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## **Social identity and the perception of history: cultural representations of Aotearoa/New Zealand**

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### *Abstract*

*The context of intergroup relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand was investigated using perceptions of history by Maori (Polynesian-descended) and Pakeha (European-descended) samples from university and the general public. There was strong consensus that the Treaty of Waitangi was the most important event in New Zealand's history, but only Maori, the subordinate ethnic group, showed in-group favouritism in their judgments regarding the Treaty. Pakeha, the dominant group, showed outgroup favouritism, and distanced themselves from past injustices using linguistic strategies. Maori students showed interest in their ethnic origins (ontogeny), rating the distant past and Polynesian history higher, and free-recalling more events prior to European arrival than other groups; Maori in the general population shared a more similar perception of history to Pakeha. Both in-group favouritism and ontogeny were found in sentence-completion choices. Historical perceptions were strongly related to positions on current political issues. Results are related to social identity theory, social representations theory, and social dominance theory. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

It has been said that those who do not remember the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them. But what lessons does history have to teach psychology? And does psychology have something to offer in return? One site for mutual learning revolves around whether social science should be idiographic (attuned to the particularities of case studies), or nomothetic (focused on the abstraction of general laws and principles, see Lyman, 1995). History is largely an idiographic discipline, whereas psychology is largely nomothetic. But the perception of history is an area of interface where the peculiarities of specific nations and peoples may be seen to influence general

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processes of group identification, and where processes of group identification may in turn be used to understand and frame what is known as history (Liu, 1999).

In history, context matters. The historian attempts to trace a multitude of conditions that led to some critical juncture, but rarely then leaps to generalizations about other times or other events. The circumstances are presumed to be unique, unless proven otherwise. History, therefore, may provide a very specific, information-rich context for understanding how general psychological processes may be conditioned, created, or constrained by political or economic circumstances. Psychology, on the other hand, can be used to provide a set of theoretical lenses and a motivational and interpretative framework for viewing the perception of history. In the paradigm we advocate (Liu, 1999; Liu and Allen, 1999; Liu and Liu 1997; see also Taylor and McKirnan 1984; for a general discussion, see Farr, 1996), general psychological processes are examined within the *context* of a specific and temporal case study; perceptions of history provide *content* that may be integral to the operation of these general processes.

The first lens, or framework from which to view psychological processes involved in historical perception is social representations theory (SRT: Moscovici, 1981, 1988; Farr and Moscovici, 1984). The telling of history can be viewed as a prototypical group activity, where different versions of history can be held among different segments of the population. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, the most salient such boundaries are between Maori (Polynesians who began arriving about a thousand years ago, and called it 'Aotearoa') and Pakeha (Europeans, primarily British who began settling about 150 years ago, and colonized it as 'New Zealand'). To understand commonalities with groups and differences between them in the perception of history is not only to begin specifying the socio-cultural milieu surrounding group and intergroup psychological processes, it is to develop a social representation of this context for future use.

What politicians (and historians, e.g. Benson, 1972) have understood for some time, but social psychologists been slower to recognize (but see Breakwell and Lyons, 1996; Hilton, Erb, McDermott & Molian, 1996; Liu, 1998; Liu, McClure, Higgins, Browne & Babbage, 1995), is that history can be used as a unifying device for social identity and it can be used as a divisive lever. Common agendas such as 'Manifest Destiny' in the nineteenth-century United States or 'The Greater East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere' in pre-World War II Japan not only framed an interpretation of the past, they also helped to drive and justify expansions of empire. More recently, memories of historic conflict have been revived with tragic consequences in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. When a particular historical representation becomes popular, it can have important implications for social policy and collective action.

Social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Hogg and Abrams, 1990) and self-categorization theory (SCT, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) rely heavily on social context (e.g. Turner and Bourhis, 1996). But at present, this context is treated as a 'black box', something largely outside the scope of the theory. We contend that perceptions of history offer an important dimension that will enable psychological theory on intergroup relations to be better applied to specific cultural settings, especially in dealing with issues of group entitativity in society (see Brewer and Harasty, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman & Lickel, 1998; Insko, Schopler & Sedikides, 1998).

A basic tenet of SIT is that in-group favouritism (the tendency to evaluate one's own group more positively than other groups, (see Brewer, 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986) should be active in most situations where group boundaries are salient. Thus, salient

ethnic or national groups should be motivated to glorify positive events in their own history and minimise negative events to increase collective self-esteem (Hilton, Erb, McDermott & Molian, 1996; Liu, 1998). The major exception to the rule of in-group favoritism is with subordinate groups in a stable social hierarchy. Except when a status hierarchy is perceived as unstable and illegitimate (Brown, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), in-group favoritism is shown least by subordinate groups (Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 1993; Ellemers, van Knippenberg, Vries & Wilke, 1988; Liu, Campbell & Condie, 1995; Mummendey and Simon, 1989; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1987, 1991; Tajfel, 1974), especially on status-related dimensions (Reichl, 1997).

It is possible, however, that psychological self-enhancement is not the only key factor in the relationship between identity and the perception of history. The other critical and heretofore neglected function of social identity is something more like self-verification (see Swann, 1987, 1990). History is the story of the making of an in-group. To accept this representation is to know oneself as part of the group. The group may prefer to exaggerate its losses rather than enhance its gains, if the loss is understood to say something about the group and the relevant others in its environment. We have named this phenomenon 'in-group ontogeny': an attempt by the group to create an historical self-narrative that tells them not only who they are (self-verification) but where they should be going. For ethnic groups within a multicultural society, ontogenic focus refers to activity that draws attention to the historic origins of one's own ethnic group, and efforts to maintain and elaborate this body of knowledge. The process and results of creating such a representation can become an important element in redefining an historical relationship between groups. Hilton *et al.* (1996) adopted Malinowski's term 'charter', to signify historical representations that serve to justify why the world is by explaining how it came to be that way. These ideas are very similar, and may be used interchangeably.

Ontogenic focus or a charter can be thought of as creating and maintaining a social representation of history for the purposes of the in-group. According to Moscovici (1988), there are three ways in which representations can become social: they can be hegemonic, shared by all members of society; they can be emancipated, or have complementary versions within smoothly interacting segments of society; or they can be polemical, and be the product and site of struggle between elements of society.

We examine evidence for these in New Zealand, treating the making of history as a social activity where our attention is focused on New Zealand Maori (of Polynesian origins) and Pakeha (of European origins). Our goal is to examine the utility of a psychological framework in furnishing a set of theoretical lenses with which to view the perception of history. The interface between history and psychological processes has been examined through primarily qualitative methods (e.g. Billig, 1978; Boerner, 1986; Hanson, 1989; Kamenka, 1976; Kapferer, 1988; Mitchison, 1980), so we outline a more quantitative approach. To make specific predictions, or even to ask general questions about the implications of psychological theory on history (and vice versa), we must detail a few of the particulars of our case study.

