -1.19$, $SD = 1.76$) of pro-bicultural policy used in Studies 1 and 2, which were moderately positively correlated in this sample ($r(111) = .38$, $p < .01$).

Importantly, analyses assessing possible response bias indicated that the proportion of men and women, and conservative and liberal voters, who responded to the questionnaire did not differ significantly across experimental conditions, $\chi^2(2, n = 113) = .50$, $p = .78$; $\chi^2(2, n = 113) = 1.81$, $p = .41$, respectively. In addition, participants did not differ significantly in mean age across experimental conditions, $F(2, 110) = .63$, $p = .54$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .01$. These results provide good evidence that people were equally likely to respond to different versions of the questionnaire regardless of their gender, age, or voting preference, and thus that any differences observed across experimental conditions were not due to demographic differences in response bias.

Results

A 3 (condition: control, historical recognition, historical negation) \times 2 (voting behaviour: conservative voter, liberal voter) MANCOVA was performed predicting opposition towards the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of biculturalism. Gender and age were entered as covariates in this analysis in order to control for potential demographic differences in response bias. Consistent with the correlation reported in Study 1, age covaried significantly with opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($F(1, 105) = 13.55$, $p < .01$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .11$). Importantly, gender and age did not covary with condition or the condition \times voting behaviour interaction, $F_s < 2.4$.

Analyses of main effects indicated that conservative voters expressed higher levels of opposition towards both the resource-specific and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($F(1, 105) = 13.93$, $p < .01$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .12$; $F(1, 105) = 5.68$, $p < .01$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .05$, respectively). The main effects of condition on opposition towards the resource-specific ($F(2, 105) = 1.88$, $p = .16$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .04$) and symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($F(2, 105) = 1.09$, $p = .34$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .02$) were both non-significant. However, these main effects were qualified by a condition \times voting behaviour interaction when predicting opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy ($F(2, 105) = 4.52$, $p = .01$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .08$). As indicated in Figure 3, this interaction occurred because liberal voters tended to express lower levels of opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy in the control ($M = 1.74$, $SD = 1.83$) and historical recognition conditions ($M = 1.23$, $SD = 2.31$), but increased levels of opposition comparable to those of conservative voters in the historical negation condition ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.52$), whereas conservative voters displayed high levels of opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of pro-bicultural policy regardless of experimental condition ($M = 3.00$, $SD = 1.12$). Condition and voting behaviour did not interact when predicting opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy ($F(2, 105) = .08$, $p = .92$, *partial* $\eta^2 < .01$).

Discussion

Not surprisingly, people who voted for a conservative party in the 2005 election (which preceded data collection by 6 months) expressed higher levels of opposition towards both the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy. These effects were qualified by an interaction suggesting that exposure to material that provided a discourse of historical negation increased opposition towards




Figure 3. Study 3: Mean levels of opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy across experimental conditions for liberal and conservative voters. (Note: Scale ranged from -4 (strongly oppose) to 4 (strongly support), error bars represent the standard error of the mean, $n = 114$)

the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy among liberal voters (relative to the control and historical recognition conditions), whereas people who voted for a conservative party expressed high levels of opposition regardless of condition. Such effects were limited to resource-specific issues, however, as the manipulation of historical negation did not affect levels of opposition towards the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Studies 1 and 2 modelled the inferred causal effects of historical negation on opposition towards bicultural policy using SEM, and demonstrated that the hypothesised model provided a significantly better fit than alternative models in which attitudes towards social policy predicted historical negation. These studies assessed individual differences in historical negation using a newly developed measure containing items adapted from previous political speeches and earlier qualitative research in NZ. This measure was intended to summarise the central and core elements of a social representation of the legitimacy and relevance of historical relations between groups as a basis for determining present day resource allocations and reparation. Study 3 extended the inferred causal effects of historical negation on bicultural policy by experimentally manipulating historical negation using extracts adapted from the same sources used to develop the historical negation scale, and demonstrated that liberal voters exposed to a historical negating extract expressed increased opposition towards resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy (relative those in the historical recognition and control conditions).

