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History and Identity: A System of Checks and Balances for Aotearoa/New Zealand

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What is social identity? From a psychological perspective, it is that aspect of people's self-image that relates to their membership in groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al, 1987). Unlike individual aspects of identity, group or social identities are known only in the contexts of relationships with others, particularly other groups. Social identity involves knowing what groups one belongs to, and this requires an understanding of what groups one does *not* belong to; in other words, every group identity involves a dynamic process of inclusion and exclusion. Social identities can be thought of as a repertoire of claims to belonging relevant to the different situations that one encounters. At different times and in different social environments, people become aware of themselves as identifying with and acting as men and not women, or as New Zealanders and not Australians, or as Europeans and not Maori, or as teachers and not students. Some of these identities, like gender, are acquired very early and can be visualised through personal role models like parents. Others, like ethnicity and nationality, are more abstract and require a good deal more work to produce and maintain.

Benedict Anderson (1991) coined the term 'imagined political community' to describe the fact that it is impossible to know every member of even the smallest ethnic or national group, and yet members are able to articulate with consensus an understanding of the group as a whole. Anderson argues that national identities are relatively recent innovations made possible by the mass production of vernacular languages in print media. The idea of citizenship in a community of equals bounded by territory, language and social conventions requires inventions as newspapers, maps, museums and public education to generate the shared knowledge necessary to maintain societal cohesion without recourse to feudal bonds of loyalty, obligation and inherited status. Newspapers in particular gave the middle class information about what was going on in the nation previously available only to political and economic elites through their social networks.

Modern large-scale identities are socially constructed out of shared representations ('imaginings') of knowledge about a group, transmitted and reproduced by society and its institutions, in the context of relationships with relevant outsiders. To understand New Zealand identity, therefore, is to grasp

the dynamic interplay between two factors: the shared knowledge on which it is based, and the comparative context or divisions in the social environment that define who is in and who is out of the group. Nationality is not the only means for organising society: competing formulations based on class, religion, marketplace or ethnicity offer alternative boundaries. These layers of identities define the shifting centre and multiple margins of New Zealand society.

Social representations of New Zealand history

Because the concept of a nation is a recent invention that draws its legitimacy from claims of antiquity, social (or shared) representations of history are a crucial ingredient in the knowledge structures necessary to produce societal cohesion (Liu and Hilton, in press). In an increasingly secular world, nationhood is one of the few ideas or institutional structures that people are willing to die for. Anything worth dying for must grant some form of immortality or symbolic continuity. Yet most nations do not claim divine origins, even though the rhetoric of nationhood is often charged with religious significance (see Morris, this volume). Hence, states must work to produce a group narrative about history that enables their members to believe that they belong to something greater than themselves that will continue after they are dead and gone. If a state is to maintain itself, it must justify the continuity of its traditions. But because it is often impossible to pinpoint the beginning of a nation, and history is variable in its interpretation, nationalities can revise their views of the past with an eye towards the future (see Byrnes, this volume). History is configured as not just a chronology of events, but as a narrative, with meaning as a graspable whole (Wertsch, 2002). Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins (1999) have argued that history is a story about the making of an in-group. The way the events of history are put together and interpreted creates meaningful positions for people in a narrative connecting past, present and future.

New Zealand has a particularly interesting history that can be configured as narrative in at least two ways. While the events are more or less the same, the psychological meaning of New Zealand history can be grasped from a bicultural perspective or from a liberal democratic perspective. The implications of the two for present-day politics and for visioning the future are at times quite distinct and at odds with one another, and at other times fit like the pieces of the puzzle that complete one other. The goal of this chapter is to offer an analysis of where there is intractable conflict and where there is synergy between the two narratives, and then apply this to the current political situation in New Zealand.

A social representation (Moscovici, 1984) of the events of New Zealand history has been mapped out in survey research by Liu et al (1999). They asked adults in a general sample and university students from Maori Studies and Psychology an open-ended question to name the most important events in

New Zealand history. Results revealed that both Maori (indigenous people) and Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans named the arrival of Maori, the arrival of Europeans, the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and the subsequent Land Wars between them among the ten most important events (see Table 1). These events form the core materials for a bicultural narrative of New Zealand, where the nation emerges as a partnership between Maori and the Crown (representing Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans and other groups) through the tribulations of history. These events were nominated by Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans as much as Maori, showing consensus with respect to the *nation*'s history. The most powerful symbol of biculturalism is the Treaty of Waitangi, named as the most important event in New Zealand history by all groups (see Orange, 2004). This account casts Maori and Pakeha, indigenous peoples and Europeans, as the main actors in the national story.