### A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND

Archaeologists date the arrival of Polynesians to Aotearoa (the land of the long white cloud) around 1000 years ago; oral traditions credit the legendary explorer Kupe with

the discovery. Several waves of immigration followed in subsequent centuries, with oral traditions suggesting seven major wakas or canoes making the thousand-mile journey from equatorial islands in Eastern Polynesia to the cooler climes of what is now known as New Zealand. The hapu, or greatly extended family, was the primary level of social organization, with the iwi, or tribe, forming a larger umbrella that became active especially during periods of warfare or expansion (see Best, 1924; Buck, 1949; Firth, 1929). The largest polity in Aotearoa prior to European arrival had territory of a few hundred square miles, with a population of a few thousand at most. Maori did not have the technology for either metal-making or ceramics, but instead relied heavily on flax, bone, jade and other materials. Trade between tribes was common, as were bursts of warfare (see Liu and Allen, 1999, for an interpretation of these patterns using intergroup theory); everyone shared the same language, but there were regional variations in dialect (see Allen, 1994; Davidson, 1984; Vayda, 1960).

The European discovery of New Zealand dates to the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman in 1642. But it was not until 1769 when British sailors led by Captain James Cook actually landed on New Zealand soil, for Tasman lost four of his crew in an incident with Maori warriors without making successful landfall. Concerted European settlement of New Zealand did not begin until the 1830s. As late as 1840, the European (predominantly British) population of New Zealand was only 2000 whereas a reasonable estimate of Maori population is 85 000 (Davidson, 1984; Butterworth, 1988). Aotearoa/New Zealand is therefore not only among the last habitable land masses to be settled by human beings, it is among the last to be colonized by Europeans.

Early encounters between Europeans and Maori saw peaceful trade (e.g. flax and timber for guns and livestock), whaling, and missionary work; outbursts of inter-ethnic violence were rare. The introduction of the musket produced a flurry of warfare between Maori tribes, however, as the guns were used to settle old scores. As European settlers began to make serious inroads into Maori land in the late 1830s, conflict between the two cultures became more pronounced. In 1840, what is now widely regarded as the most important event in New Zealand history occurred: the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between the British Crown and many Maori chiefs. This treaty conferred the full rights of British citizenship upon Maori and gave the British Crown authority to govern the country and the first option to purchase land (see Rice, Oliver & Williams, 1992, and Sinclair, 1980, for detailed histories of New Zealand; Orange, 1992, and Butterworth, 1988, for Maori and English language versions of the Treaty, which differ on the key issue of British sovereignty). As New Zealand does not have a formal constitution, this document is considered by many to be the basis for the nation's sovereignty.

In the century of European expansion that followed, the principles of the Treaty were often abrogated or forgotten as Pakeha immigrants arrived in greater numbers and acquired more land (see Belich, 1986). Large-scale warfare erupted in the 1860s. Although British soldiers were able to contain and ultimately control Maori warriors, they never achieved outright conquest. However, the half-century from 1850 to 1900 saw disease, warfare, and land alienation take its toll as the Maori population in New Zealand dwindled from an estimated 100 000–150 000 prior to European arrival to 40 000 in the 1896 census. Pakeha settlers toiled to transform the landscape and institutions of New Zealand into something resembling the emerald paddocks and parliamentary system of Great Britain.

In the early part of the twentieth century, Maori were aided by leaders who learned to walk in the Pakeha (European) world, like Te Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck), Apirana Ngata, Sir Maui Pomare, and James Carroll. Their efforts, together with liberal sentiments among Europeans to perceive Maori as a noble, savage, and 'dying race' (therefore no longer threatening, see Belich, 1986), enabled Maori people to survive. Their language and customs were actively suppressed until very recently, however, and for a people reliant on oral tradition for the transmission of culture, this was devastating (see Binney, Chaplin & Wallace, 1979; Walker, 1990).

Nevertheless, in the 1986 census over 400 000 New Zealanders self-identified as Maori, forming about 12 per cent of the total population. In 1996, this increased to about 16 per cent. Maori language, in danger of extinction in the 1970s, has experienced a revival with the growth of Kohanga Reo (children's 'language nests'). Language revival together with social activism to regain resources (e.g., the Maori Land March in 1975) have revived interest in the Treaty of Waitangi and Maori culture (see Orange, 1992; Walker, 1990). However, most social indicators show Maori still lagging behind other segments of New Zealand society in terms of such statistics as income, education level, life expectancy, likelihood of serving time in prison, etc.

On the Pakeha side, the perceived sacrifice of Anzacs during World War I by the British High Command at Gallipoli provided a major break from the ideal of Great Britain as a benevolent mother country. This perception was heightened following the 1970s after Great Britain joined the European Economic Community and erected trade barriers against New Zealand goods. New Zealand now has more trade with Asia than with Europe, and a recent prime minister referred to this country as 'an Asian nation', some indication of the on-going ferment in national identity.

### **Politics, Social Identity and History**

This brief telling of the history of Aotearoa/New Zealand is essential for understanding the independent and dependent variables used in this research. The New Zealand government has made a settlement of Maori claims under the Treaty of Waitangi against the Crown a priority on the national agenda, proposing to settle these claims for all time under a fiscal envelope of one billion New Zealand dollars (Crown Proposals, 1995). New Zealand is perhaps the only European-colonized nation in the world that continues to recognize a treaty with indigenous people as the foundation of its sovereignty. Significant aspects of national identity are based on ideals of egalitarianism and lack of racism.

New Zealand historians (e.g., Belich, 1996; Reilly, 1995) have begun to write more balanced histories, and a book has been published instructing Maori on how to seek out their roots (Royal, 1992). A few tribes have settled multi-million dollar claims against the crown as a proof of past injustices, and protest movements continue to flare periodically.

Maori appear to be a group regaining its sense of identity. The current generation of Maori students is the first to attend New Zealand universities *en masse*. Not only are Maori entering university in unprecedented numbers, but a substantial portion of them (about 35 per cent of the Maori student population) are majoring in Maori Studies, where an ontogenic focus on ethnicity is part of the pedagogy. Social representations of history among this group in comparison with Pakeha students and



Maori in the general population are very interesting, because they point to the directions where Maori intellectual activity is leading. As Moscovici (1961) has shown, intellectual ideas have their way of working from academia to the mainstream.

Pakeha are a group working on their identity as well. The very word 'Pakeha' is not English, but Maori. It has long been used as a term to refer to New Zealanders of European descent. However, Pearson and Sissons (1997) reported that 52.5 per cent of a national sample of New Zealander Europeans now claim to never refer to themselves as Pakeha. This poses a problem for researchers in referring to the majority ethnic group, because New Zealanders do not like the term 'European' either. The term 'white' is simply not in common usage. In writing this paper, we chose the term Pakeha because of its history, and because 'New Zealanders of European descent' is so awkward. The current reaction to the naming of the *dominant* ethnic group in New Zealand is one of the historical anomalies we investigate.

To generate a more specific set of hypotheses, one last theoretical lens is needed: social dominance theory (SDT: Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius and Pratto, 1993; Sidanius, Liu, Shaw & Pratto, 1994). From this perspective, dominant groups attempt to impose their versions of history on subordinate groups as part of the legitimizing myths that give them the right to sovereignty and a disproportionate share of resources. However, this theory has not elaborated on the considerable cultural and historical variation in how dominance relations are actually played out. One group may attempt to absorb the narrative of another, another might try to exterminate it altogether, still others may adopt the narrative of a subordinate group. Moreover, different sub-populations within a given ethnic group may subscribe to a greater or lesser extent to the dominant 'legitimizing myths'.