These studies supported the hypothesised pattern of causal associations, suggesting that individual differences in historical negation predicted (a) increased opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of pro-bicultural policy that aimed to reduce categorical disadvantages experienced by Maori in contemporary NZ society, and to a lesser extent (b) increased opposition towards the symbolic aspects

of pro-bicultural policy that aimed to promote Maori culture and identity and to incorporate Maori values and culture into mainstream NZ culture and national identity. Furthermore, in both Studies 1 and 2, the associations between historical negation and social policy attitudes remained unchanged when levels of objective knowledge about world (WWII) and NZ history (the Treaty of Waitangi) were controlled. On average, the effect sizes reported in Studies 1 and 2 indicated that historical negation was extremely weakly negatively correlated with knowledge of Treaty- ($r = -.17$) and WWII-related ($r = -.12$) history. Thus, historical negation did not occur simply because some people were less interested, and knew less about, specific aspects of NZ and world history. These results are consistent with our argument that historical negation functions as a legitimating myth or ideology that is employed by individuals in order to justify expressions of opposition towards social policy aimed at redressing categorical disadvantages experienced by Maori in contemporary NZ society.

To whom do discourses of historical negation most appeal? Studies 1 and 2 indicated that the ideological negation of historical injustice was most likely to be employed by people that were high in the threat-driven security-cohesion motivation indexed by RWA. People high in RWA may oppose pro-bicultural policy because they likely see such policies as threatening the stability and security of (Pakeha majority) ingroup norms, mores and values. Expressions of opposition motivated by the competitive-driven desire for dominance and superiority were not justified by recourse to the negation of history. Instead, SDO exerted a direct effect on opposition towards the symbolic aspects of social policy in both Studies 1 and 2. This is not to say that all people who construe historical relations as irrelevant for contemporary social policy are motivated by racism or security-enhancing (RWA-based) motives (Sibley & Liu, 2004). It does, however, suggest that majority group members who *are* motivated by such goals will be among those who are most ardent in negating the legitimacy of historical grievances, and that shared endorsement of such ideology by a wide segment of society may engender systemic levels of social inequality.

Why does RWA predict historical negation whereas SDO does not? As Liu et al. (1999; Liu & Hilton, 2005) have argued, history is the story of the making of an ingroup. Discourses of history provide an important narrative schema for maintaining a society's traditions and values. Such discourses may therefore be more likely to be employed by those high in RWA (rather than SDO) to justify opposition towards social policy because one central aspect of such discourses is their ability to define who belongs to the ingroup and where they have come from. For people high in the threat-driven security-cohesion motivation indexed by RWA, the ability to validate the ingroup and its version of history provides an important symbolic resource for maintaining and justifying ingroup norms. This is most clearly apparent in the strong adherence to and respect for tradition evidenced by people high in RWA (Altemeyer, 1996). This suggests that one central process underlying Pakeha opposition towards resource-allocations favouring Maori may stem from the perception that to honour such claims for reparation has important implications for the definition of the ingroup, where it has come from, the values and traditions from which it arose and the pride and security one can take from knowing that one is part of a time-honoured group. Future research is needed to examine this interesting possibility in detail. For instance, research could examine whether RWA and identification with different social groups (such as identification with European ancestors, and identification with ones contemporary ethnic ingroup) jointly contribute (and possibly interact) to predict historical negation.

The negotiation and definition of the ingroup on the basis of its history and values may be of less relevance to people high in SDO, however. Instead, as Saucier (2000, p. 378) has argued when summarising the values and motivations of people who scored high in SDO and empirically similar dimensions, 'it may be that such individuals have only relationships of convenience with belief systems: They endorse beliefs that seem likely to justify their current behaviour patterns—patterns that make sense from a fitness-maximisation standpoint but do not garner much societal approval'. Hence, people high in SDO may oppose pro-bicultural social policy because it attenuates hierarchical relations

and reduces the majority group's power, status and prestige. The implications of such policy for the perceived historical sins of the ingroup may, however, be of little direct concern to people high in SDO.

Given that SDO and RWA have been shown to predict prejudice and negative intergroup attitudes in quite different domains (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), it seems likely that they might also predict different forms of legitimising myth or ideologies that justify and maintain social inequality and enforce existing social roles and intergroup relations in different domains. More generally, we suggest that the content of legitimising myths used in a given domain should depend (a) upon the social representations used to build consensus and manage debate about intergroup relations in that context, and (b) whether such ideologies are driven by motivations for intergroup competition and dominance (SDO) or ingroup threat and security (RWA). On the one hand, the content of legitimising myths stemming from group-based motivations for dominance and superiority (indexed by SDO) may be explicitly tailored towards justifying and maintaining hierarchical relations between groups, as suggested by Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) work on the operation of ideologies positioning fairness and equality-as-meritocracy in America. In contrast, the content of legitimising myths stemming from group-based motivations for ingroup security and conformity (indexed by RWA) may be tailored towards maintaining ingroup norms and social roles. These latter ideologies may be anchored in notions of (ingroup) morality and values, portraying outgroup threats to ingroup values and way of life and prescriptions of the roles that specific subgroups may perform within society (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007).

