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## **'The double identity' of Taiwanese Chinese: A dilemma of politics and culture rooted in history**

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The 'double identity' of Taiwanese as both Chinese and Taiwanese identity was measured among both general and student samples using categorical and continuous measures. As predicted, Mingnan (native province) Taiwanese were higher in Taiwanese identity whereas outside-province Taiwanese were higher in Chinese identity. Both groups shared similar representations of the history of Taiwan, but evaluations of leaders followed patterns of in-group favoritism. These representations of history were used to predict and find zero correlations between Chinese and Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese and Chinese identities were mutually compatible in cultural domains, and mediated the effect of demographic group. However, in issues concerning politicized allocation decisions (and language), Taiwanese and Chinese identity worked in opposite directions, and demographic group (and a critical evaluation of an historical leader) were significant even after controlling for identity. Implications for social identity theory, realistic group conflict theory, and the cross-straits relationship are discussed.

*Key words:* Chinese identity, realistic conflict, social identity theory, social representations of history, Taiwanese identity.

### **Introduction**

Worldwide, the relationship between politics and group identity has assumed central importance. On the one hand, nations and peoples are growing closer together. On the other hand, many minority peoples are asserting themselves as different and, perhaps, separate from the sovereign nationalities where they reside. The relationship between ethnic and national

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identity has received considerable attention (Prentice & Miller, 1999; Liu *et al.*, 2002). But, another frame of reference is provided by the concepts of culture and politics. While ethnic identities are usually nested within a dominant national identity, culture and the identities associated with culture can be either superordinate (e.g. Muslim culture) or subordinate (e.g. Muslim-American culture) to national identities. The cultures analyzed here, Chinese and Taiwanese, have common roots (Li, 2003), but in the last 100 years have become politically separate. This cultural commonality and political division has become the source of cross-straits difficulties, and Taiwan's current dilemma of identity.

Because of this history, Chinese ('zhongguoren') and Taiwanese ('taiwanren') identities for people in Taiwan are parallel rather than nested (Liu & Ho, 1999). Each has cultural and political elements. In practical terms, both may be considered as national identities, although only one is formally recognized as such by most nations. For most of recorded history, Taiwanese identity has been subordinate to Chinese identity, but with recent political developments, the two now stand side by side in Taiwan. Either or both can be used to provide direction for cultural and political issues in Taiwan's future, so our theoretical task is to describe the structural/historical origins of this configuration, and unravel the functional relationship between the two.

This task is complicated by internal group dynamics. The three main demographic groups of Chinese in Taiwan are associated with different positions regarding the political future of Taiwan (Ko & Li, 2000).<sup>1</sup> In particular, the relationship between Mingnan Taiwanese ('mingnanren', a 75% majority) and outside-province Taiwanese ('waishengren', a 15% minority) is polarized around election time. The Mingnan majority emigrated to Taiwan during the Ming and Qing dynasties and experienced 50 years of Japanese rule prior to returning to Chinese rule under the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1945. They tend to think of themselves as more 'Taiwanese' politically, favoring independence from the mainland. Outside province Chinese, many of whom arrived in Taiwan following the KMT, tend to think of themselves as more 'Chinese' politically, favoring rapprochement. Hakka Taiwanese, the third major group ('kejiaren', about an 8% minority), are intermediate between the Mingnan and outside province groups. They have never been politically dominant in Taiwan, and while they have been long-term residents, they are not as prominent in the Taiwanese independence movement as the Mingnan. This intermediate position is important to illustrate that differences between the two main groups are domain specific and do not reflect a structural dichotomy in society.

### **Theory of double identity**

The cause of the current difficulty is that most nations do not formally recognize Taiwan (e.g. no seat in the United Nations), although practically it is often treated as such (e.g. Taiwanese passports are honored). Culturally, Chinese identity is superordinate to Taiwanese identity and the two are largely compatible. But, politically, they can be perceived as mutually antagonistic or exclusive (Liu & Ho, 1999). The rise to power of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party advocating Taiwanese independence, has made the divide between cultural commonality and political separation especially sensitive.

Our functional thesis is that when Chinese and Taiwanese identity are activated in a political context or applied to political issues, they act in an antagonistic manner, and when they are made salient in a cultural context or applied to cultural issues, they act in a compatible manner.

It may be difficult to draw a clean dividing line between political and cultural domains, but the key as we see it is that politicized debates tend to arise around two types of situations: (i) zero sum resource allocations related to group interests, where there is a forced choice between who gets rewards/sanctions and who does not (Sherif, 1966); and (ii) historical grievances between groups (Liu *et al.*, 1999). These are 'realistic threats', according to Stephan *et al.* (1998).

Besides warfare, a prototypical group-based zero sum allocation would be an election between candidates for President. Only one can win, and the 2000 election exacerbated tensions between groups because among the leading candidates, one was a Mingan Taiwanese advocating independence and the other was an outside-province Taiwanese advocating rapprochement. As for historical grievances, prototypes include resource issues like land alienation (Liu *et al.*, 1999), massacres, or warfare (Liu, 1999).

Of course, sometimes zero-sum games are a matter of political choice rather than structural necessity (e.g. framing a decision as a win-lose when it could be a win-win). However, because of the similarity between Chinese and Taiwanese culture, we believe that more symbolic issues pose little problem. The double identity configuration makes identity-based threat or conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Stephan *et al.*, 1998; Branscombe *et al.*, 1999) mild compared to that experienced by more exclusive identities.

### **Social representations of history and the relationship between identities: A structural component to double identity theory**

Drawing from the theory of Liu *et al.* (2002) that there is a link between social representations of history held by different societal groups and the correlation between different social identities, we can add a structural hypothesis to double identity theory as well. When social representations of history are shared or consensual, they become part of shared culture, and are a source of unity. When they are disputed or polemical, they can become politicized and a source of division. Emancipated representations lie somewhere in between these two extremes. Polemical representations are useful as a source of history-based individual difference variables that can be used to predict current political opinions, whereas hegemonic representations, because of their widely shared nature, are not.