Table 1. Ten most important events in New Zealand history according to Maori and Pakeha students

	Maori (N=24)			Pakeha (N=87)	
1.	**Treaty of Waitangi**	100%	1.	**Treaty of Waitangi**	94%
2.	**Land Wars**	71%	2.	**European Arrival**	67%
3.	Maori Declaration of Independ.	58%	3.	**Land Wars**	53%
4.	**European Arrival**	54%	4.	Women's Suffrage	49%
5.	Kupe's Arrival	50%	5.	World War I	48%
6.	**Maori Arrival**	46%	6.	World War II	47%
7.	Maori Language Revival	33%	7.	**Maori Arrival**	44%
8.	Abel Tasman's Voyage	24%	8.	European Settlement	42%
9.	Maori Land March	21%	9.	Springbok Tour	24%
10.	Horouta Waka Arrival	21%	10.	Great Depression	18%
11.	Maori Resource Payoffs	21%			

Table 2. Ten most important events in New Zealand history according to general sample of Maori and Pakeha

	Maori (N=37)			Pakeha (N=94)	
1.	**Treaty of Waitangi**	54%	1.	**Treaty of Waitangi**	69%
2.	**The Land Wars**	35%	2.	World Wars	66%
3.	**Maori/Polynesian Arrival**	30%	3.	**Maori/Polynesian Arrival**	41%
4.	**European Arrival**	30%	4.	**European Arrival**	40%
5.	World Wars	30%	5.	**The Land Wars**	35%
6.	Women's Suffrage	19%	6.	Women's Suffrage	29%
7.	Colonisation	16%	7.	Arrival of James Cook	28%
8.	Education Act passed providing free education	14%	8.	Colonisation	16%
			9.	The Depression	14%
9.	NZ became independent state	14%	10.	1981 Springbok Tour	14%
10.	Musket Wars between tribes	14%			
11.	NZ government formed	14%			
12.	1981 Springbok Tour	14%			

However, this is not the only meaningful story that configures these events. A second narrative relates New Zealand to Great Britain and the United States, and concerns the emergence of liberal democracy. By liberal democracy, I am referring to an inclusive form of democracy guided by the ideals of freedom and equality, operating within an open society with a free market economy, governed by an elected government under rule by law (see Fukuyama, 1992; Popper, 1962; Rokeach, 1961). Here, the story begins not with New Zealand, but in Great Britain, with a special interest in events happening in Britain during the colonial period. In this story, we are more aware that the Treaty of Waitangi was signed partly because a liberal government was in place in London in 1840. With respect to New Zealand history, the signal events are the arrival of Europeans, the signing of the Treaty, the colonisation of New Zealand (including the Land Wars), the formation of its government, the granting of women's suffrage and the World Wars (see Table 1). Its most potent symbol is ANZAC Day, celebrating the triumph and sacrifice of the far-flung forces of the British Empire (ANZAC stands for Australian and New Zealand army corps) against more authoritarian forms of governance.

Compared to a generation ago (see Pearson, this volume), considerably greater effort is now devoted to public work on New Zealand identities: in addition to the central events of Waitangi Day and ANZAC Day, a flowering of the arts (see Teaiwa and Mallon, this volume) and cultural festivals of every shape and form mark an increasingly rich symbolic landscape that begs for overall meaning.

As a whole, the events narrated by the two accounts share significant overlap (see Liu et al, 2005, about the generality of this phenomenon). However, there are significant differences between the events nominated by Maori students (mainly enrolled in Maori Studies) compared with those of the other groups (Table 1, top left-hand side). They named events central to the liberal democratic narrative only as they related to a history of Maori, and included events relevant to Maori history, such as the Maori declaration of independence and the Maori cultural renaissance. This illustrates that social representations of history are produced and transmitted by institutions (Moscovici, 1984); the mission of Maori Studies is to produce a history of, by and for Maori, whereas the other three groups surveyed were educated by Pakeha/New Zealand European-dominated institutions whose history is mainly configured as a liberal democratic narrative, with elements of the bicultural. Recent general histories of New Zealand reflect a national climate where the institutions of governance are based on liberal democratic ideals with special allowance for biculturalism and the relationship between Maori and the Crown (see Belich, 1996; King, 2003).