Thus, low levels of in-group ontogeny in a minority group may signal its assimilation into the majority (see Lyman, 1994), but alternatively, they may be produced by coercion (e.g., the silence imposed on an enslaved or colonized people, see Scott, 1990; Sidanius, 1993; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Either situation, in Moscovici's (1988) terms, would give rise to apparently hegemonic social representations. Thus, there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between psychological processes and social representations.

Threats to a group may spur ontogenic focus, as was the case in Germany in the 1930s or the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. These situations may succeed in unifying a people, or they may give rise to polemical representations, within or across nations. Descriptive information on the content of history for different segments of society therefore not only furnishes information as to their social representations, but also provides clues as to the evolution of dominance relations between them (see Taylor and McKirnan, 1984). However, historical perceptions in society cannot provide a laboratory-style test of theory. Rather, the phenomena revealed should be seen as fruitful material for theory-based interpretation, because a given observation could be indicative of a number of underlying psychological processes.

To summarize: social identity theory, social representations theory, and social dominance theory have been invoked to provide an interpretive framework from which to examine the perception of history. Both self-enhancement (in-group favouritism) and self-verification (in-group ontogeny) motives were hypothesized to operate in the link between identity and history. History and its representations were considered to provide important social context for psychological processes of social

identity, and are hypothesized to exert significant effects on attitudes regarding relevant governmental policy.

Here, then are a set of specific hypotheses derived from an analysis of history in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Each of the hypotheses should be considered as an interpretation and derivation of how a general psychological principle might be instantiated and interpreted within a cultural setting rather than as a strictly controlled test of theory (see also Liu and Allen, 1999; for a rationale behind this philosophy of science, see Liu and Liu, 1997):

- (1) Ontogeny: if asked to judge the importance of teaching about different times and places in secondary school, Maori will assign greater importance to pre-European times and Polynesia compared to Pakeha, who will assign greater importance to post-European times and Great Britain. This prediction is derived from the analysis of the self-verify function of social identity.
- (2) Ontogeny and dominance: if asked to free recall the ten most important events in New Zealand history, Maori will invoke more events prior to European arrival compared to Pakeha. Pakeha will recall more predominantly European-oriented events like World War I than Maori. However, because of the dominant position of Europeans, both groups will recall more events from the 200 or so years after European arrival than the 800 years prior.
- (3) Favouritism: In making attributions for the framing of the Treaty of Waitangi between the Maori and the British Crown, Maori will assign greater malice and less fair-mindedness to Pakeha framers of the treaty than Pakeha, and Pakeha will assign greater malice and less fair-mindedness to Maori framers of the treaty than Maori. The self-enhancement motivation of social identity theory is the source of this prediction.
- (4) Favouritism, representation and ontogeny: each group will use different words to describe the same events in history, with connotations that not only favour their own group, but furnish an understanding of historical events for verification of the group's current position and desired future standing.
- (5) Ontogeny, favouritism, and the future: these various perceptions of history will be related to stands on current political issues such as the settlement of Maori claims under the Treaty of Waitangi and whether to teach Maori language in schools.

## METHOD

### Participants

For the student sample, 128 undergraduates completed surveys as part of a voluntary class assignment in a second-year social psychology and individual differences course at Victoria University of Wellington (VUW). Among these, only two self-identified as Maori, so an additional 22 Maori from the School of Maori Studies were recruited to augment the sample (43 per cent of Maori students at VUW are enrolled in the School of Maori Studies; this is only slightly higher than figures nationwide).

For the purposes of this paper focusing on Maori and Pakeha perspectives on New Zealand history, Asians, Pacific Islanders, and other ethnic groups were excluded from analysis. There remained 24 Maori (11 women and 13 men) in our sample, together with 87 Pakeha (59 women and 28 men). The average age of our sample was



23 (S.D. 8). Since only a small percentage of secondary school students in New Zealand proceed to university, this sample cannot be considered representative of the population of young people in New Zealand as a whole, but rather are an educated elite. Because they are homogenous with respect to education and age, they are more likely to share historical representations than members of the population at large.

The general sample data used for this paper come from the fourth wave of a year-long research project examining perceptions in a variety of social and political domains (see Liu, Ikeda & Wilson, 1998). The sample was randomly selected from the electoral roll for eleven electorates in the immediate Wellington area. These electorates were selected because they presented a variety of social and economic profiles consistent with that of the country as a whole. Of the 222 valid respondents who had agreed to participate in the project, 142 completed and returned the fourth and final phase containing the perception of history items, giving a 67 per cent response rate. 13 subjects were eliminated from the analysis as non-Pakeha/non-Maori.

Of the 129 usable replies, 93 came from Pakeha and 36 from Maori. The Pakeha portion of sample comprised 49 male and 44 female respondents, and the Maori sample 11 males and 25 females. The mean age for Pakeha was 49 (S.D. = 14.6) versus 41 for Maori (S.D. = 13.9). The general sample is not only older than the students, but there is greater variability; so the schooling they would have received on history is more distant in time and more varied. The median income bracket was the same for both groups at \$20 000–\$40 000 but there was a noticeable difference in education. The median educational level for Pakeha was at least one year of tertiary study compared to schooling to 6th form (i.e. 16 years old) for Maori.

Data from the general population were collected two years after the student data. Students and members of the general population are therefore treated as separate samples for statistical analyses, but presented side-by-side, in order to better describe social representations of New Zealand history.

## Materials

Student participants completed a two-page survey on social identity and another on perceptions of history. The psychology students completed the social identity survey first, and the perception of history survey one week later. Students in the Department of Maori Studies did both surveys at one sitting, with half completing the social identity part first and the other half completing the history part first.

The social identity survey contained questions about age, ethnicity, gender, place of origin, languages used, family affiliations, and university major as well as four-item scales assessing strength of social identification with ethnicity and nationality.

General sample respondents completed the perception of history items first, followed by the social identity measures. Demographic information was obtained for the general sample from the first phase of the survey programme.

For all participants, the perception of history survey had sections that asked participants to (1) list what they considered to be the ten most important events in New Zealand/Aotearoa history, (2) rate on 7-point Likert scales (ranging from 1 = 'not likely' to 7 = 'very likely') how likely they would be to include sections on New Zealand, Australia, Polynesia, and Great Britain in the time periods AD 1000–1500, 1700–1900, and 1900 + if they were to teach history in secondary school,

(3) choose between various words with different connotations to complete sentences about events in New Zealand history, (4) use 7-point Likert scales to attribute to what extent they believed that the positive and negative effects of the Treaty of Waitangi for Maori and Pakeha were due to fairmindedness or malice on the part of the Maori and Pakeha framers of the treaty, (5) rate how well they thought Maori and Pakeha have honoured the treaty, and (6) complete a number of current events questions, among them how much money should be used to settle outstanding Maori Treaty of Waitangi claims, whether this amount should be final, and whether Maori language should be taught to all New Zealanders in school (again using 7-point Likert scales). Participants who did not complete all relevant measures for a given analysis were excluded from that analysis.

For the general sample an additional item was included from the second survey phase relating to whether New Zealanders of European ancestry should be called New Zealand Europeans, Pakeha, or something else.

## RESULTS

### Judgments of the Relevance of Different times and Places for New Zealand History


Participant ratings of the appropriateness of including various times and places for teaching New Zealand history in secondary school were analyzed using a  $4 \times 3 \times 2$  analysis of variance, treating students and general population as separate samples. Place (New Zealand, Polynesia, Great Britain, and Australia) and time (AD 1000–1500, 1700–1900, and 1900+) were within-subjects factors and participant ethnicity (Maori and Pakeha) was a between-subject factor.