History is a good source of information about unity or division regarding groups because politics and war make up the primary content of what is popularly regarded as history (Liu, 1999; Liu *et al.*, in press). Polemics about history tend to revolve around intergroup conflict and historical grievances. If history is considered a story about the making of an in-group (Liu *et al.*, 1999), then intergroup conflict is its central plot device (Liu, 1999). Past experiences of politics and war can be used by a people to create a self-narrative, where various groups and leaders are positioned as heroes and villains, allies and enemies (Dresler-Hawke & Liu, unpubl. data, 2004; Pennebaker *et al.*, 1997; Devine-Wright, 2001). History is an important source of information about whether groups can be trusted or not (Hilton *et al.*, 1996), and can be used as a culture-specific variable to make predictions about important intergroup issues facing society.

Regarding the relationship between ethnic and national identity, Liu *et al.* (2002) hypothesized that if all ethnic subgroups in a society share the same or similar representations of its history (hegemonic representations, see Moscovici, 1988), then there should be a positive correlation between the subgroup identities and national identity. This is because they share similar concepts of heroes and villains, good and bad actions between groups. By contrast, if different subgroups have polemical (or conflicting) representations of the society's

history, then Liu *et al.* predict a negative correlation between national and subgroup identity, especially for the minority group. If the minority disagrees with the majority's interpretation of the past, then the association of the minority group identity with the national identity will also be negative, particularly when social change is brewing and the minority can see that the majority's view may be illegitimate (Ng & Cram, 1988). Emancipated (or variable but not conflictual) representations are expected to be associated with zero correlations for both groups.


According to the theory outlined, the extent that representations of history are shared or disputed among Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese should influence the nature of the relationship between Chinese and Taiwanese identity. Further, evaluations of key historical events or figures may be useful as predictors of current political positions.

We anticipate that certain representations of history will be polemical between Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese because of an historical grievance, the February 28th incident, wherein the KMT in 1947 killed or imprisoned over 10 000 native province Taiwanese to suppress any political dissent. However, as Taiwan as a whole has been moving away from an authoritarian rule to a more democratic government, we also anticipate many points of commonality between the groups. Given the 'double identity' configuration between Chinese and Taiwanese identity, some aspects of the social representation of history in Taiwan will be hegemonic (or consensual, following a culture-general pattern), whereas others may be emancipated (with smoothly interacting versions of history coexisting in different segments of society), or polemical (in conflict, following a politicized pattern).

### Summary and hypotheses

We present a conceptualization of the relationship between demographic group, social identities, social representations of history, and societal issues in Figure 1.

The predictions concerning double identity theory are elaborated in three sections: (i) demographic correlations; (ii) social representations of history; and (iii) political, cultural, and attitudinal implications. The first prediction is a structural derivation of the theory



**Figure 1** Research framework for double identity theory



represented by the arrows from demographic group to social identities and representations of history in Figure 1. The second set of predictions is also structural, and involves the relationship between demographic group and representations of history, and the bidirectional link between history and identity. The third prediction is a functional hypothesis represented by the arrows from demographic group through identity and history to societal issues in Figure 1. The dotted arrow acknowledges that there may be a feedback loop from current political choices back to representations of history (Liu & Hilton, in press), but this is not tested in the current research.

- 1 We hypothesize that the vast majority of Chinese in Taiwan will conceive of themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese (Liu & Ho, 1999). Among Mingnan Taiwanese, Taiwanese identity will be prioritized above Chinese identity. Among outside-province Taiwanese, Chinese identity will be prioritized above Taiwanese identity. The effect should be reduced for the younger generation compared to the older generation. Hakka Taiwanese are predicted to be intermediate between Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese.
- 2 We use empirical measures to describe social representations of history among the different groups in Taiwan. If there is overall evidence of polemics between the different demographic groups in the evaluation of history (or a politicized pattern), then, following Liu *et al.* (2002), we should expect negative correlations between Chinese and Taiwanese identity, especially for the numerical minorities. If there is consensus (or a culture general pattern), we expect positive correlations, and if there is a mixture of consensus and disagreement (emancipated representations), we expect zero correlations.
- 3 Finally, the functional implications of double identity are: (1) in domains concerning cultural evaluations of China, Chinese identity will be influential, and Taiwanese identity will be largely irrelevant. (2) In domains concerning cultural evaluations of Taiwan, Taiwanese identity will be influential, and Chinese identity will be largely irrelevant. However, in domains concerning politics of resource allocation where there is a forced choice between alternatives, we predict that both identities will be influential, and in the opposite direction. Chinese identity will favor resource allocations and political decisions that align with accommodating the mainland, whereas Taiwanese identity will favor alignment with Taiwanese independence. Developing a culture-specific theory of intergroup relations, we predict that even after controlling for both identity and demographic group, an evaluation of history will also be an independent predictor of political choice.

## Methods

Data collection took place between March 2000 and July 2001. Data for the student sample were collected from several participating universities all over Taiwan. Student data were collected as a voluntary exercise during class time, in either general education classes or psychology classes. Data for the general sample were collected by a variety of means, including evening adult education courses at universities, snowball sampling at the workplace, and approaching morning exercise groups in public parks. Convenience sampling rather than probability sampling was used because we needed to over-sample outside-province Taiwanese to allow statistical analyses. The student sample was recruited in order to provide a basis for intergenerational comparison, and answer questions about the long-term implications of double identity in Taiwan. The complete survey, not all of which is reported here, was 15 pages long and took about 30 minutes to complete.

## Participants

There were 828 participants overall. Among these, 449 (54%) were Mingnan Taiwanese, 250 (30%) were outside-province Taiwanese, and 129 (15%) were Hakka Taiwanese. Membership in these groups was self-identified, and outside-province Taiwanese were over-sampled to allow stronger statistical comparison between the two main groups of interest. There were 190 Mingnan, 151 outside province, and 97 Hakka Taiwanese in the general sample, whereas in the student sample there were 259 Mingnan, 97 outside province, and 32 Hakka Taiwanese. Theoretically, the main demographic groups of interest were Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese because of their polarized positions on political issues. Hakka Taiwanese, who were in between the two main groups on almost all dependent variables, are important for descriptive purposes. In particular, they prevent the misconception that there is a dichotomy in Taiwanese society between the two groups of theoretical interest.