These are not always comfortable bedfellows, as seen in Figure 1. According to both Maori and Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans, what is consensually regarded as the foundational event in the nation's history, the signing of

Treaty of Waitangi, has been better honoured by Maori than Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans. Maori perceive a huge difference, Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans a slight but significant difference. Such out-group favouritism on the part of a dominant group, whose symbols generally occupy the centre of the national ideology and bolster their claims for legitimacy of governance, is unusual. Psychological theories of group identity (e.g., Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) claim that in-group favouritism (seeing one's own group as superior) is a driving force behind social comparisons between groups. Wherever possible, groups tend to be ethnocentric in their perceptions, and where this is not possible it is usually because a group occupies a lower status position in an established social hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Hence, Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans' acknowledgement of the historical injustices of colonisation should be understood as an important part of the national psyche.

Fig. 1. How well have Maori and Pakeha honoured the Treaty of Waitangi?



The Treaty of Waitangi is a pivotal event for both the bicultural and liberal democratic narratives about New Zealand. But the meaning of the Treaty for the nation today differs according to the narrative that is chosen to configure it.

A Liberal Democratic Narrative

From the perspective of liberal democracy, the Treaty functions as a symbol of social (in)justice, calling the nation to account for failures to live up to its own ideals. It is ironic that during the great era of Liberalism in New Zealand from 1890-1911 (see King, 2003, pp. 259-83), huge gains for Pakeha/ New Zealand Europeans in such areas as economic prosperity and universal suffrage often excluded or came at the expense of Maori. At the turn of the nineteenth century, there were two separate, parallel and increasingly unequal New Zealands

lurking beneath the promise of justice for all. Figure 1 shows that both Maori and Pakeha today acknowledge these historical injustices. One of the great features of liberal democracy is that it accepts that the struggle for social justice is a part of democratic traditions (see Huntington, 1981; Barclay, this volume). Disenfranchised groups from women to ethnic minorities have had to fight for their rights to achieve the dream of democracy for all. It is generally understood that sometimes the *principles* of democracy are not carried out in practice, and in this case it is the right of the people to engage in protest, from civil disobedience to outright rebellion (see Walker, 2004).

Thomas Jefferson stated this famously in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence of the United States: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government . . . '.

From this perspective, the struggle of Maori against the legacy of colonisation is not simply the struggle of one indigenous people against colonial injustice, but is representative of a continuing quest for social justice and democratic ideals. Signal events such as the march on and occupation of Bastion Point in the 1970s, or opposition to the Springbok tour in 1981, can be framed within a liberal democratic narrative as part of a general struggle for civil rights. It is no coincidence that the civil rights movement for ethnic and racial minorities burst into national prominence in both New Zealand and the United States during the Vietnam War. Opposition to one form of injustice (e.g., an unpopular war abroad) energised a more broad-based support for protest against other forms of injustice (racism back home). As Bobby Kennedy said in South Africa in 1966, with an eye to the civil rights movement back in his home in the United States, 'It is from numberless acts of courage and belief that human history is shaped. Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope. And crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring those ripples build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance'. It is possible that in the future the Treaty will be used to call liberal democracy to account for issues of social justice regarding all New Zealanders; much will depend on the causes that Maori align themselves to given their special status under the Treaty: will they be devoted solely to their own well-being and self-determination, or will they address issues of social justice more generally?

The extent to which all New Zealanders are aware of historical injustice in their country is impressive. However, there is a strict limit to Pakeha/

New Zealand European support for Maori claims to redress from a liberal democratic perspective: this is that past injustices should not create new injustices by allocating preferences to individuals on the basis of group membership (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). Equality under the law, one law for all New Zealanders, are catch phrases used by both political elites and the general public to capture the idea that categorical privileges should not be extended to one group because this would discriminate against other groups. Recent survey research by Sibley and Liu (2004), for example, found almost 100% support among New Zealand European/Pakeha for statements such as 'I feel that although Maori have had it rough in past years, they should still be treated the same as everyone else', 'No one group should be given privileges on the basis of ethnic or racial background', and 'It is racist to give one ethnic group special privileges, even if they are a minority'.

Figure 2. Regression slopes for the correlations between SDO and NZ European/Pakeha support for biculturalism in principle and resource-specific biculturalism.



There is significant debate in the literature over whether such statements can be considered as a masked form of racism variously referred to through related concepts as modern racism, aversive racism, symbolic racism or discourses of racism (e.g., Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; see McCreanor, this volume). That is, egalitarian statements are used to hide negative affect against minorities, and/or justify discriminatory action. The theoretical positions on this are varied, but Sibley and Liu (2004)

found that opposition to what they called resource-based biculturalism (i.e., a scale consisting of items like those listed above) was unrelated to social dominance orientation (SDO) (see the flat line in Figure 2). SDO measures general support for or opposition to group-based equality, and is strongly predictive of many forms of prejudice, like racism, sexism and ethnocentrism (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). This lack of relationship with SDO indicates that opposition to resource-based biculturalism is not simply hidden racism, but contains genuine concern that categorical preferences for Maori could lead to new injustices or reverse discrimination.