As can be seen in Figure 1, participant ethnicity had a significant impact on judgments of what times and places should be included in teaching New Zealand history. Among students, we found a three-way interaction between participant ethnicity, time, and place, with Maori participants being more likely to include sections on New Zealand and other areas of Oceania prior to European arrival than Pakeha,  $F(6,630) = 3.9, p < 0.001$ . The three-way interaction was supplemented by a significant two-way interaction between ethnicity and place with Maori participants rating New Zealand and Polynesia higher than Pakeha  $F(3,315) = 10.8, p < 0.0001$ . Maori students did not rate the history of Great Britain or Australia lower than Pakeha. A two-way interaction between ethnicity and time revealed that Maori students were more likely to include the period 1000–1500 overall than Pakeha,  $F(2,210) = 10.7, p < 0.0001$ .

In the general sample, we found a slightly different pattern. There was no three-way interaction. Instead, there were significant two-way interactions between ethnicity and place  $F(3,342) = 4.79, p < 0.01$ , with Maori rating Polynesia higher than Pakeha, and time period by place  $F(6,684) = 8.96, p < 0.001$ , with the importance of Great Britain peaking during the colonial period, and the other three places increasing in importance with recency.

These patterns suggest that Maori students were more interested in earlier periods than the other three groups. Supporting hypothesis 1, Maori as a whole were more interested in Polynesia than Pakeha. Contrary to the second part of hypothesis 1,

### Student Sample



### General Sample




Figure 1. Importance of time and place in New Zealand history for Maori and Pakeha

however, Maori were no less interested in British history than Pakeha. In addition to these theoretically relevant findings, there were main effects for place (New Zealand rated highest overall) and time (recent times rated highest overall) for both samples.

### Free Recall of the Ten Most Important Events in New Zealand History

Our second analysis, using a more open-ended measure again revealed qualitative differences between the student and general samples (see Table 1).

Maori students were significantly more likely than Pakeha to recall at least one event prior to European arrival in their list of the ten most important events in New Zealand

Table 1. The ten most important events in New Zealand history according to Maori and Pakeha students

Maori ( <i>N</i> = 24)		Pakeha ( <i>N</i> = 87)		
1	<b>Treaty of Waitangi</b>	100 %	1 <b>Treaty of Waitangi</b>	94 %
2	<b>Land Wars</b>	71 %	2 <b>European Arrival</b>	67 %
3	Maori Declaration of Independ.	58 %	3 <b>Land Wars</b>	53 %
4	<b>European Arrival</b>	54 %	4 Women's Suffrage	49 %
5	Kupe's Arrival	50 %	5 World War I	48 %
6	<b>Maori Arrival</b>	46 %	6 World War II	47 %
7	Maori Language Revival	33 %	7 <b>Maori Arrival</b>	44 %
8	Abel Tasman's Voyage	24 %	8 European Settlement	42 %
9=	Maori Land March	21 %	9 Springbok Tour	24 %
9=	Horouta Waka Arrival	21 %	10 Great Depression	18 %
9=	Maori Resource Payoffs	21 %		

history ( $\chi^2(1) = 5.7, p < 0.05$ ). Almost half of the Pakeha students mentioned no events prior to 1642, and only one in ten named more than one event. Even among Maori, one in five nominated no events prior to European arrival. On average, Maori mentioned 1.6 events prior to European arrival, and Pakeha 0.6. The total number of events recalled overall was equal for the two groups (Mean = 7.9).

Among the general sample, Maori mentioned fewer (though not significantly fewer) events overall than Pakeha (7.24 compared to 8.29,  $F(1,128) = 2.39, p = 0.12$ ). They were no more likely than Pakeha to recall at least one pre-arrival event ( $\chi^2(1) = 0.09, p = 0.76, ns$ ). A little under half the general sample did not mention a single event prior to European arrival. The part of hypothesis 2 dealing with group differences was therefore supported only among students. The dominance of post-European arrival events was confirmed for all four groups.

Further analysis of the specific events recalled was even more interesting. Students shared higher levels of consensus in their top ten compared to the general population. For students, the Treaty of Waitangi was mentioned by over 95 per cent of both Pakeha and Maori. It was also the most commonly recalled event for the general population, but the percentages were lower.

If there is a canonical event in New Zealand history for all groups, it is the signing of the Treaty. The other events to make the top ten for all four groups were the arrival of the two ethnic groups and the Land War between them, again highlighting the centrality of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha in representations of New Zealand history.

All groups except Maori students had women's suffrage, the world wars, European settlement, and the 1981 Springbok Tour (where the nation was violently divided over whether to allow a rugby team from South Africa to tour New Zealand) in their top ten). The presence of the Springbok Tour is fascinating because while it might seem trivial to outsiders, it was traumatic for New Zealanders because it placed into conflict two cherished aspects of national identity: rugby, and belief in lack of racism.

In general, the top ten for Maori and Pakeha in the general population were similar. Maori students, however, named detailed and specific events in the Maori arrival to Aotearoa (Kupe, Horouta Waka—the ancestral canoe of the Ngati Porou, an iwi (tribe) well represented at Victoria University) as well as mentioning recent developments in the revival of Maori language and culture (the Land March,

Table 2. The ten most important events in New Zealand history according to general sample of Maori and Pakeha

Maori ( <i>N</i> = 37)		Pakeha ( <i>N</i> = 94)			
1	<b>Treaty of Waitangi</b>	54 %	1	<b>Treaty of Waitangi</b>	69 %
2	<b>The Land Wars</b>	35 %	2	World Wars	66 %
3	<b>Maori/Polynesian Arrival</b>	30 %	3	<b>Maori/Polynesian Arrival</b>	41 %
3=	<b>European Arrival</b>	30 %	4	European Arrival	40 %
3=	World Wars	30 %	5	<b>The Land Wars</b>	35 %
6	Women's Suffrage	19 %	6	Women's Suffrage	29 %
7	Colonisation	16 %	7	Arrival of James Cook	28 %
8=	Education Act passed providing free education	14 %	8	Colonisation	16 %
8=	NZ became independent state	14 %	9=	The Depression	14 %
8=	Musket Wars between Tribes	14 %	9=	1981 Springbok Tour	14 %
8=	NZ Government formed	14 %			
8=	1981 Springbok Tour	14 %			

focusing attention on confiscations of Maori land in violation of the Treaty, the language revival at the preschool level, and the resource payoffs, where the Crown is reimbursing Maori for use of such resources as fisheries as specified under the Treaty). Many of these stress unity among Maori and/or grievance against Pakeha. The students did not mention the Musket Wars (as did Maori in the general population), where tribes that acquired guns from early European contact decimated rival tribes without guns.

Our results suggest (and course syllabi corroborate) that Maori students at university spend a good deal of time in coursework discussing Maori culture and history from an ontogenic focus. By comparison, Maori in the general population share a similar representation of history with Pakeha (Table 2).