Future research could explore these interesting possibilities by examining the different ideologies that people high in SDO or RWA adopt to justify expressions of opposition towards the same social policies, and how such effects may be moderated by societal-level changes in danger and competition. Research in this area could also control for generalised negative attitudes towards relevant outgroups (e.g. Maori in the NZ context) in order to further delineate the effects of SDO and RWA on more specific forms of legitimising myth such as historical negation (e.g. in the case of RWA) and protestant work ethic (e.g. in the case of SDO). Interestingly, RWA (but not SDO) was also correlated with lower levels of knowledge about both the Treaty of Waitangi and WWII, suggesting that people high in RWA have less objective knowledge of these two events—perhaps because they represent events that are seen as being of little relevance to the present day ingroup of people high in RWA. Future research could assess this issue in more detail by examining the ways in which history is employed in order to legitimate social inequality based upon (a) the way in which group members' encode and collectively remember important historical events (Sahdra & Ross, 2007), and (b) the way in which such collective memories affect the endorsement of historical negating ideology depending upon levels of RWA, SDO and ingroup identification.

The current study also suggests that the motivations and justifications underlying opposition towards symbolic and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy differ substantially. Historical negation was more strongly correlated with opposition towards the resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy in Studies 1 and 2 (although this effect was more pronounced Study 2), and the exposure to an argument for historical negation increased opposition towards the resource-specific but not the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy in Study 3. In addition, meta-analysis of the three samples reported here and data from Liu and Sibley (2006) indicated that opposition towards the symbolic and resource-specific aspects of bicultural policy were moderately positively correlated in NZ ($r = .42$, 95% confidence interval $\pm .07$, $N = 524$). This contrasts with research conducted in the US, which has reported a correlation of $r = .70$ between various types of symbolic and realistic threat (Stephan et al., 2002). Such observations are consistent with our claim that the political climate in NZ has facilitated a distinction between (a) specific issues involving resource allocations that favour Maori and (b) the more general symbolic principles of biculturalism (Sibley & Liu, 2004, 2006). Socially elaborated ideologies of historical negation have emerged to neutralise the threat that resource-based biculturalism represents to Pakeha motivated by the need for collective security and social cohesion.

However, there is appeal in symbolic forms of biculturalism from the majority perspective because Maori culture is viewed as helping to define the culture of NZ in a positively distinct way (Liu & Sibley, 2006; Sibley & Liu, 2006). Without Maori, NZ culture would simply be a colonial derivative of Great Britain, a nation that left NZ to its own devices and that is no longer seen as an adequate source of identity. It is difficult for majority group New Zealanders to claim their bicultural heritage verbally; this must be given them by acknowledgement from Maori. Liu (2005) refers to this as a system of checks and balances where Maori, the disadvantaged minority in terms of realistic resources, have symbolic power over the majority because they have the ability to validate ethnic identity for many members of this group. Previous qualitative research, for instance, suggests that in addition to expressions of equality-as-meritocracy and a generally high level of opposition to category-based resource allocations, Pakeha 'race' talk also contains strong and persistent themes supporting the symbolic principles of biculturalism (Kirkwood et al., 2005; Sibley et al., 2006). This observation is consistent with the present data, which indicates that Pakeha expressed relatively high mean levels of support for the symbolic aspects of bicultural policy, but strong opposition to its resource-specific aspects. A key function of historical negation in the NZ context is that it allows Pakeha to express opposition towards resource allocations for Maori that are often framed in terms of historical reparation while still allowing Pakeha to adopt symbolic aspects of Maori culture that promote the 'positive distinctiveness' of NZ on the world stage (Sibley & Liu, 2006).

In conclusion, we argue that history is an important symbolic resource defining nationhood, and culture-specific formulations of lessons taken from history are intimately part of the discursive repertoires people use in justifying their political views. The cross-sectional and experimental studies reported here provide good evidence for this premise, and indicate that historical negation predicts opposition towards resource-specific aspects of social policy that aim to redistribute resources to minority groups who have experienced historical injustices. As such, discourses of historical negation provide a central repertoire for countering claims of reparation on the basis of historical injustices, and as we have shown in the NZ context, may provide a mechanism that people high in the threat-driven security-cohesion motivation indexed by RWA employ to legitimate expressions of opposition towards resource-specific aspects of social policy. Research in this area is important for any nation with a history of intergroup conflict and injustice, as it may aid not only in understanding the form and function of historical narratives that legitimate social inequality, but may also provide insight into the ways in which such discourses can be countered and re-formulated in order to promote greater social equality.