However, whether or not the intent is racist, other research (Nairn and McCreanor, 1990, 1991) has demonstrated that liberal democratic narratives can be easily adapted into a form called the 'standard story' (McCreanor, this volume) to render claims to indigenous rights as illegitimate. It does this by portraying colonisation as a thing of the past, and Maori who claim indigenous rights as an unreasonable minority that threaten egalitarian norms. From this perspective, liberal democracy can tolerate diversity, but this cannot amount to ethnic rights; and the Treaty, while important historically, is an anachronism in the multicultural society of today.

A Bicultural Narrative

The Treaty of Waitangi has become far more than a symbol of social (in)justice, however. In recent years, it has been interpreted by the judiciary as a living document, representing the nation as founded on a covenant or partnership between Maori and the Crown. As seen in Figure 2, while there is almost universal opposition to resource-based biculturalism among New Zealand Europeans/Pakeha, there is considerable support for biculturalism in principle. This was indexed by such items as 'New Zealand should be known and seen as a bicultural society, reflecting an equal partnership between Maori and Pakeha', and 'The New Zealand national anthem should be sung in both Maori and English'. So while Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans are opposed to category-based allocations in favour of Maori, they also allow for the idea that the emblems of biculturalism should represent New Zealand as a whole.

This accommodation can be seen in many of the symbols of statehood for New Zealand. These include official ceremonies of greeting, emblems in the passport, the singing of the national anthem (in both Maori and English), the enshrining of a giant Treaty as the centrepiece of the national museum, the educational curriculum, the charter of state universities and the celebration of Waitangi Day as a national holiday. Most visitors to New Zealand walk under a visible symbol of biculturalism for the first time almost as soon as they set foot on New Zealand soil, as they pass under a carved Maori gate prior to customs at Auckland airport.

Unlike resource-based biculturalism, opposition to biculturalism in principle is correlated strongly and positively to social dominance orientation.

This suggests that opposition to the symbols of biculturalism is associated with negative affect or prejudice against Maori. Michael King (2003) articulates the delicate tension between support for biculturalism in principle and opposition to resource-based biculturalism in the resolution of his history of New Zealand: 'The assumption that most Pakeha grew up with was that their culture was strong enough and pervasive enough to persist . . . They imagined that the special measures taken as a Treaty obligation to protect and strengthen *Maori* language and culture were necessary because of their vulnerability, and that such measures would not in any way threaten the viability of Pakeha culture. Then a series of events, none of them directly related, appeared to suggest that the former imbalance was being corrected by the creation of another imbalance' (pp. 516-17). King argues that Pakeha 'did not want to see anything taken *away* from Maori, just to ensure that the measures of protection and respect extended from the one culture to embrace *both* cultures: to see the wahi tapu of significance to Pakeha, such as Frank Sargeson's grave, given as much protection as wahi tapu of significance to Maori; and to have the history and experience of Pakeha New Zealanders valued by the country as a whole, and by its institutions, as much as those of Maori. They were asking, in other words, for what might be called a "mutuality of respect" . . . Pakeha felt that they ought not be viewed by Maori as tau iwi or aliens, representatives of a colonising power that merely stole material and cultural resources from Maori and gave nothing in return' (p. 518).

Psychological theories of social identity are in agreement with this historian's eye view that Maori and Pakeha are mutually constituted in one another's gaze. However, psychological reactions to the intimate but problematic relationship between the two groups are more complicated than King's formulation.

The very word Maori means 'ordinary'. In a context prior to the arrival of Europeans, it had few of the connotations it carries today; consciousness of Maori as a people was forged through the crucible of colonisation and continues to be realised in relation to Pakeha and New Zealand identity (see McIntosh, this volume). In the absence of Pakeha, traditional identities of iwi (tribe) and hapu (sub-tribe) have been and continue to be among the most important group identities for Maori (see Ballara, 1998). Unlike in most countries, however, the identity of the majority group in New Zealand has also been forged and continues to be realised in interaction with indigenous people. The careful reader will note the practice in this chapter of labelling the majority group in New Zealand as Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans. This is because our research (Liu, 1999) has shown that there is no consensus among the majority as to what should be the appropriate label for their own group. A plurality (about 40-50 per cent, depending on the sample) preferred the term New Zealand European, but only because they thought it was 'the best of a bad lot'; these persons often stated (erroneously) that Pakeha was a derogatory term meaning 'white rabbit' or 'white pig' (see Bayard, 1995,