Among the students, 51% were less than 20 years old, and 47% were between 20 and 30 years, whereas in the general sample, 20% were in their 20s, 39% in their 30s, 25% in their 40s, and 16% in their 50s. In the general sample, 21% were public servants, 8% in education, 18% in business, 10% engineering, and 26% in various service industries. Besides four students who were simultaneously in military service as cadets, none of the students reported any occupation besides student. Whereas 95% of students reported an income less than 20 000 NT (\$590 USD) per month, the median income for the general sample was between 40 and 60 000 NT (\$1180–1760 USD) per month.

## Measures

Measures included both English language measures important from previous research and indigenous measures written in Chinese (Yang, 2000). All Likert-style items were recorded on six-point scales that did not allow for a neutral midpoint unless otherwise stated. Those measures that were originally English language items were translated into Chinese by the first author and back-translated by the second author.

- 1 To obtain measures of Taiwanese and Chinese identity, both a forced-choice format and Likert-type scales were used. The forced-choice measure asked participants: 'Among the five choices below, which description do you prefer most?' The options were: (i) I am Chinese ('zhongguoren') and also Taiwanese ('taiwanren'); (ii) I am Taiwanese and also Chinese; (iii) I am not Taiwanese, I am Chinese; (iv) I am Taiwanese, not Chinese; and (v) I am neither Taiwanese nor Chinese.

The continuous measure of identity was a 12-item adaptation (excluding the public subscale) of Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) collective self-esteem scale (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.95$  for Chinese identity 'zhongguoren', and  $\alpha = 0.95$  for Taiwanese identity 'taiwanren'). Sample items included 'Overall, being a Chinese person has very little to do with how I feel about myself', and 'In general, I'm glad to be a Chinese person'. Some items were added or changed to be more indigenously compatible (Yang, 2000).

- 2 To assess social representations of history, participants were asked to imagine that they were a high school teacher preparing materials for a course on Taiwanese history. They were asked what seven events they considered to be the most important in Taiwanese history, things that every child should know. A single line was provided for them to write in each event. Following each event they nominated, participants were asked to rate on a scale from one to seven how positive or negative they thought the event was. The open-ended responses (historical event nominations) were coded into numerical categories.

Then, participants were asked to name the five most important figures in Taiwan's history (again using an open-ended response format) and to rate persons on a scale from one to seven anchored at 'do not admire at all' on one end and 'admire greatly' at the other.

- 3 For dependent measures to assess the functional implications of double identity, several indigenous measures were designed specifically for this research. A scale to assess the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China was developed. The item stem stated 'Taiwan and China's relationship is...' Factor and reliability analyses were used to develop two highly reliable subscales. The first consisted of nine positively worded items about the cross-straits relationship (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.90$ ) like 'of the same culture, of the same kind', 'like lips and teeth', and 'if parted for long must come together again'. The second subscale contained 10 negatively worded items such as 'water and fire don't mix', 'you die and I live', 'mutually discriminatory', and 'mutually in conflict' ( $\alpha = 0.94$ ).

Participants were also asked to first evaluate Chinese culture and then Taiwanese culture using the semantic differentials. Factor and reliability analyses were used to develop highly reliable subscales. For both cultures, favorability (eight items) and openness (seven items) emerged as reliable subscales (alphas of 0.94 and 0.92 for Chinese culture, 0.93 and 0.92 for Taiwanese culture). Sample items for the favorability subscales included 'crude-sophisticated', 'shallow-deep', 'not good-good' and 'shameful-glorious'; and the openness subscales included items like 'closed-open', 'conservative-progressive', 'backwards-improving' and 'narrow-broad'.

Two sets of questions regarding dialect usage were developed. First, three-item scales on personal preference for the Mandarin and Taiwanese dialects of Chinese were constructed. Cronbach's  $\alpha$ 's for these were highly reliable ( $\alpha = 0.84$  for Mandarin, 0.95 for Taiwanese). Next, scales to measure support for the use of the Mandarin and Taiwanese as official dialects in public forums were designed. The use of Taiwanese is strongly identified with local independence movements and its use is largely restricted to Mingnan Taiwanese, whereas Mandarin is the official dialect and most Chinese in Taiwan are more fluent in this dialect. Cronbach's  $\alpha$ 's for the four-item scales were 0.90 and 0.84, respectively.

Two-item scales were developed for promotion of Chinese culture ( $\alpha = 0.86$ ) and Taiwanese culture ( $\alpha = 0.81$ ). The items were 'Our government should work hard to promote Chinese (or Taiwanese) culture' and 'Our government's artistic prizes should be awarded to those works that can display Chinese (or Taiwanese) culture.'

An eight-item scale was developed regarding support for the political indigenization of Taiwan with a Cronbach's  $\alpha$  of 0.91. Sample items included 'Emphasizing indigenization can provide Taiwan with opportunities to make its voice heard internationally' (+), 'Increasing indigenization is a way of closing the door to be king' (-), 'Pushing indigenization will allow Taiwan to develop deeper roots' (+), and 'Pushing indigenization will make Taiwan unable to keep up with global trends' (-). This scale explicitly pushes cultural issues towards discourses associated with politicized resource allocations.

Finally, several one-item measures were included, such as whom did the person vote for in the last election, and whether the person hoped Taiwan would be allowed to join the United Nations as a separate nation.

Not all participants completed all measures, so numbers varied slightly from analysis to analysis.



## Results

### **Demographic correlates of double identity**

A total of 818 participants completed a forced-choice measure of identity. The vast majority of participants (91%) preferred to describe themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese (Table 1). Only three participants saw themselves as neither. Participants were more likely to identify as Taiwanese but not Chinese (7.3%) than as Chinese but not Taiwanese (1.3%). The former pattern was sixfold more prevalent among Mingnan Taiwanese, and the latter was sixfold more prevalent among outside-province Taiwanese, but given the low cell counts for these responses, statistical tests were not appropriate.