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APPENDIX A

Instructions

This page contains a multiple choice quiz about New Zealand and world history. Please try to answer each question. We are interested in people's general knowledge about these aspects of history, so please complete this quiz *without* asking others for help and *without* looking up references. If you are unsure about a question then please just give your best guess.

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- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>1. In what year was the Treaty of Waitangi signed?
 (a) 1835
 (b) 1840
 (c) 1845
 (d) 1850</p> <p>2. Who signed the Treaty of Waitangi on behalf of the Queen of England
 (a) Governor Hobson
 (b) Captain Cook
 (c) Edward Wakefield
 (d) Charles Bledisloe</p> <p>3. Where was the Treaty of Waitangi signed?
 (a) Wellington
 (b) Auckland
 (c) Waitangi
 (d) Te Kuiti</p> <p>4. How many articles, or sections, does the Treaty of Waitangi contain?
 (a) Two
 (b) Three
 (c) Four
 (d) Five</p> <p>5. In what year was the Waitangi Tribunal established?
 (a) 1940
 (b) 1945
 (c) 1970
 (d) 1975</p> <p>6. For which period was Waitangi Day legally known as New Zealand day?
 (a) 1890–1925
 (b) 1974–1975
 (c) 1960–1965
 (d) It was never legally known as New Zealand day</p> | <p>7. Who was Prime Minister of the UK during WWII?
 (a) Martin Luther King
 (b) Winston Churchill
 (c) Arthur Chamberlain
 (d) Franklin D Roosevelt</p> <p>8. When did D-Day (the Normandy invasion) occur?
 (a) June 6, 1944
 (b) June 6, 1946
 (c) August 6, 1944
 (d) August 6, 1946</p> <p>9. What major event brought about the end of WWII?
 (a) Battle of Britain
 (b) Storming of Gallipoli
 (c) Bombing of Pearl Harbour
 (d) Bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima</p> <p>10. In what year was Germany defeated during WWII?
 (a) 1944
 (b) 1945
 (c) 1946
 (d) 1947</p> <p>11. What was the name of the secret project that created the first atomic bomb?
 (a) Project Overlord
 (b) Project MOAB
 (c) The Manhattan Project
 (d) The Seattle Project</p> <p>12. How did Adolf Hitler die?
 (a) He committed suicide
 (b) He was executed for war crimes
 (c) He died of natural causes in a PoW camp
 (d) He died in a firefight with allied troops</p> |
|--|---|
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Note: Correct answers are shown in bold. Recently, there has been some debate about the number of sections contained in the Treaty of Waitangi. Thus both 'three sections' (the traditionally correct answer) and 'four sections' were scored as correct answers.

APPENDIX B

Historical Negation*What Sort of Nation do we want to Build?*

We are one country with many peoples, not simply a society of Pakeha and Maori where the minority has a birthright to the upper hand, as some believe.

The spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi was expressed simply in 1840 by then Lt-Gov Hobson. In his halting Maori, he said to each chief as he signed: He iwi tahi tatou. We are one people.

Over the last 20 years, the Treaty has been wrenched out of its 1840s context and become the plaything of those who would divide New Zealanders from one another, not unite us.

In parallel with the Treaty process and the associated grievance industry, there has been a divisive trend to embody racial distinctions into large parts of our legislation, extending recently to local body politics. In both education and healthcare, government funding is now influenced not just by need—as it should be—but also by the ethnicity of the recipient.

Much of the non-Maori tolerance for the Treaty settlement process—where people who were not around in the 19th century pay compensation to the part-descendants of those who were—is based on a perception of relative Maori poverty. But Maori-ness explains very little about how well one does in life. Ethnicity does not determine one's destiny.

The Myths of our Past

Too many of us look back through utopian glasses, imagining the Polynesian past as a genteel world of 'wise ecologists, mystical sages, gifted artists, heroic navigators and pacifists who would not hurt a fly'.

It was nothing like that. Life was hard, brutal and short.

James Belich shows us that, once guns fell into Maori hands in the early years of the 19th century, ancient tribal rivalries saw Maori kill more of their own than the number of all New Zealanders lost in World War I.