for a debunking of such myths). A smaller proportion (20-35 per cent) called themselves Pakeha, claiming that this was an indigenous term emphasising the historical relationship with Maori (for a powerful statement of this position, see Ritchie, 1992). Finally, some (15-35 per cent) refused any ethnic labels and referred to themselves as 'New Zealanders' or 'just kiwis'. It is interesting to note that Maori, Pacific or Asian New Zealanders in these samples never made similar claims; it is only the majority group that seeks the prerogative and has the power to go ethnically unmarked. Recent work by Devos and Banaji (2005) in the United States, for example, shows that Americans implicitly and automatically bring white people to mind when primed to think about the symbols of statehood. Liz Hurley, a white British woman, was perceived to be 'more American' than Lucy Liu, an Asian American.

Most majority group members in New Zealand prefer to identify themselves at either the level of the individual or at the level of nationality (see also Bell, 1996). In stark contrast to King's formulation, most Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans in our surveys were unclear about what Pakeha identity was; more than 60 per cent of Maori answered in the affirmative to the question 'Is there such a thing as Pakeha identity?', compared to 35 per cent of Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans (see Figure 3). When asked to provide concrete examples of Maori and Pakeha culture, Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans were able to name far more and more meaningful terms for Maori, being limited by their own imagination to such things as barbeques and horse races for Pakeha culture.

Figure 3. Is there such a thing as 'Pakeha identity'?



Our data revealed that Maori prefer the label Pakeha for New Zealanders of European descent far more than Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans themselves. Because Maori prefer the term, they also use it in frequently in laying out their historical grievances against the Crown. Hence, Maori public discourse often contains a litany of grievances against 'Pakeha', leading to the belief among many New Zealanders of European descent that the term itself is derogatory. The irony is that New Zealanders who self-identify as Pakeha are the best allies Maori have. In our surveys, 'Pakeha' New Zealanders were in favour of allocating more funds to the settlement of Treaty claims, settling such claims promptly and keeping the Treaty in any new national constitution, and they took on more personal responsibility for past injustices compared to those who self-identified as either 'New Zealand European' or 'Kiwi/New Zealander'. They are that substantial minority of New Zealanders of European descent who see their relationship with Maori as an important aspect of their own identity. Not coincidentally, these people were also lower on social dominance orientation and authoritarian personality (two dispositional predictors of prejudice), and higher in education. New Zealand European was far more preferred by recent immigrants compared to multi-generational residents (who more often preferred Pakeha). This could be interpreted to provide some support for King's (1999) idea of 'Pakeha' as a term marking a 'second indigenous people' of New Zealand. Whatever the psychological validity of such a claim, this marks a controversial political position in that it takes a form of legitimacy for the majority that could be interpreted as diluting the status of Maori as indigenous people and changing the meaning of indigeneity.

For the most part, those who self-identified as 'New Zealand European' or 'Kiwi/New Zealander' were very similar in their attitudes towards bicultural issues except that kiwis were more in favour of teaching Maori language to all New Zealanders, perhaps signifying their acceptance of that aspect of Maori culture as a national heritage.

Hence, while it is irrefutable that Maori and Pakeha are two social categories that are intimately related, psychologically some people want to distance themselves from this relationship and others embrace it. Internal to the nation, the 'burden of history' appears to be too much to bear for some New Zealanders of European descent.

However, internationally, biculturalism in principle (i.e., symbolic biculturalism) is an important component of *positive distinctiveness* for New Zealand identity. As noted previously, people understand and make sense of their in-group identities (like nationality and ethnicity) through a process of social comparison with other groups. People are motivated to compare themselves favourably to relevant out-groups, striving for superiority in such domains as sporting competitions, power or national wealth. In an internal context, Pakeha/New Zealand Europeans may compare unfavourably to Maori regarding fulfilment of Treaty of Waitangi obligations, but in an international

context, they compare favourably with Australians or Americans whose treatment of their indigenous peoples was far more brutal. In an international context, the 'clean green' physical environment and the partnership between Maori and Pakeha are the two most salient ways that New Zealanders can claim positive distinctiveness in comparison with other nationalities. The recent film *The Lord of the Rings*, which established a reputation for New Zealand as 'Middle Earth', capitalised on both these elements by displaying the beautiful physical environment of New Zealand in the context of a story about the free peoples of Middle Earth fighting against tyranny. The combination of physical beauty with the perception of a civil society with harmonious race relations is a powerful international marketing device (see Capie and McGhie, this volume). However, the representation of the 'free people' of Middle Earth as fair-skinned and the almost invariable casting of Maori and Pacific extras in the movie as orcs or other forces of darkness show the limitations of this British import as a metaphor for actual race relations in New Zealand.