### Attributions for Good and Bad Consequences of the Treaty of Waitangi

Figure 2 shows mean ratings for positive and negative attributions for Maori and Pakeha framers of the Treaty for the two samples. For both students and the general population, we predicted and found a significant three-way interaction between participant ethnicity, treaty framer ethnicity, and attributions for malice and fairmindedness for the Treaty of Waitangi,  $F(1,104) = 36.6$ ,  $p < 0.0001$  for students,  $F(1,119) = 21.63$ ,  $p < 0.001$  for general population. In accord with hypothesis 3, Maori attributed more fairmindedness and less malice to Maori framers of the treaty than European framers compared to Pakeha, and they attributed greater malice and less fairmindedness to European framers of the treaty than Pakeha did.

However, we were surprised to find a highly significant two-way interaction between attributions of malice and fairmindedness and framer ethnicity for both samples as well,  $F(1,104) = 120.6$ ,  $p < 0.0001$  for students,  $F(1,119) = 34.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$  for general population. All participants, regardless of ethnicity, perceived European framers of the treaty to have harboured greater malice compared to Maori treaty framers. Pakeha students thought they were less fairminded as well, but Pakeha in the general populace rated fairmindedness about equal. This finding, which may or




Figure 2. Motives for good and bad effects of the Treaty of Waitangi according to Maori and Pakeha

may not signal outgroup favouritism among members of a dominant group on an important dimension of history, is revisited in subsequent sections.

*T*-tests were conducted on the within-subject differences between attributions for Maori and Pakeha motives for treaty consequences. All differences were significant at the 5 per cent level except for the fairness ratings made by Pakeha participants in the general sample.

### Honouring the Treaty of Waitangi

For students, a similar pattern was found for how well Maori and Pakeha have honoured the Treaty. As predicted, a significant two-way interaction emerged,  $F(1,106) = 32.7, p < 0.0001$ , with Maori students rating Pakeha as having honoured the treaty much less well than Maori. Pakeha students thought the difference was not so great. However, there was also an unanticipated significant main effect,  $F(1,106) = 60.3, p < 0.0001$  with both ethnic groups rating Maori as having honoured the treaty better than Pakeha (see Figure 3).

Among adults in the general population, the same interaction,  $F(1,120) = 28.81$ , was significant, as was the main effect,  $F(1,120) = 38.39$ . However, the interpretation is quite different, because *t*-tests revealed that only Maori participants thought that they had honoured the Treaty better than Pakeha,  $t(33) = 7.8, p < 0.001$ . Pakeha in the general population rated no difference in how well Maori and Pakeha have honoured the Treaty,  $t(87) = 0.75, p = 0.45$ .

### Sentence-Completion Choices

All participants read several sentences about historical events in New Zealand and were asked to choose from a list of options the words they thought best completed the sentence. The most preferred choices for each group to complete the sentences are noted using a P for Pakeha and M for Maori. The percentage of participants making this choice is also reported. Word choice options appear boldfaced within brackets




Figure 3. How well have Maori and Pakeha honoured the Treaty of Waitangi?

(with each option given to participants separated by slashes). Sentences with significant differences between groups as tested by chi-square statistic are denoted by an asterisk.

Student results are described first:

- (1) In 1769, Captain James Cook [discovered/rediscovered {P = 44 per cent}/reached {M = 86 per cent}]\* New Zealand.
- (2) Maori population in New Zealand was [2000 000 {P = 36 per cent} {M = 75 per cent}/125 000/85 000/40 000/20 000]\* prior to European arrival and changed to [200 000/125 000/85 000 {M = 43 per cent}/40 000 {P = 34 per cent}/20 000]\* by 1900.
- (3) From the 1840s to the 1860s, European [colonists {M = 70 per cent}/settlers {P = 64 per cent}]\* and Maori. [natives/people {P = 54 per cent} {M = 86 per cent}]\* fought a series of engagements known as the [Land {P = 74 per cent} {M = 82 per cent}/New Zealand/Maori]\* Wars.

The pattern of results shows significant differences between Maori and Pakeha students in how they believe historical events in New Zealand should be described. Maori students overwhelmingly preferred to describe James Cook as having 'reached' New Zealand {86 per cent} in 1769. Pakeha slightly preferred 'rediscovered' {44 per cent} to 'reached' {35 per cent}, with only 21 per cent describing him as having 'discovered' New Zealand, the term that confers most glory upon their ethnic in-group. Maori students also saw their group as larger in population than Pakeha students, but did not exaggerate the extent of their population losses relative to Pakeha students.

Maori students tended to describe Europeans as 'colonists' {70 per cent} rather than settlers, whereas nearly half of the Pakeha students described Maori as 'natives' {46 per cent} rather than as a 'people'. These word choices may be indicative of a different interpretation and understanding of events. If so, then they are mutually intersecting understandings, because there are considerable areas of consensus:



majorities in both groups referred to battles between Maori and Pakeha as the 'Land Wars' (82 per cent and 74 per cent respectively), even though 20 per cent of Pakeha used the term 'Maori Wars' while no Maori students did. Thirty years ago, the term 'Maori Wars', suggesting a Maori rebellion, would have been normative.

- (4) [British {P = 79 per cent}/Pakeha {M = 52 per cent}]\* soldiers in most of these engagements  
 [outnumbered {P = 72 per cent} {M = 53 per cent}/were outnumbered by]\*  
 Maori  
 [warriors {P = 95 per cent} {M = 91 per cent}/soldiers]. In these battles (like the Wairau  
 [massacre {P = 87 per cent}/affray {M = 63 per cent}]\*), European casualties were usually  
 [less than {P = 88 per cent} {M = 57 per cent}/greater than]\* Maori casualties.
- (5) In 1858, Te Wherowhero became the king of the Maori  
 [nation/tribes {P = 74 per cent}{M = 80 per cent}].
- (6) The Native Land Act in the 1870s allowed [European {P = 84 per cent}/Pakeha {M = 62 per cent}]\*  
 [settlers {P = 96 per cent}/squatters {M = 62 per cent}]\* to purchase land from maori individuals instead of groups.

Perhaps most fascinating is that Pakeha students preferred to identify members of their ethnic in-group during the historical period as 'Europeans' (79 per cent in (4) and 84 per cent in (6)). Maori students preferred the term 'Pakeha' (52 per cent and 62 per cent), making a stronger connection between white people of the past and the present. This finding may limit our interpretation of the previous results on Pakeha perceptions of the Treaty of Waitangi as out-group favouritism, since Pakeha students may be treating Europeans during the colonial period as historical out-group members rather than ethnic in-group members.

The sentence completions concerning the Wairau incident (4) and the Native Land Act (6) can be clearly interpreted as instances of in-group favouritism. Maori students tended to describe Wairau as an 'affray' {63 per cent} whereas Pakeha much preferred the term 'massacre' {87 per cent}. This event (1843) was the first violent clash between Maori and Pakeha following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi; it involved a disputed land purchase where a group of 50 armed British settlers were defeated by an equal number of Maori warriors. Twenty-two British and four Maori were killed. Pakeha students described European beneficiaries of the Native Land Act as 'settlers' {96 per cent} whereas Maori preferred the more derogatory term 'squatters' {62 per cent}.

There were no differences between the two groups in describing Maori as 'warriors' {95 per cent and 91 per cent} rather than 'soldiers' and Te Wherowhero as king of the Maori 'tribes' {74 per cent and 80 per cent} instead of 'nation'. These two items indicate that neither Maori nor Pakeha students perceived Maori as a nation during this period.

