

Cultural Aspects of Identity Construction and Their Consequences in Social Reality

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Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View, MacMillan, London 1974



Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View, MacMillan, London 1974



p.34:

Extremely crudely, one might say that the liberal takes men as they are and applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation.

Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View, MacMillan, London 1974



p.34:

The reformist, seeing and deploring that not all men's wants are given equal weight by the political system, also relates their interests to what they want or prefer, but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways - in the form of deflected, submerged or concealed wants and preferences.

Steven Lukes. Power: A Radical View, MacMillan, London 1974



p.34:

The radical, however, maintains that men's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice.

▶ “one-dimensional”





► “one-dimensional”



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- ▶ “one-dimensional”
- ▶ Herbert Marcuse
(1898-1979)



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One-dimensional Man (1964)



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- ▶ The core question of radical theory:



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One-dimensional Man (1964)

- ▶ The core question of radical theory:

Who can say what are men’s “real” interests? On what authority?



How do we understand human nature in general?



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How do we understand human nature in general?



René Descartes (1596-1650)


How do we understand human nature in general?



René Descartes (1596-1650)

- ▶ res cogitans
- ▶ res extensa


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→ We participate in reality,
but are not essentially in it.



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...another possible approach



...another possible approach
using the concept of “significant existence”



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
- ▶ the concept of *event* in Icelandic sagas: *nothing happened*
- ▶ Sidney Shoemaker “Time Without Change” (1969)
- ▶ significant existence: such existence that participates in a chain of cause and effect
- ▶ semiotics: *meaning* comes into being during the *reception* of a message




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
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
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
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
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←all languages, and humans by proxy, conceptualise the world in the same way



Descartes: Letter to Mersenne, 20 November 1629



Descartes: Letter to Mersenne, 20 November 1629



If someone were to explain correctly what are the simple ideas in the human imagination out of which all human thoughts are compounded, and if his explanation were generally received, I would dare hope for a universal language very easy to learn, to speak and to write. The greatest advantage of such a language would be the assistance it would give to men's judgement, representing matters so clearly that it would be almost impossible to go wrong.

we assume that concepts essentially
belong to such categories as names,
properties, actions


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we come to see reality as a space
filled with objects that have properties
and perform actions






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natural sentences seem to express the dyadic form of logical propositions that consist of a subject and a predicate



All of this is widespread,
but not universal.

object-oriented and event-oriented languages



object-oriented and
event-oriented
languages



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object-oriented and
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languages

“Shibuyayuki wa
tôchaku des.”



object-oriented and
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languages

thematic structure of
the logical phrase

OL: “A is B”

EL: “as far as A is
concerned, B applies”

“I am a teacher.”



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“I am tempura.”



object-oriented and
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languages
contextuality of
personal pronouns
- politeness systems




object-oriented and
event-oriented
languages

contextuality of
personal pronouns

- politeness systems
- relational kinship
terms





Piet Mondrian
(1872-1944)



Wassili Kandinski
(1866-1944)

immortal soul and illusory self



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immortal soul and illusory self



immortal soul and illusory self

► no-self



immortal soul and illusory self



- ▶ no-self
- ▶ practical application



immortal soul and illusory self



- ▶ no-self
- ▶ practical application
- ▶ Zhuangzi



immortal soul and illusory self



- ▶ no-self
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embedded selfhood?

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- ▶ Hamaguchi Eshun:
kanjin vs *kojin*



embedded selfhood?

- ▶ Hamaguchi Eshun: *kanjin* vs *kojin*
- ▶ Nishida Kitarô: the logic of *place*



embeddedness



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embeddedness



► group

embeddedness



- ▶ group
- ▶ hierarchy

embeddedness



- ▶ group
- ▶ hierarchy
- ▶ inner and outer circle

embeddedness



- ▶ group
- ▶ hierarchy
- ▶ inner and outer circle
- ▶ recontextualisation

embeddedness



Is it possible for an embedded self to have artificially created needs?

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Does this cancel the core question of radical theory or make it more radical?

Thank you for your attention!