Hence, different contexts produce different dynamics in terms of who is included and who is excluded, and what the salient boundaries are for distinguishing between the in-group and the out-group. In its most important international contexts, including comparisons with Australia, the South Pacific, Great Britain and the United States, New Zealanders can be justifiably proud about their record of race relations. However, biculturalism in principle does not come without costs. Sometimes, New Zealand race relations look prettier from the outside than from the inside, with disputes over resources pitting Maori vs. Pakeha or iwi vs. iwi and urban vs. rural Maori (see Levine, this volume).

Summary and Political Integration

Two basic narratives, a liberal democratic and a bicultural narrative, are used to configure or make sense of the history of New Zealand. Moreover, these are used as political doctrines to mobilise public opinion and argue about what paths to take in the future (see Liu, Huang and Sibley, 2004). On some levels, these two narratives are compatible, because biculturalism can be treated as a special case for the struggle for civil rights, and it contains emblems and symbols that can be embraced by all New Zealanders as meaningful aspects of national identity. On other levels, particularly when it comes to the distribution and management of resources, there appears to be serious conflict between the imperatives of liberal democracy, which emphasise individual merit and equal opportunity in the present, and biculturalism, which emphasises past injustices and intergroup relations. Very different computations of what is just and fair can be arrived at depending on whether individual and group histories are taken into account versus whether only individual merit relevant to the task at hand is considered. The framing of biculturalism as providing categorical advantages for Maori at the expense of other New Zealanders versus being

a correction of past injustices revolves around differences of interpretation about the relevance of the past versus the present, and the group versus the individual.

While there are two narratives that configure New Zealand history as a whole, separate systems of governance for Maori are found predominantly in local contexts (Hill and O'Malley, 2000). Hence, the differences of interpretation at the national level have been argued about and conceptualised in a legalistic manner characteristic of British common law. Even in this limited context, the differences are important because New Zealand does not have a formal constitution (for advantages and disadvantages of such an approach, see Barclay, this volume), but rather statutory and legal precedents, among the most important of which are cases surrounding the Treaty of Waitangi (Byrnes, this volume). As any 'living document' subject to judiciary interpretation, the principles of the Treaty are not easy to define precisely; in fact, for about half its lifetime, the Treaty was considered null and void, and even today, it must be written into law to have impact. Nevertheless, Douglas Graham (1997, pp. 22-25), the Minister for Treaty Negotiations for the landmark Tainui and Ngai Tahu settlements in the 1990s, offers a useful definition paraphrased below:

(1) The Crown (or government) is empowered to govern and make laws for the whole of New Zealand.
(2) Maori have the right to exercise self-management, or a degree of autonomy under the law to maintain Maori culture and to control their resources.
(3) Maori are entitled to equality before the law.
(4) The Treaty is a living document that takes into account factual circumstances relevant to Treaty interpretation.
(5) The Treaty involves the honour of the Crown, and signifies a relationship like a partnership based on good faith and reasonable cooperation. The relationship implies a broad and generous spirit that takes into account cultural difference and requires the Crown to protect and promote Maori culture.
(6) There is a duty to consult with Maori where government policy may affect special Maori interests. Either party has the right to seek redress in case of breach.

While there would be considerable debate about most if not all of Graham's items, they provide a useful starting point for discussion; Barclay (this volume) argues that such discussion is critical for democratic justice. The first two items state categorical limits to Maori aspirations for sovereignty. The Bolger government Graham represented was as progressive in dealing with Treaty issues as any in New Zealand history, but their formulation claims that ultimate sovereignty lies with the elected government of New Zealand (rather than Maori tribes, for example). The second and third items justify this by guaranteeing Maori a degree of autonomy while including them within

the protection of law afforded to all New Zealanders. Item 4 positions the Treaty within the Westminster system of governance where legal documents are subject to interpretation by the judiciary. These are fundamental building blocks for biculturalism as contained within a liberal democratic framework of elected governance and procedural equality before the law.