Restricting our analyses to only those participants who saw themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese, a multinomial analysis of variance (Woodward *et al.*, 1990) with demographic group as the independent variable and identity priority (Taiwanese first *vs* Chinese first) as the dependent variable was conducted. There was a main effect for demographic group ( $\chi^2(2) = 88.7, p < 0.001$ ), with Mingnan Taiwanese most likely to prioritize being Taiwanese, and outside-province Taiwanese being most likely to prioritize being Chinese, and Hakka in the middle. Results were in accord with predictions.

These results were corroborated by continuous, Likert-style measures of Chinese and Taiwanese identity. As can be seen in Figure 2, the continuous identity profiles for Mingnan, Hakka, and outside-province Taiwanese were strikingly distinct. A 3 (demographic group)  $\times$  2 (generation)  $\times$  2 (identity measures) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction,  $F_{2,765} = 11.9, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.03$ .

As the patterns were quite complex, hypothesis testing will be described for each of the three demographic groups in turn.


A 2 (generation)  $\times$  2 (identity measures) mixed ANOVA for Mingnan Taiwanese revealed a main effect for identity,  $F_{1,445} = 136.94, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.235$ . As predicted, Mingnan Taiwanese were higher on Taiwanese identity than Chinese identity. There was no two-way interaction between generation and identity profile,  $F_{1,445} = 0.97, p < 0.33, \eta^2 = 0.002$ , and no main effect for generation,  $F_{1,445} = 0.18, p < 0.67, \eta^2 = 0.000$ .

As predicted, outside-province Taiwanese showed a different pattern. A 2  $\times$  2 mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect for identity,  $F_{1,248} = 52.26, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.174$ . Outside-province Taiwanese were higher on Chinese identity than Taiwanese identity. There was a significant two-way interaction between generation and identity,  $F_{1,248} = 25.84, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.094$  indicating that the difference was more pronounced for the older generation than the younger generation. There was no main effect for generation,  $F_{1,248} = 2.17, p < 0.14, \eta^2 = 0.009$ . A *t*-test showed that for the younger generation, there was no difference in the means for Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity,  $t(98) = 1.35, p < 0.18$ .

Finally, although we did not have specific predictions for this group, Hakka Taiwanese showed a pattern of identity intermediate between the native province and outside-province

**Table 1** Forced choice measure of identity by demographic group

	Chinese first	Taiwanese first	Chinese only	Taiwanese only	Neither
Mingnan	110 (25%)	286 (64%)	2 (0.4%)	45 (10%)	2 (0.4%)
Hakka	45 (35%)	69 (54%)	3 (2.3%)	11 (8.6%)	0 (0.0%)
Outside province	158 (64%)	76 (31%)	6 (2.4%)	4 (1.3%)	1 (0.4%)
Totals	313 (38%)	431 (53%)	11 (1.3%)	60 (7.3%)	3 (0.4%)



**Figure 2** Continuous measures of identity by demographic group. (a) General sample, (b) student sample. ◆, Chinese identity; ■, Taiwanese identity

Taiwanese. There were no significant effects for identity ( $F_{1,125} = 2.21, p < 0.18$ ), generation ( $F_{1,125} = 0.00, p < 0.98$ ), or the interaction between the two ( $F_{1,125} = 0.32, p < 0.58$ ). Regardless of generation, Hakka Taiwanese rated Chinese and Taiwanese identity equally.

### **Social representations of history in Taiwan**

As the generations did not differ greatly in their representations of history, they were combined.

Detailed coding revealed that the single most important event in Taiwan's history, as nominated by all three of the main demographic groups, was the 28 February 1947 incident

where the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek eliminated the local elite to assume undisputed control over the island (Table 2). Although there was a high degree of consensus regarding the centrality of the event, it is disturbing that a tragedy involving one of the groups in society killing, jailing and oppressing another should be regarded as the most important event in the society's history (Myers, 1991). The more positive side of the KMT's arrival was denoted by the liberation of Taiwan from the Japanese, also nominated by all three groups, but by only 28–36% of participants compared to 67–72% for the negative event.

There was a strong consensus as to the events that constituted Taiwan's history among all three of the demographic groups (Table 2). Furthermore, these events revolved around the movement from colonization by foreign powers to an authoritarian form of government by outsiders to the present democratic system. In addition to the February 28th incident, the Meilidao incident (1979), the end of martial law (1987), the free presidential elections (1995), and the peaceful transition of power (2000) were all relevant. The Meilidao incident involved an unsuccessful KMT crackdown on press freedom and the jailing of Taiwanese activists. The end of martial law in 1987 marked the beginning of the end of legalized political oppression of native province Taiwanese. It allowed the DPP to become legally established as an opposition party. Following this, the first free presidential election won by Lee Teng-hui (the first Mingnan Taiwanese to serve as President) in 1995, marked a further step in the democratization process (Lee was Vice-President under Chiang Ching-Kuo and his successor). Finally, the recent transition of power in 2000 where the KMT was voted out after 50 years of continuous rule cemented the process.

**Table 2** Ten most important events in Taiwan's history by demographic group

	Mingnan ( <i>N</i> = 403)	%	Hakka ( <i>N</i> = 122)	%	Outside province ( <i>N</i> = 219)	%
1	February 28 incident	72%	February 28 incident	67%	February 28 incident	71%
2	Free presidential elections	41%	Meilidao incident	31%	Liberation from Japanese	36%
3	Liberation from Japanese	28%	Free presidential elections	31%	Zheng Chen-gung	32%
4	Japanese Occupation	27%	Zheng Chen-gung	31%	Free presidential elections	28%
5	Meilidao incident	25%	Liberation from Japanese	31%	Japanese Occupation	25%
6	21 September earthquake	25%	Japanese Occupation	29%	Meilidao incident	23%
7	Zheng Chen-gung	24%	Peaceful transition of government	24%	10 Construction projects	22%
8	Peaceful transition of government	20%	September 21 earthquake	22%	End of martial law	22%
9	End of martial law	18%	Taiwan ceded to Japan	21%	Land reform	20%
10	10 Construction projects	18%	Jiao Ba nian incident	20%	Taiwan ceded to Japan	19%
10 =			10 Construction projects	20%		

There were few differences among the three groups with regard to what constitutes Taiwan's history. Furthermore, there were no significant differences of opinion between them in their evaluation of these events (Table 3). Contrary to predictions, all three groups regarded the February 28th incident as equally negative (about 2.5 on a seven-point scale). Conversely all regarded liberation from the Japanese as positive (means greater than 6). The Meilidao incident was also perceived as negative ( $M = 2.78-3.57$ ), but not as unambiguously, because although the people involved suffered, they also planted the seeds for democracy. The end of martial law and the free election of the president, in contrast, were viewed very positively, above six on a seven-point scale. Post-hoc tests revealed no significant differences between outside province and Mingnan Taiwanese in the evaluation of any of these events.