Equally, however, the initial Maori contact with Europeans was hardly a contact with the cream of European civilisation. The first Europeans that Maori encountered were explorers, whalers, escaped convicts from Australia and then settlers hungry for land to build a new life. Many were none too concerned about the niceties of the Treaty. And none possessed any appreciation of the interpretations of its meaning that some are trying to breathe into the document today.

We should celebrate the fact that, despite a war between the races in the 1860s and the speed with which Maori were separated from much of their land—partly through settler greed, partly through a couple of generations of deficient leadership by some Maori—our Treaty is probably the only example in the world of any such treaty surviving rifle shots.

Many things happened to the Maori people that should not have happened. There were injustices, and the Treaty process is an attempt to acknowledge that, and to make a gesture at recompense. But it is only that. It can be no more than that.

None of us was around at the time of the New Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confiscations. There is a limit to how much any generation can apologise for the sins of its great grandparents.

The Treaty is not some magical, mystical, document. Lurking behind its words is not a blueprint for building a modern, prosperous, New Zealand. The Treaty did not create a partnership: fundamentally, it was the launching pad for the creation of one sovereign nation.

We must build a modern, prosperous, democratic nation based on one rule for all. We cannot allow the loose threads of 19th century law and custom to unravel our attempts at nation-building in the 21st century.

Historical Recognition

What Sort of Nation do we Want to Build?

We are a nation with many peoples, not simply a European society where the majority runs roughshod over minorities.

The spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi was expressed simply in 1840 by then Lt-Gov Hobson. In his halting Maori, he said to each chief as he signed: He iwi tahi tatou. We are one people.

The Treaty provides us with a sense of national identity that makes us unique. It provides an umbrella where all the different peoples in New Zealand can be respected for who they are.

In the recent election there has been a divisive trend to talk about 'equality' that ignores the realities of social disadvantage that history has enforced on some people within our nation. In every sphere of social life, Pakeha New Zealanders continue to enjoy opportunities and benefits that other groups in our society fail to achieve.

Much of the non-Maori tolerance for this rhetoric—where equality of opportunity is talked about, but equality of outcome is never achieved—is based on a lack of knowledge about the facts. Throughout history, our system has served its majority better than its minorities. Today it delivers more prison sentences than tertiary degrees to Maori men. The colonial legacy is with us to this day.

The Myths of our Past

Too many of us look back through utopian glasses, imagining the colonial past as a genteel world of 'wise governors, able woodsmen, thrifty farmers and hard-working businessmen' carving prosperity out of a primitive and backwards land.

It was nothing like that. Colonists worked hard. They prospered under a government that discriminated against Maori and Chinese, disallowing Maori the vote (because of their collectively owned property) and imposing a poll tax on Chinese (for no good reason except racism).

James Belich shows us that, just as New Zealand was entering into a liberal era of unparalleled prosperity in the 1890s, Maori were excluded from the business infrastructure and voting franchise, while wives and children of Chinese gold miners were not allowed to join their husbands here.

Maori encountered Europeans not as individuals, but as harbingers of the British Empire. The first Europeans that Maori encountered were explorers, whalers, pastors and then settlers hungry for land. Most had little understanding of Maori culture. They built a society based on inequality where the centre of the universe was London, and New Zealanders were subjects of monarchy. The better future they made for themselves came at the expense of the people who lived here before them and beside them.

The Treaty reminds us that there was a war in the 1860s wherein violence was used to separate Maori from their land. After this violence, the Treaty was declared 'null and void', and an era of neglect followed where the building of modern infrastructure and extension of the franchise bypassed Maori.

Many things happened to the Maori people that should not have happened. There were injustices, and the Treaty process is an attempt to acknowledge that. But more than that, it is a covenant that honours our past with a promise to do better in the future.

None of us were around at the time of the New Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confiscations. Honouring the Treaty is not a process of apology, although it is a step along the way. It is about building a genuinely inclusive nation that truly provides better outcomes for all people, not just Europeans.

The Treaty is not some magical, mystical, document, however. The Treaty is an invitation to a partnership, but this partnership must be created and recreated by cooperation and collaboration between each and every one of us.

We must build a modern, prosperous, democratic nation based on a rule of law that is inclusive and fair. We learn from our history that a political and economic process that excludes some members of our society will produce enduring harm. These divisions can only be healed through building law and custom that acknowledges difference as an integral part of how we live together as one nation in the 21st century.