It places New Zealand in line with countries like Belgium (with French- and Dutch-speaking citizens), Switzerland (German-, French- and Italian-speaking citizens), and Canada (English, French and, to a lesser extent, Native American citizens) that take culture and group membership into account in attempting to build an inclusive society. These countries have evolved democratic systems where certain issues are not decided by the principle of one person, one vote, but rather through a process of consultation involving representatives of historically important cultural groups. For instance, though German-speaking Swiss are a majority, they cannot pass legislation regarding language issues for Switzerland without a mandate from the Italian- and French-speaking parts of the country.

Even the United States, whose basic principle is 'liberty and justice for all' (i.e., no categorical differences by law) has an historically evolved democratic system that deviates significantly from the ideal of one person, one vote. This is that the smaller states are over-represented in one of the branches of national government (the Senate), and hence representatives of these states must be treated with a respect beyond what their sheer numbers should imply under majority rules.

All of these adjustments are realistic and reveal historically practical ways by which various peoples have dealt with one of the principle weaknesses of liberal democracy: the potential for the tyranny of the majority. Americans in small states like Rhode Island and Connecticut would have refused to join any union wherein a simple majority was used to make every political decision because they wanted to protect significant aspects of their regional culture and group interests. However, outside of the regional concession to the states, and its elaborate system of checks and balances, the American constitution generally deals with the problem of the tyranny of the majority by allowing groups to engage in culture-specific practices without interference (or support) from the nation. Effectively, the strategy is to ignore group-based differences, emphasise the national identity and eventually assimilate minority groups into the mainstream.

Item 5 in Graham's list offers a different solution to the problem, the idea of a partnership between Maori and the Crown. It articulates what may be referred to as the 'principle of non-assimilable difference'. This asserts that the government of New Zealand acknowledges that its sovereignty is built around the basic right of its indigenous people to practice, maintain and promote their distinctive culture. Maori culture is not only to be tolerated without interference, but is to be celebrated as an aspect of national culture. It

should not be the target of assimilation (Ward and Lin, this volume). This is an extremely important principle that goes beyond simple tolerance of difference (usually made easier by spatial segregation) into working out a relationship between groups. This relationship seems to be developing smoothly at the symbolic level of national identity, and it functions well at the interpersonal level in daily life. Where it encounters the most difficulty is in the resolution of historical grievances, the distribution of resources and the managing of consents (item 6).

New Zealand is almost unique in that its 'principle of non-assimilable difference' is not spatially organised; Maori and non-Maori in the main do not occupy different blocks of the country. In the other Western nations mentioned previously, ethnic minorities are a majority within a region, and hence it is possible to accommodate differences without building privileges for particular ethnic groups into the law; each group is a cultural majority in its own territory and administers it according to custom under the overall umbrella of the state. This lack of spatial segregation poses a difficult challenge because those aspects of biculturalism that touch on resource distribution are often perceived as providing a categorical advantage to Maori at the expense of other New Zealanders. But it also provides an opportunity because it reduces segregation and the building of separate and unequal regions like shantytowns and ghettos.

Prospects for the Future, Advice from the Heart

I would like to close this chapter by offering some personal advice on prospects for the future. While it is entirely appropriate to describe the past and present from the stance of a dispassionate observer, future gazing is an art best suited to full disclosure as to the nature of the person gazing into the crystal ball.

Shortly after I was naturalised as a New Zealand citizen in 1997, I was invited to a friend's place to watch the All Blacks play the Wallabies. When they heard that I'd become a citizen, my friends congratulated me by saying 'You're a kiwi now!' to which I replied, 'No, I'm a Chinese-American-New Zealander'. I have told this story many times and had plenty of laughs out of it, but the statement expresses an important part of my self. As a social scientist, I fully realise that a majority group's claim to the national identity is far stronger than a minority's. Although I may be more of a kiwi than in 1997, this does not describe me as well as Chinese-American-New Zealander. This hyphenated term depicts me at the margins of three nationalities, and my strength flows from my ability to walk between worlds (see Ip and Pang, this volume; also Borell, this volume).

My choice of career as a culture-oriented psychologist owes much to my interaction with Maori (Liu and Liu, 1999, for details). As a boy growing up in the Midwest of the United States, I'd been desperate to assimilate, but found the going hard. My experiences with Maori and knowledge of their struggle

to keep their culture alive made me realise that my own identity as a Chinese might be worth preserving as well. For me, the invisible strands that connect Maori to one another in this land are an incredible treasure that I would like to see grow in health and fitness. They have been an inspiration to me.