However, when evaluations of the most important leaders in Taiwanese history are considered, this consensus disappears. The three most important contemporary leaders in Taiwanese history are Chiang-Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Lee Teng-hui (Table 4). Chiang Kai-shek's presidency lasted from 1945 to 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo, his son, succeeded him from 1978 to 1988, and Lee Teng-hui was president from 1988 to 2000. The two other most important figures nominated in Taiwanese history were Zheng Chen-gung and Liu Ming-chuan, pre-Qing dynasty figures who were involved in the defeat of the Dutch and in the early Chinese settlement of Taiwan.

Regarding the more recent leaders, there was a significant degree of polemics. As seen in Table 5, there were significant differences of opinion regarding how much the most important leaders in Taiwan's history are admired.

Chiang Kai-shek, as the author of the February 28th incident and the liberator of Taiwan from the Japanese, was regarded somewhat negatively by Mingnan Taiwanese ( $M = 3.69$ ), and fairly positively by outside-province Taiwanese ( $M = 4.80$ ), with Hakka in the middle ( $M = 4.0$ ). Lee Teng-hui, the first native province Taiwanese president, was regarded moderately by Mingnan Taiwanese ( $M = 4.01$ ) and Hakka ( $M = 4.1$ ), but negatively by outside-province Taiwanese ( $M = 2.54$ ). Chen Shui-bian, the first non-KMT president of

**Table 3** Evaluation of important events in Taiwan's history by demographic groups

	Mingnan	Hakka	Outside province	<i>F</i> -test
Liberation from Japanese (1945)	6.06	6.11	6.38	$F_{2,218} = 2.70, p < 0.07$
February 28 incident (1947)	2.69	2.59	2.42	$F_{2,510} = 1.23, p < 0.29$
Meilidao incident (1979)	3.57	2.78	3.30	$F_{2,255} = 1.40, p < 0.25$
End martial law (1987)	6.16	6.35	6.08	$F_{2,137} = 0.48, p < 0.62$
Free presidential elections (1995)	6.17	6.47	6.25	$F_{2,180} = 2.51, p < 0.08$

**Table 4** Most important figures in Taiwan's history by demographic groups

	Mingnan ( $N = 411$ )		Hakka ( $N = 124$ )		Outside province ( $N = 222$ )	
1.	Chiang Ching-kuo	68%	Chiang Ching-kuo	74%	Chiang Ching-kuo	77%
2.	Lee Teng-hui	64%	Lee Teng-hui	56%	Chiang Kai-shek	64%
3.	Chiang Kai-shek	58%	Chiang Kai-shek	56%	Lee Teng-hui	63%
4.	Chen Shui-bian	49%	Zheng Chen-gung	49%	Zheng Chen-gung	51%
5.	Zheng Chen-gung	40%	Liu Ming-chuan	44%	Liu Ming-chuan	40%
6.	Liu Ming-chuan	29%	Chen Shui-bian	37%	Chen Shui-bian	31%

**Table 5** Evaluation of important leaders in Taiwan's history by demographic groups

	Mingnan	Hakka	Outside province	F-test
Chiang Kai-shek	3.69	4.00	4.80	$F_{2,439} = 17.62, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.07$ (1945–75)
Chiang Ching-kuo	5.54	5.80	6.11	$F_{2,532} = 10.53, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.04$ (1978–88)
Lee Teng-hui	4.01	4.10	2.54	$F_{2,459} = 37.15, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.14$ (1988–2000)
Chen Shui-bian	4.61	4.20	3.12	$F_{2,308} = 17.82, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.10$ (2000–)

Taiwan, and a Mingnan Taiwanese as well, received positive evaluations from Mingnan Taiwanese ( $M = 4.61$ ), but negative evaluations from outside-province Taiwanese ( $M = 3.12$ ). These differences were all significant.

While there was consensus regarding Taiwan's history, there was no consensus regarding how admirable her leaders were. The only figure who escaped the polemics between outside province and Mingnan Taiwanese was Chiang Ching-kuo. He was admired by all for ending martial law and setting Taiwan on its current course towards a Western-style democracy.

In summary, Taiwanese history is a blend of consensus and polemics. The most important event in Taiwan's history involved the February 28th incident, an historical grievance of Mingnan Taiwanese against the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek. However, all groups (including outside province Chinese) regarded this event as equally negative and, overall, the story of a movement from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance was nominated and evaluated with consensus. This suggests that there is a cultural consensus in Taiwan supporting an anti-authoritarian and democratic system of governance.

This consensus disappeared when it came to evaluating political leaders, however, with Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese favoring their own and denigrating leaders from the other group. On balance, social representations of history were polemical in some domains (i.e. the politicized evaluations of political leaders) and consensual in others (i.e. the cherished movement from authoritarian to democratic rule). This blend may be termed as 'emancipated', and is consistent with the 'double nature' of Taiwanese representations of culture and political life.

Hence, we predict, on balance, about a zero correlation between Taiwanese and Chinese identity. Among members of the minority groups (outside province and Hakka), the correlation should tend to be more negative, whereas among members of the majority (Mingnan) it may be slightly positive.

### **Correlations between Chinese and Taiwanese identity**

Table 6 shows that our predictions were confirmed. Overall, there was a slightly negative correlation between the continuous measures of Chinese and Taiwanese identity ( $r = -0.101, p < 0.01, N = 824$ ). As predicted, this effect was more pronounced among the two minority groups, Hakka Taiwanese ( $r = -0.143, p = \text{NS}, N = 128$ ) and outside-province Taiwanese ( $r = -0.075, p = \text{NS}, N = 250$ ), whereas for the majority group, Mingnan Taiwanese, the correlation was slightly positive ( $r = 0.103, p < 0.05, N = 447$ ).