A majority in both groups thought that European casualties were 'less than' Maori casualties. This view was more prevalent among Pakeha {88 per cent} than Maori {57 per cent}, but the majority view may not accord well with historical records (see Belich, 1986; Butterworth, 1988). Maori casualties sustained in battle were often less than those of Europeans; however, their indirect losses (e.g. through famine, disease,

and land alienation) were much greater. Second, Maori perceived their numbers to be greater than Pakeha thought them to be, with only 53 per cent believing that Pakeha forces 'outnumbered' Maori compared to 72 per cent of Pakeha. Historians recognize the numerical superiority of British Imperial forces in almost every major engagement during the Land Wars (as much as 10–1, see Belich, 1986).

These two findings run counter to direct self-enhancement for Maori, since more heroism is conferred upon a numerically inferior group suffering fewer casualties than a numerically superior group suffering more casualties. It appears that both Maori and Pakeha students view Maori in the past as victims rather than the effective fighters they actually were: not a single individual mentioned among the ten most important events in New Zealand history Maori innovations in warfare such as the modern pa (fort) which may have held the world's first anti-artillery bunker (Belich, 1986, p. 52) and a rotating system of warriors which allowed them to field as much as one-third of their total available manpower in the North Island during the fight for Waikato in the 1860s (Belich, 1986, p. 130).

Responses among Maori and Pakeha in the general sample were more alike than for the student sample. Only three of the sentence-completion choices revealed significant differences: (1) Maori preferred to call Europeans 'colonists' {58 per cent} and Pakeha chose 'settlers' {65 per cent} just as in the student sample; (2) Maori were more likely than Pakeha {81 per cent to 60 per cent} to think that British/Pakeha soldiers outnumbered Maori warriors during the conflicts of the 1860s; and (3) Maori were more likely to refer to land purchasers as 'squatters' {14 per cent} than Pakeha {3 per cent}. Though these few differences show a tendency towards in-group favouritism, as a rule the similarities outnumbered the differences.

In the general population, both Maori and Pakeha thought James Cook 'reached' New Zealand {P: 54 per cent, M: 66 per cent}, they did not estimate Maori population loss differently, they both referred to Maori as people rather than natives {P: 64 per cent, M: 68 per cent}, as tribes rather than as a nation {P: 78 per cent, M: 82 per cent}. Both called the Wairau incident a 'massacre' {P: 67 per cent, M: 79 per cent}, and both estimated European casualties as less than Maori {P: 79 per cent, M: 74 per cent}. Like the students, both groups believed that Maori suffered greater casualties during the battles of the Land Wars {P: 79 per cent, M: 74 per cent}, but unlike the students, they recognized European numerical superiority during these engagements {P: 60 per cent M: 81 per cent}. This suggests a slightly less 'victim-like' view of Maori ability in warfare.

Most strikingly, Maori in the general population were no more likely to refer to white people in the past as 'Pakeha' than Pakeha. Eighty per cent of Maori and 79 per cent of Pakeha called the soldiers 'British' rather than 'Pakeha', and 73 per cent of Maori and 83 per cent of Pakeha called settlers 'Europeans' rather than 'Pakeha'. Comparing these figures to the student sample, it is again Maori students that are different from the other three groups.

### **Correlations between the Perception of History and Current Events**

Analyses thus far have focused on social representations of history among four groups, on what is shared among group members and different across groups rather than on individual differences. Now we turn to individual differences. To test the assertion that the perception of history should be correlated with political positions

on current events, we created several indices of the differential perception of history based on prior analyses.

As a measure of the relative importance of teaching about New Zealand prior to European arrival versus Great Britain, we subtracted the inclusion rating for Great Britain from 1000 to 1500 from that for New Zealand in the same time period. A second indicator was constructed by subtracting inclusion ratings for Great Britain from those for Polynesia over all three time periods; this provided an index of the importance of teaching the history of Polynesia over Great Britain.

As an indicator of the preponderance of pre- versus post-European events, the total number of post-European arrival events was subtracted from the number of pre-arrival events for each participant.

To obtain measures of attributional bias in historical perceptions, we subtracted ratings of how well Europeans have honoured the Treaty of Taitangi from how well Maori have honoured the treaty to obtain one index. For a second index, we subtracted ratings of how much malice Maori framers of the treaty had from how much malice European framers had and added this to the score obtained by subtracting how much fairmindedness European framers had from how much fairmindedness Maori had to create a measure of attributional bias in favour of Maori.

Finally, we added together scores of five sentence-completion items that provided clear directions for in-group favouritism after recoding all items so that a higher score indicated more support for a position in favour of the Maori: Captain Cook's reaching versus discovery of New Zealand, European colonists versus settlers, the Land versus Maori Wars, the Wairau affray versus massacre, and Pakeha squatters versus settlers, forming a single indicator of word choices.

These six indicators of historical perceptions were then correlated with positions on two current political events: (1) whether monetary settlements by the Crown for Treaty of Waitangi violations against the Maori should be final (i.e. no further compensation), and (2) whether the Maori language should be taught to all New Zealanders in school. We did not use the amount of money for settling Treaty of Waitangi claims because a majority of participants could not put a dollar figure to settling the claims. Both of these issues are controversial in New Zealand as a whole and among our sample: the modal scores for both variables were at the ends of the response scales (i.e. 'definitely not' and 'definitely yes'; see Liu and Latane, 1998, for research on the relationship between political issue importance and extremity, and the significance of bimodal distributions in social attitudes). For this reason, the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution of the two dependent variables were compared with zero using the *z*-distribution. These were tested using the conventional alpha level of 0.01 suggested by Tabachnik and Fidell (1996) and found to be high but non-significant.

As can be seen in Table 3, the patterns of correlations are similar for both samples. For both samples, most of the historical perceptions were significantly correlated with positions on the two current political issues involving Maori and Pakeha: those participants who rated Maori and Polynesian history as more important to New Zealand history than Great Britain, who rated Maori as more fairminded and less malicious than Europeans and better at honouring the Treaty of Waitangi also tended to support teaching Maori in schools and be against a final settlement of Maori Treaty claims against the Crown. For the general sample only, the difference between pre- and post-1600 events was not significantly correlated to positions on current political

Table 3. Correlations of historical perceptions with positions on current political issues

	Student sample			General sample		
	Settlements being final	Teaching Maori in schools	<i>N</i>	Settlements being final	Teaching Maori in schools	<i>N</i>
Settlements being final	1.00	−0.43	109	1.00	−0.43	123
Teaching Maori in schools	−0.43**	1.00	109	−0.42**	1.00	123
Pre/post-European event differential	−0.21*	0.19*	109	−0.11ns	0.07ns	125
Maori vs European honouring of Treaty	−0.63**	0.53**	108	−0.51**	0.48**	121
Maori vs European treaty attributions	−0.40**	0.39**	106	−0.30**	0.30**	120
Teaching NZ vs GB history 1000–1500	−0.33**	0.22*	107	−0.21**	0.33**	120
Teaching Polynesian vs GB history	−0.41**	0.28*	106	−0.32**	0.30**	116
Sentence-completion choices	−0.38**	0.21*	96	−0.32**	0.33**	80
Respondent ethnicity (1 = Eur, 2 = Maori)	−0.58**	0.27*	109	−0.46**	0.36**	125

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

issues. As none of the independent variables were correlated at greater than 0.60, multi-collinearity was not deemed to be a problem and regressions were performed. The sentence-completion choices were dropped because substantially fewer participants completed all the items in this section, and its inclusion therefore would have reduced the power of the analyses.