I should also acknowledge that I have seen as much sickness as health in these relationships. For Maori, observation of such damage done must act as a daily reminder of the effects of colonisation and as a spur to enter grievance mode. My advice to them is to temper these feelings with an acknowledgement that, despite its flaws, the ideals of liberal democracy still provide fertile grounds for the establishment of indigenous rights (see, for example, Kymlicka, 1995). The suppression of indigenous peoples in other systems of governance (e.g., communism, authoritarianism, theocracy) has if anything been even more severe.

My brief encounters with Maori tribal politics have led me to question what place they may have in the running of a modern, multi-ethnic state. Chinese intellectuals have since the beginning of the twentieth century (the May 4th movement) accepted democracy as a more benevolent and effective form of government compared to their own, more autocratic and relational traditions (Liu and Liu, 2003). Traditional forms of governance have problems with transparency, as corruption becomes a part of life when the rules of the game are defined by social relations/group membership and not by law. As Maori tribes become increasingly vested with money, and stalk the New Zealand landscape as corporations, they may find the accountability and transparency demanded of public institutions in a liberal democracy to be a useful counterweight to the demands of tribal politics.

Public acknowledgement of such utility would help to bring the term 'Pakeha' back from disrepute. Like it or not, Maori and Pakeha are joined at the hip, and associating 'Pakeha' with nothing but grievances will not foster the development of a future relationship. Unlike most indigenous people, Maori hold the key to a secure national identity for all New Zealanders. This is a most precious gift to be keeping, and it should be held as a sacred trust.

While I was fascinated by Maori culture immediately, mainstream New Zealand culture has taken longer to grow on me. When I first arrived I felt like New Zealand was just a phase shift away from America, alike and not alike in ways difficult to articulate. Perhaps this lack of overt distinctiveness has contributed to what some have called a cultural cringe. Australians are like Americans, open and gregarious, whereas New Zealanders have more of a British sense of reserve. Over time, what I have come to appreciate most about Pakeha New Zealanders is their simple decency. Honesty (though not forthrightness), modesty and fairness are qualities I have come to expect from Pakeha. They are not a bad set of values to have, and ones I would like my children to have.

My advice to Pakeha would be not to shrink from the gaze of others who

seek to define you. It is a rare majority group member who gets to see him or herself in the light of a less powerful group's gaze. The humility that brings, combined with a confidence in one's own fortitude, will go a long way in dealing with the difficult points of the relationship with Maori (see Ritchie, 1992, for a primer on this). A good partner is someone who acknowledges when he has done wrong, and but also stands up for what he believes is right.

This Chinese-American-New Zealander feels more comfortable moving between these two poles than he did in America, where there is just one group at the centre (see Devos & Banaji, 2005). In New Zealand, I have very rarely experienced unthinking prejudice from the majority group, and I think this is because of their historical relationship with Maori. Everyone should be marginal sometimes; no one should be marginal all the time. These two things together are good because they define a shifting centre for the soul. Any ideology at the centre of a system of power relations, including liberalism and biculturalism, can be used to justify inequality and to defend privilege; every ideological system builds its own centre and creates margins (Barclay, this volume). The goal of an inclusive society is to ensure that not every dimension of society maps onto a single centre full of wealth and privilege, with dark shadows of the impoverished and voiceless surrounding it. Biculturalism does create possibilities of new privileges (see Borell, this volume), but this is a different centre with different margins than those created by liberalism and the legacy of colonisation.

Biculturalism creates alternate centres for New Zealand society located on maraes and rivers and mountaintops, and these draw energy into spheres of cultural rather than economic creation. This is not idle work; in this coming age of globe-spanning corporate powers, it behoves a nation to know what things it holds sacred and what things it cannot afford to compromise. Maori have been persistent in refusing to reduce all things to a single metric, in the currency of money or ideology; this can be a source of immense strength in the coming century when corporate giants will seek to exploit nations to their own ends (see, for example, Kelsey, 1995). But the future of Maori in the national consciousness of New Zealand may be very much influenced by the extent to which new migrants (see Zodgekar, this volume; Ward and Lin, this volume) have access to these alternative spaces and learn to treasure them; such aspects of citizenship education are relevant to us all.

I stand optimistic about the future of New Zealand. It has no natural enemies and sufficient natural resources (Frame et al, this volume). It has been afforded a marvellous set of cultural tools to build a more inclusive society. With a liberal democratic narrative and system of governance as its base, and a bicultural narrative and select institutions acting as a critic and conscience of society, generating cultural awareness, its prospects are abundant.

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