**Table 6** Correlations between Chinese and Taiwanese identity by demographic group and age cohort

	Demographic group	Age cohort	Demographic group × Age	Correlation
Overall $N = 824$				- 0.101**
$N = 447$	Mingnan			0.103*
$N = 128$	Hakka			- 0.143
$N = 250$	Outside province			- 0.075
$N = 435$		General		- 0.189***
$N = 389$		Students		0.059

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.0001$ .

Examination of the correlations for older adults in the general population compared to students revealed that Chinese and Taiwanese identity was less compatible among older adults ( $r = -0.189$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $N = 435$ ) than among younger adults ( $r = 0.059$ ,  $p = \text{NS}$ ,  $N = 389$ ). This suggests that history is involved in the negative correlation, as older adults would have had more direct experience of the events nominated than younger ones.

### **Political, cultural, and attitudinal implications of double identity**

The first block of dependent variables were all continuous Likert-type scales evaluating cultural issues related to China and Taiwan. Preliminary analyses revealed that means for Hakka Taiwanese were intermediate between those for Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese for every dependent variable. As the functional predictions of double identity theory are rendered most salient by comparing the two more extreme groups, we provide detailed results only for Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese. A similar pattern of results (only with fewer initial mean differences) can be found when comparing Hakka with either Mingnan or outside-province Taiwanese; for brevity's sake, these are not reported.

An initial MANOVA was conducted with demographic group (Mingnan, outside-province Taiwanese) as the independent variable and a battery of 12 dependent variables. Multivariate tests indicated significant effects for demographic group ( $F_{12,657} = 22.5$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.29$ ). Furthermore, univariate tests revealed that means for outside-province Taiwanese were significantly different than those for Mingnan Taiwanese for all 12 of the dependent measures.

As predicted, outside-province Taiwanese were more favorable on preference for the Mandarin dialect, support for use of Mandarin as an official language, promotion of Chinese culture, and evaluation of Chinese culture's favorability and openness.

Also, as predicted, Mingnan Taiwanese were more favorable on preference for the Taiwanese dialect, support for use of Taiwanese as an official language, promotion of Taiwanese culture, and evaluation of Taiwanese culture's favorability and openness.

They were also more supportive of statements describing negative aspects and less supportive of statements describing positive aspects of the cross-straits relationship between Taiwan and mainland China compared to outside-province Taiwanese. Mingnan Taiwanese systematically favored a more distant and less positive relationship with mainland China than outside-province Taiwanese.

*Cultural evaluations.* Among the 12 dependent measures, the first five mentioned above were related to attitudes concerning cultural evaluations of China (and the Mandarin dialect, which is the official Chinese dialect of the mainland). They were entered into a MANCOVA with demographic group as the independent variable and Chinese and Taiwanese identity as covariates. It was predicted and found that Chinese identity would be a significant covariate,  $F_{5,672} = 90.2, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.402$ . All univariate tests with Chinese identity as a covariate were significant as well. Taiwanese identity was also a significant, but weak, covariate overall,  $F_{5,672} = 2.64, p < 0.023, \eta^2 = 0.019$ . None of the univariate tests with Taiwanese identity as a covariate were significant.

Multivariate tests found demographic group ( $F_{5,672} = 3.86, p < 0.002, \eta^2 = 0.028$ ) was still significant, but had slight effects after controlling for identity. Univariate tests revealed that demographic group was significant only for preference for the Mandarin dialect and support for use of Mandarin as the official language.

Correspondingly, when the five dependent variables concerning evaluations of Taiwan were entered into a MANCOVA with Taiwanese and Chinese identity as covariates, Taiwanese identity had the most powerful effect overall ( $F_{5,667} = 60.49, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.312$ ). Chinese identity was also significant overall ( $F_{5,667} = 3.93, p < 0.002, \eta^2 = 0.029$ ), but slight in effect. Univariate tests revealed that Chinese identity was significant only for evaluating the favorability of Taiwanese culture and support for usage of Taiwanese as an official language.

Effects for demographic group ( $F_{5,667} = 18.52, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.122$ ) were of moderate effect size and significant after controlling for the effects of identity.

Finally, the last MANCOVA concerned the dependent variables of positive and negative statements about the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland. Only Chinese identity was a significant covariate ( $F_{2,685} = 126.2, p < 0.0001, \eta^2 = 0.269$ ); Taiwanese identity was not significant ( $F_{2,685} = 1.41, p < 0.244, \eta^2 = 0.004$ ). Demographic group was not significant ( $F_{2,685} = 1.91, p < 0.149, \eta^2 = 0.006$ ) after controlling for the effects of identity.

Results supported the hypotheses: Chinese identity was a powerful covariate of dependent variables concerning China, whereas Taiwanese identity was statistically significant but very weak. Entering the identity variables as covariates mediated the effects of demographic group for four of the six dependent measures. Strikingly, the two effects that remained significant were for language issues; while not being a zero sum game, these have resource implications and are among the strongest factors in marking groups as categorically different.

Results for issues concerning Taiwan were also in line with hypotheses, but were more complex. Taiwanese identity was a powerful covariate of dependent measures concerning Taiwan, and Chinese identity was statistically significant but weak. However, demographic group remained significant and influential in terms of effect size even after controlling for the effects of identity. This suggests that issues concerning Taiwanese culture are more politically salient, because identity variables shared by all participants do not mediate the effects of demographic group.

Finally, only Chinese identity (not Taiwanese) was a significant covariate, and it mediated the relationship between demographic group and description of Taiwan's relationship with the mainland.

*Politicized evaluations.* Our second set of analyses had to do with issues that we thought a priori to be more politicized. We chose the three most prototypical political issues to be: (i) whether Taiwan should enter the United Nations as a separate nation; (ii) their vote for President: either the native-province-born Taiwanese independence candidate Chen Shui-

bian, or the outside-province-born status quo candidate Song Cu-yi; and (iii) their support for the political indigenization of Taiwan. The first variable was taken on a seven-point Likert scale of agree/disagree, the second was a forced choice measure, and third was a reliable eight-item scale described previously. For each of these variables, there were large and significant differences between Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese, with the former favoring independence and indigenization more than the latter.