Regression equations with final settlement of treaty claims or teaching Maori language as the dependent variable and the five remaining indicators of historical perceptions as independent variables were highly significant for both the student sample ( $F(5,98) = 21.7, p < 0.0001, r^2_{\text{adjusted}} = 0.50$  and  $F(5,98) = 9.1, p < 0.001, r^2_{\text{adjusted}} = 0.28$  respectively) and the general sample ( $F(5,102) = 10.8, p < 0.0001, r^2_{\text{adjusted}} = 0.31$  for final settlement and  $F(5,102) = 10.9, p < 0.0001, r^2_{\text{adjusted}} = 0.32$  for teaching Maori in schools). By far the most important predictor variable in all four equations was the perception of how well Maori have honoured the Treaty of Waitangi compared to Pakeha. Among students, the measure of the relative importance of teaching of Polynesia versus Great Britain also made a statistically significant contribution to the final settlement issue. For the general sample, the only other significant variable was preference for the teaching of New Zealand history over British history for predicting Maori language in schools.

These results held true after entering participant ethnicity as a predictor variable (Table 4 shows the standardized beta weights); ethnicity made a significant independent contribution to the final settlement issue, but not the language issue for students, and in neither case did the *R*-squared or adjusted *R*-squared increase significantly. Ethnicity was a significant predictor of both treaty settlements being final and teaching Maori language in schools among the general sample. Honouring the Treaty and ethnicity were the two main predictors of policy preferences in all four regression equations. In none of the four equations, however, did the standardized beta weights for ethnicity exceed those for honouring the Treaty. Hypothesis 5 was fully supported.

#### **Discriminant Analyses of Preference for the Labels 'NZ European' versus 'Pakeha'**

A final, supplementary analysis refers only to the general population. Among Pakeha, 23 per cent of the sample preferred the term 'Pakeha' as a self-descriptor, 43 per cent preferred 'New Zealand European', while the remaining 34 per cent preferred neither. Among Maori, 60 per cent preferred 'Pakeha', 17 per cent preferred 'New Zealand European', and 23 per cent preferred neither.

The six history variables were entered in two stepwise discriminant analyses to assess which variables are the best predictors of whether Pakeha or Maori general sample respondents prefer the terms 'Pakeha', 'NZ European', or 'something else' to describe New Zealanders of European ancestry. Both analyses produced a strongly significant first discriminant function explaining 76 per cent and 89 per cent of variance for Pakeha ( $\chi^2(10) = 23.47, p < 0.01$ ) and Maori ( $\chi^2(8) = 23.09, p < 0.01$ ) respectively. Additionally both analyses correctly predicted preference significantly better than chance on any criteria available (Predicted<sub>Pakeha</sub> = 64 per cent, Press's  $Q = 66.46, p < 0.01$ , Predicted<sub>Maori</sub> = 93 per cent, Press's  $Q = 97.2, p < 0.01$ ).

The discriminant functions obtained were quite different for the two ethnic groups, with only the word index being a satisfactory predictor of preferences for the three labels among Pakeha (discriminant loading =  $-0.41$ ); the other historical indices

Table 4. Multiple regression analyses with historical perceptions and ethnicity prediction positions on current political issues

	Student sample		General sample	
	Settlements being final	Teaching Maori in schools	Settlements being final	Teaching Maori in schools
Pre/post-Euro arrival event difference	-0.09ns	0.07ns	-0.13ns	0.10ns
Maori vs European honouring of Treaty	- <b>0.42**</b>	<b>0.40**</b>	- <b>0.36**</b>	<b>0.32*</b>
Maori vs European Treaty attributions	0.12ns	0.07ns	-0.07ns	0.15ns
Teaching NZ vs GB history 1000-1500	-0.09ns	0.08ns	-0.10ns	<b>0.33*</b>
Teaching Polynesian vs GB history	-0.14	0.09ns	-0.00ns	-0.13ns
Ethnicity	- <b>0.40**</b>	0.04ns	- <b>0.28**</b>	<b>0.21*</b>
<i>F</i> -value	(6,97) = 25.3**	(6,97) = 7.5**	(6,101) = 11.4**	(6,101) = 10.3*
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> adjusted	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>0.34</b>
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> adjusted (without ethnicity)	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>0.31</b>	<b>0.32</b>
<i>F</i> -value (without ethnicity)	(5,98) = 21.7**	(5,98) = 9.1**	(5,102) = 10.8**	(5,102) = 10.9*

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , *B*'s are standardized beta weights.

were significant contributors, but weak with loadings around 0.30. Examination of group centroids on the discriminant function showed for Pakeha subjects that as their word index scores favoured their ethnic in-group, they increasingly preferred 'NZ European' as a self-descriptor. The interpretation for Maori subjects is more complex. It indicates that preference for the label 'Pakeha' is associated with increased emphasis on NZ history pre-arrival and perception of Maori honouring the Treaty better than Pakeha together with more negative attributions regarding Pakeha framers of the Treaty compared to Maori. This suggests that while Pakeha concerns about labelling centre around considerations of language, Maori choices for labels centre around perceptions of grievances.

Given that the criteria for conducting discriminant analysis were only narrowly supported (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1995), and that the sample size is such that we were unable to include separate analyses of holdout samples these interpretations should be taken as only suggestive of the relationships between perceptions of history and naming practices.

## DISCUSSION

To understand the social context for intergroup relations provided by historical perceptions in Aotearoa/New Zealand, we begin with the areas of agreement between Maori and Pakeha. There were four consensus events that were named among the ten most important in New Zealand history by all groups surveyed. These were the arrival of the Maori, the arrival of the Europeans, the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the Land Wars between them. All these events concern Maori–Pakeha relations, so there can be little doubt what groupings in New Zealand society have been most important historically.

The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 stands above all other events in New Zealand history. No other event comes close to the level of consensus as to its importance: over 90 per cent of Maori and Pakeha students and a majority among both groups in the general population nominated it. There may not be another country in the world where a century-and-a-half-old treaty, conceived as a partnership between indigenous peoples and Europeans, would retain its status as the foundation of the nation's sovereignty and its key historical event.

Given the consensus as to its importance, and the three articles in the Treaty that define not only status relations but resource allocations between the two groups, it is striking that only Maori, the subordinate ethnic group in New Zealand, displayed in-group favouritism in making judgments about behaviour with respect to the Treaty. All groups surveyed, including two samples of Pakeha, rated Maori as having significantly less malice in their motives regarding the Treaty. Pakeha students also rated Maori as having honoured the Treaty better than Pakeha, and having more fairmindedness in their motives. Pakeha in the general sample showed no difference in ratings of fairmindedness and honouring the Treaty. Among Maori, there was no question that their ancestors were more honourable, less malicious, and more fairminded about the Treaty than Pakeha. These evaluations have real implications: the New Zealand government has already settled two major claims under recommendations by the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal for around \$400 million NZ.