The pattern of results was exactly as predicted. For the issue of whether Taiwan should enter the UN, both Taiwanese identity ( $F_{1,682} = 173.9$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.203$ ) and Chinese identity ( $F_{1,682} = 74.1$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.098$ ) were significant covariates, and demographic group remained significant ( $F_{1,346} = 5.43$ ,  $p < 0.02$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.01$ ) even after controlling for the effects of identity.

The same outcome was received for the vote (please note that  $N$ s for the presidential vote were quite a bit lower than for other issues because many participants either did not vote or did not vote for one of the two main candidates). Both Taiwanese identity ( $F_{1,346} = 9.1$ ,  $p < 0.003$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.026$ ) and Chinese identity ( $F_{1,346} = 70.1$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.169$ ) were significant covariates, and demographic group remained significant ( $F_{1,346} = 46.2$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.118$ ) even after controlling for the effects of identity.

Finally, both Taiwanese identity ( $F_{1,691} = 129.3$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.158$ ) and Chinese identity ( $F_{1,691} = 54.9$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.074$ ) were significant covariates, and demographic group remained significant ( $F_{1,691} = 33.7$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.046$ ) even after controlling for identity on the issue of the political indigenization of Taiwan.

For all three issues, Chinese and Taiwanese identity worked in opposite directions.

*Issues at the culture/politics interface.* Finally, there were two sets of issues designed to probe at the interface between what might constitute 'cultural' and 'political' issues. Again, there were significant differences between Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese on all issues. The first had to do with basking in the reflected glory of sporting successes for China and Taiwan. Participants were asked to what extent they felt: (i) pride when a Taiwanese performed well in an international sporting competition; (ii) pride when a mainland Chinese performed well in an international competition; (iii) pride when either a Taiwanese or a mainland Chinese performed well; and (iv) pride when a mainland Chinese represented Taiwan in the Olympics. The pattern of results was exactly that found for cultural issues. Univariate tests indicated that Taiwanese identity was a significant covariate for the first issue (involving Taiwan), and Chinese identity was not. Chinese identity was significant for the latter three issues (involving both China and Taiwan), and Taiwanese identity was not significant. Identity mediated the effects of group for all four issues. Overall, multivariate tests indicated an effect for Taiwanese identity ( $F_{4,680} = 17.8$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.095$ ), Chinese identity ( $F_{4,680} = 58.9$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.257$ ), and no significant effects for demographic group ( $F_{4,680} = 1.97$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.01$ ). Issues concerning symbolic competition (sports), seem to be treated very much like other cultural issues.

A different set of results was obtained for dependent variables regarding the forced choice allocation of resources concerning institutionalizing culture. Participants were given forced choice alternatives concerning: (i) what type of gift, representing either Taiwanese or Chinese culture should be given to visiting foreign dignitaries? (ii) what type of song, either Taiwanese or Chinese, should be played at a national celebration? and (iii) what type of musical, either Taiwanese or Chinese is most representative of 'our' culture? These questions framed cultural issues as a zero sum game, but these are not structural characteristics of the situation, because, logically, more than one gift could be given or more than one song played.

The pattern of results was exactly as obtained for zero sum political issues. Multivariate tests (MANCOVAs) indicated that both Chinese identity ( $F_{3,653} = 37.7$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.148$ ) and Taiwanese identity ( $F_{3,653} = 14.8$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.064$ ) and demographic group remained significant after controlling for the effects of identity ( $F_{3,653} = 29.2$ ,  $p < 0.0001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.118$ ). Chinese and Taiwanese identity worked against one another in these issues.

Because the sheer volume of these results makes them difficult to present as tables or figures, hierarchical regression analyses were run using the most reliable and important dependent variables. For each regression, demographic group was entered in the first step and then Chinese and Taiwanese identity in the second step as independent variables. In the first step (not shown), demographic group was always significant. Results are shown in Table 7 after the second step, and mirror the results of the MANCOVAs. Logistic regression used for the dichotomous dependent variable yielded the same pattern of results as ordinary least squares regression.

Finally, to make a direct connection between the history variables described above and the dependent variables tested here, an historical variable was chosen as a predictor for one of the prototypical politicized resource issues. We anticipated that for the presidential election, the most politicized of issues, a critical historical variable would explain variance unaccounted for by the identity and group variables. As can be seen in Table 7, this was

**Table 7** Regression analyses on political and cultural dependent measures with Chinese identity, Taiwanese identity, and demographic group as predictors

	Evaluating Chinese culture	Evaluating Taiwanese culture	Relationship with China (+)	Taiwan in UN	Vote
Demographic group	0.06	-0.06	0.06	-0.09**	0.33***
Chinese identity	0.37***	0.09*	0.53***	-0.28***	0.38***
Taiwanese identity	0.06	0.31***	-0.06	0.44***	-0.14**
$F(3, \dots) =$	(684) = 39.3	(681) = 28.5	(691) = 107.8	(685) = 129.3	(346) = 87.6
Adj R squared	0.143	0.108	0.316	0.362	0.427
Chiang Kai-shek's evaluation					0.16** (4,190) = 46.9 0.487
	Mandarin language prefs	Taiwanese language prefs	Mandarin as official language	Taiwanese as official language	
Demographic group	0.09**	-0.28***	0.16***	-0.24***	
Chinese identity	0.55***	0.02	0.43***	-0.10**	
Taiwanese identity	0.05	0.45***	-0.05	0.45***	
$F$	(3,693) = 115.3	(3,693) = 130.9	(3,693) = 82.1	(3,693) = 134.6	
R squared	0.330	0.359	0.259	0.365	

Standardized beta weights, \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.0001$ .

For demographic group: 1, Mingnan; 2, outside province.

For vote: 1, Chen (Mingnan candidate, pro independence); 2, Song (outside province candidate).

exactly the case. The evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek was able to independently predict the presidential vote even after controlling for the other variables.

## Discussion

The historical origins and current ramifications for Taiwanese Chinese were examined using a theory of double identity. Structurally, it was found that (1) while 90% of those surveyed thought of themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese, outside-province Taiwanese prioritized the former while Mingnan Taiwanese prioritized the latter. This difference was more pronounced among the older generation, and Hakka were in between the two larger groups. (2) Social representations of history were largely consensual regarding the constitution and evaluation of events in Taiwanese history, but polemical regarding the evaluation of key leaders. The story that emerges is democracy developing out of colonization and authoritarian rule, with the most important event being the February 28th incident. (3) The overall pattern of historical representation was judged to be emancipated; it was found that Chinese and Taiwanese identity were relatively uncorrelated, with slightly negative correlations for the minorities and slightly positive correlations for the majority. (4) Functionally, Chinese identity was the main predictor of cultural issues regarding the mainland, while Taiwanese identity was the main predictor of cultural issues to do with Taiwan. These were compatible and largely mediated the effects of demographic group. However, Chinese and Taiwanese identity were predictive in the opposite direction for politicized issues regarding resource allocation; here, the effects of demographic group remained influential even after controlling for identity. The cultural pattern prevailed for symbolic competitions (sports) involving the mainland and Taiwan, while the politicized pattern prevailed for cultural issues framed as zero sum games, and language. (5) For the central issue of the history-making 2000 presidential election, the historical evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek predicted the vote even after controlling for demographic group and social identity.

Theoretically, the most important results pertain to the patterns concerning political attitudes and decisions analyzed through regression equations and MANCOVAs. Taiwanese double identities conflict when there is either an actual or perceived conflict of material interests. The process by which cultural issues become politicized was explored through various dependent measures framing cultural issues as a zero sum game (i.e. a forced choice between two alternatives). For both structural conflicts of interest and cultural issues framed as zero sum games, Chinese and Taiwanese identity worked in opposite directions. Otherwise, the two identities were mutually compatible. The exception to this rule was the issue of dialect – language may be an issue with automatic forced choice resource implications. Future research should examine the generality of this formulation, which differentiates qualitatively between symbolic and realistic threat (Bobo, 1988; Sears, 1993; Stephan *et al.*, 1998; Liu & Allen, 1999).

In other parts of the world, historically distinct ethnic minorities have been asserting their independence from recently imposed nation states, but the case in Taiwan is different. Here, an historically coherent cultural group are now asserting themselves as politically different after de facto separation of 100 years. We would argue that this process is important in nation building, but is more reminiscent of the situation of the 13 colonies in the USA and their relationship to mother culture Britain than the recent ethnic breakdowns in Yugoslavia or Rwanda. In Taiwan, a new political and cultural identity has emerged out of political struggle from the ground of an older political and cultural identity. It is decidedly anti-authoritarian



and pro-democratic in its historical representations. As was the case in the USA 200 years ago, there is considerable internal controversy over whether a clear declaration of independence for this identity is optimal. However, generational data suggest that Taiwanese identity has grown in strength over the years and will continue to rise.

The social representation of history is not independent from current political events. The Taiwanese independence movement is anchored in a widely shared historical grievance against the KMT and outside province (read mainland) interests symbolized by February 28th. The importance of the Chiang Kai-shek era is underscored by their prevalence in open-ended nominations, and regression analysis showing that his evaluation provides explanatory power on top of identity and demographic group for the crucial 2000 presidential election.

These data suggest that Liu *et al.*'s (2002) formulation requires modification: it is not just the degree of consensus around history that determines the relationship between superordinate and subordinate level identities, but the extent to which these representations are relevant to current political controversies. Hence, the feedback loop shown in Figure 1 should become the focus of future investigations, and help to elaborate a theory of social change (Reicher, 1996; Reid & Ng, 1999). It is the rise to power of a Taiwanese independence movement, and subsequent subordination of a previously dominant Chinese identity that has in our view changed the representations of history in Taiwan, and hence generated the present dilemma of double identity for Mingnan and outside-province Taiwanese. Among Hakka Taiwanese, who have always been a minority and never experienced a shift in power relations between groups, the functional dilemma of 'double identity' was less salient. For the other two groups, 'double identity' has become a dilemma precisely because a feedback loop between identities, representations, and societal issues has resulted in social change. Where previously one identity was dominant, now the other is ascendant; this shift in the basis of legitimacy for Taiwanese government will continue to be a source of identity insecurity between these two groups until a new social order is firmly established (Ng & Cram, 1988).

While it is difficult to imagine Taiwan surrendering its hard-won political freedom to an authoritarian government after 50 years of struggle against its own system, our data illustrate how a smoother course of action can be plotted for this land. First, there are domains of inevitable conflict, where there is a structural zero sum game between groups. Currently, as long as a Mingnan candidate is running against an outside province candidate, and the mainland issue looms, there is always room for polemics. However, even this problem can be reduced if political leaders representing the majority (Mingnan Taiwanese) refrain from calling into question the loyalty of outside-province Taiwanese in order to gain votes. Such tactics may have short-term effects, but in the long term will exacerbate intergroup tensions. As Abraham Lincoln said, a house divided against itself cannot stand. Conversely, outside-province Taiwanese should recognize that Taiwan has just obtained a peaceful transition of power after 50 years of struggle, and that some emotional rhetoric at election time can be expected in the short term.

In terms of Taiwan entering the United Nations, the problem is not internal but external. China looms large over all such political debate, because it is not Taiwan's desires that will determine its fate in this domain, but the outcome of its negotiations with China. Our representations of history suggest that there is consensus among all groups of Chinese in Taiwan, young and old, native, Hakka, or outside province, regarding the evaluation of Taiwan's historical movement from colonization to independence. The main issue is not whether Taiwan should be autonomous from China (in fact it already is), but how this is to be accomplished safely. Here, it is a sobering thought for Taiwanese to realize that mainland Chinese may have an equally strongly held representation of history that justifies their 'one

China' policy. Confrontation on such political issues will result in irreconcilable differences across the straits, whereas cultural issues, like the Beijing Olympics, may be easier ground to begin dialogue. Research pursuing representations of Chinese history across the straits will have much to say about prospects for the future.

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## End note

1. There is also a 2% minority of non-Chinese aboriginals in Taiwan.

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