These data suggest that historical context may provide limits to laboratory work such as that of Reichl (1997) and others, which shows that subordinate groups do not show in-group favouritism on status-related dimensions. They point to a need for more temporally contingent theory. Taylor & McKirnan (1984) proposed a five-stage model, for example, where the 'competitive' stage of intergroup relations is associated with the idea among the subordinate group that their 'disadvantaged position in the *past* is attributed to the dominant group, while the hope for the *future* lies with controllable internal characteristics, exercised on a collective or group level' (p. 299). Seen in this light, aspects of historical perception among Maori students that appeared to emphasize self-verification more than self-enhancement (e.g. down-playing fighting ability) can be viewed as part of an overall strategy for empowerment (see Vaughan, 1978, for changes in New Zealand in a previous generation).

The result of this drive for empowerment has significant implications for social dominant theory (SDT) as well. The basic premise of SDT is that all societies are composed of groups arranged in a hierarchical order. But it does not specify the degree of hierarchy (or inequality) in a given arrangement, nor has it stated clearly how to detect or when to expect the degree of hierarchy to increase or decrease. The candidate suggested by our research is to examine the extent to which representations of history are hegemonic, emancipated, or polemical. Indicators from the present research suggest that a hegemonic representation of history as produced by colonial power is on the wane in New Zealand. The situation is much more disputed now. If history is part of a 'legitimizing myth' to justify the unequal division of value in society, then New Zealand is one society where this legitimacy is being actively challenged. It will be interesting for SD theorists to examine whether the revisioning of history is generally implicated in transitions of dominance relations in society.

Comparisons of university students, who will be among the intellectual and economic elites of the future, versus the older and more age-varied adults in the general sample are suggestive of changes that have taken place in New Zealand society. Any history taught in school to older Maori would have been largely from a European perspective. Thus, for the more open-ended measures (the word-completion choices and the free recall of important events), their answers tended to differ little from Pakeha in the general sample. The educational environment for Maori in the university sample is quite different. Many of them, as is the trend nationwide, are learning Maori language and culture as the focus of their degree work. As a consequence, their survey responses differed strikingly from all other groups in three respects: (1) their interest in teaching/learning about earlier periods of all places, especially Aotearoa, (2) their choices for the ten most important events in New Zealand history, which included many events specific to Maori development, and (3) their sentence-completion choices, which showed aspects of not only ethnic in-group favouritism but also a tendency to identify New Zealand Europeans of the colonial era with the same label as present-day New Zealanders.

This representation is both emancipated from and polemical to that of Pakeha students. The patterns of means in Pakeha students' opinions about historical behaviour regarding the Treaty are the same as those of Maori, but they are less extreme in their judgments. Like Maori students, they view Maori of the nineteenth century as victims more than as effective fighters. However, Pakeha/European students named the colonizers 'British' or 'European' rather than 'Pakeha'. This may represent either an attempt to distance themselves from the signs of the past

(e.g. British and Europeans committed the crimes, we are innocent) or a mere linguistic convention (e.g. we don't like the label 'Pakeha'). Only further research will provide answers to this question.

As Moscovici (1961) has shown, there can be a movement of ideas from intellectual circles into the general population; Awatere's 1984 book on *Maori sovereignty* could easily be analysed in such a manner for its impact on New Zealand. But just how far the idea of past injustices will be able to move from universities to the general population is an open question. Maori students' representations are largely polemical to those held by Pakeha in the general population, many of whom reject the very label 'Pakeha' because they are uncomfortable with the position this label gives them relative to Maori.

This leads us to perhaps the most important implication that can be drawn from the present research. While social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) has focused on psychological reactions to a dissatisfying social identity for minority or subordinate groups, our research suggests that under particular circumstances, investigation into majority or dominant group reactions may be just as fruitful. In SIT terms, the representation of history may affect and reflect the perceived legitimacy and stability of social relations in society, and this has implications for the majority or dominant group as much as the minority or subordinate group.

Typically, it is the subordinate or stigmatized group that attempts to change its name. In the United States, African American, Negro, and Black have all been used to describe Americans of African origins; homosexual, gay, and queer have been used to refer to men who prefer partners of the same sex. But in Aotearoa/New Zealand, it is New Zealanders of European descent who want a change of label, from Pakeha to something else. And it is their preferences on a sentence-completion test rather than any evaluation of how well the Treaty has been honoured that best predicts whether they want this name change. Whether the reasons for a name change stem from discomfort with a label in a 'foreign language', a desire to avoid negative associations with the past, or a need for a more meaningful self-ascription cannot be determined at present. This issue should be a fruitful area for future research, not only in New Zealand, but in other parts of the world where minorities are asserting themselves in an effective way politically.

New Zealand has important choices to make in the near future regarding ethnic issues. Our data documented that historical perceptions will be part of these choices. We found that historical perceptions of how well Maori have honoured the Treaty of Waitangi compared to Pakeha was the single best predictor of attitudes towards final settlement of claims and teaching Maori language in schools, even considering the effects of participant ethnicity. Cutting across ethnicity, the perception of history may be a useful source of information to determine cooperation and competition between ethnic groups in a bicultural or multicultural nation. Indeed it may be the key to determining the 'entitativity' of ethnic and national groups.

The cross-sectional data presented here are valuable, but they cannot assess the more dynamical and longitudinal aspects of historical perceptions. Ontogenic focus, or developing a 'charter', is a creative activity. Groups may rework a narrative of history to bind different people together, making a theory of group unity (see Medin, 1989; Liu, 1994, unpublished manuscript; Liu and Liu, 1997). The form of a 'unification story' incorporates elements of the stories of disparate groups and binds them together in a form that reconciles the past and provides an agenda for the future. Such

a story has been emerging among Maori in New Zealand, containing elements of the old—the arrival of the canoes and the fight against the Pakeha—together with elements of the new—the revival of Maori culture and language, reduced emphasis on tribal conflict, and the struggle to regain resources—in a way that reinforces a superordinate ethnic identity, and differentiates this identity from the national identity. Whether this story is capable of sustaining unity for Maori in the future and what response it will engage among Pakeha remains to be seen. We look forward to surveying the situation again in 5–10 years. Such longitudinal data would enable a more stringent test of a model such as Taylor and McKirnan's (1984). Cross-cultural data, on the other hand, would help to determine whether the results reported here are idiographic, or more representative of a general 'stage' in intergroup relations. The perception of history is an important component to deriving a social science of *transitions*.

Compared to the more volatile historical interpretations dominant in the former Yugoslavia or the Middle East or the backlash against multiculturalism in the US (Bloom, 1987), the accommodative nature of 'race' relations in New Zealand is clear. However, what New Zealand Pakeha are willing to provide may fall short of what New Zealand Maori believe is just: Maori have criticized the fiscal envelope as insufficient and been reluctant to endorse the concept of a 'final settlement' (Durie and Asher, 1995). But it is entirely realistic to conceive of New Zealand schools teaching widely about Maori history prior to European arrival, just as it is not difficult to conceive of historical texts that are appropriate for both groups. In a dynamical system, the process of social change is neither linear nor inevitable (Gleick, 1987; Vallacher and Nowak, 1994). As the content of social identities change, they produce non-linear changes in patterns of interpersonal ties and changes in material conditions (Liu and Allen, 1999; Liu, Bonzon-Liu & Pierce-Guarino, 1997; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif 1961), which feed back into social identities. The interaction of these elements is important in producing cultural change, and the pattern of feedback can develop into anomaly. So this new scientific paradigm can be used to demonstrate what historians believed for some time: that crucial social processes may be idiographic, and an understanding of anomaly may augment and increase our knowledge of generalities.

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